vagueness challenge in Kansas

2020To survive a vagueness challenge, a law must "define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 19 understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S. Ct. 1855 , 75 L.

2020To survive a vagueness challenge, a law must "define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 19 understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S. Ct. 1855 , 75 L.

1981We noted that the title of the statute was “endangering a child” and that in State v. Kirby, 222 Kan. 1 , 563 P.2d 408 (1977), we found the language “endangering of life” without further statutory definition too indefinite to pass the vagueness test applicable to criminal statutes.

1981We noted that the title of the statute was “endangering a child” and that in State v. Kirby, 222 Kan. 1 , 563 P.2d 408 (1977), we found the language “endangering of life” without further statutory definition too indefinite to pass the vagueness test applicable to criminal statutes.

2021Our inquiry is "'whether a person of ordinary intelligence understands what conduct is prohibited by' the statutory language at issue." State v. Richardson, 289 Kan. 118, 125 , 209 P.3d 696 (2009). • Under the separation of powers doctrine inherent in our constitutional structure, the statute must adequately guard against arbitrary and unreasonable enforcement.

2020Finally, the need to prevent "arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is heightened for criminal statutes because criminal violations result in the loss of personal liberty." Richardson, 289 Kan. at 125 . 7 Most litigation concerning vagueness in statutes has tended to focus on the due process elements of the vagueness doctrine.

2020In City of Lincoln Center v. Farmway Co-Op, Inc., 298 Kan. 540, 546 , 316 P.3d 707 (2013), we considered the City's ordinance that criminalized the making of "'any excessive, unnecessary, unreasonable or unusually loud noise which either annoys, disrupts, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, health, peace or safety of others within the City.'" We held this language "fails the second prong of the vagueness inquiry" because it failed to "'convey sufficient clarity to those who apply the ordinance standards to protect against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'" 298 Kan. at 549 (quoti

2020In City of Lincoln Center v. Farmway Co-Op, Inc., 298 Kan. 540, 546 , 316 P.3d 707 (2013), we considered the City's ordinance that criminalized the making of "'any excessive, unnecessary, unreasonable or unusually loud noise which either annoys, disrupts, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, health, peace or safety of others within the City.'" We held this language "fails the second prong of the vagueness inquiry" because it failed to "'convey sufficient clarity to those who apply the ordinance standards to protect against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'" 298 Kan. at 549 (quoti

2018McLinn cannot assert this vagueness challenge through circumstances not in her own case, see Papen, 274 Kan. at 162 , and thus her second constitutional challenge to K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6624 fails.

2018McLinn cannot assert this vagueness challenge through circumstances not in her own case, see Papen, 274 Kan. at 162 , and thus her second constitutional challenge to K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6624 fails.

2015Ed. 2d 903 (1983) (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574-75 , 94 S. Ct. 1242 , 39 L.

2015Ed. 2d 903 (1983) (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574-75 , 94 S. Ct. 1242 , 39 L.

2007The court in Brooks also noted that prior case law may provide a settled meaning for a statutory phrase, thus providing sufficient certainly as to die statute’s meaning to guide citizen conduct. 228 Kan. at 544 .

2007The court in Brooks also noted that prior case law may provide a settled meaning for a statutory phrase, thus providing sufficient certainty as to the statute's meaning to guide citizen conduct. 228 Kan. at 544 , 618 P.2d 814 .

2026Vagueness challenge to term "about," "immediate access," and "loaded" Wilson next alleges that K.S.A. 21-6332(a) is vague because it "fails to provide adequate direction for one to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct because terminology like about, immediate access, and loaded enable policemen, prosecutors, judges, and juries to resolve their meaning on an ad hoc subjective basis." We interpret Wilson's argument to challenge whether the forementioned terms "give fair warning to those potentially subject" to them and whether the terms "adequately guard[] against arbitrary and unreasonable

2021Ed. 2d 866 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("In fact, it appears that the Court's void-for-overbreadth rule developed as a result of the vagueness doctrine's application in the First Amendment context."); State v. Hughes, 246 Kan. 607, 616 , 792 P.2d 1023 (1990) ("Nevertheless, the overbreadth doctrine has been applied by the United States Supreme Court where the operation of a statute infringes on freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, where those freedoms involve privacy rights and medical matters." [Emphasis added.]).

2021Ed. 2d 866 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("In fact, it appears that the Court's void-for-overbreadth rule developed as a result of the vagueness doctrine's application in the First Amendment context."); State v. Hughes, 246 Kan. 607, 616 , 792 P.2d 1023 (1990) ("Nevertheless, the overbreadth doctrine has been applied by the United States Supreme Court where the operation of a statute infringes on freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, where those freedoms involve privacy rights and medical matters." [Emphasis added.]).

2020In City of Lincoln Center v. Farmway Co-Op, Inc., 298 Kan. 540, 546 , 316 P.3d 707 (2013), we considered the City's ordinance that criminalized the making of "'any excessive, unnecessary, unreasonable or unusually loud noise which either annoys, disrupts, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, health, peace or safety of others within the City.'" We held this language "fails the second prong of the vagueness inquiry" because it failed to "'convey sufficient clarity to those who apply the ordinance standards to protect against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'" 298 Kan. at 549 (quoti

2020In City of Lincoln Center v. Farmway Co-Op, Inc., 298 Kan. 540, 546 , 316 P.3d 707 (2013), we considered the City's ordinance that criminalized the making of "'any excessive, unnecessary, unreasonable or unusually loud noise which either annoys, disrupts, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, health, peace or safety of others within the City.'" We held this language "fails the second prong of the vagueness inquiry" because it failed to "'convey sufficient clarity to those who apply the ordinance standards to protect against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'" 298 Kan. at 549 (quoti

2020The plain language of the defining statutory and regulatory provisions is clear." 311 Kan. at 56-57, 455 P.3d at 791 .

2015In People v. Ross, 41 Ill. 2d 445 , 244 N.E.2d 608 (1968), the Illinois Supreme Court considered a vagueness challenge to its arson statute.

2015In People v. Ross, 41 Ill. 2d 445 , 244 N.E.2d 608 (1968), the Illinois Supreme Court considered a vagueness challenge to its arson statute.

2013In rejecting this argument, we relied on the definition of “prejudicial” and reasoned that this term sufficiently defined the degree of conduct expected from a licensed attorney. 284 Kan. at 201 (quoting State v. Nelson, 210 Kan. 637, 639-40 , 504 P.2d 211 [1972]).

2013In rejecting this argument, we relied on the definition of “prejudicial” and reasoned that this term sufficiently defined the degree of conduct expected from a licensed attorney. 284 Kan. at 201 (quoting State v. Nelson, 210 Kan. 637, 639-40 , 504 P.2d 211 [1972]).

2013A successful overbreadth challenge can thus be made only when 1) the protected activity is a significant part of the law’s target, and 2) there exists no satisfactory method of severing the law’s constitutional from its unconstitutional applications. [Citation omitted.]’ [[Image here]] ‘ “The distinction between the doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness is that the overbreadth doctrine is applicable primarily in the First Amendment area and may render void legislation which is lacking neither in clarity nor precision, whereas the vagueness doctrine is rested on the due process clauses of the

2013There we considered the respondent’s vagueness challenge and his suggestion that the rule is “ ‘a simplistic standard that warns nobody of what hidden layer of discipline awaits them.’ ” 284 Kan. at 200 .

2013In rejecting this argument, we relied on the definition of “prejudicial” and reasoned that this term sufficiently defined the degree of conduct expected from a licensed attorney. 284 Kan. at 201 (quoting State v. Nelson, 210 Kan. 637, 639-40 , 504 P.2d 211 [1972]).

2012The vagueness doctrine is premised on the notion that the law must “give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 , 92 S. Ct. 2294 , 33 L.

2012The vagueness doctrine is premised on the notion that the law must “give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 , 92 S. Ct. 2294 , 33 L.

2008Turning to the second part of the vagueness test — arbitrary enforcement — we acknowledge that testing at different times during a 2-honr period may reveal different alcohol concentrations, and it is conceivable that some results might be less than .08 and others equal to or more than that amount..We nevertheless do not agree with the conclusion in Baker that this “encourages arbitrary enforcement.” 720 A.2d at 1149 .

2004However, State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 717 , 887 P.2d 110 (1994), modified the statement in Willis and held that the new instruction should be used only in cases where the vagueness of the instruction had been raised in both the trial court and as an issue on appeal.

2004However, State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 717 , 887 P.2d 110 (1994), modified the statement in Willis and held that the new instruction should be used only in cases where the vagueness of the instruction had been raised in both the trial court and as an issue on appeal.

2002In Adams , we also spoke of the second part of the vagueness analysis, which consists of a determination of whether the statute “ ‘adequately guards against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ [Citations omitted.] When making either inquiry, the court should bear in mind that ‘[t]he standards of certainty in a statute punishing criminal offenses are higher than in those depending primarily upon civil sanctions for enforcement.’ [Citation omitted.]” 254 Kan. at 439 .

2001App.3d 719 , 403 N.E.2d 90 (1980), also addressed a vagueness challenge to “unsightly.” Seiber, the property owner, claimed the nuisance provisions of the Collinsville ordinance were unconstitutionally vague, arguing that the terms “unsightly” and “junk” were not defined.

2001App.3d 719 , 403 N.E.2d 90 (1980), also addressed a vagueness challenge to "unsightly." Seiber, the property owner, claimed the nuisance provisions of the Collinsville ordinance were unconstitutionally vague, arguing that the terms "unsightly" and "junk" were not defined.