vagueness challenge in Florida

2025"Finally, a defendant who establishes only that the statute is vague in the sense that it requires a person to conform his or her conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible standard cannot prevail on a vagueness challenge." Barnes, 686 So. 2d at 637 (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489 , 495 n.7 (1982)). 24 Section 921.0021(7)(e) is not vague.

2018See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982) (stating that when analyzing a vagueness challenge, a court should "examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law").

2018If the record demonstrates that the [defendant] engaged in some conduct clearly proscribed by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute, then he cannot successfully challenge it for vagueness nor complain of its vagueness as applied to the hypothetical conduct of others.' Thus, the instant vagueness claim must be examined in light of the facts pertinent to this case before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law." (alteration in original) (quoting Sieniarecki v. State, 756 So. 2d 68, 74-75 (Fla. 2000))); Rice v. State, 754 So. 2d 881, 884 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) ("A challenge to a

2005Thus, in undertaking a vagueness analysis under the federal and Florida constitutions, the appellate court should "examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law." Id. at 75 .

2023However, “in a vagueness challenge, any doubt as to a statute’s validity should be resolved in favor of the citizen and against the State.” Id. (quoting DuFresne v. State, 826 So. 2d 272, 274 (Fla. 2002)).

2018Yet, "in a vagueness challenge, any doubt as to a statute's validity should be resolved in favor of the citizen and against the State." DuFresne v. State, 826 So. 2d 272, 274 (Fla. 2002).

2025See State v. Barnes, 686 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (explaining that a vagueness challenge which did not involve the First Amendment had to be reviewed on the facts of the case and on an as-applied basis); see also United States v. 23 Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 551 (1975).

2025"Finally, a defendant who establishes only that the statute is vague in the sense that it requires a person to conform his or her conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible standard cannot prevail on a vagueness challenge." Barnes, 686 So. 2d at 637 (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489 , 495 n.7 (1982)). 24 Section 921.0021(7)(e) is not vague.

2005Third, but related, where a vague statute "abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms." Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to "`steer far wider of the unlawful zone' ... than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 [, 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 ] (1972) (citations omitted); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 [, 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 ] (1983) ("the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine `is not actual notice,

2001However, any doubt as to a statute's validity that is raised in a vagueness challenge should be resolved "in favor of the citizen and against the state." Brown, 629 So.2d at 843 ; Wershow, 343 So.2d at 608 .

2016“The vagueness doctrine has a broader application ... because it was developed to assure compliance with the due process clause of the United States Constitution.” Id.

2000The appellant contends that these terms as defined in the Act are vague, especially the term "likely," which is used in the terminology "likely, to engage in acts of sexual violence." *650 The vagueness doctrine was adopted to assure compliance with the due process clause of the United States and Florida Constitutions. [8] See Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 453 So.2d 1351 (Fla. 1984); State v. Rawlins, 623 So.2d 598 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); State v. Hoyt, 609 So.2d 744 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

2006See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (stating that the "more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but the . . . requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement") (internal quotation marks omitted).

2006See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (stating that the "more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but the . . . requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement") (internal quotation marks omitted).

2019“To withstand a vagueness challenge, a statute must be specific enough to give persons of common intelligence and understanding adequate warning of the proscribed conduct.” State v. Mitro, 700 So. 2d 643 , 645 4 (Fla. 1997) (citing Trushin v. State, 425 So. 2d 1126, 1130 (Fla.1983).

2000See Trushin v. State, 425 So.2d 1126 (Fla.1982)(constitutional application of a statute to a particular set of facts must first be raised at the trial level).

2018If the record demonstrates that the [defendant] engaged in some conduct clearly proscribed by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute, then he cannot successfully challenge it for vagueness nor complain of its vagueness as applied to the hypothetical conduct of others.' Thus, the instant vagueness claim must be examined in light of the facts pertinent to this case before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law." (alteration in original) (quoting Sieniarecki v. State, 756 So. 2d 68, 74-75 (Fla. 2000))); Rice v. State, 754 So. 2d 881, 884 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) ("A challenge to a

2002A vagueness claim "must be evaluated by an examination of the statute in the abstract if the statute is one that purports to regulate constitutionally protected activity such as speech...." Travis v. State, 700 So.2d 104, 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

2000Id. (citing Perkins v. State, 576 So.2d 1310 (Fla.1991); State v. Bussey, 463 So.2d 1141 (Fla.1985); State v. Barquet, 262 So.2d 431 (Fla.1972)). [10] The term "likely" is also typically defined in dictionaries as meaning "probably." See e.g., American Heritage Dictionary 731 (2d ed. 1985) ("Possessing or displaying the qualities or characteristics that make something probable.").

1990"The question presented by a vagueness challenge ... is whether the language of the statute is sufficiently clear to provide a definite warning of what conduct will be deemed a violation; that is, whether ordinary people will understand what the statute requires or forbids, measured by common understanding and practice." State v. Bussey, 463 So.2d 1141, 1144 (Fla. 1985).

2000Nevertheless, while section 827.04(1)(a) may not be "a paradigm of legislative drafting," L.B., 700 So.2d at 371 (citing State v. Manfredonia, 649 So.2d 1388, 1390 (Fla.1995)), well settled principles of statutory construction adequately respond to the alleged vagueness challenge.

1997See, e.g., Manfredonia, 649 So.2d at 1391 (rejecting a vagueness challenge to a statute imposing a duty upon any adult in control of an open house party to “take reasonable steps” to prevent the possession or consumption of alcohol or drugs by a minor at that party).

2000The appellant contends that these terms as defined in the Act are vague, especially the term "likely," which is used in the terminology "likely, to engage in acts of sexual violence." *650 The vagueness doctrine was adopted to assure compliance with the due process clause of the United States and Florida Constitutions. [8] See Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 453 So.2d 1351 (Fla. 1984); State v. Rawlins, 623 So.2d 598 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); State v. Hoyt, 609 So.2d 744 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

2000State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980) (citing Washington v. State, 302 So.2d 401 (Fla.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 918 , 95 S.Ct. 1582 , 43 L.Ed.2d 786 (1975); Newman v. Carson, 280 So.2d 426 (Fla. 1973)); see also State v. Rawlins, 623 So.2d 598 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) ("The vagueness doctrine was developed to insure compliance with the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions which require that a law be declared void if it is so vague that one of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.") (citing Webb v. Department of

2023Before we address the merits of D.M.T.’s vagueness challenge, controlling case law requires us to first determine whether he “has standing to raise this challenge by examining his conduct in the record before us.” See J.L.S. v. State, 947 So. 2d 641, 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (citing State v. Brake, 796 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 2001); Dickerson v. State, 783 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)). “[T]he traditional rule is that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied lacks standing to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in sit

2012“This Court has noted, however, that in a vagueness challenge, any doubt as to a statute’s validity should be resolved in favor of the citizen and against the State.” Id. (citing State v. Brake, 796 So.2d 522, 527 (Fla.2001)).

2005Third, but related, where a vague statute "abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms." Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to "`steer far wider of the unlawful zone' ... than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 [, 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 ] (1972) (citations omitted); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 [, 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 ] (1983) ("the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine `is not actual notice,

2005Third, but related, where a vague statute "abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms." Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to "`steer far wider of the unlawful zone' ... than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 [, 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 ] (1972) (citations omitted); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 [, 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 ] (1983) ("the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine `is not actual notice,

2019See Hughes v. State, 943 So. 2d 176, 189 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (rejecting a vagueness claim and noting “[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of a word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary.”); accord State v. Hagan, 387 So. 2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980) (noting that the “legislature’s failure to define a statutory term does not in and of itself render a penal provision unconstitutionally vague”).

2000State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980) (citing Washington v. State, 302 So.2d 401 (Fla.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 918 , 95 S.Ct. 1582 , 43 L.Ed.2d 786 (1975); Newman v. Carson, 280 So.2d 426 (Fla. 1973)); see also State v. Rawlins, 623 So.2d 598 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) ("The vagueness doctrine was developed to insure compliance with the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions which require that a law be declared void if it is so vague that one of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.") (citing Webb v. Department of

1999In State v. Kahles, 644 So.2d 512, 512-13 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), approved, 657 So.2d 897 (Fla.1995), this court stated the following with regard to the principles to be applied in determining whether a criminal statute is facially unconstitutional: In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court's first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.

1998In State v. Kahles, 644 So.2d 512 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), approved, 657 So.2d 897 (Fla.1995), this court explained the various principles that a court must apply in determining whether a criminal statute is facially unconstitutional for vagueness: The court should then examine the facial vagueness challenge and, assuming the enactment implicates no constitutionally protected conduct, should uphold the challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.

2025“A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence with a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, and is written in a manner that encourages or permits arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.” Cashatt v. State, 873 So. 2d 430, 435 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

2018After all, "[a] facial challenge to a -7- statute is more difficult than an 'as applied' challenge, because the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid." Cashatt v. State, 873 So. 2d 430, 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

2023In so stating, we cited as one example State v. Gaylord, where we had defined “malice” in the aggravated child abuse context to mean “ill will, hatred, spite, an evil intent.” 356 So. 2d 313, 314 (Fla. 1978).

2023We found that this challenge lacked merit, and in addressing the defendant’s vagueness argument stated that “[t]his Court has repeatedly upheld the terms ‘malice’ and ‘malicious’ against a vagueness challenge.” Id. at 1263 . 15 We cited Gaylord in support of this proposition, a case in which we said, without much analysis, that “[m]alice means ill will, hatred, spite, an evil intent” before rejecting a vagueness and overbreadth challenge to section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1975), which criminalized aggravated child abuse. 356 So. 2d at 314 .16 But our mere citation of Gaylord in rejecting a v

2023Before we address the merits of D.M.T.’s vagueness challenge, controlling case law requires us to first determine whether he “has standing to raise this challenge by examining his conduct in the record before us.” See J.L.S. v. State, 947 So. 2d 641, 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (citing State v. Brake, 796 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 2001); Dickerson v. State, 783 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)). “[T]he traditional rule is that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied lacks standing to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in sit

2007See, e.g., J.L.S. v. State, 947 So.2d 641, 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).

2018If the record demonstrates that the [defendant] engaged in some conduct clearly proscribed by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute, then he cannot successfully challenge it for vagueness nor complain of its vagueness as applied to the hypothetical conduct of others.' Thus, the instant vagueness claim must be examined in light of the facts pertinent to this case before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law." (alteration in original) (quoting Sieniarecki v. State, 756 So. 2d 68, 74-75 (Fla. 2000))); Rice v. State, 754 So. 2d 881, 884 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) ("A challenge to a

2000Specifically, he argues that it fails to define the terms "church or religious organization," "regularly conducts," and "religious services." In rejecting a vagueness challenge of section 893.13(1)(e), the Fifth District in Rice v. State, 754 So.2d 881, 884 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), stated that the first inquiry must be whether the defendant's conduct clearly violates the statute. [A] statute like paragraph 893.13(1)(e) which does not purport to regulate constitutionally protected conduct can be struck down as being unconstitutionally vague only if the statutory language is so vague that it fails t

2006App.1988), or "on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 , *188 767, 102 S.Ct. 3348 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)); see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982) ("A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."); Sieniareck

2006App.1988), or "on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982)(citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)); see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)("A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."); Sieniarecki v. St

2019“To withstand a vagueness challenge, a statute must be specific enough to give persons of common intelligence and understanding adequate warning of the proscribed conduct.” State v. Mitro, 700 So. 2d 643 , 645 4 (Fla. 1997) (citing Trushin v. State, 425 So. 2d 1126, 1130 (Fla.1983).

1999Appellant contends that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to define "a place of worship," "a church or religious organization," or "regularly conducted religious services." "In order to withstand a vagueness challenge, a statute must be specific enough to give persons of common intelligence and understanding adequate warning of the proscribed conduct." State v. Mitro, 700 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla.1997) (citations omitted).

2000Nevertheless, while section 827.04(1)(a) may not be "a paradigm of legislative drafting," L.B., 700 So.2d at 371 (citing State v. Manfredonia, 649 So.2d 1388, 1390 (Fla.1995)), well settled principles of statutory construction adequately respond to the alleged vagueness challenge.

2000So long as "it is evident to citizens and factfinders" whether something is covered "under any intended definition" of a term and so long as the term appeals to the "norms of the community, which is precisely the gauge by which vagueness is *858 to be judged," the statute will survive a vagueness challenge, even if the Legislature's chosen words do not exemplify a "model of clarity." L.B. v. State, 700 So.2d 370 , 372, 373 (Fla.1997), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. A.M., 765 So.2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). "[A]ll doubts as to the validity of a statute are to be reso

1999In State v. Kahles, 644 So.2d 512, 512-13 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), approved, 657 So.2d 897 (Fla.1995), this court stated the following with regard to the principles to be applied in determining whether a criminal statute is facially unconstitutional: In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court's first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.

1998In State v. Kahles, 644 So.2d 512 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), approved, 657 So.2d 897 (Fla.1995), this court explained the various principles that a court must apply in determining whether a criminal statute is facially unconstitutional for vagueness: The court should then examine the facial vagueness challenge and, assuming the enactment implicates no constitutionally protected conduct, should uphold the challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.