vagueness challenge in Louisiana

1991Indeed, the regulated enterprise may have the ability to clarify the meaning of the regulation by its *739 own inquiry, or by resort to an administrative process....' Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982).

1991Indeed, the regulated enterprise may have the ability to clarify the meaning of the regulation by its *739 own inquiry, or by resort to an administrative process....' Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982).

2023United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 , 95 S.Ct. 710 , 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975); State v. Boyd, 97-0579 (La. 4/14/98), 710 So.2d 1074 .

2023United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 , 95 S.Ct. 710 , 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975); State v. Boyd, 97-0579 (La. 4/14/98), 710 So.2d 1074 .

2015In State v. Passman, [ 391 So.2d 1140 (La.1980) ], this court interpreted the phrase “any duty lawfully required” to mean that before a public officer or employee can be charged with malfeasance in office, there must be a statute or provision of law which imposes an affirmative duty ■ upon him.

2011In State v. Passman, supra, this court interpreted the phrase “any duty lawfully required” to mean that before a public officer or employee can be charged with malfeasance in office, there must be a statute or provision of law which imposes an affirmative duty upon him.

2015This is not the first case in which courts have been tasked with interpreting the meaning and scope of the phrase “any duty lawfully required.” In rejecting a vagueness challenge to LSA-R.S. 14:134, the court in State v. Perret, 563 So.2d 459 (La.App. 1 Cir.1990), noted that the language has a well-defined and readily understandable meaning: Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1968) defines “lawful,” “lawfully,” and “unlawful” as follows: (1) “Lawful” means “constituted, authorized, or established by law: rightful.” (2) “Lawfully” means “in a. lawful manner.” (3) “Unlawful” means “no

2015This is not the first case in which courts have been tasked with interpreting the meaning and scope of the phrase “any duty lawfully required.” In rejecting a vagueness challenge to LSA-R.S. 14:134, the court in State v. Perret, 563 So.2d 459 (La.App. 1 Cir.1990), noted that the language has a well-defined and readily understandable meaning: Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1968) defines “lawful,” “lawfully,” and “unlawful” as follows: (1) “Lawful” means “constituted, authorized, or established by law: rightful.” (2) “Lawfully” means “in a. lawful manner.” (3) “Unlawful” means “no

2012Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 , 108 S.Ct. 1853, 1857-58 , 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 , 96 S.Ct. 316, 319 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975).

2012Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 , 108 S.Ct. 1853, 1857-58 , 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 , 96 S.Ct. 316, 319 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975).

1995There are two prongs of a vagueness analysis: first, a challenged provision must give "actual notice" of what activities are criminalized sufficient to allow a reasonable person to distinguish legitimate from criminal activity; and second, that same provision should "establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1859 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983), quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974).

1995There are two prongs of a vagueness analysis: first, a challenged provision must give "actual notice" of what activities are criminalized sufficient to allow a reasonable person to distinguish legitimate from criminal activity; and second, that same provision should "establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1859 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983), quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974).

2023Emps., 431 So.2d 752 , wherein this Court rejected a vagueness challenge to an Ethics Code violation when this Court found the challenged terms were defined in the Ethics Code; and, Med Exp.

2023Emps., 431 So.2d 752 , wherein this Court rejected a vagueness challenge to an Ethics Code violation when this Court found the challenged terms were defined in the Ethics Code; and, Med Exp.

2023They cannot, under the guise of interpretation, assume legislative function.” Id., 94 So.2d at 448 (citation omitted). 41 41 Compare cases in which this Court rejected a vagueness challenge: Glazer v. Comm’n on Ethics for Pub.

2023Ambulance Serv., Inc., 684 So.2d 359 , wherein a vagueness challenge to Evangeline Parish Code Art.

2023Ambulance Serv., Inc., 684 So.2d 359 , wherein a vagueness challenge to Evangeline Parish Code Art.

2023A court should therefore examine the complainant’s conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law.[30] Additionally, this Court, in State v. Hair, 00-2694, p. 5 (La. 5/15/01), 784 So.2d 1269, 1273 , addressed a vagueness challenge and held in pertinent part: It is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand.

2023See United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975); State v. Hair, 00-2694 (La. 5/15/01), 784 So. 2d 1269, 1273 .

2023United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 , 95 S.Ct. 710 , 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975); State v. Boyd, 97-0579 (La. 4/14/98), 710 So.2d 1074 .

2020Gibbs, 38,184, p. 6, 870 So.2d at 1115 .

1995See also State v. Barthelemy, 545 So.2d 531, 532-533 (La.1989); State v. David, 468 So.2d 1126, 1128-1129 (La.1984), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1130 , 106 S.Ct. 1998 , 90 L.Ed.2d 678 (1985).

1995See also State v. Barthelemy, 545 So.2d 531, 532-533 (La.1989); State v. David, 468 So.2d 1126, 1128-1129 (La.1984), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1130 , 106 S.Ct. 1998 , 90 L.Ed.2d 678 (1985).

1995See also State v. Barthelemy, 545 So.2d 531, 532-533 (La.1989); State v. David, 468 So.2d 1126, 1128-1129 (La.1984), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1130 , 106 S.Ct. 1998 , 90 L.Ed.2d 678 (1985).

1985The statute "must give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); for "no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed." United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. 808, 812 , 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954).

1985The statute "must give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); for "no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed." United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. 808, 812 , 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954).