vagueness challenge in South Carolina

2025Of equal importance, there is evidence in this case that the ordinance was "enforced in a discriminatory manner or with the aim of inhibiting unpopular speech." Cf. Hoffman Ests., 455 U.S. at 503 (rejecting a vagueness challenge in part because there seemed to be a minimal danger of arbitrary enforcement of the ordinance in question given the lack of evidence tending to show law enforcement had applied the ordinance in a discriminatory manner or with the goal of stifling unpopular speech); Colten, 407 U.S. at 109–110 (noting that because the law at issue was applied in a content-neutral manner

2007See Village of Hoffman Est, 455 U.S. 489, 498-499 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982) (stating criminal statutes, in general, face a higher vagueness standard than do civil statutes because the consequences of imprecision in the latter are qualitatively less severe).

2023Legislation is not overturned unless the law has no rational relationship to any legitimate interest of government." (cleaned up)); Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2245–46 (holding that "a State's regulation of abortion is not a sex-based classification [in violation of the Equal Protection Clause] and is thus not subject to the 'heightened scrutiny' that applies to such classifications"); State v. Wright, 349 S.C. 310, 313 , 563 S.E.2d 311, 312 (2002) (finding equal protection is not implicated when a law "realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances

2023Legislation is not overturned unless the law has no rational relationship to any legitimate interest of government." (cleaned up)); Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2245–46 (holding that "a State's regulation of abortion is not a sex-based classification [in violation of the Equal Protection Clause] and is thus not subject to the 'heightened scrutiny' that applies to such classifications"); State v. Wright, 349 S.C. 310, 313 , 563 S.E.2d 311, 312 (2002) (finding equal protection is not implicated when a law "realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances

2025See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 ; Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974) (explaining that because people's behavior is typically "not mapped out in advance on the basis of statutory language," the more meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice but, instead, the requirement that the legislature establish guidelines to limit the discretion of law enforcement).

2025A person disagreeing with the content of the speech is likely to conclude that the speech constitutes 'unreasonable' noise."; noting that "[f]ederal courts have held similar statutes or ordinances unconstitutional[ly vague]" (collecting cases)); Marks, 500 P.2d at 646 ("[T]he ordinance now before this court [criminalizing making "unreasonable noise"] raises the spectre of all of these abuses: it prohibits conduct which is protected by the United States and Alaska constitutions, it fails to give adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited, and it gives enforcement officials excessive discreti

2025Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000); City of Beaufort v. Baker, 315 S.C. 146, 152 , 432 S.E.2d 470 , 473–74 (1993) (quoting State v. Albert, 257 S.C. 131, 134 , 184 S.E.2d 605 , 606–07 (1971)).

2012Hill, 530 U.S. at 732 , 120 S.Ct. 2480 .

2025A. Looking first at the term "annoy," the United States Supreme Court has previously applied the vagueness doctrine to strike down statutes that tied criminal culpability to whether the defendant's conduct was "annoying." See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948); Carolina Youth Action Project v. Wilson, 60 F.4th 770, 787 (4th Cir. 2023).

2025A. Looking first at the term "annoy," the United States Supreme Court has previously applied the vagueness doctrine to strike down statutes that tied criminal culpability to whether the defendant's conduct was "annoying." See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948); Carolina Youth Action Project v. Wilson, 60 F.4th 770, 787 (4th Cir. 2023).

2025Cf. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 317 (1951) ("The police officers made no effort to interfere with petitioner's speech, but were first concerned with the effect of the crowd on both pedestrian and vehicular traffic."); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574 . vague statute was applied by law enforcement).

2025I address that requirement separately below. 14 Cf. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 517 (1948) ("When do [emotions such as 'hatred' or 'hostility'] arise?

2025See Chimento, 401 S.C. at 535 , 737 S.E.2d at 839 ("One whose conduct clearly falls within the statutory prescription does not have standing to raise a void-for-vagueness challenge.").

2025See Chimento, 401 S.C. at 535 , 737 S.E.2d at 839 ("One whose conduct clearly falls within the statutory prescription does not have standing to raise a void-for-vagueness challenge.").

2025A. Looking first at the term "annoy," the United States Supreme Court has previously applied the vagueness doctrine to strike down statutes that tied criminal culpability to whether the defendant's conduct was "annoying." See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948); Carolina Youth Action Project v. Wilson, 60 F.4th 770, 787 (4th Cir. 2023).

2025A. Looking first at the term "annoy," the United States Supreme Court has previously applied the vagueness doctrine to strike down statutes that tied criminal culpability to whether the defendant's conduct was "annoying." See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948); Carolina Youth Action Project v. Wilson, 60 F.4th 770, 787 (4th Cir. 2023).

2025The term "annoy" requires law enforcement or a trier of fact to make a wholly subjective judgment given that "[c]onduct that annoys some people does not annoy others." Coates, 402 U.S. at 614 .

2025A person disagreeing with the content of the speech is likely to conclude that the speech constitutes 'unreasonable' noise."; noting that "[f]ederal courts have held similar statutes or ordinances unconstitutional[ly vague]" (collecting cases)); Marks, 500 P.2d at 646 ("[T]he ordinance now before this court [criminalizing making "unreasonable noise"] raises the spectre of all of these abuses: it prohibits conduct which is protected by the United States and Alaska constitutions, it fails to give adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited, and it gives enforcement officials excessive discreti

2025See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 ; Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974) (explaining that because people's behavior is typically "not mapped out in advance on the basis of statutory language," the more meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice but, instead, the requirement that the legislature establish guidelines to limit the discretion of law enforcement).

2025See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 ; Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974) (explaining that because people's behavior is typically "not mapped out in advance on the basis of statutory language," the more meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice but, instead, the requirement that the legislature establish guidelines to limit the discretion of law enforcement).

2023Legislation is not overturned unless the law has no rational relationship to any legitimate interest of government." (cleaned up)); Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2245–46 (holding that "a State's regulation of abortion is not a sex-based classification [in violation of the Equal Protection Clause] and is thus not subject to the 'heightened scrutiny' that applies to such classifications"); State v. Wright, 349 S.C. 310, 313 , 563 S.E.2d 311, 312 (2002) (finding equal protection is not implicated when a law "realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances

2023Legislation is not overturned unless the law has no rational relationship to any legitimate interest of government." (cleaned up)); Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2245–46 (holding that "a State's regulation of abortion is not a sex-based classification [in violation of the Equal Protection Clause] and is thus not subject to the 'heightened scrutiny' that applies to such classifications"); State v. Wright, 349 S.C. 310, 313 , 563 S.E.2d 311, 312 (2002) (finding equal protection is not implicated when a law "realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances

2023Legislation is not overturned unless the law has no rational relationship to any legitimate interest of government." (cleaned up)); Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2245–46 (holding that "a State's regulation of abortion is not a sex-based classification [in violation of the Equal Protection Clause] and is thus not subject to the 'heightened scrutiny' that applies to such classifications"); State v. Wright, 349 S.C. 310, 313 , 563 S.E.2d 311, 312 (2002) (finding equal protection is not implicated when a law "realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances

2023Legislation is not overturned unless the law has no rational relationship to any legitimate interest of government." (cleaned up)); Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2245–46 (holding that "a State's regulation of abortion is not a sex-based classification [in violation of the Equal Protection Clause] and is thus not subject to the 'heightened scrutiny' that applies to such classifications"); State v. Wright, 349 S.C. 310, 313 , 563 S.E.2d 311, 312 (2002) (finding equal protection is not implicated when a law "realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances

2009See Kurschner v. City of Camden Planning Comm'n, 376 S.C. 165, 171 , 656 S.E.2d 346, 350 (2008) ("Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty or property interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution."); Guinyard v. State, 260 S.C. 220, 226 , 195 S.E.2d 392, 394 (1973) ("The concept of vagueness or indefiniteness rests on the constitutional principle that procedural due process requires fair notice and proper standards for adjudication.

2009See Kurschner v. City of Camden Planning Comm'n, 376 S.C. 165, 171 , 656 S.E.2d 346, 350 (2008) ("Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty or property interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution."); Guinyard v. State, 260 S.C. 220, 226 , 195 S.E.2d 392, 394 (1973) ("The concept of vagueness or indefiniteness rests on the constitutional principle that procedural due process requires fair notice and proper standards for adjudication.

2009See Kurschner v. City of Camden Planning Comm'n, 376 S.C. 165, 171 , 656 S.E.2d 346, 350 (2008) ("Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty or property interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution."); Guinyard v. State, 260 S.C. 220, 226 , 195 S.E.2d 392, 394 (1973) ("The concept of vagueness or indefiniteness rests on the constitutional principle that procedural due process requires fair notice and proper standards for adjudication.

2009See Kurschner v. City of Camden Planning Comm'n, 376 S.C. 165, 171 , 656 S.E.2d 346, 350 (2008) ("Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty or property interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution."); Guinyard v. State, 260 S.C. 220, 226 , 195 S.E.2d 392, 394 (1973) ("The concept of vagueness or indefiniteness rests on the constitutional principle that procedural due process requires fair notice and proper standards for adjudication.