vagueness doctrine in New Jersey

2025"Penal laws 'are subjected to sharper scrutiny and given more exacting and critical assessment under the vagueness doctrine than civil enactments.'" Ibid. (quoting Cameron, 100 N.J. at 591 ).

2025"Penal laws 'are subjected to sharper scrutiny and given more exacting and critical assessment under the vagueness doctrine than civil enactments.'" Ibid. (quoting Cameron, 100 N.J. at 591 ).

2010The vagueness doctrine is premised on the notion that the law must "give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298 , 33 L.Ed. 2d 222, 227 (1972); State v. Saunders, 302 N.J.Super. 509, 520-21 , 695 A. 2d 722 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 470 , 700 A. 2d 881 (1997).

2010The vagueness doctrine is premised on the notion that the law must "give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298 , 33 L.Ed. 2d 222, 227 (1972); State v. Saunders, 302 N.J.Super. 509, 520-21 , 695 A. 2d 722 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 470 , 700 A. 2d 881 (1997).

2021Ibid. "[A]s a sort of A-3676-17 20 'junior version of the vagueness doctrine,' the canon of strict construction of criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered." United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (quoting H.

2019Economic legislation "is subject to a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is often more narrow, and because businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action." Cameron, 100 N.J. at 592 (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982)).

2023Vague laws not only deprive individuals of adequate notice, but they may also result in “arbitrary and erratic enforcement.” Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 94 N.J. 85, 118 (1983). 25 On the other hand, due process is satisfied when “ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited,” and when the offense is defined “in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550, 576 (2016) (quoting Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402-03 (2010)); see also Lenihan, 219 N.J. at 268 (rejecting a vagueness claim because “[a]

2019"The vagueness doctrine requires that laws that impose criminal penalties or impede First Amendment interests be strictly scrutinized." Id. at 182 .

2012The vagueness doctrine “‘is essentially a procedural due process concept grounded in notions of fair play.’ ” State v. Lee, 96 N.J. 156, 165 , 475 A.2d 31 (1984) (quoting State v. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. 1, 17 , 404 A.2d 1121 (1979)).

2012The vagueness doctrine “‘is essentially a procedural due process concept grounded in notions of fair play.’ ” State v. Lee, 96 N.J. 156, 165 , 475 A.2d 31 (1984) (quoting State v. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. 1, 17 , 404 A.2d 1121 (1979)).

2021See State v. Afanador, 134 N.J. 162, 170 (1993) (stating "courts give criminal laws sharper scrutiny and more exacting and critical assessment under the vagueness doctrine than they give to civil enactments").

2009See State v. Afanador, supra, 134 N.J. at 170 , 631 A. 2d 946 ("[C]ourts give criminal laws sharper scrutiny and more exacting and critical assessment under the vagueness doctrine than they give to civil enactments.").

2021Notably, "[j]udicial review of a vagueness challenge is not 'a linguistic analysis conducted in a vacuum.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Saunders, 302 N.J.

2014Ed. 322, 328 (1926)); see also Town Tobbacconist, supra, 94 N.J. at 118 . 24 A-6292-11T2 Judicial review of a vagueness challenge is not "'a linguistic analysis conducted in a vacuum.'" Saunders, supra, 302 N.J.

2012The vagueness doctrine “‘is essentially a procedural due process concept grounded in notions of fair play.’ ” State v. Lee, 96 N.J. 156, 165 , 475 A.2d 31 (1984) (quoting State v. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. 1, 17 , 404 A.2d 1121 (1979)).

2012The vagueness doctrine “‘is essentially a procedural due process concept grounded in notions of fair play.’ ” State v. Lee, 96 N.J. 156, 165 , 475 A.2d 31 (1984) (quoting State v. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. 1, 17 , 404 A.2d 1121 (1979)).

1989In Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 1953 , 32 L.Ed. 2d 584 (1972), Justice White said, "[t]he root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness.

1989In Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 1953 , 32 L.Ed. 2d 584 (1972), Justice White said, "[t]he root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness.

2005In general, in order to survive a vagueness challenge, a statute "must enable a person of `common intelligence, in light of ordinary experience' to understand whether contemplated conduct is lawful." Cameron, supra, 100 N.J. at 591 , 498 A. 2d 1217 (quoting State v. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. 1, 18 , 404 A. 2d 1121 (1979)); see State v. Malik, 365 N.J.Super. 267, 281-82 , 839 A.2d 67 (App.Div.2003) certif. denied, 180 N.J. 354 , 851 A. 2d 648 (2004); State v. Golin, 363 N.J.Super. 474, 482-83 , 833 A. 2d 660 (App.Div.2003)(citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.

2005In general, in order to survive a vagueness challenge, a statute "must enable a person of `common intelligence, in light of ordinary experience' to understand whether contemplated conduct is lawful." Cameron, supra, 100 N.J. at 591 , 498 A. 2d 1217 (quoting State v. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. 1, 18 , 404 A. 2d 1121 (1979)); see State v. Malik, 365 N.J.Super. 267, 281-82 , 839 A.2d 67 (App.Div.2003) certif. denied, 180 N.J. 354 , 851 A. 2d 648 (2004); State v. Golin, 363 N.J.Super. 474, 482-83 , 833 A. 2d 660 (App.Div.2003)(citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.

1998See In re Polk License Revocation, 90 N.J. 550, 575 , 449 A.2d 7 (1982). “ ‘The underlying principle [is] that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.’ ” State v. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. 1, 17 , 404 A.2d 1121 (1979) (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 , 92 S.Ct. 1953, 1957 , 32 L.Ed.2d 584, 590 (1972)).

1998See In re Polk License Revocation, 90 N.J. 550, 575 , 449 A.2d 7 (1982). “ ‘The underlying principle [is] that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.’ ” State v. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. 1, 17 , 404 A.2d 1121 (1979) (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 , 92 S.Ct. 1953, 1957 , 32 L.Ed.2d 584, 590 (1972)).

2021Ibid. "[A]s a sort of A-3676-17 20 'junior version of the vagueness doctrine,' the canon of strict construction of criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered." United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (quoting H.

2009United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S.Ct. 1219, 1225 , 137 L.Ed. 2d 432, 442-43 (1997) (stating that fair warning requirement is manifest in the vagueness doctrine, the rule of lenity, and the rule that a court may not add a gloss to an unclear statute that was not apparent from the face of the statute or prior judicial decision).

1985See, e.g., State v. Lee, 96 N.J. 156, 167 (1984) (high standard of certainty applies to a vagueness challenge in a criminal case); Town Tobacconist, supra, 94 N.J. at 119 n. 16 (economic regulation called for a less stringent evaluation); In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 618 (1982) (in which we stated that where a statute's literal scope is capable of reaching expression protected by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts).

1985See, e.g., State v. Lee, 96 N.J. 156, 1 .67 (1984) (high standard of certainty applies to a vagueness challenge in a criminal case); Town Tobacconist, supra, 94 N.J. at 119 n. 16 (economic regulation called for a less stringent evaluation); In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 618 (1982) (in which we stated that where a statute’s literal scope is capable of reaching expression protected by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts).

2014Super. at 521 (quoting In re DeMarco, 83 N.J. 25, 37 (1980)).

1984Cf. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 , 99 S.Ct. 675, 685 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 596, 609 (1979) (disapproving statute that was found to be little more than a trap for those acting in good faith); In re DeMarco, 83 N.J. 25, 37 (1980); State v. Lashinsky, supra, 81 N.J. at 18 .

2010See San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F. 2d 1125, 1139 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 908 , 113 S.Ct. 305 , 121 L.Ed. 2d 228 (1992) (evaluating a vagueness challenge to a standard for discharge from public employment).

2010See San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F. 2d 1125, 1139 (3d Cir.) (evaluating a vagueness challenge to a standard for discharge from public employment), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 908 , 113 S.Ct. 305 , 121 L.Ed. 2d 228 (1992); Chez Sez VIII, Inc. v. Poritz, 297 N.J.Super. 331, 351 , 688 A. 2d 119 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 409 , 694 A. 2d 194 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 932 , 118 S.Ct. 337 , 139 L.Ed. 2d 262 (1997).

2010See San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F. 2d 1125, 1139 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 908 , 113 S.Ct. 305 , 121 L.Ed. 2d 228 (1992) (evaluating a vagueness challenge to a standard for discharge from public employment).

2010See San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F. 2d 1125, 1139 (3d Cir.) (evaluating a vagueness challenge to a standard for discharge from public employment), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 908 , 113 S.Ct. 305 , 121 L.Ed. 2d 228 (1992); Chez Sez VIII, Inc. v. Poritz, 297 N.J.Super. 331, 351 , 688 A. 2d 119 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 409 , 694 A. 2d 194 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 932 , 118 S.Ct. 337 , 139 L.Ed. 2d 262 (1997).

2005In general, in order to survive a vagueness challenge, a statute "must enable a person of `common intelligence, in light of ordinary experience' to understand whether contemplated conduct is lawful." Cameron, supra, 100 N.J. at 591 , 498 A. 2d 1217 (quoting State v. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. 1, 18 , 404 A. 2d 1121 (1979)); see State v. Malik, 365 N.J.Super. 267, 281-82 , 839 A.2d 67 (App.Div.2003) certif. denied, 180 N.J. 354 , 851 A. 2d 648 (2004); State v. Golin, 363 N.J.Super. 474, 482-83 , 833 A. 2d 660 (App.Div.2003)(citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.

2005In general, in order to survive a vagueness challenge, a statute "must enable a person of `common intelligence, in light of ordinary experience' to understand whether contemplated conduct is lawful." Cameron, supra, 100 N.J. at 591 , 498 A. 2d 1217 (quoting State v. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. 1, 18 , 404 A. 2d 1121 (1979)); see State v. Malik, 365 N.J.Super. 267, 281-82 , 839 A.2d 67 (App.Div.2003) certif. denied, 180 N.J. 354 , 851 A. 2d 648 (2004); State v. Golin, 363 N.J.Super. 474, 482-83 , 833 A. 2d 660 (App.Div.2003)(citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.

2023Vague laws not only deprive individuals of adequate notice, but they may also result in “arbitrary and erratic enforcement.” Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 94 N.J. 85, 118 (1983). 25 On the other hand, due process is satisfied when “ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited,” and when the offense is defined “in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550, 576 (2016) (quoting Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402-03 (2010)); see also Lenihan, 219 N.J. at 268 (rejecting a vagueness claim because “[a]

2014Hamilton Amusement Ctr., supra, 156 N.J. at 269 .

2023Vague laws not only deprive individuals of adequate notice, but they may also result in “arbitrary and erratic enforcement.” Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 94 N.J. 85, 118 (1983). 25 On the other hand, due process is satisfied when “ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited,” and when the offense is defined “in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550, 576 (2016) (quoting Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402-03 (2010)); see also Lenihan, 219 N.J. at 268 (rejecting a vagueness claim because “[a]

2021"Nonetheless, 'vagueness may be mitigated by a scienter requirement, especially when a court examines a challenge claiming that the law failed to provide adequate notice of the proscribed conduct.'" A-5556-16 26 Lenihan, 219 N.J. at 267 (quoting Saunders, 302 N.J.

2012See In re Health Care Administration Bd., 83 N.J. 67, 82 , 415 A.2d 1147 (1980) (considering and rejecting a vagueness challenge). “[T]he constitutional ban on vague laws is intended to invalidate regulatory enactments that fail to provide adequate notice of their scope and sufficient guidance for their application.” State v. Cameron, 100 N.J. 586, 591 , 498 A.2d 1217 (1985).

2012See In re Health Care Administration Bd., 83 N.J. 67, 82 , 415 A.2d 1147 (1980) (considering and rejecting a vagueness challenge). “[T]he constitutional ban on vague laws is intended to invalidate regulatory enactments that fail to provide adequate notice of their scope and sufficient guidance for their application.” State v. Cameron, 100 N.J. 586, 591 , 498 A.2d 1217 (1985).