vagueness challenge in Utah

2021Moreover, “when a vagueness challenge does not involve First Amendment freedoms,” as Rashid acknowledges is the case here, “this court examines the statute only in light of the facts of the case at hand.” See id. (quotation simplified). ¶16 We first address whether the challenged statute defines stalking with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people would understand what actions are prohibited.

2020State v. Garcia, 2017 UT 53, ¶ 56 , 424 P.3d 171 .

2018See Kolender v. Lawson , 461 U.S. 352 , 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) ("[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."); State v. Green , 2004 UT 76 , ¶ 43, 99 P.3d 820 (same).

2018See Kolender v. Lawson , 461 U.S. 352 , 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) ("[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."); State v. Green , 2004 UT 76 , ¶ 43, 99 P.3d 820 (same).

2026If a defendant files a motion to dismiss a complaint under rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, the defendant “admits the facts alleged in the complaint but challenges the plaintiff’s right to relief based on those facts.” Miller v. Miller, 2020 UT App 171, ¶ 15 , 480 P.3d 341 (quotation simplified). ¶108 We see no legal or logical basis for concluding that a vagueness challenge would operate outside this traditional rubric.

2026If a defendant files a motion to dismiss a complaint under rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, the defendant “admits the facts alleged in the complaint but challenges the plaintiff’s right to relief based on those facts.” Miller v. Miller, 2020 UT App 171, ¶ 15 , 480 P.3d 341 (quotation simplified). ¶108 We see no legal or logical basis for concluding that a vagueness challenge would operate outside this traditional rubric.

2026If a defendant was charged with murder and his defense was that he didn’t pull the trigger, it wouldn’t make sense to say that the defendant could prevail on a vagueness challenge by arguing that a reasonable person wouldn’t know that the murder 20220571-CA 41 2026 UT App 11 State v. Youren statute applies to a person who didn’t kill the victim.

2026If a defendant was charged with murder and his defense was that he didn’t pull the trigger, it wouldn’t make sense to say that the defendant could prevail on a vagueness challenge by arguing that a reasonable person wouldn’t know that the murder 20220571-CA 41 2026 UT App 11 State v. Youren statute applies to a person who didn’t kill the victim.

2022With regard to his vagueness claim, his challenge fails for the simple reason that Calder himself asserts, in his brief, that the applicable statutes are “obviously vague.” Calder does not set forth any facts that he did not know at the time, but knows now, that would allow him to proceed with a vagueness claim. ¶39 Calder’s equal protection claim is grounded in the notion, discussed to some extent above, that there existed other similarly situated individuals—teachers or employees at secondary 20200456-CA 20 2022 UT App 67 Calder v. State schools—who engaged in sexual activity with sixteen- o

2022The Court merely added in a footnote that “moreover, any concern about lack of notice is 20121040-CA 21 2022 UT App 95 State v. Ray ameliorated by the fact that the [statute] contains a scienter requirement.” Id. ¶ 16 n.1 (quotation simplified). ¶45 Second, turning to Ray’s assertions that Gallegos is distinguishable from the present case on the ground that the enticement provision does not require “enticement to engage in illegal sex,” Ray does not elaborate on this argument other than to reiterate that “underlying crimes are absent” in the enticement provision.

2022The Court merely added in a footnote that “moreover, any concern about lack of notice is 20121040-CA 21 2022 UT App 95 State v. Ray ameliorated by the fact that the [statute] contains a scienter requirement.” Id. ¶ 16 n.1 (quotation simplified). ¶45 Second, turning to Ray’s assertions that Gallegos is distinguishable from the present case on the ground that the enticement provision does not require “enticement to engage in illegal sex,” Ray does not elaborate on this argument other than to reiterate that “underlying crimes are absent” in the enticement provision.

2021Compare State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30, ¶ 17 , 254 P.3d 183 (“To determine whether a statute violates the uniform operation of laws, we apply a three-step analysis: (1) whether the statute creates any classifications; (2) whether the classifications impose any disparate treatment on persons similarly situated; and (3) if there is disparate treatment, whether (continued…) 20190682-CA 13 2021 UT App 17 State v. Rashid that the statute is unconstitutional “[b]ecause the statute permits police, prosecutors, and judges to have arbitrary discretion in determining who can and cannot be charged.” Rashi

2021In asserting that the statute encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement under the vagueness doctrine, Rashid cites State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995).

2020And “second, when a vagueness challenge does not involve First Amendment freedoms, this court examines the statute only in light of the facts of the case at hand.” Id. (quotation simplified). ¶20 Regarding the first step, we disagree with Lopez that the statute is so unclear that an ordinary person would be unable to understand what conduct is prohibited and that if the prohibited conduct was undertaken, that the crimes would not merge.

2018Pence cannot persuasively argue that he would not have known that yelling at Victim, approaching her, and getting "right in [her] face" would constitute acts sufficient to violate the protective order. ¶ 23 Moreover, assuming without deciding that the vagueness doctrine applies to court orders in addition to statutes, we disagree with Pence's argument that "ordinary people" would not know "what conduct is prohibited," Tulley , 2018 UT 35 , ¶ 54, 428 P.3d 1005 (cleaned up), by the "Stay Away" language used in the protective order.

2018Pence cannot persuasively argue that he would not have known that yelling at Victim, approaching her, and getting "right in [her] face" would constitute acts sufficient to violate the protective order. ¶ 23 Moreover, assuming without deciding that the vagueness doctrine applies to court orders in addition to statutes, we disagree with Pence's argument that "ordinary people" would not know "what conduct is prohibited," Tulley , 2018 UT 35 , ¶ 54, 428 P.3d 1005 (cleaned up), by the "Stay Away" language used in the protective order.

2018Id. § 76-5-111(1)(o). ¶54 To survive a vagueness challenge, a criminal statute must "(1) 'define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,' and (2) 'establish minimal guidelines' that sufficiently instruct law enforcement [so] as to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." State v. Holm , 2006 UT 31 , ¶ 77, 137 P.3d 726 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson , 461 U.S. 352 , 357-58, 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) ). ¶55 The United States

2018Id. § 76-5-111(1)(o). ¶54 To survive a vagueness challenge, a criminal statute must "(1) 'define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,' and (2) 'establish minimal guidelines' that sufficiently instruct law enforcement [so] as to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." State v. Holm , 2006 UT 31 , ¶ 77, 137 P.3d 726 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson , 461 U.S. 352 , 357-58, 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) ). ¶55 The United States

2017First, a criminal statute is not unconstitutionally vague "if it 'defines the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' " Second, "when a vagueness challenge does not involve First Amendment freedoms, [this court] examine[s] the statute only in light of the facts of the case at hand." United States v. Patterson , 431 F.3d 832 , 836 (5th Cir. 2005) (alterations in original) (citations omitted). ¶ 57 Federal courts have recognized possible constitu

2015We rejected the unnecessary rigor challenge because that provision ―applies only to the conditions of one‘s confinement and does not speak to the proportionality of the particular sentence imposed,‖ so the provision was ―not implicated by the imposition of‖ an LWOP sentence.144 And we determined that the cruel and unusual punishment challenge was meritless because the defendant was an adult, did not face the death penalty, and did not commit a non-homicide crime, so none of the United States Supreme Court precedent the defendant cited demonstrated that an LWOP sentence violated the Eighth 141

2004Thus, following a guilty plea, a defendant could raise on appeal that he was prosecuted under an unconstitutional statute." United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314, 1317 (6th Cir.1994) (quotations and citation omitted); see Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 , 62 n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 241 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975) (per curiam) ("We simply hold that a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that — judged on its face — the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute."); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 , 94 S.Ct. 2098 , 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974) (holding that guilty plea did

2004Thus, following a guilty plea, a defendant could raise on appeal that he was prosecuted under an unconstitutional statute.” United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314, 1317 (6th Cir.1994) (quotations and citation omitted); see Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 , 62 n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 241 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975) (per curiam) (“We simply hold that a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim thaU-judged on its face — the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.”); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 , 94 S.Ct. 2098 , 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974) (holding that guilty plea did no

2004Thus, following a guilty plea, a defendant could raise on appeal that he was prosecuted under an unconstitutional statute." United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314, 1317 (6th Cir.1994) (quotations and citation omitted); see Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 , 62 n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 241 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975) (per curiam) ("We simply hold that a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that — judged on its face — the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute."); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 , 94 S.Ct. 2098 , 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974) (holding that guilty plea did

2004Thus, following a guilty plea, a defendant could raise on appeal that he was prosecuted under an unconstitutional statute.” United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314, 1317 (6th Cir.1994) (quotations and citation omitted); see Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 , 62 n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 241 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975) (per curiam) (“We simply hold that a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim thaU-judged on its face — the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.”); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 , 94 S.Ct. 2098 , 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974) (holding that guilty plea did no

2004Thus, following a guilty plea, a defendant could raise on appeal that he was prosecuted under an unconstitutional statute." United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314, 1317 (6th Cir.1994) (quotations and citation omitted); see Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 , 62 n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 241 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975) (per curiam) ("We simply hold that a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that — judged on its face — the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute."); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 , 94 S.Ct. 2098 , 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974) (holding that guilty plea did

2004Thus, following a guilty plea, a defendant could raise on appeal that he was prosecuted under an unconstitutional statute.” United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314, 1317 (6th Cir.1994) (quotations and citation omitted); see Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 , 62 n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 241 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975) (per curiam) (“We simply hold that a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim thaU-judged on its face — the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.”); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 , 94 S.Ct. 2098 , 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974) (holding that guilty plea did no