vagueness challenge in Iowa

2018Even if Pinky’s owner had fair warning of what conduct was prohibited, the next question is whether the dangerous-animal ordinance offered “minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.” See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (recognizing this requirement as the more important aspect of the vagueness analysis). “[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them.” 9 Quoting an unnamed poet, our supreme court once said: “Let dogs delight to bark and bite, For God hath made them so.” Brown v. Moyer, 171 N.W. 2

2018Even if Pinky's owner had fair warning of what conduct was prohibited, the next question is whether the dangerous-animal ordinance offered "minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement." See Kolender v. Lawson , 461 U.S. 352 , 358 (1983) (recognizing this requirement as the more important aspect of the vagueness analysis). "[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them." Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U.S. 104 , 108 (1972).

2006See MRM, Inc. v. City of Davenport, 290 N.W.2d 338, 344-45 (Iowa 1980) (“Ordinarily a ‘significantly higher’ standard of certainty is required when a vagueness challenge is made in the context of a criminal prosecution than in situations involving civil remedies.” (citing Williams, 281 N.W.2d at 625 ; Knight v. Iowa Dist.

2006See MRM, Inc. v. City of Davenport, 290 N.W.2d 338, 344-45 (Iowa 1980) (“Ordinarily a ‘significantly higher’ standard of certainty is required when a vagueness challenge is made in the context of a criminal prosecution than in situations involving civil remedies.” (citing Williams, 281 N.W.2d at 625 ; Knight v. Iowa Dist.

1979See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 , 68 S.Ct. 665, 670 , 92 L.Ed. 840 , 849 (1948).

1979See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 , 68 S.Ct. 665, 670 , 92 L.Ed. 840 , 849 (1948).

2008The statute does not define “entice.” In State v. Osmundson, 546 N.W.2d 907 (Iowa 1996), we rejected a vagueness challenge to section 710.10.

2008The statute does not define “entice.” In State v. Osmundson, 546 N.W.2d 907 (Iowa 1996), we rejected a vagueness challenge to section 710.10.

2006See MRM, Inc. v. City of Davenport, 290 N.W.2d 338, 344-45 (Iowa 1980) (“Ordinarily a ‘significantly higher’ standard of certainty is required when a vagueness challenge is made in the context of a criminal prosecution than in situations involving civil remedies.” (citing Williams, 281 N.W.2d at 625 ; Knight v. Iowa Dist.

2006See MRM, Inc. v. City of Davenport, 290 N.W.2d 338, 344-45 (Iowa 1980) (“Ordinarily a ‘significantly higher’ standard of certainty is required when a vagueness challenge is made in the context of a criminal prosecution than in situations involving civil remedies.” (citing Williams, 281 N.W.2d at 625 ; Knight v. Iowa Dist.

2004Where economic regulation is involved, the statute is subject to a less strict vagueness test “because its subject matter is often more narrow, and because businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action.” Knepper v. Monticello State Bank, 450 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Iowa 1990) (citations omitted).

1994We explained the vagueness challenge in Eaves v. Board of Medical Examiners, 467 N.W.2d 234, 236 (Iowa 1991) (citing Knepper v. Monticello State Bank, 450 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Iowa 1990)).

2024See Formaro v. Polk County, 773 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Iowa 2009).

2014See United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 575 (6th Cir.2012) (upholding against a vagueness challenge lifetime supervision conditions that include a prohibition on “loitering where minors congregate, such as playgrounds, arcades, amusement parks, recreation parks, sporting events, shopping malls, swimming pools, etc.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Rusty Nail Acquisition, Inc., 186 Vt. 195 , 980 A.2d 758, 766-67 (2009) (rejecting a vagueness attack on an ordinance that prohibits licensed establishments from allowing intoxicated persons to “loiter” on the premises, and noting loiter

2006Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909 (1983); State v. Hunter, 550 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Iowa 1996).

1997With regard to a vagueness challenge, “we presume the statute is constitutional and give it any reasonable construction necessary to uphold it.” State v. Hunter, 550 N.W.2d 460, 462 (Iowa 1996).

2004Moreover, “[statutes threatening to inhibit the exercise of constitutional rights receive a more stringent vagueness analysis.” State v. Sylvester, 516 N.W.2d 845, 850 (Iowa 1994).

2004Moreover, "[s]tatutes threatening to inhibit the exercise of constitutional rights receive a more stringent vagueness analysis." State v. Sylvester, 516 N.W.2d 845, 850 (Iowa 1994).

2001To pass a vagueness test a statute must be “ ‘set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest.’ ” Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 159 , 94 S.Ct. 1633, 1647 , 40 L.Ed.2d 15, 36 (1974) (quoting United States Civil Serv.

2001To pass a vagueness test a statute must be “ ‘set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest.’ ” Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 159 , 94 S.Ct. 1633, 1647 , 40 L.Ed.2d 15, 36 (1974) (quoting United States Civil Serv.

1990Where economic regulation is involved, the statute is subject to a less strict vagueness test “because its subject matter is often more narrow, and because businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action.” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 371 (1982) (footnotes omitted).

1990Where economic regulation is involved, the statute is subject to a less strict vagueness test “because its subject matter is often more narrow, and because businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action.” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 371 (1982) (footnotes omitted).

2014See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 , 577 n. 20, 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 1249 n. 20, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 , 614 n. 20 (1974) ("Appellant is correct in asserting that Goguen failed to compartmentalize in his state court brief the due process doctrine of vagueness and First Amendment concepts of overbreadth....

2014See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 , 577 n. 20, 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 1249 n. 20, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 , 614 n. 20 (1974) ("Appellant is correct in asserting that Goguen failed to compartmentalize in his state court brief the due process doctrine of vagueness and First Amendment concepts of overbreadth....

2024See id. at 465–66.

2001Robinson, 618 N.W.2d at 314 ; State v. Milner, 571 N.W.2d 7, 14 (Iowa 1997); Sylvester, 516 N.W.2d at 849.

2023The vagueness doctrine is a concept of due process and is rooted in the “rough idea of fairness.” Sloman v. Bd. of Pharmacy Exam’rs, 440 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Iowa 1989). 12 A statute[7] offends the Due Process Clause if it does not give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act accordingly.

2018See In re Welfare of B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d 158, 163 (Minn. 2014) (“Naturally, the essential question in a vagueness challenge is whether the statute is vague.

2018See In re Welfare of B.A.H. , 845 N.W.2d 158 , 163 (Minn. 2014) ("Naturally, the essential question in a vagueness challenge is whether the statute is vague.

2014See United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 575 (6th Cir.2012) (upholding against a vagueness challenge lifetime supervision conditions that include a prohibition on “loitering where minors congregate, such as playgrounds, arcades, amusement parks, recreation parks, sporting events, shopping malls, swimming pools, etc.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Rusty Nail Acquisition, Inc., 186 Vt. 195 , 980 A.2d 758, 766-67 (2009) (rejecting a vagueness attack on an ordinance that prohibits licensed establishments from allowing intoxicated persons to “loiter” on the premises, and noting loiter

2014True, Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion also asserts that “the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Morales, 527 U.S. at 53 , 119 S.Ct. at 1857 , 144 L.Ed.2d at 78 (plurality opinion).

2014True, Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion also asserts that “the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Morales, 527 U.S. at 53 , 119 S.Ct. at 1857 , 144 L.Ed.2d at 78 (plurality opinion).

2014See United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 575 (6th Cir.2012) (upholding against a vagueness challenge lifetime supervision conditions that include a prohibition on “loitering where minors congregate, such as playgrounds, arcades, amusement parks, recreation parks, sporting events, shopping malls, swimming pools, etc.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Rusty Nail Acquisition, Inc., 186 Vt. 195 , 980 A.2d 758, 766-67 (2009) (rejecting a vagueness attack on an ordinance that prohibits licensed establishments from allowing intoxicated persons to “loiter” on the premises, and noting loiter

2014See United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 575 (6th Cir.2012) (upholding against a vagueness challenge lifetime supervision conditions that include a prohibition on “loitering where minors congregate, such as playgrounds, arcades, amusement parks, recreation parks, sporting events, shopping malls, swimming pools, etc.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Rusty Nail Acquisition, Inc., 186 Vt. 195 , 980 A.2d 758, 766-67 (2009) (rejecting a vagueness attack on an ordinance that prohibits licensed establishments from allowing intoxicated persons to “loiter” on the premises, and noting loiter

2013“The fact that a type of contraband may have various nicknames on the street does not render a statute punishing possession of that contraband invalid simply because it fails to list all of the then current nicknames.” United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1033 (6th Cir.1990).

2012Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. Goettsch, 403 N.W.2d 772, 773 (Iowa 1987).

2010Vagueness To survive a vagueness claim, the statute must define the criminal offense with “sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” State v. Millsap, 704 N.W.2d 426, 436 (Iowa 2005).

2010“Statutory terms meet this constitutional test if their meaning ‘is fairly ascertainable by reference to similar statutes, prior judicial determinations, reference to the dictionary, or if the questioned words have a common and generally accepted meaning.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Aldrich, 231 N.W.2d 890, 894 (Iowa 1975)).

2010“Statutory terms meet this constitutional test if their meaning ‘is fairly ascertainable by reference to similar statutes, prior judicial determinations, reference to the dictionary, or if the questioned words have a common and generally accepted meaning.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Aldrich, 231 N.W.2d 890, 894 (Iowa 1975)).

2001Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 578-79 , 93 S.Ct. 2880, 2897 , 37 L.Ed.2d 796, 816 (1973)).

2001Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 578-79 , 93 S.Ct. 2880, 2897 , 37 L.Ed.2d 796, 816 (1973)).

2001Robinson, 618 N.W.2d at 314 ; State v. Milner, 571 N.W.2d 7, 14 (Iowa 1997); Sylvester, 516 N.W.2d at 849.