vagueness doctrine in Missouri

2011See Condict, 65 S.W.3d at 17 (where a scienter requirement prevented a vagueness challenge to a statute prohibiting possession of precursor chemicals from being successful), and Young, 695 S.W.2d at 884-85 (because the statute did not require the defendant to know that a cockfight was taking place, it was found impermissibly vague).

2006“The second is that the vagueness doctrine assures that guidance, through explicit standards, will be afforded to those who must apply the statute, avoiding possible arbitrary and discriminatory application.” Young, 695 S.W.2d at 884 , citing, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972).

2011“When *616 reviewing a vagueness challenge, it is not necessary to determine if a situation could be imagined in which the language used might be vague or confusing; the language is to be treated by applying it to the facts at hand.” State v. Self, 155 S.W.3d 756, 760 (Mo. banc 2005) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

2006The vagueness doctrine is designed to help protect against arbitrary and discriminatory application of laws.” State v. Self, 155 S.W.3d 756, 760 (Mo. banc 2005) (citations omitted).

2006“The second is that the vagueness doctrine assures that guidance, through explicit standards, will be afforded to those who must apply the statute, avoiding possible arbitrary and discriminatory application.” Young, 695 S.W.2d at 884 , citing, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972).

2006“The second is that the vagueness doctrine assures that guidance, through explicit standards, will be afforded to those who must apply the statute, avoiding possible arbitrary and discriminatory application.” Young, 695 S.W.2d at 884 , citing, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972).

2024On more than one occasion, this Court has listed the reasons for that rule, including: “judicial reluctance to tamper with a traditional, common law concept; the notion that the deliberate criminal act of a third person is the intervening cause of harm to another; the difficulty that often exists in determining the foreseeability of criminal acts; the vagueness of the standard the owner must meet; the economic consequences of imposing such a duty; and conflict with the public policy that 8 protecting citizens is the government’s duty rather than a duty of the private sector.” Wood v. Centermar

1999Faheen, 734 S.W.2d at 272 .

2005State v. Brown, 660 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Mo. banc 1983).

2005State v. Brown, 660 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Mo. banc 1983).

2006“The test for vagueness is whether the language conveys to a person of ordinary intelligence a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.” State v. Brown, 140 S.W.3d 51, 54 (Mo. banc 2004) (citations omitted).

2005State v. Brown, 140 S.W.3d 51, 55 (Mo. banc 2004).

2001Nappier v. Kincade, 666 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Mo.App. 1984). 4 .

1987Nappier v. Kincade, 666 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Mo.App.1984) (citing Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 195 (Tenn.1975)).

1987Nappier v. Kincade, 666 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Mo.App.1984) (citing Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 195 (Tenn.1975)).

1984Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 195 (Tenn.1975).

2021Id.

2005Accord Cocktail Fortune, 994 S.W.2d at 958-59 .

2024On more than one occasion, this Court has listed the reasons for that rule, including: “judicial reluctance to tamper with a traditional, common law concept; the notion that the deliberate criminal act of a third person is the intervening cause of harm to another; the difficulty that often exists in determining the foreseeability of criminal acts; the vagueness of the standard the owner must meet; the economic consequences of imposing such a duty; and conflict with the public policy that 8 protecting citizens is the government’s duty rather than a duty of the private sector.” Wood v. Centermar

2023See Jackson Cnty., 207 S.W.3d at 614 (finding that Jackson County was not a person under the due process clause and thus could not bring a vagueness challenge to a statute); City of Chesterfield v. Dir. of Revenue, 811 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Mo. banc 1991) (stating that the city had no “personal” due process or equal protection rights and can thus not meet the standing requirement to challenge the constitutionality of a statute); State ex rel.

2023See Jackson Cnty., 207 S.W.3d at 614 (finding that Jackson County was not a person under the due process clause and thus could not bring a vagueness challenge to a statute); City of Chesterfield v. Dir. of Revenue, 811 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Mo. banc 1991) (stating that the city had no “personal” due process or equal protection rights and can thus not meet the standing requirement to challenge the constitutionality of a statute); State ex rel.

2023See Jackson Cnty., 207 S.W.3d at 614 (finding that Jackson County was not a person under the due process clause and thus could not bring a vagueness challenge to a statute); City of Chesterfield v. Dir. of Revenue, 811 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Mo. banc 1991) (stating that the city had no “personal” due process or equal protection rights and can thus not meet the standing requirement to challenge the constitutionality of a statute); State ex rel.

2023See Jackson Cnty., 207 S.W.3d at 614 (finding that Jackson County was not a person under the due process clause and thus could not bring a vagueness challenge to a statute); City of Chesterfield v. Dir. of Revenue, 811 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Mo. banc 1991) (stating that the city had no “personal” due process or equal protection rights and can thus not meet the standing requirement to challenge the constitutionality of a statute); State ex rel.

2013City of Pagedale v. Murphy, 142 S.W.3d 775, 778 (Mo.App.E.D.2004).

2011For instance, in Conseco Fin. *444 Servicing Corp. v. Missouri Dep’t of Revenue, 195 S.W.3d 410, 415 (Mo. banc 2006), “the amorphous and open-ended nature of the definition of ‘abandoned’ ” in a statute permitting a landowner to obtain title to an “abandoned” manufactured home rendered the statute “vulnerable to a vagueness challenge,” but ultimately the challengers failed to demonstrate that they were actually confused or misled by the definition and therefore lacked standing to challenge it.

2011Cf. Richard, 298 S.W.3d at 533 (the defendant had “no standing to raise hypothetical instances in which the statute [prohibiting possession of a loaded firearm while intoxicated] might be applied unconstitutionally” based on the state constitutional right to keep and bear arms).

2011See Condict, 65 S.W.3d at 17 (where a scienter requirement prevented a vagueness challenge to a statute prohibiting possession of precursor chemicals from being successful), and Young, 695 S.W.2d at 884-85 (because the statute did not require the defendant to know that a cockfight was taking place, it was found impermissibly vague).

2005While neither section 167.031 nor section 167.061 expressly specify the mental state necessary for violation of the compulsory attendance law, it is well-settled *762 that, where a specific mental state is not prescribed in a statute, "a culpable mental state is nonetheless required and is established if a person acts purposely or knowingly ..." Sec. 562.021.3; State v. Bratina, 73 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Mo. banc 2002).

2005While neither* section 167.031 nor section 167.061 expressly specify the mental state necessary for violation of the compulsory attendance law, it is well-set- tied that, where a specific mental state is not prescribed in a statute, “a culpable mental state is nonetheless required and is established if a person acts purposely or knowingly ...” Sec. 562.021.3; State v. Bratina, 73 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Mo. banc 2002).

2005See Cocktail Fortune, 994 S.W.2d at 958-59 ; Ellis, 853 S.W.2d at 446 ; Raines, 362 U.S. at 21, 80 S.Ct. 519 .

2005See Cocktail Fortune, 994 S.W.2d at 958-59 ; Ellis, 853 S.W.2d at 446 ; Raines, 362 U.S. at 21, 80 S.Ct. 519 .