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18 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1919–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kaneakuagreen2 sentences2007Whether the Camping Ordinance and the Camping Ms Are Constitutionally Overbroad “The doctrine of overbreadth, although closely related to a vagueness claim, is distinct in that while a statute may be clear and precise in its terms, it may sweep so broadly that constitutionally protected conduct as well as unprotected conduct is included in its proscriptions.” State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai'i 127, 142 , 890 P.2d 1167, 1182 (1995) (quoting State v. Kaneakua, 61 Haw. 136, 143 , 597 P.2d 590, 594 (1979) (quotation marks omitted)). 2007Whether the Camping Ordinance and the Camping Ms Are Constitutionally Overbroad “The doctrine of overbreadth, although closely related to a vagueness claim, is distinct in that while a statute may be clear and precise in its terms, it may sweep so broadly that constitutionally protected conduct as well as unprotected conduct is included in its proscriptions.” State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai'i 127, 142 , 890 P.2d 1167, 1182 (1995) (quoting State v. Kaneakua, 61 Haw. 136, 143 , 597 P.2d 590, 594 (1979) (quotation marks omitted)). | 5 | 5 |
State v. Buigreen2 sentences2006"The doctrine of overbreadth, although closely related to a vagueness claim, is distinct in that while a statute may be clear and precise in its terms, it may sweep so broadly that constitutionally protected conduct is included in its proscriptions.” State v. Bui, 104 Hawai'i 462, 465 , 92 P.3d 471, 474 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 2006"The doctrine of overbreadth, although closely related to a vagueness claim, is distinct in that while a statute may be clear and precise in its terms, it may sweep so broadly that constitutionally protected conduct is included in its proscriptions.” State v. Bui, 104 Hawai'i 462, 465 , 92 P.3d 471, 474 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Gaylordgreen2 sentences2007Whether the Camping Ordinance and the Camping Ms Are Constitutionally Overbroad “The doctrine of overbreadth, although closely related to a vagueness claim, is distinct in that while a statute may be clear and precise in its terms, it may sweep so broadly that constitutionally protected conduct as well as unprotected conduct is included in its proscriptions.” State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai'i 127, 142 , 890 P.2d 1167, 1182 (1995) (quoting State v. Kaneakua, 61 Haw. 136, 143 , 597 P.2d 590, 594 (1979) (quotation marks omitted)). 2007Whether the Camping Ordinance and the Camping Ms Are Constitutionally Overbroad “The doctrine of overbreadth, although closely related to a vagueness claim, is distinct in that while a statute may be clear and precise in its terms, it may sweep so broadly that constitutionally protected conduct as well as unprotected conduct is included in its proscriptions.” State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai'i 127, 142 , 890 P.2d 1167, 1182 (1995) (quoting State v. Kaneakua, 61 Haw. 136, 143 , 597 P.2d 590, 594 (1979) (quotation marks omitted)). | 2 | 4 |
State v. Batesgreen2 sentences2019See State v. Bates, 84 Hawai‘i 211, 222, 933 P.2d 48, 59 (1997) (observing that where a case does not involve any first amendment issues, a “defendant has standing to raise a vagueness challenge only insofar as the statute is vague as applied to his or her specific conduct”)[.] In order for a defendant to succeed on an as-applied challenge, the defendant must demonstrate that the disputed statute is vague with respect to his or her conduct. 2015See State v. Bates, 84 Hawai'i 211, 222 , 933 P.2d 48, 59 (1997) (observing that where a case does not involve any first amendment issues, a “defendant has standing to raise a vagueness challenge only insofar as the statute is vague as applied to his or her specific conduct”); State v. Manzo, 58 Haw. 440 , 573 P.2d 945, 955 (1977) (“A statute may be overbroad because its vagueness extends its reach too far, and yet it may define the core of its coverage with sufficient specificity to avoid challenge for facial vagueness.”). | 2 | 2 |
Grayned v. City of Rockfordgreen2 sentences2001See also Kalama, 94 Hawai'i at 64 , 8 P.3d at 1228 ("to comport with due process, penal statutes must inform a person of ordinary intelligence of what conduct is prohibited so that he or she may choose between lawful and unlawful conduct.”) A vagueness challenge may also arise where a statute "authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement!,]” Hill, 120 S.Ct. at 2498 , by promoting application "on an ad hoc and subjective basis[.]” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). 2001See also Kalama, 94 Hawai'i at 64 , 8 P.3d at 1228 ("to comport with due process, penal statutes must inform a person of ordinary intelligence of what conduct is prohibited so that he or she may choose between lawful and unlawful conduct.”) A vagueness challenge may also arise where a statute "authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement!,]” Hill, 120 S.Ct. at 2498 , by promoting application "on an ad hoc and subjective basis[.]” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Beltrangreen2 sentences2015Thus, the statement of the ICA that "before a law may be held to be unduly vague, ... it must be demonstrated that the law is impermissibly vague in all its applications,” Alangcas, 131 Hawai'i at 325 , 318 P.3d at 615 , is contrary to our prior decision in Beltran. 116 Hawai'i at 154-55 , 172 P.3d at 466-67 (permitting a vagueness challenge to "invalidate a criminal statute on its face even when it could conceivably have had some valid application”). 27 . 2015Thus, the statement of the ICA that "before a law may be held to be unduly vague, ... it must be demonstrated that the law is impermissibly vague in all its applications,” Alangcas, 131 Hawai'i at 325 , 318 P.3d at 615 , is contrary to our prior decision in Beltran. 116 Hawai'i at 154-55 , 172 P.3d at 466-67 (permitting a vagueness challenge to "invalidate a criminal statute on its face even when it could conceivably have had some valid application”). 27 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Manzogreen2 sentences2015See State v. Bates, 84 Hawai'i 211, 222 , 933 P.2d 48, 59 (1997) (observing that where a case does not involve any first amendment issues, a “defendant has standing to raise a vagueness challenge only insofar as the statute is vague as applied to his or her specific conduct”); State v. Manzo, 58 Haw. 440 , 573 P.2d 945, 955 (1977) (“A statute may be overbroad because its vagueness extends its reach too far, and yet it may define the core of its coverage with sufficient specificity to avoid challenge for facial vagueness.”). 2015See State v. Bates, 84 Hawai'i 211, 222 , 933 P.2d 48, 59 (1997) (observing that where a case does not involve any first amendment issues, a “defendant has standing to raise a vagueness challenge only insofar as the statute is vague as applied to his or her specific conduct”); State v. Manzo, 58 Haw. 440 , 573 P.2d 945, 955 (1977) (“A statute may be overbroad because its vagueness extends its reach too far, and yet it may define the core of its coverage with sufficient specificity to avoid challenge for facial vagueness.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Richiegreen2 sentences2006Id. at 32 , 960 P.2d at 1240 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2006Id. at 32 , 960 P.2d at 1240 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kalamagreen2 sentences2001See also Kalama, 94 Hawai'i at 64 , 8 P.3d at 1228 ("to comport with due process, penal statutes must inform a person of ordinary intelligence of what conduct is prohibited so that he or she may choose between lawful and unlawful conduct.”) A vagueness challenge may also arise where a statute "authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement!,]” Hill, 120 S.Ct. at 2498 , by promoting application "on an ad hoc and subjective basis[.]” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). 2001See also Kalama, 94 Hawai'i at 64 , 8 P.3d at 1228 ("to comport with due process, penal statutes must inform a person of ordinary intelligence of what conduct is prohibited so that he or she may choose between lawful and unlawful conduct.”) A vagueness challenge may also arise where a statute "authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement!,]” Hill, 120 S.Ct. at 2498 , by promoting application "on an ad hoc and subjective basis[.]” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Coloradogreen1 sentence2001See also Kalama, 94 Hawai'i at 64 , 8 P.3d at 1228 ("to comport with due process, penal statutes must inform a person of ordinary intelligence of what conduct is prohibited so that he or she may choose between lawful and unlawful conduct.”) A vagueness challenge may also arise where a statute "authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement!,]” Hill, 120 S.Ct. at 2498 , by promoting application "on an ad hoc and subjective basis[.]” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 546225green1 sentence1997See also, United States v. Andrews, 749 F.Supp. 1520, 1522-23 (N.D.Ill.1990) (rejecting appellant’s claim that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c) was void “on its face” because first amendment freedoms were not implicated; “[t]hus, because there is no conceivable implication of the First Amendment here, it is irrelevant that RICO may be unconstitutional with respect to theoretical and marginal cases before this Court.”). *222 Because this case does not involve any first amendment issues, the defendant “has standing to raise a vagueness challenge | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Andrewsgreen2 sentences1997See also, United States v. Andrews, 749 F.Supp. 1520, 1522-23 (N.D.Ill.1990) (rejecting appellant’s claim that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c) was void “on its face” because first amendment freedoms were not implicated; “[t]hus, because there is no conceivable implication of the First Amendment here, it is irrelevant that RICO may be unconstitutional with respect to theoretical and marginal cases before this Court.”). *222 Because this case does not involve any first amendment issues, the defendant “has standing to raise a vagueness challenge 1997See also, United States v. Andrews, 749 F.Supp. 1520, 1522-23 (N.D.Ill.1990) (rejecting appellant’s claim that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c) was void “on its face” because first amendment freedoms were not implicated; “[t]hus, because there is no conceivable implication of the First Amendment here, it is irrelevant that RICO may be unconstitutional with respect to theoretical and marginal cases before this Court.”). *222 Because this case does not involve any first amendment issues, the defendant “has standing to raise a vagueness challenge | 1 | 1 |
New York v. Ferbergreen2 sentences1997See also, United States v. Andrews, 749 F.Supp. 1520, 1522-23 (N.D.Ill.1990) (rejecting appellant’s claim that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c) was void “on its face” because first amendment freedoms were not implicated; “[t]hus, because there is no conceivable implication of the First Amendment here, it is irrelevant that RICO may be unconstitutional with respect to theoretical and marginal cases before this Court.”). *222 Because this case does not involve any first amendment issues, the defendant “has standing to raise a vagueness challenge 1997See also, United States v. Andrews, 749 F.Supp. 1520, 1522-23 (N.D.Ill.1990) (rejecting appellant’s claim that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c) was void “on its face” because first amendment freedoms were not implicated; “[t]hus, because there is no conceivable implication of the First Amendment here, it is irrelevant that RICO may be unconstitutional with respect to theoretical and marginal cases before this Court.”). *222 Because this case does not involve any first amendment issues, the defendant “has standing to raise a vagueness challenge | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kameenuigreen2 sentences1995See also Kameenui, 69 Haw. at 623 , 753 P.2d at 1252 ; Kam, 69 Haw. at 487, 748 P.2d at 375 . 1995See also Kameenui, 69 Haw. at 623 , 753 P.2d at 1252 ; Kam, 69 Haw. at 487, 748 P.2d at 375 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Alangcas
green
2 sentences2015Thus, the statement of the ICA that "before a law may be held to be unduly vague, ... it must be demonstrated that the law is impermissibly vague in all its applications,” Alangcas, 131 Hawai'i at 325 , 318 P.3d at 615 , is contrary to our prior decision in Beltran. 116 Hawai'i at 154-55 , 172 P.3d at 466-67 (permitting a vagueness challenge to "invalidate a criminal statute on its face even when it could conceivably have had some valid application”). 27 . 2015Thus, the statement of the ICA that "before a law may be held to be unduly vague, ... it must be demonstrated that the law is impermissibly vague in all its applications,” Alangcas, 131 Hawai'i at 325 , 318 P.3d at 615 , is contrary to our prior decision in Beltran. 116 Hawai'i at 154-55 , 172 P.3d at 466-67 (permitting a vagueness challenge to "invalidate a criminal statute on its face even when it could conceivably have had some valid application”). 27 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Tauese v. State, Department of Labor & Industrial Relations
green
2 sentences2007Relations, 113 Hawai'i 1 , 28 n. 27, 147 P.3d 785 , 811 n. 27 (2006) (quoting State v. Bui, 104 Hawai'i 462, 465 , 92 P.3d 471, 474 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 2007Relations, 113 Hawai'i 1 , 28 n. 27, 147 P.3d 785 , 811 n. 27 (2006) (quoting State v. Bui, 104 Hawai'i 462, 465 , 92 P.3d 471, 474 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Chapman v. United States
green
2 sentences2004Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 , 111 S.Ct. 1919 , 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975). 2004Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 , 111 S.Ct. 1919 , 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
United States v. Powell
green
2 sentences2004Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 , 111 S.Ct. 1919 , 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975). 2004Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 , 111 S.Ct. 1919 , 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Kane
green
2 sentences2004This court, in State v. Kane, 87 Hawai'i 71 , 951 P.2d 934 (1998), explained that a defendant who raises an overbreadth claim must establish that he or she is personally affected: “The doctrine of overbreadth, although closely related to a vagueness claim, is distinct in that while a statute may be clear and precise in its terms, it may sweep so broadly that constitutionally protected conduct is included in its proscriptions.” [State v.]Gaylord, 78 Hawai'i [127,] 142, 890 P.2d [1167,] 1182 [ (1995) ]. 2004This court, in State v. Kane, 87 Hawai'i 71 , 951 P.2d 934 (1998), explained that a defendant who raises an overbreadth claim must establish that he or she is personally affected: “The doctrine of overbreadth, although closely related to a vagueness claim, is distinct in that while a statute may be clear and precise in its terms, it may sweep so broadly that constitutionally protected conduct is included in its proscriptions.” [State v.]Gaylord, 78 Hawai'i [127,] 142, 890 P.2d [1167,] 1182 [ (1995) ]. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Columbia Natural Resources, Inc. v. Tatum
green
1 sentence1997See also, United States v. Andrews, 749 F.Supp. 1520, 1522-23 (N.D.Ill.1990) (rejecting appellant’s claim that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c) was void “on its face” because first amendment freedoms were not implicated; “[t]hus, because there is no conceivable implication of the First Amendment here, it is irrelevant that RICO may be unconstitutional with respect to theoretical and marginal cases before this Court.”). *222 Because this case does not involve any first amendment issues, the defendant “has standing to raise a vagueness challenge | 1 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. Harriss
green
2 sentences1997Id. at 1523; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 767-68 , 102 S.Ct. at 3360-61 ; Harriss, 347 U.S. at 617 , 74 S.Ct. at 811-12 ; Parness, 503 F.2d at 442 ; Paccione, 738 F.Supp. at 698 . 1997Id. at 1523; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 767-68 , 102 S.Ct. at 3360-61 ; Harriss, 347 U.S. at 617 , 74 S.Ct. at 811-12 ; Parness, 503 F.2d at 442 ; Paccione, 738 F.Supp. at 698 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. Paccione
green
1 sentence1997Id. at 1523; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 767-68 , 102 S.Ct. at 3360-61 ; Harriss, 347 U.S. at 617 , 74 S.Ct. at 811-12 ; Parness, 503 F.2d at 442 ; Paccione, 738 F.Supp. at 698 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counts v. Brown
green
1 sentence1997See also, United States v. Andrews, 749 F.Supp. 1520, 1522-23 (N.D.Ill.1990) (rejecting appellant’s claim that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c) was void “on its face” because first amendment freedoms were not implicated; “[t]hus, because there is no conceivable implication of the First Amendment here, it is irrelevant that RICO may be unconstitutional with respect to theoretical and marginal cases before this Court.”). *222 Because this case does not involve any first amendment issues, the defendant “has standing to raise a vagueness challenge | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Polk County v. Brown
green
1 sentence1997See also, United States v. Andrews, 749 F.Supp. 1520, 1522-23 (N.D.Ill.1990) (rejecting appellant’s claim that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c) was void “on its face” because first amendment freedoms were not implicated; “[t]hus, because there is no conceivable implication of the First Amendment here, it is irrelevant that RICO may be unconstitutional with respect to theoretical and marginal cases before this Court.”). *222 Because this case does not involve any first amendment issues, the defendant “has standing to raise a vagueness challenge | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Union Bank v. Wolas
green
1 sentence1997See also, United States v. Andrews, 749 F.Supp. 1520, 1522-23 (N.D.Ill.1990) (rejecting appellant’s claim that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c) was void “on its face” because first amendment freedoms were not implicated; “[t]hus, because there is no conceivable implication of the First Amendment here, it is irrelevant that RICO may be unconstitutional with respect to theoretical and marginal cases before this Court.”). *222 Because this case does not involve any first amendment issues, the defendant “has standing to raise a vagueness challenge | 1 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. Milton Parness and Barbara Parness
green
1 sentence1997Id. at 1523; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 767-68 , 102 S.Ct. at 3360-61 ; Harriss, 347 U.S. at 617 , 74 S.Ct. at 811-12 ; Parness, 503 F.2d at 442 ; Paccione, 738 F.Supp. at 698 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Elias-Zacarias
green
1 sentence1997See also, United States v. Andrews, 749 F.Supp. 1520, 1522-23 (N.D.Ill.1990) (rejecting appellant’s claim that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c) was void “on its face” because first amendment freedoms were not implicated; “[t]hus, because there is no conceivable implication of the First Amendment here, it is irrelevant that RICO may be unconstitutional with respect to theoretical and marginal cases before this Court.”). *222 Because this case does not involve any first amendment issues, the defendant “has standing to raise a vagueness challenge | 1 | 1997–1997 |
South Dakota v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe
green
1 sentence1997See also, United States v. Andrews, 749 F.Supp. 1520, 1522-23 (N.D.Ill.1990) (rejecting appellant’s claim that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c) was void “on its face” because first amendment freedoms were not implicated; “[t]hus, because there is no conceivable implication of the First Amendment here, it is irrelevant that RICO may be unconstitutional with respect to theoretical and marginal cases before this Court.”). *222 Because this case does not involve any first amendment issues, the defendant “has standing to raise a vagueness challenge | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Kam
green
2 sentences1995See also Kameenui, 69 Haw. at 623 , 753 P.2d at 1252 ; Kam, 69 Haw. at 487, 748 P.2d at 375 . 1995See also Kameenui, 69 Haw. at 623 , 753 P.2d at 1252 ; Kam, 69 Haw. at 487, 748 P.2d at 375 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Shigematsu green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
State v. Marley
green
1 sentence1979Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra; State v. Manzo, supra; State v. Marley, supra. In State v. Shigematsu, 52 Haw. 604 , 483 P.2d 997 (1971), this court examined a statute which proscribed presence in a “barricaded place” where gambling implements were exhibited. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| United States v. Petrillo green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Bloom v. Municipal Court green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Parker v. Levy green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Koch & Dryfus v. Bridges green | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.