70 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1906–2026 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Howellgreen2 sentences2003Moreover, “[vjagueness challenges that do not implicate First Amendment freedoms are examined in light of the facts of each particular case.” People v Lino, 447 Mich 567, 575 ; 527 NW2d 434 (1994); Howell, supra at 21 ; see also People v Rogers, 249 Mich App 77, 95 ; 641 NW2d 595 (2001), and People v Cavaiani, 172 Mich App 706, 714 ; 432 NW2d 409 (1988) (“A defendant has standing to raise a vagueness challenge to a statute only if the statute is vague as applied to his conduct.”). 2003In light of our conclusion above that the specific facts of the instant case clearly and unequivocally supported a finding of sexual harassment, the relevant provisions of the Civil Rights Act were not vague, in terms of the first two *626 Howell grounds, as applied to defendants’ conduct. 10 See, generally, Howell, supra at 21 , and Cavaiani, supra at 714 . | 4 | 7 |
Kolender v. Lawsongreen2 sentences2021A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. [Id. at 108-109 (citations omitted).] And, in Kolender v Lawson, 461 US 352, 357 ; 103 S Ct 1855 ; 75 L Ed 2d 903 (1983), the Court said that it had recently recognized, in the context of a penal statute, that “the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine ‘is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine—the requirement that a legislature establish minimal g 2021A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. [Id. at 108-109 (citations omitted).] And, in Kolender v Lawson, 461 US 352, 357 ; 103 S Ct 1855 ; 75 L Ed 2d 903 (1983), the Court said that it had recently recognized, in the context of a penal statute, that “the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine ‘is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine—the requirement that a legislature establish minimal g | 2 | 8 |
Plymouth Charter Township v. Hancockgreen2 sentences2024Accordingly, a statute may be considered unconstitutionally vague if it “fail[s] to provide fair notice of the conduct proscribed” or “encourage[s] arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” People v Harris, 495 Mich 120, 133, 135 ; 845 NW2d 477 (2014); see also Plymouth Twp v Hancock, 236 Mich App 197, 200 ; 600 NW2d 380 (1999). 2002Reversed. 1 The circuit court stated that it was addressing the “vagueness or over-breadth question,” but the analysis that followed addressed only the vagueness claim. 2 In Plymouth Charter Twp, supra at 198, a constitutional challenge was made to a township ordinance that provided as follows: It shall be unlawful for a person to disturb the public peace and quiet by shouting, whistling, loud, boisterous, or vulgar conduct, the playing of musical instruments, phonographs, radios, televisions, tapeplayers or any other means of amplification at any time or place so as to unreasonably annoy or d | 2 | 3 |
Allison v. City of Southfieldgreen2 sentences2026See Allison v Southfield, 172 Mich App 592, 596 ; 432 NW2d 369 (1988) (“Even if one of the evils sought to be prevented by the vagueness doctrine is the vesting of unstructured discretion and the resultant arbitrary and [discriminatory] enforcement of the law, the doctrine is not triggered unless the wording of the promulgation is itself vague.”) (citation omitted). 6. 2026See Allison v Southfield, 172 Mich App 592, 596 ; 432 NW2d 369 (1988) (“Even if one of the evils sought to be prevented by the vagueness doctrine is the vesting of unstructured discretion and the resultant arbitrary and [discriminatory] enforcement of the law, the doctrine is not triggered unless the wording of the promulgation is itself vague.”) (citation omitted). 6. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Downesgreen2 sentences1981People v Howell, 396 Mich 16, 20 ; 238 NW2d 148, 149 (1976), accord People v Downes, 394 Mich 17, 23-24 ; 228 NW2d 212, 215-216 (1975). 1981People v Howell, 396 Mich 16, 20 ; 238 NW2d 148, 149 (1976), accord People v Downes, 394 Mich 17, 23-24 ; 228 NW2d 212, 215-216 (1975). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hrlicgreen2 sentences2025“To evaluate a vagueness challenge, this Court must examine the entire text of the statute and give the words of the statute their ordinary meanings.” People v Hrlic, 277 Mich App 260, 263 ; 744 NW2d 221 (2007). 2025“To evaluate a vagueness challenge, this Court must examine the entire text of the statute and give the words of the statute their ordinary meanings.” People v Hrlic, 277 Mich App 260, 263 ; 744 NW2d 221 (2007). | 1 | 6 |
People v. Linogreen2 sentences2020In People v Lino, 447 Mich 567 , 575 n 2; 527 NW2d 434 (1994), our Supreme Court noted that a constitutional challenge based on vagueness “is brought under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” The Lino Court, explaining the vagueness doctrine, stated that “[i]n order to pass constitutional muster, a penal statute must define the criminal offense ‘with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ ” Id. at 575 , quoting Kol 2020In People v Lino, 447 Mich 567 , 575 n 2; 527 NW2d 434 (1994), our Supreme Court noted that a constitutional challenge based on vagueness “is brought under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” The Lino Court, explaining the vagueness doctrine, stated that “[i]n order to pass constitutional muster, a penal statute must define the criminal offense ‘with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ ” Id. at 575 , quoting Kol | 1 | 4 |
People v. Cavaianigreen2 sentences2003Moreover, “[vjagueness challenges that do not implicate First Amendment freedoms are examined in light of the facts of each particular case.” People v Lino, 447 Mich 567, 575 ; 527 NW2d 434 (1994); Howell, supra at 21 ; see also People v Rogers, 249 Mich App 77, 95 ; 641 NW2d 595 (2001), and People v Cavaiani, 172 Mich App 706, 714 ; 432 NW2d 409 (1988) (“A defendant has standing to raise a vagueness challenge to a statute only if the statute is vague as applied to his conduct.”). 2003Moreover, “[vjagueness challenges that do not implicate First Amendment freedoms are examined in light of the facts of each particular case.” People v Lino, 447 Mich 567, 575 ; 527 NW2d 434 (1994); Howell, supra at 21 ; see also People v Rogers, 249 Mich App 77, 95 ; 641 NW2d 595 (2001), and People v Cavaiani, 172 Mich App 706, 714 ; 432 NW2d 409 (1988) (“A defendant has standing to raise a vagueness challenge to a statute only if the statute is vague as applied to his conduct.”). | 1 | 4 |
United States v. National Dairy Products Corp.green2 sentences1998United States v Nat'l Dairy Products Corp, 372 US 29, 36 ; 83 S Ct 594 ; 9 L Ed 2d 561 (1963); People v Howell, 396 Mich 16, 21 ; 283 NW2d 148 (1976). 1998United States v Nat'l Dairy Products Corp, 372 US 29, 36 ; 83 S Ct 594 ; 9 L Ed 2d 561 (1963); People v Howell, 396 Mich 16, 21 ; 283 NW2d 148 (1976). | 1 | 3 |
People v. Rogersgreen2 sentences2003Moreover, “[vjagueness challenges that do not implicate First Amendment freedoms are examined in light of the facts of each particular case.” People v Lino, 447 Mich 567, 575 ; 527 NW2d 434 (1994); Howell, supra at 21 ; see also People v Rogers, 249 Mich App 77, 95 ; 641 NW2d 595 (2001), and People v Cavaiani, 172 Mich App 706, 714 ; 432 NW2d 409 (1988) (“A defendant has standing to raise a vagueness challenge to a statute only if the statute is vague as applied to his conduct.”). 2003Moreover, “[vjagueness challenges that do not implicate First Amendment freedoms are examined in light of the facts of each particular case.” People v Lino, 447 Mich 567, 575 ; 527 NW2d 434 (1994); Howell, supra at 21 ; see also People v Rogers, 249 Mich App 77, 95 ; 641 NW2d 595 (2001), and People v Cavaiani, 172 Mich App 706, 714 ; 432 NW2d 409 (1988) (“A defendant has standing to raise a vagueness challenge to a statute only if the statute is vague as applied to his conduct.”). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Tombsgreen1 sentence2025See id. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Malonegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Harrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Tennysongreen | 1 | 1 |
| STC, Inc. v. Department of Treasurygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bouie v. City of Columbiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Saldanagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Johngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Vronko
green
2 sentences2025“When a defendant’s vagueness challenge does not implicate First Amendment freedoms, the constitutionality of the statute in question must be examined in light of the particular facts at hand without concern for the hypothetical rights of others.” Id. 2021When a vagueness challenge does not involve the First Amendment, “the constitutionality of the statute in question must be examined in light of the particular facts at hand without concern for the hypothetical rights of others.” People v Vronko, 228 Mich App 649, 652 ; 579 NW2d 138 (1998). | 10 | 2001–2025 |
People v. Al-Saiegh
green
2 sentences2025In other words, “[a] defendant has standing to raise a vagueness challenge only if the statute is vague as applied to his conduct.” People v Al-Saiegh, 244 Mich App 391 , 397 n 5; 625 NW2d 419 (2001). 2025In other words, “[a] defendant has standing to raise a vagueness challenge only if the statute is vague as applied to his conduct.” People v Al-Saiegh, 244 Mich App 391 , 397 n 5; 625 NW2d 419 (2001). | 4 | 2003–2025 |
People v. Sands
green
2 sentences2025“A vagueness challenge must be considered in light of the facts at issue.” Sands, 261 Mich App at 161 . 2018“A vagueness challenge must be considered in light of the facts at issue.” Id. | 4 | 2005–2025 |
Smith v. Goguen
green
2 sentences2024The vagueness doctrine “incorporates notions of fair notice or warning” and “requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Smith v Goguen, 415 US 566, 572-573 ; 94 S Ct 1242 ; 39 L Ed 2d 605 (1974) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2024The vagueness doctrine “incorporates notions of fair notice or warning” and “requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Smith v Goguen, 415 US 566, 572-573 ; 94 S Ct 1242 ; 39 L Ed 2d 605 (1974) (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 4 | 1986–2024 |
People v. Morey
green
2 sentences2018"A vagueness challenge must be considered in light of the facts at issue." Id ."When presented with a vagueness challenge, we examine the entire text of the statute and give the words of the *284 statute their ordinary meanings." People v. Morey , 230 Mich. App. 152 , 163, 583 N.W.2d 907 (1998), aff'd 461 Mich. 325 , 603 N.W.2d 250 (1999). 2018"A vagueness challenge must be considered in light of the facts at issue." Id ."When presented with a vagueness challenge, we examine the entire text of the statute and give the words of the *284 statute their ordinary meanings." People v. Morey , 230 Mich. App. 152 , 163, 583 N.W.2d 907 (1998), aff'd 461 Mich. 325 , 603 N.W.2d 250 (1999). | 3 | 2004–2018 |
People v. Morey
green
2 sentences2018"A vagueness challenge must be considered in light of the facts at issue." Id ."When presented with a vagueness challenge, we examine the entire text of the statute and give the words of the *284 statute their ordinary meanings." People v. Morey , 230 Mich. App. 152 , 163, 583 N.W.2d 907 (1998), aff'd 461 Mich. 325 , 603 N.W.2d 250 (1999). 2018"A vagueness challenge must be considered in light of the facts at issue." Id ."When presented with a vagueness challenge, we examine the entire text of the statute and give the words of the *284 statute their ordinary meanings." People v. Morey , 230 Mich. App. 152 , 163, 583 N.W.2d 907 (1998), aff'd 461 Mich. 325 , 603 N.W.2d 250 (1999). | 3 | 2004–2018 |
People v. Nichols
green
2 sentences2017People v Nichols, 262 Mich App 408, 410 ; 686 NW2d 502 (2004). 2017People v Nichols, 262 Mich App 408, 410 ; 686 NW2d 502 (2004). | 3 | 2013–2017 |
People v. Gratsch
green
2 sentences2015In People v Gratsch, 299 Mich App 604, 609-610 ; 831 NW2d 462 (2013), vacated in part on other grounds 495 Mich 876 (2013), this Court discussed the nature of a vagueness challenge: The void-for-vagueness doctrine flows from the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and Const 1963, art 1, § 17, which guarantee that the state may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. 2015In People v Gratsch, 299 Mich App 604, 609-610 ; 831 NW2d 462 (2013), vacated in part on other grounds 495 Mich 876 (2013), this Court discussed the nature of a vagueness challenge: The void-for-vagueness doctrine flows from the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and Const 1963, art 1, § 17, which guarantee that the state may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. | 3 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Wilson
green
2 sentences2015“Reference to a dictionary is appropriate to determine the ordinary meaning of a word.” People v Wilson, 230 Mich App 590, 592 ; 585 NW2d 24 (1998). 2015“Reference to a dictionary is appropriate to determine the ordinary meaning of a word.” People v Wilson, 230 Mich App 590, 592 ; 585 NW2d 24 (1998). | 3 | 2004–2015 |
People v. Perkins
green
2 sentences2022“At common law, misconduct in office was defined as ‘corrupt behavior by an officer in the exercise of the duties of his office or while acting under color of his office.’ ” People v Perkins, 1 I otherwise agree with the majority’s resolution of the issues addressing defendant’s challenges to the prosecutor’s charging decision and the vagueness claim. -1- 468 Mich 448, 456 ; 662 NW2d 727 (2003), quoting People v Coutu, 459 Mich 348, 354 ; 589 NW2d 458 (1999), quoting Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed), p 543. 2022“At common law, misconduct in office was defined as ‘corrupt behavior by an officer in the exercise of the duties of his office or while acting under color of his office.’ ” People v Perkins, 1 I otherwise agree with the majority’s resolution of the issues addressing defendant’s challenges to the prosecutor’s charging decision and the vagueness claim. -1- 468 Mich 448, 456 ; 662 NW2d 727 (2003), quoting People v Coutu, 459 Mich 348, 354 ; 589 NW2d 458 (1999), quoting Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed), p 543. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Coutu
green
2 sentences2022“At common law, misconduct in office was defined as ‘corrupt behavior by an officer in the exercise of the duties of his office or while acting under color of his office.’ ” People v Perkins, 1 I otherwise agree with the majority’s resolution of the issues addressing defendant’s challenges to the prosecutor’s charging decision and the vagueness claim. -1- 468 Mich 448, 456 ; 662 NW2d 727 (2003), quoting People v Coutu, 459 Mich 348, 354 ; 589 NW2d 458 (1999), quoting Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed), p 543. 2022“At common law, misconduct in office was defined as ‘corrupt behavior by an officer in the exercise of the duties of his office or while acting under color of his office.’ ” People v Perkins, 1 I otherwise agree with the majority’s resolution of the issues addressing defendant’s challenges to the prosecutor’s charging decision and the vagueness claim. -1- 468 Mich 448, 456 ; 662 NW2d 727 (2003), quoting People v Coutu, 459 Mich 348, 354 ; 589 NW2d 458 (1999), quoting Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed), p 543. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Booth Newspapers, Inc v. University of Michigan Board of Regents
green
2 sentences2018Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Mich Bd of Regents, 444 Mich 211 , 234 n 23; 507 NW2d 422 (1993) (we need not address issues that were not posed in the lower court); Dresden v Detroit Macomb Hosp Corp, 218 Mich App 292, 300 ; 553 NW2d 387 (1996) (insufficiently briefed issues are abandoned on appeal). 2018Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Mich Bd of Regents, 444 Mich 211 , 234 n 23; 507 NW2d 422 (1993) (we need not address issues that were not posed in the lower court); Dresden v Detroit Macomb Hosp Corp, 218 Mich App 292, 300 ; 553 NW2d 387 (1996) (insufficiently briefed issues are abandoned on appeal). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Dresden v. Detroit MacOmb Hospital Corp.
green
2 sentences2018Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Mich Bd of Regents, 444 Mich 211 , 234 n 23; 507 NW2d 422 (1993) (we need not address issues that were not posed in the lower court); Dresden v Detroit Macomb Hosp Corp, 218 Mich App 292, 300 ; 553 NW2d 387 (1996) (insufficiently briefed issues are abandoned on appeal). 2018Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Mich Bd of Regents, 444 Mich 211 , 234 n 23; 507 NW2d 422 (1993) (we need not address issues that were not posed in the lower court); Dresden v Detroit Macomb Hosp Corp, 218 Mich App 292, 300 ; 553 NW2d 387 (1996) (insufficiently briefed issues are abandoned on appeal). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Nichols
green
2 sentences2017People v Nichols, 262 Mich App 408, 410 ; 686 NW2d 502 (2004). 2017People v Nichols, 262 Mich App 408, 410 ; 686 NW2d 502 (2004). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Rose v. Locke
green
2 sentences2005Due process requires “that the law give sufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden.” Rose v Locke, 423 US 48, 50 ; 96 S Ct 243 ; 46 L Ed 2d 185 (1975). 2005Due process requires “that the law give sufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden.” Rose v Locke, 423 US 48, 50 ; 96 S Ct 243 ; 46 L Ed 2d 185 (1975). | 2 | 1994–2005 |
Miller v. California
green
2 sentences2002Reversed. 1 The circuit court stated that it was addressing the “vagueness or over-breadth question,” but the analysis that followed addressed only the vagueness claim. 2 In Plymouth Charter Twp, supra at 198, a constitutional challenge was made to a township ordinance that provided as follows: It shall be unlawful for a person to disturb the public peace and quiet by shouting, whistling, loud, boisterous, or vulgar conduct, the playing of musical instruments, phonographs, radios, televisions, tapeplayers or any other means of amplification at any time or place so as to unreasonably annoy or d 2002Reversed. 1 The circuit court stated that it was addressing the “vagueness or over-breadth question,” but the analysis that followed addressed only the vagueness claim. 2 In Plymouth Charter Twp, supra at 198, a constitutional challenge was made to a township ordinance that provided as follows: It shall be unlawful for a person to disturb the public peace and quiet by shouting, whistling, loud, boisterous, or vulgar conduct, the playing of musical instruments, phonographs, radios, televisions, tapeplayers or any other means of amplification at any time or place so as to unreasonably annoy or d | 2 | 1976–2002 |
People v. Mitchell
green
2 sentences2001People v Mitchell, 131 Mich App 69, 74 ; 345 NW2d 611 (1983). 2001People v Mitchell, 131 Mich App 69, 74 ; 345 NW2d 611 (1983). | 2 | 1988–2001 |
People v. Harbour
green
2 sentences1981The basic standard for determining whether a statute is void for vagueness is found in People v Herron, 68 Mich App 381, 382 ; 242 NW2d 584 (1976), where the Court stated: " '[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.’ Lanzetta v New Jersey, 306 US 451, 453 ; 59 S Ct 618 ; 83 L Ed 888 (1939).” The parameters of a vagueness inquiry are *703 clearly spelled out in People v Harbour, 76 Mich App 552, 558 1981The basic standard for determining whether a statute is void for vagueness is found in People v Herron, 68 Mich App 381, 382 ; 242 NW2d 584 (1976), where the Court stated: " '[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.’ Lanzetta v New Jersey, 306 US 451, 453 ; 59 S Ct 618 ; 83 L Ed 888 (1939).” The parameters of a vagueness inquiry are *703 clearly spelled out in People v Harbour, 76 Mich App 552, 558 | 2 | 1981–1988 |
Lanzetta v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences1981The basic standard for determining whether a statute is void for vagueness is found in People v Herron, 68 Mich App 381, 382 ; 242 NW2d 584 (1976), where the Court stated: " '[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.’ Lanzetta v New Jersey, 306 US 451, 453 ; 59 S Ct 618 ; 83 L Ed 888 (1939).” The parameters of a vagueness inquiry are *703 clearly spelled out in People v Harbour, 76 Mich App 552, 558 1981The basic standard for determining whether a statute is void for vagueness is found in People v Herron, 68 Mich App 381, 382 ; 242 NW2d 584 (1976), where the Court stated: " '[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.’ Lanzetta v New Jersey, 306 US 451, 453 ; 59 S Ct 618 ; 83 L Ed 888 (1939).” The parameters of a vagueness inquiry are *703 clearly spelled out in People v Harbour, 76 Mich App 552, 558 | 2 | 1981–1983 |
| Hackel v. Macomb County Commission green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Gaines green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Beckles v. United States green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Beckles v. United States green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| City of Lansing v. Hartsuff green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Fitzgerald green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Grievance Administrator v. Fieger green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Lewis green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Roberts green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| United States v. Williams green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Summit green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| United States v. John P. Miller green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Adkins v. Department of Civil Service green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Noble green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Douglas green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Russell green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Derror red | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. Knapp green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| People v. Hill green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Maiden v. Rozwood green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.