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28 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Harrissgreen2 sentences2016United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. 808, 811 , 98 L.Ed. 989, 996 (1954). 2016United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. 808, 811 , 98 L.Ed. 989, 996 (1954). | 10 | 16 |
Lanzetta v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2016This Court has explained: “ ‘ “The doctrine of vagueness ,.. originates in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 , 59 S.Ct. 618 , 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939), and is the basis for striking down legislation which contains insufficient warning of what conduct is unlawful, see United States v. National Dairy Products Corporation, 372 U.S. 29 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963). “ ‘ “Void for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed. 2016This Court has explained: “ ‘ “The doctrine of vagueness ,.. originates in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 , 59 S.Ct. 618 , 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939), and is the basis for striking down legislation which contains insufficient warning of what conduct is unlawful, see United States v. National Dairy Products Corporation, 372 U.S. 29 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963). “ ‘ “Void for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed. | 1 | 17 |
Vaughn v. Stategreen2 sentences2014In Vaughn v. State, 880 So.2d 1178, 1194-96 (Ala.Crim.App.2008) (quoted with approval in O’Callaghan v. State, 945 So.2d 467, 474-75 (Ala.Crim.App.2006)), this Court held: “ ‘ “The doctrine of vagueness ... originates in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 , 59 S.Ct. 618 , 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939), and is the basis for striking down legislation which contains insufficient warning of what conduct is unlawful, see United States v. National Dairy Products Corporation, 372 U.S. 29 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963). “ ‘ “Void for vagueness sim 2011In Vaughn v. State, 880 So.2d 1178 (Ala.Crim.App.2003), this Court set forth the following guidelines for addressing constitutional challenges on vagueness grounds: “ ‘ “The doctrine of vagueness ... originates in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lanzaetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 , 59 S.Ct. 618 , 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939), and is the basis for striking down legislation which contains insufficient warning of what conduct is unlawful, see United States v. National Dairy Products Corporation, 372 U.S. 29 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963). “ ‘ “Void for vagueness simply me | 1 | 5 |
O'CALLAGHAN v. Stategreen1 sentence2014In Vaughn v. State, 880 So.2d 1178, 1194-96 (Ala.Crim.App.2008) (quoted with approval in O’Callaghan v. State, 945 So.2d 467, 474-75 (Ala.Crim.App.2006)), this Court held: “ ‘ “The doctrine of vagueness ... originates in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 , 59 S.Ct. 618 , 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939), and is the basis for striking down legislation which contains insufficient warning of what conduct is unlawful, see United States v. National Dairy Products Corporation, 372 U.S. 29 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963). “ ‘ “Void for vagueness sim | 1 | 1 |
Cadle Co. v. City of Kentwoodgreen2 sentences2010“Because the vagueness challenge is not based on the First Amendment, this Court examines ‘ “whether the statute is vague as applied to the conduct allegedly proscribed in this case,” ’ instead of hypothetical concerns.” Cadle Co. v. City of Kentwood, 285 Mich.App. 240, 259 , 776 N.W.2d 145, 159 (2009) (quoting People v. Knapp, 244 Mich.App. 361 , 374 n. 4, 624 N.W.2d 227 (2001), quoting in turn People v. Vronko, 228 Mich.App. 649, 652 , 579 N.W.2d 138 (1998)(emphasis added)). 2010“Because the vagueness challenge is not based on the First Amendment, this Court examines ‘ “whether the statute is vague as applied to the conduct allegedly proscribed in this case,” ’ instead of hypothetical concerns.” Cadle Co. v. City of Kentwood, 285 Mich.App. 240, 259 , 776 N.W.2d 145, 159 (2009) (quoting People v. Knapp, 244 Mich.App. 361 , 374 n. 4, 624 N.W.2d 227 (2001), quoting in turn People v. Vronko, 228 Mich.App. 649, 652 , 579 N.W.2d 138 (1998)(emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
Connally v. General Construction Co.green1 sentence2009We have little doubt that § 818 is similarly not so vague that ‘men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.’ Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).... | 1 | 1 |
WATER AND SEWER COM'RS OF MOBILE v. Huntergreen1 sentence2009See Board of Water & Sewer Commissioners, 956 So.2d at 418 . (”[I]n order to challenge a statute on the basis of vagueness, the challenger must first have standing to do so.” "[A] litigant has no standing to assert a vagueness claim against a statute if the litigant’s conduct is clearly proscribed by that statute.”). | 1 | 1 |
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.green2 sentences2006See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside , Hoffman Estates, Inc. , 455 U.S. 489 , 495 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982) ("A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others. 2006See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside , Hoffman Estates, Inc. , 455 U.S. 489 , 495 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982) ("A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others. | 1 | 1 |
Dwight O. Brockert, Jr. v. Joel Skornicka, Mayor, and the City of Madison, Wisconsin, a Municipal Corporationgreen2 sentences2000I agree with these observations. "[A] standardless [statute] is subject to facial attack under the due process clause though the vagueness doctrine." Brockert v. Skornicka , 711 F.2d 1376 , 1381 (7th Cir. 1983). 2000I agree with these observations. "[A] standardless [statute] is subject to facial attack under the due process clause though the vagueness doctrine." Brockert v. Skornicka, 711 F.2d 1376, 1381 (7th Cir.1983). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 472591green2 sentences2000"A state's legislative enactment is void for vagueness under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment if it `is inherently standardless, enforceable only on the exercise of an unlimited, and hence arbitrary, discretion vested in the state.'" Margaret S. v. Edwards , 794 F.2d 994 , 999 (5th Cir. 1986). 2000"A state's legislative enactment is void for vagueness under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment if it `is inherently standardless, enforceable only on the exercise of an unlimited, and hence arbitrary, discretion vested in the state.'" Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir.1986). | 1 | 1 |
MC v. Stategreen1 sentence1996See M.C. v. State , 600 So.2d 387 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991). | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. Stategreen1 sentence1994In Allen v. State, 380 So.2d 313, 326 (Ala. Cr.App.1979), cert. denied, 380 So.2d 341 (Ala.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 , 101 S.Ct. 121 , 66 L.Ed.2d 49 (1980), this Court stated: "The Alabama Supreme Court in Comer v. City of Mobile, Ala., 337 So.2d 742 (Ala.1976), considered the constitutionality of Act No. 130 of the Alabama Legislature, Regular Session 1975, and found the Act `not vague or overbroad.'" However, Comer was not concerned with the arguments here presented. "`The doctrine of vagueness, ... originates in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lanzetta v. New Jer | 1 | 1 |
| Kolender v. Lawsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Goguengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harrison v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. National Dairy Products Corp.
green
2 sentences2016This Court has explained: “ ‘ “The doctrine of vagueness ,.. originates in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 , 59 S.Ct. 618 , 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939), and is the basis for striking down legislation which contains insufficient warning of what conduct is unlawful, see United States v. National Dairy Products Corporation, 372 U.S. 29 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963). “ ‘ “Void for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed. 2016This Court has explained: “ ‘ “The doctrine of vagueness ,.. originates in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 , 59 S.Ct. 618 , 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939), and is the basis for striking down legislation which contains insufficient warning of what conduct is unlawful, see United States v. National Dairy Products Corporation, 372 U.S. 29 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963). “ ‘ “Void for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed. | 17 | 1983–2016 |
City of Chicago v. Morales
green
2 sentences2007The overbreadth doctrine protects the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, see Morales, 527 U.S. at 52 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 ; the vagueness doctrine seeks to protect the due-process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 2007The overbreadth doctrine protects the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, see Morales, 527 U.S. at 52 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 ; the vagueness doctrine seeks to protect the due-process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. | 3 | 2006–2007 |
Broadrick v. Oklahoma
green
2 sentences2007City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 , 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999). “[T]he overbreadth doctrine permits the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law are substantial when ‘judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Morales, 527 U.S. at 52 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). 2007City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 , 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999). “[T]he overbreadth doctrine permits the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law are substantial when ‘judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Morales, 527 U.S. at 52 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). | 3 | 2006–2007 |
Musgrove v. State
green
2 sentences2007In Musgrove v. State , 519 So.2d 565 (Ala.Crim.App.), aff'd, 519 So.2d 586 (Ala. 1986), this Court rejected a vagueness challenge to our first-degree-kidnapping statute, despite the fact that the statute did not define the term "terrorism." We noted that in construing criminal statutes words must be given their ordinary, commonly understood meaning, concluding that the statute provided fair warning of its prohibited *Page 1177 conduct. 519 So.2d at 582-83 . 2007In Musgrove v. State, 519 So.2d 565 (Ala.Crim.App.), aff'd, 519 So.2d 586 (Ala.1986), this Court rejected a vagueness challenge to our first-degree-kidnapping statute, despite the fact that the statute did not define the term “terrorism.” We noted that in construing criminal statutes words must be given their ordinary, commonly understood meaning, concluding that the statute provided fair warning of its prohib ited conduct. 519 So.2d at 582-83. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Ex Parte Musgrove.
green
2 sentences2007In Musgrove v. State , 519 So.2d 565 (Ala.Crim.App.), aff'd, 519 So.2d 586 (Ala. 1986), this Court rejected a vagueness challenge to our first-degree-kidnapping statute, despite the fact that the statute did not define the term "terrorism." We noted that in construing criminal statutes words must be given their ordinary, commonly understood meaning, concluding that the statute provided fair warning of its prohibited *Page 1177 conduct. 519 So.2d at 582-83 . 2007In Musgrove v. State, 519 So.2d 565 (Ala.Crim.App.), aff'd, 519 So.2d 586 (Ala.1986), this Court rejected a vagueness challenge to our first-degree-kidnapping statute, despite the fact that the statute did not define the term “terrorism.” We noted that in construing criminal statutes words must be given their ordinary, commonly understood meaning, concluding that the statute provided fair warning of its prohib ited conduct. 519 So.2d at 582-83. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
cluster 716733
green
1 sentence2010“To make a successful facial challenge in a non-First Amendment context, a litigant ‘must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.’ ” Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235 , 1253 n. 13 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
United States v. Allied Oil Corp.
green
1 sentence2010“To make a successful facial challenge in a non-First Amendment context, a litigant ‘must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.’ ” Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235 , 1253 n. 13 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Knapp
green
2 sentences2010“Because the vagueness challenge is not based on the First Amendment, this Court examines ‘ “whether the statute is vague as applied to the conduct allegedly proscribed in this case,” ’ instead of hypothetical concerns.” Cadle Co. v. City of Kentwood, 285 Mich.App. 240, 259 , 776 N.W.2d 145, 159 (2009) (quoting People v. Knapp, 244 Mich.App. 361 , 374 n. 4, 624 N.W.2d 227 (2001), quoting in turn People v. Vronko, 228 Mich.App. 649, 652 , 579 N.W.2d 138 (1998)(emphasis added)). 2010“Because the vagueness challenge is not based on the First Amendment, this Court examines ‘ “whether the statute is vague as applied to the conduct allegedly proscribed in this case,” ’ instead of hypothetical concerns.” Cadle Co. v. City of Kentwood, 285 Mich.App. 240, 259 , 776 N.W.2d 145, 159 (2009) (quoting People v. Knapp, 244 Mich.App. 361 , 374 n. 4, 624 N.W.2d 227 (2001), quoting in turn People v. Vronko, 228 Mich.App. 649, 652 , 579 N.W.2d 138 (1998)(emphasis added)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Vronko
green
2 sentences2010“Because the vagueness challenge is not based on the First Amendment, this Court examines ‘ “whether the statute is vague as applied to the conduct allegedly proscribed in this case,” ’ instead of hypothetical concerns.” Cadle Co. v. City of Kentwood, 285 Mich.App. 240, 259 , 776 N.W.2d 145, 159 (2009) (quoting People v. Knapp, 244 Mich.App. 361 , 374 n. 4, 624 N.W.2d 227 (2001), quoting in turn People v. Vronko, 228 Mich.App. 649, 652 , 579 N.W.2d 138 (1998)(emphasis added)). 2010“Because the vagueness challenge is not based on the First Amendment, this Court examines ‘ “whether the statute is vague as applied to the conduct allegedly proscribed in this case,” ’ instead of hypothetical concerns.” Cadle Co. v. City of Kentwood, 285 Mich.App. 240, 259 , 776 N.W.2d 145, 159 (2009) (quoting People v. Knapp, 244 Mich.App. 361 , 374 n. 4, 624 N.W.2d 227 (2001), quoting in turn People v. Vronko, 228 Mich.App. 649, 652 , 579 N.W.2d 138 (1998)(emphasis added)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
United States v. Salerno
green
2 sentences2010“To make a successful facial challenge in a non-First Amendment context, a litigant ‘must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.’ ” Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235 , 1253 n. 13 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)). 2010“To make a successful facial challenge in a non-First Amendment context, a litigant ‘must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.’ ” Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235 , 1253 n. 13 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
United States Civil Service Commission v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers
green
1 sentence2009As to the vagueness challenge, the Court held: “We have held today that the Hatch Act is not impermissibly vague. [United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548 (1973)]. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Ross Neely Exp., Inc. v. ALA. DEPT. OF ENVIRON. MANAGEMENT
green
1 sentence2006Mgmt , 437 So.2d 82 , 84 (Ala. 1983).' Alabama Dep't Envtl. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Comer v. City of Mobile
green
1 sentence1994In Allen v. State, 380 So.2d 313, 326 (Ala. Cr.App.1979), cert. denied, 380 So.2d 341 (Ala.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 , 101 S.Ct. 121 , 66 L.Ed.2d 49 (1980), this Court stated: "The Alabama Supreme Court in Comer v. City of Mobile, Ala., 337 So.2d 742 (Ala.1976), considered the constitutionality of Act No. 130 of the Alabama Legislature, Regular Session 1975, and found the Act `not vague or overbroad.'" However, Comer was not concerned with the arguments here presented. "`The doctrine of vagueness, ... originates in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lanzetta v. New Jer | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Ex Parte Allen
green
1 sentence1994In Allen v. State, 380 So.2d 313, 326 (Ala. Cr.App.1979), cert. denied, 380 So.2d 341 (Ala.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 , 101 S.Ct. 121 , 66 L.Ed.2d 49 (1980), this Court stated: "The Alabama Supreme Court in Comer v. City of Mobile, Ala., 337 So.2d 742 (Ala.1976), considered the constitutionality of Act No. 130 of the Alabama Legislature, Regular Session 1975, and found the Act `not vague or overbroad.'" However, Comer was not concerned with the arguments here presented. "`The doctrine of vagueness, ... originates in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lanzetta v. New Jer | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Urbatec v. Yuma County
green
1 sentence1994In Allen v. State, 380 So.2d 313, 326 (Ala. Cr.App.1979), cert. denied, 380 So.2d 341 (Ala.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 , 101 S.Ct. 121 , 66 L.Ed.2d 49 (1980), this Court stated: "The Alabama Supreme Court in Comer v. City of Mobile, Ala., 337 So.2d 742 (Ala.1976), considered the constitutionality of Act No. 130 of the Alabama Legislature, Regular Session 1975, and found the Act `not vague or overbroad.'" However, Comer was not concerned with the arguments here presented. "`The doctrine of vagueness, ... originates in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lanzetta v. New Jer | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Sterritt Trucking, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board
green
1 sentence1994In Allen v. State, 380 So.2d 313, 326 (Ala. Cr.App.1979), cert. denied, 380 So.2d 341 (Ala.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 , 101 S.Ct. 121 , 66 L.Ed.2d 49 (1980), this Court stated: "The Alabama Supreme Court in Comer v. City of Mobile, Ala., 337 So.2d 742 (Ala.1976), considered the constitutionality of Act No. 130 of the Alabama Legislature, Regular Session 1975, and found the Act `not vague or overbroad.'" However, Comer was not concerned with the arguments here presented. "`The doctrine of vagueness, ... originates in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lanzetta v. New Jer | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Allen v. Alabama
green
1 sentence1994In Allen v. State, 380 So.2d 313, 326 (Ala. Cr.App.1979), cert. denied, 380 So.2d 341 (Ala.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 , 101 S.Ct. 121 , 66 L.Ed.2d 49 (1980), this Court stated: "The Alabama Supreme Court in Comer v. City of Mobile, Ala., 337 So.2d 742 (Ala.1976), considered the constitutionality of Act No. 130 of the Alabama Legislature, Regular Session 1975, and found the Act `not vague or overbroad.'" However, Comer was not concerned with the arguments here presented. "`The doctrine of vagueness, ... originates in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lanzetta v. New Jer | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Palmore v. Sidoti green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Gibson v. South Carolina green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Martin v. Mitchell
green
1 sentence1993McCrary v. State, 429 So.2d 1121 (Ala.Crim.App.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 913 , 104 S.Ct. 273 , 78 L.Ed.2d 254 (1983). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| McCrary v. State green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Jackson v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Ex Parte Jackson green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Matthews v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Ex Parte Matthews green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Kinney v. State green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.