116 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1978–2026 15 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Pickeringgreen2 sentences2001In the absence of an official statement that a permit was required for a roof repair, the defendant argues that he was not fully warned as to what conduct was required or forbidden. “[T]o surmount a vagueness challenge, a statute must afford a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is permitted or prohibited.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Erzen, 29 Conn. App. 591, 593 , 617 A.2d 177 (1992); see also State v. Pickering, 180 Conn. 54, 60 , 428 A.2d 322 (1980); State v. Jones, 29 Conn. App. 683, 687 , 617 A.2d 918 (1992). 2001In the absence of an official statement that a permit was required for a roof repair, the defendant argues that he was not fully warned as to what conduct was required or forbidden. “[T]o surmount a vagueness challenge, a statute must afford a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is permitted or prohibited.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Erzen, 29 Conn. App. 591, 593 , 617 A.2d 177 (1992); see also State v. Pickering, 180 Conn. 54, 60 , 428 A.2d 322 (1980); State v. Jones, 29 Conn. App. 683, 687 , 617 A.2d 918 (1992). | 3 | 8 |
State v. Schrivergreen2 sentences2002(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kolender v. Lawson , [ 461 U.S. 352 , 357-58 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)]; State v. Schriver , [ 207 Conn. 456 , 460 , 542 A.2d 686 (1988).] Thus, [i]n order to surmount a vagueness challenge, a statute . . . must not impermissibly [delegate] basic policy matters to policemen, judges (emphasis added), and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. 2002(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kolender v. Lawson , [ 461 U.S. 352 , 357-58 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)]; State v. Schriver , [ 207 Conn. 456 , 460 , 542 A.2d 686 (1988).] Thus, [i]n order to surmount a vagueness challenge, a statute . . . must not impermissibly [delegate] basic policy matters to policemen, judges (emphasis added), and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. | 2 | 7 |
United States v. Davisgreen2 sentences2021The defendant also claims that, even if §§ 53a-60b (a) (1) and 1-1f (b) are sufficiently clear to give notice to a person of ordinary intelligence of what conduct is prohibited, they are unconstitutionally vague because they confer ‘‘unfettered discretion [on police officers], prosecutors, judges and juries to determine which vic- tims [are] physically disabled ‘enough’ to warrant enhanced criminal liability . . . .’’ See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, supra, 461 U.S. 358 (‘‘[T]he more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine— 2021The defendant also claims that, even if §§ 53a-60b (a) (1) and 1-1f (b) are sufficiently clear to give notice to a person of ordinary intelligence of what conduct is prohibited, they are unconstitutionally vague because they confer ‘‘unfettered discretion [on police officers], prosecutors, judges and juries to determine which vic- tims [are] physically disabled ‘enough’ to warrant enhanced criminal liability . . . .’’ See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, supra, 461 U.S. 358 (‘‘[T]he more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine— | 2 | 2 |
| Grayned v. City of Rockfordgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegelgreen | 2 | 2 |
Packer v. Board of Educationgreen2 sentences2021Indeed, this court has previously explained that ‘‘[t]he void for vagueness doctrine is a procedural due process concept that origi- nally was derived from the guarantees of due process contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution.’’ Packer v. Board of Edu- cation, 246 Conn. 89, 98 , 717 A.2d 117 (1998). 2021Indeed, this court has previously explained that ‘‘[t]he void for vagueness doctrine is a procedural due process concept that origi- nally was derived from the guarantees of due process contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution.’’ Packer v. Board of Edu- cation, 246 Conn. 89, 98 , 717 A.2d 117 (1998). | 1 | 5 |
Smith v. Goguengreen2 sentences1997In such cases, perhaps the most meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine — the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.” Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 , 94 S. Ct. 1242 , 39 L. 1997In such cases, perhaps the most meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine — the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.” Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 , 94 S. Ct. 1242 , 39 L. | 1 | 5 |
State Management Ass'n of Connecticut, Inc. v. O'Neillgreen2 sentences2019Civil enactments like the zoning regulation at issue in the present case "must be definite in their meaning and application, but may survive a vagueness challenge by a lesser degree of specificity than in criminal statutes." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 757 , 529 A.2d 1276 . 2019Civil enactments like the zoning regulation at issue in the present case "must be definite in their meaning and application, but may survive a vagueness challenge by a lesser degree of specificity than in criminal statutes." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 757 , 529 A.2d 1276 . | 1 | 4 |
State v. Salamongreen2 sentences2011On the other hand, if the state has satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of each of these essential elements, your verdict should be guilty of the offenses as charged on this count." [10] "We reiterate[d], however, that kidnapping convictions involving miniscule restraints remain subject to challenge under the vagueness doctrine." State v. Salamon, supra, 287 Conn. at 546 n. 31, 949 A.2d 1092 . [11] In State v. DeJesus, supra, 288 Conn. at 437 , 953 A.2d 45 , we overruled our previous decision in State v. Sanseverino, 287 Conn. 608 , 949 A.2d 1156 (2008) ( Sanseverino I ), 2011On the other hand, if the state has satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of each of these essential elements, your verdict should be guilty of the offenses as charged on this count." [10] "We reiterate[d], however, that kidnapping convictions involving miniscule restraints remain subject to challenge under the vagueness doctrine." State v. Salamon, supra, 287 Conn. at 546 n. 31, 949 A.2d 1092 . [11] In State v. DeJesus, supra, 288 Conn. at 437 , 953 A.2d 45 , we overruled our previous decision in State v. Sanseverino, 287 Conn. 608 , 949 A.2d 1156 (2008) ( Sanseverino I ), | 1 | 3 |
State v. Winotgreen2 sentences2026Our Supreme Court recently addressed a vagueness challenge to a statute and set forth the following legal principles: “The determination of whether a statutory provision is unconstitutionally vague is a question of law over which we exercise de novo review.” State v. Winot, 294 Conn. 753 , 758–59, 988 A.2d 188 (2010). 2026Our Supreme Court recently addressed a vagueness challenge to a statute and set forth the following legal principles: “The determination of whether a statutory provision is unconstitutionally vague is a question of law over which we exercise de novo review.” State v. Winot, 294 Conn. 753 , 758–59, 988 A.2d 188 (2010). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Josephsgreen2 sentences2025L., 339 Conn. 820 , 855 n.18, 262 A.3d 712 (2021); see also State v. Josephs, 328 Conn. 21, 32 , 176 A.3d 542 (2018) (‘‘[u]nless a vagueness claim implicates the first amendment right to free speech, [a] defendant whose conduct clearly comes within a statute’s unmistakable core of prohibited conduct may not challenge the statute because it is vague as applied to some hypothetical situation’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2025L., 339 Conn. 820 , 855 n.18, 262 A.3d 712 (2021); see also State v. Josephs, 328 Conn. 21, 32 , 176 A.3d 542 (2018) (‘‘[u]nless a vagueness claim implicates the first amendment right to free speech, [a] defendant whose conduct clearly comes within a statute’s unmistakable core of prohibited conduct may not challenge the statute because it is vague as applied to some hypothetical situation’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 2 |
Hogan v. Department of Children & Familiesgreen2 sentences2014Therefore, [c]ivil statutes . . . may survive a vagueness challenge by a lesser degree of specificity than in criminal stat- utes.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Hogan v. Dept. of Children & Families, 290 Conn. 545, 575 , 964 A.2d 1213 (2009), quoting Gonzalez v. Surgeon, 284 Conn. 573 , 583–84, 937 A.2d 24 (2007). 2014Therefore, [c]ivil statutes . . . may survive a vagueness challenge by a lesser degree of specificity than in criminal stat- utes.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Hogan v. Dept. of Children & Families, 290 Conn. 545, 575 , 964 A.2d 1213 (2009), quoting Gonzalez v. Surgeon, 284 Conn. 573 , 583–84, 937 A.2d 24 (2007). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Sanseverinogreen2 sentences2011On the other hand, if the state has satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of each of these essential elements, your verdict should be guilty of the offenses as charged on this count." [10] "We reiterate[d], however, that kidnapping convictions involving miniscule restraints remain subject to challenge under the vagueness doctrine." State v. Salamon, supra, 287 Conn. at 546 n. 31, 949 A.2d 1092 . [11] In State v. DeJesus, supra, 288 Conn. at 437 , 953 A.2d 45 , we overruled our previous decision in State v. Sanseverino, 287 Conn. 608 , 949 A.2d 1156 (2008) ( Sanseverino I ), 2011On the other hand, if the state has satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of each of these essential elements, your verdict should be guilty of the offenses as charged on this count." [10] "We reiterate[d], however, that kidnapping convictions involving miniscule restraints remain subject to challenge under the vagueness doctrine." State v. Salamon, supra, 287 Conn. at 546 n. 31, 949 A.2d 1092 . [11] In State v. DeJesus, supra, 288 Conn. at 437 , 953 A.2d 45 , we overruled our previous decision in State v. Sanseverino, 287 Conn. 608 , 949 A.2d 1156 (2008) ( Sanseverino I ), | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Ehlersgreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. DeFrancescogreen | 1 | 2 |
| Papachristou v. City of Jacksonvillegreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Charles L.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Michael R.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. CARACOGLIAgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Orlando Cordia Hall, Also Known as Langreen | 1 | 1 |
| Godfrey v. Georgiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McKinney v. Town of Coventry
green
2 sentences1997Thus, “[i]n order to surmount a vagueness challenge, ‘a statute [must] afford a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is permitted or prohibited. ’ McKinney v. Coventry, 176 Conn. 613, 618 , 410 A.2d 453 (1979).” State v. Schriver, supra, 460 . 1997Thus, “[i]n order to surmount a vagueness challenge, ‘a statute [must] afford a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is permitted or prohibited. ’ McKinney v. Coventry, 176 Conn. 613, 618 , 410 A.2d 453 (1979).” State v. Schriver, supra, 460 . | 9 | 1982–1997 |
Kolender v. Lawson
green
2 sentences2002(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kolender v. Lawson , [ 461 U.S. 352 , 357-58 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)]; State v. Schriver , [ 207 Conn. 456 , 460 , 542 A.2d 686 (1988).] Thus, [i]n order to surmount a vagueness challenge, a statute . . . must not impermissibly [delegate] basic policy matters to policemen, judges (emphasis added), and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. 2002(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kolender v. Lawson , [ 461 U.S. 352 , 357-58 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)]; State v. Schriver , [ 207 Conn. 456 , 460 , 542 A.2d 686 (1988).] Thus, [i]n order to surmount a vagueness challenge, a statute . . . must not impermissibly [delegate] basic policy matters to policemen, judges (emphasis added), and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. | 8 | 1988–2021 |
State v. Payne
green
2 sentences2002"Thus, in order to surmount a vagueness challenge, a statute must afford a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is permitted or prohibited." State v. Payne , 240 Conn. 766 , 777 (1997). 2001"In order to surmount a vagueness challenge, a statute must afford a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is permitted or prohibited." State v. Payne , 240 Conn. 766 , 777 (1997). | 8 | 1997–2003 |
State v. Indrisano
green
2 sentences2007If, for example, the law interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795, 802-804 , 640 A.2d 986 (1994). 2007If, for example, the law interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795, 802-804 , 640 A.2d 986 (1994). | 7 | 1994–2007 |
State v. Golding
green
2 sentences2023Although the defendant failed to raise a vagueness claim at trial, we review his claim under State v. Gold- ing, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015),22 ‘‘because the record is adequate for our review, and a claim that a statute is unconstitution- ally vague implicates a defendant’s fundamental due process right to fair warning.’’ State v. Coleman, 83 Conn. App. 672 , 676–77, 851 A.2d 329 , cert. denied, 271 Conn. 910 , 859 A.2d 571 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1050 , 125 S. Ct. 2290 , 161 L. 2023Although the defendant failed to raise a vagueness claim at trial, we review his claim under State v. Gold- ing, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015),22 ‘‘because the record is adequate for our review, and a claim that a statute is unconstitution- ally vague implicates a defendant’s fundamental due process right to fair warning.’’ State v. Coleman, 83 Conn. App. 672 , 676–77, 851 A.2d 329 , cert. denied, 271 Conn. 910 , 859 A.2d 571 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1050 , 125 S. Ct. 2290 , 161 L. | 6 | 1990–2023 |
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999Ed. 2d 362 (1982). 20 The United States Supreme Court has also expressed “greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe.” Id., 498-99 ; accord State Management Assn. of Connecticut, Inc. v. O’Neill, supra, 204 Conn. 757 (“[c]ivil statutes . . . may survive a vagueness challenge by a lesser degree of specificity than in criminal statutes” [internal quotation marks omitted]); Seals v. Hickey, 186 Conn. 337, 343 , 441 A.2d 604 (1982); State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 163 , 425 A.2d 939 (1979); McKi 1995If, for example, the law interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply.’ Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 , 102 S. Ct. 1186 , 71 L. | 6 | 1994–2002 |
State v. Proto
green
2 sentences2003When a penal statute implicates rights protected by the first amendment, the statute’s meaning must be capable of precise ascertainment in order to repel a vagueness challenge because “[w]here first amendment rights are at stake, vague laws may cause citizens to avoid constitutionally protected conduct for fear of incurring criminal prosecution.” State v. Proto, 203 Conn. 682, 696 , 526 A.2d 1297 (1987). 2003When a penal statute implicates rights protected by the first amendment, the statute’s meaning must be capable of precise ascertainment in order to repel a vagueness challenge because “[w]here first amendment rights are at stake, vague laws may cause citizens to avoid constitutionally protected conduct for fear of incurring criminal prosecution.” State v. Proto, 203 Conn. 682, 696 , 526 A.2d 1297 (1987). | 4 | 1987–2003 |
Gonzalez v. Surgeon
green
2 sentences2014Therefore, [c]ivil statutes . . . may survive a vagueness challenge by a lesser degree of specificity than in criminal stat- utes.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Hogan v. Dept. of Children & Families, 290 Conn. 545, 575 , 964 A.2d 1213 (2009), quoting Gonzalez v. Surgeon, 284 Conn. 573 , 583–84, 937 A.2d 24 (2007). 2014Therefore, [c]ivil statutes . . . may survive a vagueness challenge by a lesser degree of specificity than in criminal stat- utes.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Hogan v. Dept. of Children & Families, 290 Conn. 545, 575 , 964 A.2d 1213 (2009), quoting Gonzalez v. Surgeon, 284 Conn. 573 , 583–84, 937 A.2d 24 (2007). | 3 | 2009–2014 |
State v. Sanseverino
green
2 sentences2011On the other hand, if the state has satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of each of these essential elements, your verdict should be guilty of the offenses as charged on this count." [10] "We reiterate[d], however, that kidnapping convictions involving miniscule restraints remain subject to challenge under the vagueness doctrine." State v. Salamon, supra, 287 Conn. at 546 n. 31, 949 A.2d 1092 . [11] In State v. DeJesus, supra, 288 Conn. at 437 , 953 A.2d 45 , we overruled our previous decision in State v. Sanseverino, 287 Conn. 608 , 949 A.2d 1156 (2008) ( Sanseverino I ), 2011On the other hand, if the state has satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of each of these essential elements, your verdict should be guilty of the offenses as charged on this count." [10] "We reiterate[d], however, that kidnapping convictions involving miniscule restraints remain subject to challenge under the vagueness doctrine." State v. Salamon, supra, 287 Conn. at 546 n. 31, 949 A.2d 1092 . [11] In State v. DeJesus, supra, 288 Conn. at 437 , 953 A.2d 45 , we overruled our previous decision in State v. Sanseverino, 287 Conn. 608 , 949 A.2d 1156 (2008) ( Sanseverino I ), | 3 | 2008–2011 |
United States v. Lanier
green
2 sentences2010First, the vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of ‘a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’ ” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S. Ct. 1219 , 137 L. 2010First, the vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of ‘a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’ ” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S. Ct. 1219 , 137 L. | 3 | 2002–2010 |
Ribotsky v. United States
green
2 sentences2002Hoffman Estates v. Flipside , Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 , 498-99 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 , reh. denied, 456 U.S. 950 , 102 S.Ct. 2023 , 72 L.Ed.2d 476 (1982)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Indrisano , supra., 228 Conn. 803 -04. 1995Ed. 2d 362 , reh. denied, 456 U.S. 950 , 102 S. Ct. 2023 , 72 L. | 3 | 1994–2002 |
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.
green
2 sentences2002Hoffman Estates v. Flipside , Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 , 498-99 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 , reh. denied, 456 U.S. 950 , 102 S.Ct. 2023 , 72 L.Ed.2d 476 (1982)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Indrisano , supra., 228 Conn. 803 -04. 1995Ed. 2d 362 , reh. denied, 456 U.S. 950 , 102 S. Ct. 2023 , 72 L. | 3 | 1994–2002 |
Jones v. Leidinger
green
2 sentences2002Hoffman Estates v. Flipside , Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 , 498-99 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 , reh. denied, 456 U.S. 950 , 102 S.Ct. 2023 , 72 L.Ed.2d 476 (1982)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Indrisano , supra., 228 Conn. 803 -04. 1995Ed. 2d 362 , reh. denied, 456 U.S. 950 , 102 S. Ct. 2023 , 72 L. | 3 | 1994–2002 |
State v. Putnoki
green
2 sentences2025With respect to the vagueness challenge, I hope to provide some clarifica- tion of the judicial gloss that this court applied to the statutory scheme in cases such as State v. Putnoki, 200 Conn. 208 , 510 A.2d 1329 (1986), and State v. Metz, supra, 230 Conn. 400 , to assist the board and trial courts in complying with all statutory and regulatory require- ments and steering clear of the constitutional bound- aries. 2025With respect to the vagueness challenge, I hope to provide some clarifica- tion of the judicial gloss that this court applied to the statutory scheme in cases such as State v. Putnoki, 200 Conn. 208 , 510 A.2d 1329 (1986), and State v. Metz, supra, 230 Conn. 400 , to assist the board and trial courts in complying with all statutory and regulatory require- ments and steering clear of the constitutional bound- aries. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Metz
green
2 sentences2025With respect to the vagueness challenge, I hope to provide some clarifica- tion of the judicial gloss that this court applied to the statutory scheme in cases such as State v. Putnoki, 200 Conn. 208 , 510 A.2d 1329 (1986), and State v. Metz, supra, 230 Conn. 400 , to assist the board and trial courts in complying with all statutory and regulatory require- ments and steering clear of the constitutional bound- aries. 2025With respect to the vagueness challenge, I hope to provide some clarifica- tion of the judicial gloss that this court applied to the statutory scheme in cases such as State v. Putnoki, 200 Conn. 208 , 510 A.2d 1329 (1986), and State v. Metz, supra, 230 Conn. 400 , to assist the board and trial courts in complying with all statutory and regulatory require- ments and steering clear of the constitutional bound- aries. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
State Ex Rel. Gregan v. Koczur
green
2 sentences2024Gregan v. Koczur, 287 Conn. 145 , 156–57, 947 A.2d 282 (2008). ‘‘A statute is not unconstitutional merely because a person must inquire further as to the precise reach of its prohibitions, nor is it necessary that a statute list the exact conduct prohibited.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Aurora H., supra, 329. 2024Gregan v. Koczur, 287 Conn. 145 , 156–57, 947 A.2d 282 (2008). ‘‘A statute is not unconstitutional merely because a person must inquire further as to the precise reach of its prohibitions, nor is it necessary that a statute list the exact conduct prohibited.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Aurora H., supra, 329. | 2 | 2018–2024 |
State v. Coleman
green
2 sentences2023Although the defendant failed to raise a vagueness claim at trial, we review his claim under State v. Gold- ing, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015),22 ‘‘because the record is adequate for our review, and a claim that a statute is unconstitution- ally vague implicates a defendant’s fundamental due process right to fair warning.’’ State v. Coleman, 83 Conn. App. 672 , 676–77, 851 A.2d 329 , cert. denied, 271 Conn. 910 , 859 A.2d 571 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1050 , 125 S. Ct. 2290 , 161 L. 2023Although the defendant failed to raise a vagueness claim at trial, we review his claim under State v. Gold- ing, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015),22 ‘‘because the record is adequate for our review, and a claim that a statute is unconstitution- ally vague implicates a defendant’s fundamental due process right to fair warning.’’ State v. Coleman, 83 Conn. App. 672 , 676–77, 851 A.2d 329 , cert. denied, 271 Conn. 910 , 859 A.2d 571 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1050 , 125 S. Ct. 2290 , 161 L. | 2 | 2004–2023 |
State v. Knybel
green
2 sentences2015State v. Knybel, 281 Conn. 707, 713 , 916 A.2d 816 (2007). ‘‘[A] penal statute [must] define [a] criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohib- ited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. . . . [This concept] embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute or regulation and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement. . . . [T]he [most] important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice . . . but . . . the require- ment that a l 2015State v. Knybel, 281 Conn. 707, 713 , 916 A.2d 816 (2007). ‘‘[A] penal statute [must] define [a] criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohib- ited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. . . . [This concept] embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute or regulation and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement. . . . [T]he [most] important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice . . . but . . . the require- ment that a l | 2 | 2012–2015 |
State v. DeJesus
green
2 sentences2011On the other hand, if the state has satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of each of these essential elements, your verdict should be guilty of the offenses as charged on this count." [10] "We reiterate[d], however, that kidnapping convictions involving miniscule restraints remain subject to challenge under the vagueness doctrine." State v. Salamon, supra, 287 Conn. at 546 n. 31, 949 A.2d 1092 . [11] In State v. DeJesus, supra, 288 Conn. at 437 , 953 A.2d 45 , we overruled our previous decision in State v. Sanseverino, 287 Conn. 608 , 949 A.2d 1156 (2008) ( Sanseverino I ), 2011On the other hand, if the state has satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of each of these essential elements, your verdict should be guilty of the offenses as charged on this count." [10] "We reiterate[d], however, that kidnapping convictions involving miniscule restraints remain subject to challenge under the vagueness doctrine." State v. Salamon, supra, 287 Conn. at 546 n. 31, 949 A.2d 1092 . [11] In State v. DeJesus, supra, 288 Conn. at 437 , 953 A.2d 45 , we overruled our previous decision in State v. Sanseverino, 287 Conn. 608 , 949 A.2d 1156 (2008) ( Sanseverino I ), | 2 | 2010–2011 |
| State v. Payne neutral | 2 | 1997–2003 |
| State v. Jones neutral | 2 | 1995–2001 |
| State v. Erzen green | 2 | 1995–2001 |
| State v. Linares green | 2 | 2000–2000 |
| State v. Anonymous green | 2 | 1985–1999 |
| State v. Jones green | 2 | 1992–1996 |
| Mitchell v. King green | 2 | 1987–1994 |
| State v. Palangio green | 2 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Evans green | 2 | 1990–1992 |
| State v. Cavallo green | 2 | 1987–1988 |
| Connally v. General Construction Co. green | 2 | 1979–1982 |
| Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Oradell green | 2 | 1978–1978 |
| State v. Hersey green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission of New London green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| State v. Caracoglia green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| State v. Russo green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| State v. Ares neutral | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| State v. Roy D. L. green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Coleman green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Gates v. Discovery Communications Inc. green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Morgan v. United States District Court for the Central District of California green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.