vagueness challenge in Minnesota

2014Although these two requirements of due process present “analytically distinct bases upon which one may challenge a statute on vagueness grounds,” State v. Ness, 834 N.W.2d 177, 184 (Minn.2013), the United States Supreme Court has called the second basis — demanding ‘“minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement’ ” — the “more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine.” Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974)).

2014Although these two requirements of due process present “analytically distinct bases upon which one may challenge a statute on vagueness grounds,” State v. Ness, 834 N.W.2d 177, 184 (Minn.2013), the United States Supreme Court has called the second basis — demanding ‘“minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement’ ” — the “more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine.” Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974)).

2014Although these two requirements of due process present “analytically distinct bases upon which one may challenge a statute on vagueness grounds,” State v. Ness, 834 N.W.2d 177, 184 (Minn.2013), the United States Supreme Court has called the second basis — demanding ‘“minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement’ ” — the “more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine.” Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974)).

2014Although these two requirements of due process present “analytically distinct bases upon which one may challenge a statute on vagueness grounds,” State v. Ness, 834 N.W.2d 177, 184 (Minn.2013), the United States Supreme Court has called the second basis — demanding ‘“minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement’ ” — the “more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine.” Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974)).

2009Despite the dissent's claim to the contrary, we need not, and do not, reach the issue of whether Givens precludes a vagueness challenge to the facts that must be found by a jury (which we describe as "additional facts" and which the dissent erroneously asserts include "aggravating sentencing factors"). [1] See United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 89-90 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975) (Fifth Amendment); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353-54 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (Fourteenth Amendment). [2] The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure provide waiver options for enhance

2009Despite the dissent's claim to the contrary, we need not, and do not, reach the issue of whether Givens precludes a vagueness challenge to the facts that must be found by a jury (which we describe as "additional facts" and which the dissent erroneously asserts include "aggravating sentencing factors"). [1] See United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 89-90 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975) (Fifth Amendment); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353-54 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (Fourteenth Amendment). [2] The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure provide waiver options for enhance

2019Long addressed a vagueness challenge under the First Amendment, not an overbreadth challenge. 931 S.W.2d at 287 .

2017Notably, we mentioned that it might have been possible to decide which interpretation to adopt based on a vagueness analysis and the canon of constitutional avoidance, but we concluded that, “[i]n light of our holding on lenity grounds[,] ... we need not address the issue of vagueness.” Id. at 639 n.2.

2014Vagueness, in the context of a claim like B.A.H.’s, means that a statute “ ‘leaves [its enforcers] free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case.’ ” Bussmann, 741 N.W.2d at 83 (quoting Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 , 86 S.Ct. 518 , 15 L.Ed.2d 447 (1966)).

2014Vagueness, in the context of a claim like B.A.H.’s, means that a statute “ ‘leaves [its enforcers] free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case.’ ” Bussmann, 741 N.W.2d at 83 (quoting Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 , 86 S.Ct. 518 , 15 L.Ed.2d 447 (1966)).

2014Vagueness, in the context of a claim like B.A.H.’s, means that a statute “ ‘leaves [its enforcers] free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case.’ ” Bussmann, 741 N.W.2d at 83 (quoting Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 , 86 S.Ct. 518 , 15 L.Ed.2d 447 (1966)).

2013At oral argument, appellant relied on Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 , 130 S.Ct. 2896 , 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010), to argue that she can bring a vagueness challenge to a criminal statute if her conduct lies outside of the core class of conduct prohibited by the statute.

2013At oral argument, appellant relied on Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 , 130 S.Ct. 2896 , 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010), to argue that she can bring a vagueness challenge to a criminal statute if her conduct lies outside of the core class of conduct prohibited by the statute.

2009“A statute can be impermissibly vague ... if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 , 120 S.Ct. 2480 , 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000).

2009“A statute can be impermissibly vague ... if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 , 120 S.Ct. 2480 , 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000).

2009Id. [4] The Eighth Circuit reasoned: Because there is no constitutional right to sentencing guidelines—or, more generally, to a less discretionary application of sentences than that permitted prior to the Guidelines—the limitations the Guidelines place on a judge's discretion cannot violate a defendant's right to due process by reason of being vague.

2009Id. .

2009“So too, vague sentencing provisions may pose constitutional questions if they do not state with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given criminal statute.” United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 , 99 S.Ct. 2198 , 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); see also James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 230-31 , 127 S.Ct. 1586 , 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007) (Scalia, J„ dissenting, joined by Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ.) (concluding that sentencing enhancement factor in Armed Career Criminal Act was unconstitutionally vague).

2009“So too, vague sentencing provisions may pose constitutional questions if they do not state with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given criminal statute.” United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 , 99 S.Ct. 2198 , 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); see also James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 230-31 , 127 S.Ct. 1586 , 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007) (Scalia, J„ dissenting, joined by Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ.) (concluding that sentencing enhancement factor in Armed Career Criminal Act was unconstitutionally vague).

2006Second, even if the vagueness doctrine applied, vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause must be analyzed as applied to the facts of the case at issue and “may be overcome in any specific case where reasonable persons would know that their conduct is at risk.” Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 , 108 S.Ct. 1853, 1857 , 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988).

2006Second, even if the vagueness doctrine applied, vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause must be analyzed as applied to the facts of the case at issue and “may be overcome in any specific case where reasonable persons would know that their conduct is at risk.” Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 , 108 S.Ct. 1853, 1857 , 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988).

2004“In attacking a rule on due process grounds, including a vagueness challenge, the challenger bears a heavy burden.” Id.

2004A rule is void for vagueness “if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited or fails to provide sufficient standards for enforcement.” Id. (quoting In re N.P., 361 N.W.2d 386, 394 (Minn.1985)).

2002In re Ramey, 648 N.W.2d 260 (Minn.App.2002).

1996Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 205 Minn. 545, 555 , 287 N.W. 297, 302 (1939) (upholding the statute against, inter alia, a vagueness challenge), aff 'd, 309 U.S. 270, 277 , 60 S.Ct. 523, 527 , 84 L.Ed. 744 (1940).

1996Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 205 Minn. 545, 555 , 287 N.W. 297, 302 (1939) (upholding the statute against, inter alia, a vagueness challenge), aff 'd, 309 U.S. 270, 277 , 60 S.Ct. 523, 527 , 84 L.Ed. 744 (1940).

1995In re Welfare of I.Q.S., 309 Minn. 78, 84-85 , 244 N.W.2d 30, 36-37 (1976).