vagueness doctrine in Georgia

2026The Supreme Court of the United States has described the rule of lenity “as a sort of junior version of the vagueness doctrine,” which requires fair warning as to 2 See generally Mejia v. State, 366 Ga. App. 837 , 838(a) ( 884 SE2d 423 ) (2023) (“If a life sentence is imposed . . . the trial court lacks the discretion to probate or suspend the life sentence, unless otherwise provided by law.”); Grace v. State, 347 Ga. App. 396, 400 (2) ( 819 SE2d 674 ) (2018) (“Construing OCGA § 17-10-1, we have consistently held that a trial court’s ability to probate or suspend a sentence does not extend to

2026The Supreme Court of the United States has described the rule of lenity “as a sort of junior version of the vagueness doctrine,” which requires fair warning as to 2 See generally Mejia v. State, 366 Ga. App. 837 , 838(a) ( 884 SE2d 423 ) (2023) (“If a life sentence is imposed . . . the trial court lacks the discretion to probate or suspend the life sentence, unless otherwise provided by law.”); Grace v. State, 347 Ga. App. 396, 400 (2) ( 819 SE2d 674 ) (2018) (“Construing OCGA § 17-10-1, we have consistently held that a trial court’s ability to probate or suspend a sentence does not extend to

2025The Supreme Court of the United States has referred to the rule of lenity “as a sort of junior version of the vagueness doctrine,” which requires fair warning as to what conduct is proscribed.4 The rule of lenity ensures that “if and when an ambiguity exists in one or more statutes, such that the law exacts varying degrees of punishment 3 Although OCGA § 16-8-41 (b) provides that a defendant convicted of armed robbery may be sentenced to death, and OCGA § 17-10-7 (c) required the trial court to impose the maximum sentence available for that offense, our Supreme Court has held that “the armed r

2025The Supreme Court of the United States has referred to the rule of lenity “as a sort of junior version of the vagueness doctrine,” which requires fair warning as to what conduct is proscribed.4 The rule of lenity ensures that “if and when an ambiguity exists in one or more statutes, such that the law exacts varying degrees of punishment 3 Although OCGA § 16-8-41 (b) provides that a defendant convicted of armed robbery may be sentenced to death, and OCGA § 17-10-7 (c) required the trial court to impose the maximum sentence available for that offense, our Supreme Court has held that “the armed r

2025See Gordon v. State, 334 Ga. App. 633, 634 ( 780 SE2d 376 ) (2015) (explaining the rule of lenity “ensures that if and when an ambiguity exists in one or more statutes, such that the law exacts varying degrees of punishment for the same offense, the ambiguity will be resolved in favor of a defendant, who will then receive the lesser punishment” (punctuation omitted)); Sambou v. State, 358 Ga. App. 645 , 655 ( 854 SE2d 392 ) (2021) (referring to the rule of lenity “as a sort of junior version of the vagueness doctrine,” which “requires fair warning as to what conduct is proscribed” (citation an

2025See Gordon v. State, 334 Ga. App. 633, 634 ( 780 SE2d 376 ) (2015) (explaining the rule of lenity “ensures that if and when an ambiguity exists in one or more statutes, such that the law exacts varying degrees of punishment for the same offense, the ambiguity will be resolved in favor of a defendant, who will then receive the lesser punishment” (punctuation omitted)); Sambou v. State, 358 Ga. App. 645 , 655 ( 854 SE2d 392 ) (2021) (referring to the rule of lenity “as a sort of junior version of the vagueness doctrine,” which “requires fair warning as to what conduct is proscribed” (citation an

2021The problem that poses is addressed, not by the doctrine of vagueness, but by the requirement of proof”); Banta v. State, 281 Ga. 615, 617 ( 642 SE2d 51 ) (2007) (noting that “‘the fact that application of the statute’s standards sometimes requires an assessment of the surrounding circumstances to determine if the statute is violated does not render it unconstitutional’” (citation omitted)).13 The Owners argue that there are a variety of hypothetical 13 As the superior court noted in its order, in arguing that the “truck stop” definition was not vague, the County confusingly asserted that the

2021The problem that poses is addressed, not by the doctrine of vagueness, but by the requirement of proof”); Banta v. State, 281 Ga. 615, 617 ( 642 SE2d 51 ) (2007) (noting that “‘the fact that application of the statute’s standards sometimes requires an assessment of the surrounding circumstances to determine if the statute is violated does not render it unconstitutional’” (citation omitted)).13 The Owners argue that there are a variety of hypothetical 13 As the superior court noted in its order, in arguing that the “truck stop” definition was not vague, the County confusingly asserted that the

2021See also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 ( 102 SCt 1186 , 71 LE2d 362) (1982) (noting that “economic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test”).

2021See also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 ( 102 SCt 1186 , 71 LE2d 362) (1982) (noting that “economic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test”).

2015Franklin, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee. 1 See OCGA § 16-10-20. 2 See OCGA § 16-10-26. 3 See OCGA § 40-6-270. 4 This served as the foundation for Gordon’s violation of OCGA § 40-6-270. 5 The record does not indicate how or why Gordon came to he in contact with law enforcement after leaving the scene of the hit and run. 6 296 Ga. App. 186 ( 674 SE2d 68 ) (2009). 7 326 Ga. App. 516 ( 757 SE2d 141 ) (2014). 8 See Court of Appeals Rule 33 (a). 9 McNair v. State, 293 Ga. 282, 283 ( 745 SE2d 646 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U. S. 259, 266 (II) (

2015Franklin, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee. 1 See OCGA § 16-10-20. 2 See OCGA § 16-10-26. 3 See OCGA § 40-6-270. 4 This served as the foundation for Gordon’s violation of OCGA § 40-6-270. 5 The record does not indicate how or why Gordon came to he in contact with law enforcement after leaving the scene of the hit and run. 6 296 Ga. App. 186 ( 674 SE2d 68 ) (2009). 7 326 Ga. App. 516 ( 757 SE2d 141 ) (2014). 8 See Court of Appeals Rule 33 (a). 9 McNair v. State, 293 Ga. 282, 283 ( 745 SE2d 646 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U. S. 259, 266 (II) (

2015Franklin, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee. 1 See OCGA § 16-10-20. 2 See OCGA § 16-10-26. 3 See OCGA § 40-6-270. 4 This served as the foundation for Gordon’s violation of OCGA § 40-6-270. 5 The record does not indicate how or why Gordon came to he in contact with law enforcement after leaving the scene of the hit and run. 6 296 Ga. App. 186 ( 674 SE2d 68 ) (2009). 7 326 Ga. App. 516 ( 757 SE2d 141 ) (2014). 8 See Court of Appeals Rule 33 (a). 9 McNair v. State, 293 Ga. 282, 283 ( 745 SE2d 646 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U. S. 259, 266 (II) (

2015Franklin, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee. 1 See OCGA § 16-10-20. 2 See OCGA § 16-10-26. 3 See OCGA § 40-6-270. 4 This served as the foundation for Gordon’s violation of OCGA § 40-6-270. 5 The record does not indicate how or why Gordon came to he in contact with law enforcement after leaving the scene of the hit and run. 6 296 Ga. App. 186 ( 674 SE2d 68 ) (2009). 7 326 Ga. App. 516 ( 757 SE2d 141 ) (2014). 8 See Court of Appeals Rule 33 (a). 9 McNair v. State, 293 Ga. 282, 283 ( 745 SE2d 646 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U. S. 259, 266 (II) (

2017Furthermore, with regard to a vagueness challenge, there is "a greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe." Thelen v. State , 272 Ga. 81 , 82, 526 S.E.2d 60 (2000) (punctuation omitted); accord Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. , 455 U.S. 489 , 498-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982).

2017Furthermore, with regard to a vagueness challenge, there is "a greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe." Thelen v. State , 272 Ga. 81 , 82, 526 S.E.2d 60 (2000) (punctuation omitted); accord Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. , 455 U.S. 489 , 498-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982).

2021The Supreme Court of the United States has referred to the rule of lenity “as a sort of junior version of the vagueness doctrine,” which requires fair warning as to what conduct is proscribed.29 And as this Court has previously explained, the rule of 28 See Nordahl, 306 Ga. at 23 (3) (explaining that in applying the “formal categorical” approach to recidivist sentencing, “the sentencing court lines up [the out of state] crime’s elements alongside those of the [state] offense and sees if they match.” (punctuation omitted)). 29 United States v. Lanier 520 U.S. 259, 266 (II) (117 SCt 1219, 137 LE

2021The Supreme Court of the United States has referred to the rule of lenity “as a sort of junior version of the vagueness doctrine,” which requires fair warning as to what conduct is proscribed.29 And as this Court has previously explained, the rule of 28 See Nordahl, 306 Ga. at 23 (3) (explaining that in applying the “formal categorical” approach to recidivist sentencing, “the sentencing court lines up [the out of state] crime’s elements alongside those of the [state] offense and sees if they match.” (punctuation omitted)). 29 United States v. Lanier 520 U.S. 259, 266 (II) (117 SCt 1219, 137 LE

2025Applying the doctrine of vagueness, we have little trouble concluding that this statutory language does not “hold[] an individual criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand 9 to be proscribed.” Rose, 423 U. S. at 49 (citation and punctuation omitted).

2025Applying the doctrine of vagueness, we have little trouble concluding that this statutory language does not “hold[ ] an individual criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.” 9 Rose, 423 U. S. at 49 (citation and punctuation omitted).

2021The Supreme Court of the United States has referred to the rule of lenity “as a sort of junior version of the vagueness doctrine,” which requires fair warning as to what conduct is proscribed.29 And as this Court has previously explained, the rule of 28 See Nordahl, 306 Ga. at 23 (3) (explaining that in applying the “formal categorical” approach to recidivist sentencing, “the sentencing court lines up [the out of state] crime’s elements alongside those of the [state] offense and sees if they match.” (punctuation omitted)). 29 United States v. Lanier 520 U.S. 259, 266 (II) (117 SCt 1219, 137 LE

2021The Supreme Court of the United States has referred to the rule of lenity “as a sort of junior version of the vagueness doctrine,” which requires fair warning as to what conduct is proscribed.29 And as this Court has previously explained, the rule of 28 See Nordahl, 306 Ga. at 23 (3) (explaining that in applying the “formal categorical” approach to recidivist sentencing, “the sentencing court lines up [the out of state] crime’s elements alongside those of the [state] offense and sees if they match.” (punctuation omitted)). 29 United States v. Lanier 520 U.S. 259, 266 (II) (117 SCt 1219, 137 LE

2021See, e.g., Morgan County v. May, 305 Ga. 305 , 309 n.5 ( 824 SE2d 365 ) (2019); Humphrey v. Walker, 294 Ga. 855, 856 ( 757 SE2d 68 ) (2014).8 2.

2021See, e.g., Morgan County v. May, 305 Ga. 305 , 309 n.5 ( 824 SE2d 365 ) (2019); Humphrey v. Walker, 294 Ga. 855, 856 ( 757 SE2d 68 ) (2014).8 2.

2021See Maxim Cabaret, Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, 304 Ga. 187 , 195 ( 816 SE2d 31 ) (2018) (Peterson, J., concurring) (emphasizing the need for separate analysis of analogous Georgia and federal constitutional provisions but explaining that, “[a]s the Court’s decision explains, [the appellants’] federal claim fails.

2021See Maxim Cabaret, Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, 304 Ga. 187 , 195 ( 816 SE2d 31 ) (2018) (Peterson, J., concurring) (emphasizing the need for separate analysis of analogous Georgia and federal constitutional provisions but explaining that, “[a]s the Court’s decision explains, [the appellants’] federal claim fails.

2021See, e.g., Morgan County v. May, 305 Ga. 305 , 309 n.5 ( 824 SE2d 365 ) (2019); Humphrey v. Walker, 294 Ga. 855, 856 ( 757 SE2d 68 ) (2014).8 2.

2021See, e.g., Morgan County v. May, 305 Ga. 305 , 309 n.5 ( 824 SE2d 365 ) (2019); Humphrey v. Walker, 294 Ga. 855, 856 ( 757 SE2d 68 ) (2014).8 2.

2021See, e.g., Morgan County v. May, 305 Ga. 305 , 309 n.5 ( 824 SE2d 365 ) (2019); Humphrey v. Walker, 294 Ga. 855, 856 ( 757 SE2d 68 ) (2014).8 2.

2021See, e.g., Morgan County v. May, 305 Ga. 305 , 309 n.5 ( 824 SE2d 365 ) (2019); Humphrey v. Walker, 294 Ga. 855, 856 ( 757 SE2d 68 ) (2014).8 2.

2015Franklin, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee. 1 See OCGA § 16-10-20. 2 See OCGA § 16-10-26. 3 See OCGA § 40-6-270. 4 This served as the foundation for Gordon’s violation of OCGA § 40-6-270. 5 The record does not indicate how or why Gordon came to he in contact with law enforcement after leaving the scene of the hit and run. 6 296 Ga. App. 186 ( 674 SE2d 68 ) (2009). 7 326 Ga. App. 516 ( 757 SE2d 141 ) (2014). 8 See Court of Appeals Rule 33 (a). 9 McNair v. State, 293 Ga. 282, 283 ( 745 SE2d 646 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U. S. 259, 266 (II) (

2014As our Supreme Court has explained, the rule of lenity finds its roots in the vagueness doctrine, “which requires fair warning as to what conduct is proscribed.”9 More specifically, the rule of lenity ensures that if and when an ambiguity exists in one or more statutes, such that the law exacts varying degrees of punishment for the same offense, “the ambiguity will be resolved in favor of a defendant, who will then receive the lesser punishment.”10 Of course, if it is determined after applying the 8 See generally McNair v. State, 293 Ga. 282, 284-85 ( 745 SE2d 646 ) (2013); id. at 284 (“This C

2015Franklin, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee. 1 See OCGA § 16-10-20. 2 See OCGA § 16-10-26. 3 See OCGA § 40-6-270. 4 This served as the foundation for Gordon’s violation of OCGA § 40-6-270. 5 The record does not indicate how or why Gordon came to he in contact with law enforcement after leaving the scene of the hit and run. 6 296 Ga. App. 186 ( 674 SE2d 68 ) (2009). 7 326 Ga. App. 516 ( 757 SE2d 141 ) (2014). 8 See Court of Appeals Rule 33 (a). 9 McNair v. State, 293 Ga. 282, 283 ( 745 SE2d 646 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U. S. 259, 266 (II) (

2015Franklin, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee. 1 See OCGA § 16-10-20. 2 See OCGA § 16-10-26. 3 See OCGA § 40-6-270. 4 This served as the foundation for Gordon’s violation of OCGA § 40-6-270. 5 The record does not indicate how or why Gordon came to he in contact with law enforcement after leaving the scene of the hit and run. 6 296 Ga. App. 186 ( 674 SE2d 68 ) (2009). 7 326 Ga. App. 516 ( 757 SE2d 141 ) (2014). 8 See Court of Appeals Rule 33 (a). 9 McNair v. State, 293 Ga. 282, 283 ( 745 SE2d 646 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted); see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U. S. 259, 266 (II) (

2013Moreover, “[w]ith regard to a vagueness challenge, there is a greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe.” Foster v. State, 273 Ga. 555, 556 ( 544 SE2d 153 ) (2001) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2013Moreover, “[w]ith regard to a vagueness challenge, there is a greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe.” Foster v. State, 273 Ga. 555, 556 ( 544 SE2d 153 ) (2001) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2004See State of Ga. v. Old South Amusements, 275 Ga. 274, 276 ( 564 SE2d 710 ) (2002) (legislature not required to draft statutes with mathematical precision); Izzo v. State, 257 Ga. 109 (1) (356 SE2d204) (1987) (statute not void for vagueness if it provides enough specificity so as not to encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement).

2004See State of Ga. v. Old South Amusements, 275 Ga. 274, 276 ( 564 SE2d 710 ) (2002) (legislature not required to draft statutes with mathematical precision); Izzo v. State, 257 Ga. 109 (1) (356 SE2d204) (1987) (statute not void for vagueness if it provides enough specificity so as not to encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement).

1991To withstand a vagueness challenge, “all that is required is that the language ‘conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.’ ” Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 491 (77 SC 1304, 1 LE2d 1498) (1957).

1990OCGA § 16-11-39 (3) makes it a misdemeanor to engage “in indecent or disorderly conduct in the presence of another in any public place." In Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 491 (77 SC 1304, 1 LE2d 1498) (1957), the United States Supreme Court held that to withstand a vagueness challenge, “all that is required is that the language ‘conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.’ ” However, the Court has more recently noted that with regard to a vagueness *428 challenge, there is “greater tolerance of enactments with c

2001Douglas v. State, 263 Ga. 748, 749 (2) ( 438 SE2d 361 ) (1994).

2001Douglas v. State, 263 Ga. 748, 749 (2) ( 438 SE2d 361 ) (1994).

2019Instead, the trial court's written order merely acknowledged Mondor's request for an exact definition of the word "cause" in OCGA § 40-6-393 and then expressly "decline[d] to set a definition of the word 'cause' as used in OCGA § 40-6-393 prior to trial." Mondor points to certain statements the trial court made at the motions hearing for the proposition that the court did rule on this constitutional issue, see Jenkins v. State , 284 Ga. 642 , 643-644, 670 S.E.2d 425 (2008) (a distinct ruling on a constitutional question may be oral and not reduced to writing), but those statements merely discu

2019Instead, the trial court's written order merely acknowledged Mondor's request for an exact definition of the word "cause" in OCGA § 40-6-393 and then expressly "decline[d] to set a definition of the word 'cause' as used in OCGA § 40-6-393 prior to trial." Mondor points to certain statements the trial court made at the motions hearing for the proposition that the court did rule on this constitutional issue, see Jenkins v. State , 284 Ga. 642 , 643-644, 670 S.E.2d 425 (2008) (a distinct ruling on a constitutional question may be oral and not reduced to writing), but those statements merely discu

1994Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108 (92 SC 2294, 33 LE2d 222) (1972).

1981Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241 (88 SC 391,19 LE2d 444) (1967); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U. S. 288 (84 SC 1302,12 LE2d 325) (1964); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 , supra, pp. 114-115.

2026Accord Slack v. State, 265 Ga. App. 306, 307 (1) ( 593 SE2d 664 ) (2004). 17 See Pavlov, 362 Ga. App. at 832–33(1)(a) (holding that defendant’s kissing of victim’s neck was an immoral or indecent act sufficient to support his child molestation conviction); Thomas, 324 Ga. App. at 28 (finding evidence sufficient to establish that defendant committed an immoral or indecent act by kissing an eleven-year-old victim on the lips, thus supporting conviction for child molestation). 12 The Supreme Court of the United States has referred to the rule of lenity “as a sort of junior version of the vaguenes

2026Accord Slack v. State, 265 Ga. App. 306, 307 (1) ( 593 SE2d 664 ) (2004). 17 See Pavlov, 362 Ga. App. at 832–33(1)(a) (holding that defendant’s kissing of victim’s neck was an immoral or indecent act sufficient to support his child molestation conviction); Thomas, 324 Ga. App. at 28 (finding evidence sufficient to establish that defendant committed an immoral or indecent act by kissing an eleven-year-old victim on the lips, thus supporting conviction for child molestation). 12 The Supreme Court of the United States has referred to the rule of lenity “as a sort of junior version of the vaguenes