vagueness challenge in Wisconsin

2018Milwaukee , 178 Wis. 2d 353 , 359-60, 504 N.W.2d 375 (1993) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U.S. 104 , 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) ). ¶ 64 In assessing the clarity of a statute, normally only "a reasonable degree of clarity" is required for it to be constitutional; however, when the statute infringes on a constitutionally protected right, the law requires more exacting precision, and "a more stringent vagueness test should apply." Id. (first quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees , 468 U.S. 609 , 629, 104 S.Ct. 3244 , 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984) ; then citing Grayned ,

2018Milwaukee , 178 Wis. 2d 353 , 359-60, 504 N.W.2d 375 (1993) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U.S. 104 , 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) ). ¶ 64 In assessing the clarity of a statute, normally only "a reasonable degree of clarity" is required for it to be constitutional; however, when the statute infringes on a constitutionally protected right, the law requires more exacting precision, and "a more stringent vagueness test should apply." Id. (first quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees , 468 U.S. 609 , 629, 104 S.Ct. 3244 , 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984) ; then citing Grayned ,

2006"The constitutional foundation of the vagueness challenge to a penal statute is the procedural due process requirement of fair notice." State v. Ehlenfeldt, 94 Wis. 2d 347, 355 , 288 N.W.2d 786 (1980) (citation omitted).

2006"The constitutional foundation of the vagueness challenge to a penal statute is the procedural due process requirement of fair notice." State v. Ehlenfeldt, 94 Wis. 2d 347, 355 , 288 N.W.2d 786 (1980) (citation omitted).

2018Milwaukee , 178 Wis. 2d 353 , 359-60, 504 N.W.2d 375 (1993) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U.S. 104 , 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) ). ¶ 64 In assessing the clarity of a statute, normally only "a reasonable degree of clarity" is required for it to be constitutional; however, when the statute infringes on a constitutionally protected right, the law requires more exacting precision, and "a more stringent vagueness test should apply." Id. (first quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees , 468 U.S. 609 , 629, 104 S.Ct. 3244 , 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984) ; then citing Grayned ,

2018Milwaukee , 178 Wis. 2d 353 , 359-60, 504 N.W.2d 375 (1993) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U.S. 104 , 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) ). ¶ 64 In assessing the clarity of a statute, normally only "a reasonable degree of clarity" is required for it to be constitutional; however, when the statute infringes on a constitutionally protected right, the law requires more exacting precision, and "a more stringent vagueness test should apply." Id. (first quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees , 468 U.S. 609 , 629, 104 S.Ct. 3244 , 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984) ; then citing Grayned ,

2015Stevenson, 236 Wis. 2d 86, ¶15 (internal citations omitted). 31 No. 2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W ¶54 Related to the overbreadth doctrine is the vagueness doctrine, 19 which "requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent 'arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'" State v. Princess Cinema of Milwaukee, Inc., 96 Wis. 2d 646, 657 , 292 N.W.2d 807 (1980) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974)).

2015Stevenson, 236 Wis. 2d 86, ¶15 (internal citations omitted). 31 No. 2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W ¶54 Related to the overbreadth doctrine is the vagueness doctrine, 19 which "requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent 'arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'" State v. Princess Cinema of Milwaukee, Inc., 96 Wis. 2d 646, 657 , 292 N.W.2d 807 (1980) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974)).

2015"Where statutes have an overbroad sweep, just as where they are vague, 'the hazard of loss or substantial impairment of those precious [First Amendment] rights may be critical,' since those covered by the statute are bound to limit their behavior to that which is unquestionably safe." Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967) (internal citation omitted). 32 No. 2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W what is prohibited; (2) lacking precise or articulated standards, it allows for arbitrary or discriminatory enforce

2015"Where statutes have an overbroad sweep, just as where they are vague, 'the hazard of loss or substantial impairment of those precious [First Amendment] rights may be critical,' since those covered by the statute are bound to limit their behavior to that which is unquestionably safe." Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967) (internal citation omitted). 32 No. 2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W what is prohibited; (2) lacking precise or articulated standards, it allows for arbitrary or discriminatory enforce

2015See also id. at 78-80 , which addresses the vagueness challenge brought against disclosure and reporting requirements applicable to contributions and expenditures.

2015See also id. at 78-80 , which addresses the vagueness challenge brought against disclosure and reporting requirements applicable to contributions and expenditures.

2015Related to the overbreadth doctrine is the vagueness doctrine, 19 which "requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent 'arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'" State v. Princess Cinema of Milwaukee, Inc., 96 Wis. 2d 646, 657 , 292 N.W.2d 807 (1980) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974)).

2015Stevenson, 236 Wis. 2d 86, ¶15 (internal citations omitted). 31 No. 2014AP296-OA & 2014AP417-W through 2014AP421-W & 2013AP2504-W through 2013AP2508-W ¶54 Related to the overbreadth doctrine is the vagueness doctrine, 19 which "requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent 'arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'" State v. Princess Cinema of Milwaukee, Inc., 96 Wis. 2d 646, 657 , 292 N.W.2d 807 (1980) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974)).

2013Reginald D. v. State, 193 Wis. 2d 299, 306-07 , 533 N.W.2d 181 (1995). 11 State v. Sorenson, 2002 WI 78, ¶25 , 254 Wis. 2d 54 , 646 N.W.2d 354 . 12 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 409 U.S. 104 , 108 (1972); Elections Bd. v. Wis. Mfrs. & Commerce, 227 Wis. 2d 650, 676-77 , 597 N.W.2d 721 (1999); State v. Nelson, 2006 WI App 124, ¶36 , 294 Wis. 2d 578 , 718 N.W.2d 168 . 13 Connally v. Gen.

2013Reginald D. v. State, 193 Wis. 2d 299, 306-07 , 533 N.W.2d 181 (1995). 11 State v. Sorenson, 2002 WI 78, ¶25 , 254 Wis. 2d 54 , 646 N.W.2d 354 . 12 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 409 U.S. 104 , 108 (1972); Elections Bd. v. Wis. Mfrs. & Commerce, 227 Wis. 2d 650, 676-77 , 597 N.W.2d 721 (1999); State v. Nelson, 2006 WI App 124, ¶36 , 294 Wis. 2d 578 , 718 N.W.2d 168 . 13 Connally v. Gen.

2002See Courtney, 74 Wis. 2d at 713 ("Where . . . conduct is clearly within the prohibited zone, the defendant will not be heard to hypothesize other factual situations which might raise a question as to the applicability of the statute or regulation."). *463 ¶ 6.

1991See id. at 713 , 247 N.W.2d at 719 .

2015The vagueness test has two prongs: (1) does the language sufficiently warn those trying to obey the law that their conduct violates the regulation; and (2) "whether those who must enforce and apply the law may do so without creating or applying their own standards." See State v. Pittman, 174 Wis. 2d 255, 276 , 496 N.W.2d 74 (1993). ¶ 18.

2015The vagueness test has two prongs: (1) does the language sufficiently warn those trying to obey the law that their conduct violates the regulation; and (2) "whether those who must enforce and apply the law may do so without creating or applying their own standards." See State v. Pittman, 174 Wis. 2d 255, 276 , 496 N.W.2d 74 (1993). ¶ 18.

1998In other words, "[t]he first prong of the vagueness test is concerned with whether the statute sufficiently warns persons 'wishing to obey the law that [their]... conduct comes near the proscribed area.'" Id. (quoting State v. Tronca, 84 Wis. 2d 68, 86 , 267 N.W.2d 216, 224 (1978)).

1998In other words, "[t]he first prong of the vagueness test is concerned with whether the statute sufficiently warns persons 'wishing to obey the law that [their]... conduct comes near the proscribed area.'" Id. (quoting State v. Tronca, 84 Wis. 2d 68, 86 , 267 N.W.2d 216, 224 (1978)).

2019To survive a vagueness challenge, the injunctions must be “sufficiently definite to give persons of ordinary intelligence who wish to abide by the law sufficient notice of the proscribed conduct.” See Bachowski v. Salamone, 139 Wis. 2d 397, 406 , 407 N.W.2d 533 (1987).

2019To survive a vagueness challenge, the injunctions must be “sufficiently definite to give persons of ordinary intelligence who wish to abide by the law sufficient notice of the proscribed conduct.” See Bachowski v. Salamone, 139 Wis. 2d 397, 406 , 407 N.W.2d 533 (1987).

2016See City of Madison v. Baumann, 162 Wis. 2d 660, 672-74 , 470 N.W.2d 296 (1991) (stating, in a vagueness challenge to a noise ordinance on First Amendment grounds, that "we look to the face of the ordinance to guard against the possibility that a vague prohibition may deter or give pause to socially desirable conduct or expression").

2016See City of Madison v. Baumann, 162 Wis. 2d 660, 672-74 , 470 N.W.2d 296 (1991) (stating, in a vagueness challenge to a noise ordinance on First Amendment grounds, that "we look to the face of the ordinance to guard against the possibility that a vague prohibition may deter or give pause to socially desirable conduct or expression").

2025An administrative policy is unconstitutionally vague when the policy does not provide “‘fair notice’ of the prohibited conduct.” Id.; see also State ex rel Kalt v. Board of Fire & Police Comm’rs, 145 Wis. 2d 504, 510 , 427 N.W.2d 408 (Ct. App. 1988) (a policy is vague if “[people] of common intelligence must necessarily guess [as to] its meaning and differ as to its application”).11 11 The vagueness rule “applies to administrative regulations affecting conditions of governmental employment in the same manner as it applies to penal statutes.” State ex rel Kalt v. Board of Fire & Police Comm’rs,

2025An administrative policy is unconstitutionally vague when the policy does not provide “‘fair notice’ of the prohibited conduct.” Id.; see also State ex rel Kalt v. Board of Fire & Police Comm’rs, 145 Wis. 2d 504, 510 , 427 N.W.2d 408 (Ct. App. 1988) (a policy is vague if “[people] of common intelligence must necessarily guess [as to] its meaning and differ as to its application”).11 11 The vagueness rule “applies to administrative regulations affecting conditions of governmental employment in the same manner as it applies to penal statutes.” State ex rel Kalt v. Board of Fire & Police Comm’rs,

1994See Milwaukee v. K.F., 145 Wis. 2d at 33-34 , 426 N.W.2d at 333-34 .

1994See Milwaukee v. K.F., 145 Wis. 2d at 33-34 , 426 N.W.2d at 333-34 .

2017It is not necessary that an ordinance be written with exact precision; it will withstand a vagueness challenge if it is "sufficiently definite so that potential offenders who wish to abide by the law are able to discern when the region of proscribed conduct is neared and those who are charged either with enforcing or applying it are not relegated to creating their own standards of culpability." City of Milwaukee v. Wilson, 96 Wis. 2d 11, 16 , 291 N.W.2d 452 (1980).

2017It is not necessary that an ordinance be written with exact precision; it will withstand a vagueness challenge if it is "sufficiently definite so that potential offenders who wish to abide by the law are able to discern when the region of proscribed conduct is neared and those who are charged either with enforcing or applying it are not relegated to creating their own standards of culpability." City of Milwaukee v. Wilson, 96 Wis. 2d 11, 16 , 291 N.W.2d 452 (1980).

1987In State v. Popanz, 112 Wis. 2d 166 , 332 N.W.2d 750 (1983) this court explained that "[t]he principles underlying the void for vagueness doctrine ... stem from concepts of procedural due process." Id. at 172 . [4, 5] To survive a vagueness challenge a statute must be sufficiently definite to give persons of ordinary intelligence who wish to abide by the law sufficient notice of the proscribed conduct.

1987In State v. Popanz, 112 Wis. 2d 166 , 332 N.W.2d 750 (1983) this court explained that "[t]he principles underlying the void for vagueness doctrine ... stem from concepts of procedural due process." Id. at 172 . [4, 5] To survive a vagueness challenge a statute must be sufficiently definite to give persons of ordinary intelligence who wish to abide by the law sufficient notice of the proscribed conduct.

2020“Stated another way, ‘[t]he first prong of the vagueness test is concerned with whether the statute sufficiently warns persons wishing to obey the law that [their] … conduct comes near the proscribed area.’” Id. (alteration in Smith; citations and one set of quotation marks omitted).

2020In other words, “a defendant who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others, absent an impact on a First Amendment right…. [I]f an actor’s conduct plainly falls within the proscription of the law, he cannot make a vagueness challenge.” Id. ¶27 Barrett contends that WIS.

2026Nebraska State Bar Ass’n v. Kirshen, 441 N.W.2d 161, 168 (Neb. 1989); In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 33 (N.Y. 1991); Comm'n for Law.

2026See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hupy, 2011 WI 38, ¶91 , 333 Wis. 2d 612 , 799 N.W.2d 732 . ¶25 We apply a less stringent vagueness standard to ethical rules than we apply to criminal statutes.

2026See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hupy, 2011 WI 38, ¶91 , 333 Wis. 2d 612 , 799 N.W.2d 732 . ¶25 We apply a less stringent vagueness standard to ethical rules than we apply to criminal statutes.

2026See, e.g., People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510, 516 (Colo. 1986) (“Since a disciplinary rule is promulgated for the purpose of guiding lawyers in their professional conduct, and is not directed to the public at large, the central consideration in resolving a vagueness challenge should be whether the nature of the proscribed conduct encompassed by the rule is readily understandable to a licensed lawyer”); In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d 352 , 379 n.45 (Mass. 2008); State ex rel.

2026Nebraska State Bar Ass’n v. Kirshen, 441 N.W.2d 161, 168 (Neb. 1989); In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 33 (N.Y. 1991); Comm'n for Law.