75 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2025 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gravesgreen2 sentences2025See ORS 163.665(3) (f) (defining “sexually explicit conduct,” in part, as the “actual or simulated * * * [l]ewd exhibition of sexual or other intimate parts” (emphasis added)). 7 Article I, section 20, provides, “No law shall be passed granting to any cit- izen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” 8 Article I, section 21, provides in relevant part, “No ex-post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall ever be passed, nor shall any law be passed, the taking effect of which shall be made to depe 2025See ORS 163.665(3) (f) (defining “sexually explicit conduct,” in part, as the “actual or simulated * * * [l]ewd exhibition of sexual or other intimate parts” (emphasis added)). 7 Article I, section 20, provides, “No law shall be passed granting to any cit- izen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” 8 Article I, section 21, provides in relevant part, “No ex-post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall ever be passed, nor shall any law be passed, the taking effect of which shall be made to depe | 5 | 15 |
State v. Plowmangreen2 sentences2009Of that category, this court wrote: “ ‘If [a] statute [is] directed only against causing the forbidden effects, a person accused of causing such effects by language or gestures would be left to assert (apart from a vagueness claim) that the statute could not constitutionally be applied to his particular words or other expression, not that it was drawn and enacted contrary to [A]rticle I, section 8.’ Id. at 417 .” State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 163-64 , 838 P2d 558 (1992), cert den, 508 US 974 (1993) (emphasis in original); see also State v. Ciancanelli, 339 Or 282 , 121 P3d 613 (2005) (reaffirm 2009Of that category, this court wrote: “ ‘If [a] statute [is] directed only against causing the forbidden effects, a person accused of causing such effects by language or gestures would be left to assert (apart from a vagueness claim) that the statute could not constitutionally be applied to his particular words or other expression, not that it was drawn and enacted contrary to [A]rticle I, section 8.’ Id. at 417 .” State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 163-64 , 838 P2d 558 (1992), cert den, 508 US 974 (1993) (emphasis in original); see also State v. Ciancanelli, 339 Or 282 , 121 P3d 613 (2005) (reaffirm | 4 | 8 |
United States v. Anthony Evansgreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., Evans, 883 F3d at 1164 (“[A] vague supervised release con- dition ‘cannot be cured by allowing the probation officer an unfettered power of interpretation, as this would create one of the very problems against which the vagueness doctrine is meant to protect, i.e., the delegation of basic policy matters to policemen for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.’ ” (Quoting United States v. Soltero, 510 F3d 858 , 867 n 10 (9th Cir 2007).); see also State v. Wallmuller, 194 Wash 2d 234, 240, 449 P3d 619, 621 (2019) (explaining that a condition bar- ring an individual from frequent 2025See, e.g., Evans, 883 F3d at 1164 (“[A] vague supervised release con- dition ‘cannot be cured by allowing the probation officer an unfettered power of interpretation, as this would create one of the very problems against which the vagueness doctrine is meant to protect, i.e., the delegation of basic policy matters to policemen for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.’ ” (Quoting United States v. Soltero, 510 F3d 858 , 867 n 10 (9th Cir 2007).); see also State v. Wallmuller, 194 Wash 2d 234, 240, 449 P3d 619, 621 (2019) (explaining that a condition bar- ring an individual from frequent | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Solterogreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., Evans, 883 F3d at 1164 (“[A] vague supervised release con- dition ‘cannot be cured by allowing the probation officer an unfettered power of interpretation, as this would create one of the very problems against which the vagueness doctrine is meant to protect, i.e., the delegation of basic policy matters to policemen for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.’ ” (Quoting United States v. Soltero, 510 F3d 858 , 867 n 10 (9th Cir 2007).); see also State v. Wallmuller, 194 Wash 2d 234, 240, 449 P3d 619, 621 (2019) (explaining that a condition bar- ring an individual from frequent 2025See, e.g., Evans, 883 F3d at 1164 (“[A] vague supervised release con- dition ‘cannot be cured by allowing the probation officer an unfettered power of interpretation, as this would create one of the very problems against which the vagueness doctrine is meant to protect, i.e., the delegation of basic policy matters to policemen for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.’ ” (Quoting United States v. Soltero, 510 F3d 858 , 867 n 10 (9th Cir 2007).); see also State v. Wallmuller, 194 Wash 2d 234, 240, 449 P3d 619, 621 (2019) (explaining that a condition bar- ring an individual from frequent | 3 | 3 |
State v. Wallmullergreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., Evans, 883 F3d at 1164 (“[A] vague supervised release con- dition ‘cannot be cured by allowing the probation officer an unfettered power of interpretation, as this would create one of the very problems against which the vagueness doctrine is meant to protect, i.e., the delegation of basic policy matters to policemen for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.’ ” (Quoting United States v. Soltero, 510 F3d 858 , 867 n 10 (9th Cir 2007).); see also State v. Wallmuller, 194 Wash 2d 234, 240, 449 P3d 619, 621 (2019) (explaining that a condition bar- ring an individual from frequent 2025See, e.g., Evans, 883 F3d at 1164 (“[A] vague supervised release con- dition ‘cannot be cured by allowing the probation officer an unfettered power of interpretation, as this would create one of the very problems against which the vagueness doctrine is meant to protect, i.e., the delegation of basic policy matters to policemen for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.’ ” (Quoting United States v. Soltero, 510 F3d 858 , 867 n 10 (9th Cir 2007).); see also State v. Wallmuller, 194 Wash 2d 234, 240, 449 P3d 619, 621 (2019) (explaining that a condition bar- ring an individual from frequent | 3 | 3 |
State v. McKenziegreen2 sentences2002See *280 State v. McKenzie, 307 Or 554, 560 , 771 P2d 264 (1989) (holding vagueness challenge proper basis for demurrer to indictment). 1995In State v. McKenzie, supra, 307 Or at 560, in dicta, the court stated that a vagueness challenge comes within ORS 135.630(4), because facts alleged in an indictment under a constitutionally vague statute do not and cannot constitute an offense. | 2 | 3 |
State v. DiMolfettogreen2 sentences2025See ORS 163.665(3) (f) (defining “sexually explicit conduct,” in part, as the “actual or simulated * * * [l]ewd exhibition of sexual or other intimate parts” (emphasis added)). 7 Article I, section 20, provides, “No law shall be passed granting to any cit- izen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” 8 Article I, section 21, provides in relevant part, “No ex-post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall ever be passed, nor shall any law be passed, the taking effect of which shall be made to depe 2025See ORS 163.665 (3)(f) (defining “sexually explicit conduct,” in part, as the “actual or simulated * * * [l]ewd exhibition of sexual or other intimate parts” (emphasis added)). 7 Article I, section 20, provides, “No law shall be passed granting to any cit- izen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” 8 Article I, section 21, provides, in relevant part, “No ex-post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall ever be passed, nor shall any law be passed, the taking effect of which shall be made to dep | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Reevesgreen2 sentences2023The dictionary definition still requires interpretation of the meaning of “serious” and “lasting” in terms of a “romantic relationship.” In United States v. Reeves, 591 F3d 77, 79 (2d Cir 2010), the Second Circuit determined that the phrase “significant romantic relationship” was an unconstitution- ally vague condition, because “[w]hat makes a relationship ‘romantic,’ let alone ‘significant’ in its romantic depth, can be the subject of endless debate that varies across genera- tions, regions and genders.” Reeves, 591 F3d at 81 . 588 State v. Priester Like the condition in Reeves, the dictionar 2023The dictionary definition still requires interpretation of the meaning of “serious” and “lasting” in terms of a “romantic relationship.” In United States v. Reeves, 591 F3d 77, 79 (2d Cir 2010), the Second Circuit determined that the phrase “significant romantic relationship” was an unconstitution- ally vague condition, because “[w]hat makes a relationship ‘romantic,’ let alone ‘significant’ in its romantic depth, can be the subject of endless debate that varies across genera- tions, regions and genders.” Reeves, 591 F3d at 81 . 588 State v. Priester Like the condition in Reeves, the dictionar | 2 | 2 |
Delgado v. Soudersgreen2 sentences2003That mistake was recognized and rectified, however, in Delgado : "[T]his court's case law could be read to suggest that a vagueness challenge under Article I, section 21, can encompass a `fair notice' elementthat is, that Article I, section 21, prohibits the enactment of a law that fails to inform those who are subject to it, in a sufficiently explicit manner, `"what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties."' "Upon closer examination of the case law, however, it is apparent that such suggestions concern the nature of the vagueness doctrine generally, rather than articul 2003That mistake was recognized and rectified, however, in Delgado : "[T]his court's case law could be read to suggest that a vagueness challenge under Article I, section 21, can encompass a `fair notice' elementthat is, that Article I, section 21, prohibits the enactment of a law that fails to inform those who are subject to it, in a sufficiently explicit manner, `"what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties."' "Upon closer examination of the case law, however, it is apparent that such suggestions concern the nature of the vagueness doctrine generally, rather than articul | 2 | 2 |
State v. Robertsongreen2 sentences2012Of that category, this court wrote: “ ‘If [a] statute [is] directed only against causing the forbidden effects, a person accused of causing such effects by language or gestures would be left to assert (apart from a vagueness claim) that the statute could not constitutionally be applied to his particular words or other expression, not that it was drawn and enacted contrary to article I, section 8.’ Id. at 417 .” (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted; second omission and second through fourth brackets in Plowman.) Robertson, Plowman, and numerous subsequent Article I, section 8, cases, then, d 2011The court later reiterated that “article I, section 8, prohibits lawmakers from enacting restrictions that focus on the content of speech or writing, either because that content itself is deemed socially undesirable or offensive, or because it is thought to have adverse consequences. * * * It means that laws must focus on proscribing the pursuit or accomplishment of forbidden results rather than on the suppression of speech or writing either as an end in itself or as a means to some other legislative end. * * * If [a] statute [is] directed only against causing the forbidden effects, a person a | 1 | 15 |
Megdal v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examinersgreen2 sentences2002We begin with Article I, section 21, which provides, in part: “No ex-post facto law * * * shall ever be passed * * As pertinent to a vagueness challenge, that constitutional provision prevents those charged with enforcing and applying criminal laws “to make the law after the event.” State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 408 , 649 P2d 569 (1982); see also State v. Cornell I Pinnell, 304 Or 27, 32-33 , 741 P2d 501 (1987) (Article I, section 21, prohibits granting “unbridled discretion” to judge and jury in respect of applying criminal statute in question); Megdal v. Board of Dental Examiners, 288 Or 2 2002We begin with Article I, section 21, which provides, in part: “No ex-post facto law * * * shall ever be passed * * As pertinent to a vagueness challenge, that constitutional provision prevents those charged with enforcing and applying criminal laws “to make the law after the event.” State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 408 , 649 P2d 569 (1982); see also State v. Cornell I Pinnell, 304 Or 27, 32-33 , 741 P2d 501 (1987) (Article I, section 21, prohibits granting “unbridled discretion” to judge and jury in respect of applying criminal statute in question); Megdal v. Board of Dental Examiners, 288 Or 2 | 1 | 5 |
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.green2 sentences2017The Supreme Court has explained that in a vagueness inquiry, the level of specificity required depends on the type of enactment challenged: “[t]he degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates—as well as the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement—depends in part on the nature of the enactment,” Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). 2017The Supreme Court has explained that in a vagueness inquiry, the level of specificity required depends on the type of enactment challenged: “[t]he degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates—as well as the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement—depends in part on the nature of the enactment,” Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). | 1 | 4 |
State v. Hodgesgreen2 sentences2002See Graves, 299 Or at 195 (in discussing fair notice requirement, court cited State v. Hodges, 254 Or 21, 27 , 457 P2d 491 (1969), which set out fair notice requirement under Due Process Clause); see also Chakerian, 325 Or at 382 (citing Graves for “fair notice” proposition); Plowman, 314 Or at 160 (same); Cornell /Pinnell, 304 Or at 29-30 (same). 13 We note that, in Davidson, 300 Or 415 , this court suggested that a civil statute that imposed a forfeiture penalty was more likely to implicate vagueness protections under the state and federal constitutions than a civil statute that governed pro 2002See Graves, 299 Or at 195 (in discussing fair notice requirement, court cited State v. Hodges, 254 Or 21, 27 , 457 P2d 491 (1969), which set out fair notice requirement under Due Process Clause); see also Chakerian, 325 Or at 382 (citing Graves for “fair notice” proposition); Plowman, 314 Or at 160 (same); Cornell /Pinnell, 304 Or at 29-30 (same). 13 We note that, in Davidson, 300 Or 415 , this court suggested that a civil statute that imposed a forfeiture penalty was more likely to implicate vagueness protections under the state and federal constitutions than a civil statute that governed pro | 1 | 3 |
State v. Illig-Renngreen2 sentences2011Id. at 146-47. 12 Later, the court reaffirmed in State v. Illig-Renn, 341 Or 228 , 239 n 4, 142 P3d 62 (2006), that “[t]he ‘fair notice’ component of the vagueness analysis is not an issue under the Oregon Constitution.” Defendant argues that the discussions of fair notice in Delgado and Illig-Renn were dicta and that we should follow the holding in Graves rather than the dicta in those cases. 2011Id. at 146-47. 12 Later, the court reaffirmed in State v. Illig-Renn, 341 Or 228 , 239 n 4, 142 P3d 62 (2006), that “[t]he ‘fair notice’ component of the vagueness analysis is not an issue under the Oregon Constitution.” Defendant argues that the discussions of fair notice in Delgado and Illig-Renn were dicta and that we should follow the holding in Graves rather than the dicta in those cases. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Ciancanelligreen2 sentences2009Of that category, this court wrote: “ ‘If [a] statute [is] directed only against causing the forbidden effects, a person accused of causing such effects by language or gestures would be left to assert (apart from a vagueness claim) that the statute could not constitutionally be applied to his particular words or other expression, not that it was drawn and enacted contrary to [A]rticle I, section 8.’ Id. at 417 .” State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 163-64 , 838 P2d 558 (1992), cert den, 508 US 974 (1993) (emphasis in original); see also State v. Ciancanelli, 339 Or 282 , 121 P3d 613 (2005) (reaffirm 2009Of that category, this court wrote: “ ‘If [a] statute [is] directed only against causing the forbidden effects, a person accused of causing such effects by language or gestures would be left to assert (apart from a vagueness claim) that the statute could not constitutionally be applied to his particular words or other expression, not that it was drawn and enacted contrary to [A]rticle I, section 8.’ Id. at 417 .” State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 163-64 , 838 P2d 558 (1992), cert den, 508 US 974 (1993) (emphasis in original); see also State v. Ciancanelli, 339 Or 282 , 121 P3d 613 (2005) (reaffirm | 1 | 2 |
State v. Ausmusgreen2 sentences2003In Ausmus, we began by recognizing that the defendant's vagueness claim rested on Article I, sections 20 and 21, of the Oregon Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution. [3] 178 Or.App. at 326 , 37 P.3d 1024 . 2003In Ausmus, we began by recognizing that the defendant's vagueness claim rested on Article I, sections 20 and 21, of the Oregon Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution. [3] 178 Or.App. at 326 , 37 P.3d 1024 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Chakeriangreen2 sentences2002We note, however, that this court’s case law could be read to suggest that a vagueness challenge under Article I, section 21, can encompass a “fair notice” element — that is, that Article I, section 21, prohibits the enactment of a law that fails to inform those who are subject to it, in a sufficiently explicit manner, “ ‘what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.’ ” State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 160 , 838 P2d 558 (1992), cert den 508 US 974 (1993) (citing State v. Graves, 299 Or 189, 195 , 700 P2d 244 (1985)); see also State v. Chakerian, 325 Or 370, 382 , 938 P2d 75 2002We note, however, that this court’s case law could be read to suggest that a vagueness challenge under Article I, section 21, can encompass a “fair notice” element — that is, that Article I, section 21, prohibits the enactment of a law that fails to inform those who are subject to it, in a sufficiently explicit manner, “ ‘what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.’ ” State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 160 , 838 P2d 558 (1992), cert den 508 US 974 (1993) (citing State v. Graves, 299 Or 189, 195 , 700 P2d 244 (1985)); see also State v. Chakerian, 325 Or 370, 382 , 938 P2d 75 | 1 | 2 |
State v. Cornellgreen2 sentences2002We begin with Article I, section 21, which provides, in part: “No ex-post facto law * * * shall ever be passed * * As pertinent to a vagueness challenge, that constitutional provision prevents those charged with enforcing and applying criminal laws “to make the law after the event.” State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 408 , 649 P2d 569 (1982); see also State v. Cornell I Pinnell, 304 Or 27, 32-33 , 741 P2d 501 (1987) (Article I, section 21, prohibits granting “unbridled discretion” to judge and jury in respect of applying criminal statute in question); Megdal v. Board of Dental Examiners, 288 Or 2 2002We begin with Article I, section 21, which provides, in part: “No ex-post facto law * * * shall ever be passed * * As pertinent to a vagueness challenge, that constitutional provision prevents those charged with enforcing and applying criminal laws “to make the law after the event.” State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 408 , 649 P2d 569 (1982); see also State v. Cornell I Pinnell, 304 Or 27, 32-33 , 741 P2d 501 (1987) (Article I, section 21, prohibits granting “unbridled discretion” to judge and jury in respect of applying criminal statute in question); Megdal v. Board of Dental Examiners, 288 Or 2 | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Meyergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davidson v. Oregon Government Ethics Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Whitfordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. McKenziegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Pursellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Crossgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Plowman v. Oregon
green
2 sentences2009Of that category, this court wrote: “ ‘If [a] statute [is] directed only against causing the forbidden effects, a person accused of causing such effects by language or gestures would be left to assert (apart from a vagueness claim) that the statute could not constitutionally be applied to his particular words or other expression, not that it was drawn and enacted contrary to [A]rticle I, section 8.’ Id. at 417 .” State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 163-64 , 838 P2d 558 (1992), cert den, 508 US 974 (1993) (emphasis in original); see also State v. Ciancanelli, 339 Or 282 , 121 P3d 613 (2005) (reaffirm 2006Of that category, this court wrote: “ ‘If [a] statute [is] directed only against causing the forbidden effects, a person accused of causing such effects by language or gestures would be left to assert (apart from a vagueness claim) that the statute could not constitutionally be applied to his particular words or other expression, not that it was drawn and enacted contrary to article I, section 8.’ ” State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 163-64 , 838 P2d 558 (1992), cert den, 508 US 974 (1993) (quoting Robertson-, internal citations and footnote omitted; alterations and emphasis in Plowman). | 4 | 2002–2021 |
State v. Cortes
green
2 sentences2025Considering the need for fair notice, the state’s proffered reading of “weapons” in ORS 137.540—partic- ularly when considered within the context of constructive Cite as 374 Or 461 (2025) 491 possession—invites potential state and federal constitu- tional problems, independently under Article I, section 34, of the Oregon Constitution, and the state constitutional princi- ples articulated in Graves, 299 Or 189 , and separately under the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution. 2025Considering the need for fair notice, the state’s proffered reading of “weapons” in ORS 137.540—partic- ularly when considered within the context of constructive Cite as 374 Or 461 (2025) 491 possession—invites potential state and federal constitu- tional problems, independently under Article I, section 34, of the Oregon Constitution, and the state constitutional princi- ples articulated in Graves, 299 Or 189 , and separately under the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution. | 3 | 2025–2025 |
City of Portland v. James
green
2 sentences1976In City of Portland v. James, 251 Or 8 , 444 P2d 554 (1968), the Oregon Supreme Court indicated that the vagueness doctrine could also rest on the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment because a vague statute does not provide sufficiently ascertainable standards from which a reasonably prudent man could form a belief in the guilt of the accused. 1976In City of Portland v. James, 251 Or 8 , 444 P2d 554 (1968), the Oregon Supreme Court indicated that the vagueness doctrine could also rest on the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment because a vague statute does not provide sufficiently ascertainable standards from which a reasonably prudent man could form a belief in the guilt of the accused. | 3 | 1976–1978 |
Anderson v. Peden
green
2 sentences2002Notwithstanding the discussion in Davidson , this court’s general pronouncements under Article I, section 21, as well as the court’s statement in Megdal, 288 Or at 298 , that Article I, section 21, applies to vagueness challenges to only criminal laws, clarify that a vagueness challenge to a civil law — that is, for ex post facto purposes, a law that does not impose a “criminal” penalty — cannot stand under Article I, section 21. 14 As noted earlier, ORS 30.866(4) also provides for the potential award of damages to the plaintiff, as well as the imposition of reasonable attorney fees and costs. 2002Notwithstanding the discussion in Davidson , this court’s general pronouncements under Article I, section 21, as well as the court’s statement in Megdal, 288 Or at 298 , that Article I, section 21, applies to vagueness challenges to only criminal laws, clarify that a vagueness challenge to a civil law — that is, for ex post facto purposes, a law that does not impose a “criminal” penalty — cannot stand under Article I, section 21. 14 As noted earlier, ORS 30.866(4) also provides for the potential award of damages to the plaintiff, as well as the imposition of reasonable attorney fees and costs. | 2 | 1992–2002 |
State v. Moyle
green
2 sentences2000In State v. Moyle, 299 Or 691 , 705 P2d 740 (1985), the Supreme Court rejected a vagueness challenge to a harassment statute that prohibited making a threat that “reasonably would be expected to cause alarm.” It held that the statute adequately informed potential defendants of the prohibited conduct and did not unconstitutionally delegate uncontrolled discretion to a judge or jury. 2000In State v. Moyle, 299 Or 691 , 705 P2d 740 (1985), the Supreme Court rejected a vagueness challenge to a harassment statute that prohibited making a threat that “reasonably would be expected to cause alarm.” It held that the statute adequately informed potential defendants of the prohibited conduct and did not unconstitutionally delegate uncontrolled discretion to a judge or jury. | 2 | 2000–2002 |
State v. Knobel
green
2 sentences1993Accordingly, we will treat them that way. *883 To withstand a vagueness challenge, the terms of a criminal statute "must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it of [ sic ] what conduct on their part will render them liable in penalties." State v. Graves, 299 Or. 189, 195 , 700 P.2d 244 (1985); State v. Knobel, 97 Or.App. 559, 563 , 777 P.2d 985 , rev. den. 309 Or. 522 , 789 P.2d 1387 (1989). 1993Accordingly, we will treat them that way. *883 To withstand a vagueness challenge, the terms of a criminal statute "must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it of [ sic ] what conduct on their part will render them liable in penalties." State v. Graves, 299 Or. 189, 195 , 700 P.2d 244 (1985); State v. Knobel, 97 Or.App. 559, 563 , 777 P.2d 985 , rev. den. 309 Or. 522 , 789 P.2d 1387 (1989). | 2 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Collins
green
2 sentences1993Bearing in mind that the key to a vagueness challenge is the statute’s failure to provide a defendant with fair notice of the prohibited conduct, it follows that “ ‘where the punishment imposed is only for an act knowingly done with the purpose of doing that which the statute prohibits, the accused cannot be said to suffer from lack of warning or knowledge that the act which he does is a violation law * * *.’ ” State v. Collins, 68 Or App 101, 103-04 , 680 P2d 713 (1984). 1993Bearing in mind that the key to a vagueness challenge is the statute’s failure to provide a defendant with fair notice of the prohibited conduct, it follows that “ ‘where the punishment imposed is only for an act knowingly done with the purpose of doing that which the statute prohibits, the accused cannot be said to suffer from lack of warning or knowledge that the act which he does is a violation law * * *.’ ” State v. Collins, 68 Or App 101, 103-04 , 680 P2d 713 (1984). | 2 | 1984–1993 |
State v. Gardner
neutral
2 sentences1989State v. Gardner, 16 Or App 464, 466 , 518 P2d 1341 , rev den (1974). 1989State v. Gardner, 16 Or App 464, 466 , 518 P2d 1341 , rev den (1974). | 2 | 1988–1989 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences1984See State v. Crane, 46 Or App 547 , 612 P2d 735 , rev den 289 Or 903 (1980) (rejecting a vagueness challenge to the phrase “any other means that creates a substantial risk of physical injury to any person,” as used in ORS 162.315, the resisting arrest statute); State v. Williams, 37 Or App 419 , 587 P2d 1049 (1978) (upholding against a similar challenge the words “whose use would endanger the safety or security of such institution or any person therein” in the definition of “contraband” in ORS 162.135(1)). 1984See State v. Crane, 46 Or App 547 , 612 P2d 735 , rev den 289 Or 903 (1980) (rejecting a vagueness challenge to the phrase “any other means that creates a substantial risk of physical injury to any person,” as used in ORS 162.315, the resisting arrest statute); State v. Williams, 37 Or App 419 , 587 P2d 1049 (1978) (upholding against a similar challenge the words “whose use would endanger the safety or security of such institution or any person therein” in the definition of “contraband” in ORS 162.135(1)). | 2 | 1978–1984 |
State v. Samter
green
2 sentences1982State v. Samter, 4 Or App 349 , 479 P2d 237 (1971). 1982State v. Samter, 4 Or App 349 , 479 P2d 237 (1971). | 2 | 1980–1982 |
State v. Sanderson
green
2 sentences1981State v. Sanderson, 33 Or App 173 , [176], 575 P2d 1025 [1978].” In addition to due process concepts of standards and fair notice, the constitutional dimensions of the vagueness doctrine include the prohibition against unlawful delegation of the legislative power to define a crime, Or Const, Art III, § 1, and the prohibition against ex post facto laws, Or Const, Art I, § 21. 1981State v. Sanderson, 33 Or App 173 , [176], 575 P2d 1025 [1978].” In addition to due process concepts of standards and fair notice, the constitutional dimensions of the vagueness doctrine include the prohibition against unlawful delegation of the legislative power to define a crime, Or Const, Art III, § 1, and the prohibition against ex post facto laws, Or Const, Art I, § 21. | 2 | 1978–1981 |
City of Portland v. Kreutz
neutral
2 sentences1978In City of Portland v. Kreutz, 7 Or App 618 , 492 P2d 824 (1972), this court held that an ordinance making it unlawful to operate a vehicle in a manner that "endangers or would be likely to endanger any person or property was not unconstitutionally vague.” We have previously stated that the vagueness doctrine requires more specificity in statutes defining crimes than in non-penal statutes. 1978In City of Portland v. Kreutz, 7 Or App 618 , 492 P2d 824 (1972), this court held that an ordinance making it unlawful to operate a vehicle in a manner that "endangers or would be likely to endanger any person or property was not unconstitutionally vague.” We have previously stated that the vagueness doctrine requires more specificity in statutes defining crimes than in non-penal statutes. | 2 | 1978–1980 |
| Palen v. Oregon State Board of Higher Education green | 2 | 1977–1978 |
| State v. Farris green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Graves green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Graves green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Smallman v. Gladden green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| City of Eugene v. Miller green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Jahagirdar v. United States green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Vannatta v. Oregon Government Ethics Commission green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Moyer green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc. v. Department of Transportation green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Ingram v. Davis, Agent green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Hunt v. Feld green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Restrepo v. United States green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Smith v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Illig-Renn green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Compton green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Langley green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| State v. Langley green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| State v. Stoneman green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Norris-Romine green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Wolfs green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Bruce Lincoln Butterfield green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Goodwill green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Zelinka green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| United States v. National Dairy Products Corp. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Steffel v. Thompson green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Romig green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Farrar green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.