vagueness challenge in Montana

2017State v. Watters, 2009 MT 163, ¶ 24 , 350 Mont. 465 , 208 P.3d 408 .

2017State v. Watters, 2009 MT 163, ¶ 24 , 350 Mont. 465 , 208 P.3d 408 .

1998Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other principle element of the doctrine—the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement." Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit "a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections." Kolender v. Lawson (1983), 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 , 103 S

1998Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other principle element of the doctrine—the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement." Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit "a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections." Kolender v. Lawson (1983), 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 , 103 S

1998Nye, 283 Mont. at 510 , 943 P.2d at 99 ; State v. Martel (1995), 273 Mont. 143, 148 , 902 P.2d 14, 17-18; Monroe v. State (1994), 265 Mont. 1, 3 , 873 P.2d 230, 231 ; GBN, Inc. v. Montana Dept. of Revenue (1991), 249 Mont. 261, 265 , 815 P.2d 595, 597 . ¶56 A vagueness challenge to a statute or ordinance may be raised in two different connotations: (1) whether the statute or ordinance is so vague that it is rendered void on its face; or (2) whether it is vague as applied in a particular situation.

1998Nye, 283 Mont. at 510 , 943 P.2d at 99 ; State v. Martel (1995), 273 Mont. 143, 148 , 902 P.2d 14, 17-18; Monroe v. State (1994), 265 Mont. 1, 3 , 873 P.2d 230, 231 ; GBN, Inc. v. Montana Dept. of Revenue (1991), 249 Mont. 261, 265 , 815 P.2d 595, 597 . ¶56 A vagueness challenge to a statute or ordinance may be raised in two different connotations: (1) whether the statute or ordinance is so vague that it is rendered void on its face; or (2) whether it is vague as applied in a particular situation.

2026In Love, the Massachusetts court observed “the vagueness doctrine ‘is not a principle designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited.’” Love, 530 N.E.2d at 179 (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 , 92 S. Ct. 1953, 1957 (1972)).

2026Regarding the first element in a vagueness challenge—fair notice to the defendant—the court reasoned that its own statute, like many other jurisdictions, required a “willful” failure to appear and that the “present defendant, in reason, could apprehend within rough bounds where his duty lay, and these would correspond with the scope of the statute as described by the judge.” Love, 530 N.E.2d at 179-80 .

2017Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine “is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine-the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.” Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit “a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.” State v. Dixon, 2000 MT 82, ¶ 27 , 299 Mont. 165 , 998

2017Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine “is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine-the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.” Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit “a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.” State v. Dixon, 2000 MT 82, ¶ 27 , 299 Mont. 165 , 998

2011See State v. Frasure, 2004 MT 305, ¶ 12 , 323 Mont. 479 , 100 P.3d 1013 (“counsel are not expected to make motions that theoretically might help their clients if the motions lack merit”); State v. Maine, 2011 MT 90, ¶ 39 , 360 Mont. 182 , 255 P.3d 64 CTtJhe only evidence is that counsel failed to raise it, and it is certainly possible that counsel did conduct an investigation and decided that the facts did not support such a defense”).

2011See State v. Frasure, 2004 MT 305, ¶ 12 , 323 Mont. 479 , 100 P.3d 1013 (“counsel are not expected to make motions that theoretically might help their clients if the motions lack merit”); State v. Maine, 2011 MT 90, ¶ 39 , 360 Mont. 182 , 255 P.3d 64 CTtJhe only evidence is that counsel failed to raise it, and it is certainly possible that counsel did conduct an investigation and decided that the facts did not support such a defense”).

1998Nye, 283 Mont. at 510 , 943 P.2d at 99 ; State v. Martel (1995), 273 Mont. 143, 148 , 902 P.2d 14, 17-18; Monroe v. State (1994), 265 Mont. 1, 3 , 873 P.2d 230, 231 ; GBN, Inc. v. Montana Dept. of Revenue (1991), 249 Mont. 261, 265 , 815 P.2d 595, 597 . ¶56 A vagueness challenge to a statute or ordinance may be raised in two different connotations: (1) whether the statute or ordinance is so vague that it is rendered void on its face; or (2) whether it is vague as applied in a particular situation.

1998Nye, 283 Mont. at 510 , 943 P.2d at 99 ; State v. Martel (1995), 273 Mont. 143, 148 , 902 P.2d 14, 17-18 ; Monroe v. State (1994), 265 Mont. 1, 3 , 873 P.2d 230, 231 ; GBN, Inc. v. Montana Dept. of Revenue (1991), 249 Mont. 261, 265 , 815 P.2d 595, 597 . ¶ 56 A vagueness challenge to a statute or ordinance may be raised in two different connotations: (1) whether the statute or ordinance is so vague that it is rendered void on its face; or (2) whether it is vague as applied in a particular situation.

1998Nye, 283 Mont. at 510 , 943 P.2d at 99 ; State v. Martel (1995), 273 Mont. 143, 148 , 902 P.2d 14, 17-18; Monroe v. State (1994), 265 Mont. 1, 3 , 873 P.2d 230, 231 ; GBN, Inc. v. Montana Dept. of Revenue (1991), 249 Mont. 261, 265 , 815 P.2d 595, 597 . ¶56 A vagueness challenge to a statute or ordinance may be raised in two different connotations: (1) whether the statute or ordinance is so vague that it is rendered void on its face; or (2) whether it is vague as applied in a particular situation.

1998Nye, 283 Mont. at 510 , 943 P.2d at 99 ; State v. Martel (1995), 273 Mont. 143, 148 , 902 P.2d 14, 17-18 ; Monroe v. State (1994), 265 Mont. 1, 3 , 873 P.2d 230, 231 ; GBN, Inc. v. Montana Dept. of Revenue (1991), 249 Mont. 261, 265 , 815 P.2d 595, 597 . ¶ 56 A vagueness challenge to a statute or ordinance may be raised in two different connotations: (1) whether the statute or ordinance is so vague that it is rendered void on its face; or (2) whether it is vague as applied in a particular situation.

1994As was said in United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. 808, 811 , 98 L.Ed. 989 , “The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.

1994As was said in United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. 808, 811 , 98 L.Ed. 989 , “The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.