vagueness challenge in California

2025“The vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of ‘ “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 , 890 (Sheena K.).) “[A] law that is ‘void for vagueness’ not only fails to provide adequate notice to those who must observe its strictures, but also ‘impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dan

2025(See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 [“the underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of ‘fair warning’ ”].) “To satisfy due process, a statute must be sufficiently clear to provide adequate notice of the prohibited or required conduct referred to therein. [Citations.] Thus, a statute will be deemed void for vagueness if it either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to what is required.” (Nisei Farmers League v. Labor & Workforce Development Agency (

2025Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1116 (Acuna).) A defendant may raise a vagueness challenge for the first time on appeal when the challenge presents a pure question of law that the appellate court can resolve without reference to the sentencing record.

2025Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1115 ].) 4 The vagueness doctrine requires probation conditions to “be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated.” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 .) This doctrine does not require “ ‘absolute clarity’ in the text of the condition itself,” but only “ ‘a reasonable degree of certainty.’ ” (People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 503 (Hall).) Additionally, courts analyze the “reasonable specificity” of probation conditions as they apply in their speci

2021(See Batchelder, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 123 [rejecting a vagueness challenge to statutes that overlapped in prohibiting felons from receiving firearms but authorized different maximum penalties]; Davis v. Municipal Court (1988) 46 Cal.3d 64, 88-89 [citing Batchelder to reject a challenge to rules giving the district attorney the authority to decide whether to charge a crime as a misdemeanor or a felony]; cf. People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 834-835 [citing Batchelder to reject an equal 12 protection challenge to statutes allowing more severe punishment for battery on a custodial offic

2021(See Batchelder, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 123 [rejecting a vagueness challenge to statutes that overlapped in prohibiting felons from receiving firearms but authorized different maximum penalties]; Davis v. Municipal Court (1988) 46 Cal.3d 64, 88-89 [citing Batchelder to reject a challenge to rules giving the district attorney the authority to decide whether to charge a crime as a misdemeanor or a felony]; cf. People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 834-835 [citing Batchelder to reject an equal 12 protection challenge to statutes allowing more severe punishment for battery on a custodial offic

2021(Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 910 .) “The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on [the individual’s] constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.” (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153 .) Additionally, under the vagueness doctrine, an order must be “sufficiently precise” for the probationer to know what is required and for the court to determine whethe

2016(Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 907 , citing Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal 4th at pp. 889-890.) E.N. does not identify any particular unclarity in the condition, which is essential to a vagueness challenge, nor does he identify any respect in which it limits his constitutional rights, which is essential for a challenge for overbreadth.

2024(See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889 (Sheena K.).) “[T]he underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of ‘fair warning.’ [Citation.] The rule of fair warning consists of ‘the due process concepts of preventing arbitrary law enforcement and providing adequate notice to potential 5 offenders.’” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 .) “A probation condition ‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to withstand a challenge on the ground of v

2023(See People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 630 .) In Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th 875 , the California Supreme Court reviewed a vagueness challenge to a probation condition, explaining the governing principles as follows.

2024A. Legal Framework and Standard of Review “Because parolees retain constitutional protection against arbitrary and oppressive official action, ‘parole conditions, like conditions of probation, must be reasonable .…’ ” (People v. Austin (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 778, 787 .) “[P]arole conditions may not be unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.” (Ibid.) “To withstand a vagueness challenge, a condition must be sufficiently precise for parolees to know what is required of them and whether the condition has been violated.” (Ibid.; accord, In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 (Sheena K.) [vaguenes

2024To the extent defendant is raising a vagueness challenge, his failure to 2 “Because parolees retain constitutional protection against arbitrary and oppressive official action, ‘parole conditions, like conditions of probation, must be reasonable.’ ” (People v. Austin (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 778, 787 .) “[P]arole conditions may not be unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.” (Ibid.) “To withstand a vagueness challenge, a condition must be sufficiently precise for parolees to know what is required of them and whether the condition has been violated.” (Ibid.) “A restriction is unconstitutionally over

2026(See Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 887–888.) In any event, like in overbreadth challenges, we consider vagueness challenges to probation conditions by applying “ ‘the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader.’ ” (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 382 , accord, People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 606 [probation condition is not impermissibly vague “ ‘ “simply because there may be difficulty in determining whether some marginal or hypothetical act is covered by its language” ’ ”]; In re I.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 249, 261 [“A probation condition survives a vagueness ch

2023I, § 7, subd. (a).) “The vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of ‘ “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” ’ ” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 .) Yet “ ‘ “a statute is not void simply because there may be difficulty in determining whether some marginal or hypothetical act is covered by its language.” ’ ” (People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 606 .) “ ‘[F]ew words possess the precision of mathematical symbols, most statutes must deal wi

2021(Cranston v. City of Richmond (1985) 40 Cal.3d 755 , 763–764, citing Connally v. General Const. Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391 .) Moreover, the regulation cannot be “unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious” and “the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.” (Nebbia v. New York (1934) 291 U.S. 502, 525 .) In considering a vagueness challenge to an administrative regulation, we do not view the regulation in the abstract; rather we consider whether it is vague when applied to the complaining party’s conduct in light of the specific facts of the p

2018Because the constitutional guarantee of due process generally secures the right to notice and the opportunity to be heard ( Dusenbery v. United States (2002) 534 U.S. 161 , 167, 122 S.Ct. 694 , 151 L.Ed.2d 597 ), a law is unconstitutionally *533 vague only it if fails to " 'give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited' " or to know "what conduct on [his or her] part will render [him or her] liable to [the law's] penalties." ( Cranston v. City of Richmond (1985) 40 Cal.3d 755 , 763, 221 Cal.Rptr. 779 , 710 P.2d 845 ; Connally v. General Const. Co.

2015(See, e.g., People v. Leon (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 943, 952 (Leon) [prohibition that defendant not “ ‘frequent’ ” areas where gang activity occurs was “unconstitutionally vague, because it is both obscure and has multiple meanings”]; In re White, supra, 97 Cal.App.3d at pp. 147-148 [probation condition containing blanket restriction against being present in specified areas of city at any time must be narrowed so that right to travel is not unduly restricted].) In considering a condition prohibiting a minor from associating with “ ‘anyone disapproved of by probation,’ ” the California Supreme Co

2014General Legal Principles “A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 (Sheena K.); see also People v. Leon (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 943, 948-949 (Leon).) In addition, “[a] probation condition ‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him [or her], and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to withstand a [consti

2025Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1115 ].) 4 The vagueness doctrine requires probation conditions to “be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated.” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 .) This doctrine does not require “ ‘absolute clarity’ in the text of the condition itself,” but only “ ‘a reasonable degree of certainty.’ ” (People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 503 (Hall).) Additionally, courts analyze the “reasonable specificity” of probation conditions as they apply in their speci

2025(Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 503 .) Instead, the vagueness doctrine “demands ‘“no more than a reasonable degree of certainty.”’” (Ibid.) People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341 , considered a probation condition forbidding the probationer from purchasing or possessing “pornographic or sexually explicit materials as defined by the probation officer.” (Id. at p. 1352.) The Court of Appeal held this condition “does not sufficiently provide defendant with advance knowledge of what is required of him.

2022Law “A probation condition ‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness.” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 .) The “underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of ‘fair warning.’ ” (Ibid.) A probation condition is not unconstitutionally vague if it provides “adequate notice—‘fair warning’—of the conduct proscribed.” (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153 , quoting Sheena K., at p. 890.) “ ‘

2016I thought I said that, but -- not associate with anyone he knows are gang members. [¶] Anyway, it’s always knowingly, should be knowingly, but the burden -- the standard of proof on a probation violation is preponderance of the evidence. [¶] If you know the people you’re with are 2 Hells Angels, you shouldn’t be with them. [¶] THE DEFENDANT: (Defendant nods head.)” “[T]he underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of ‘fair warning.’ [Citation.] The rule of fair warning consists of ‘the due process concepts of preventing arbitrary law enforcement and providing adequate not

2020(See Smith v. Goguen (1974) 415 U.S. 566, 573 [“[w]here a statute’s literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the [due process doctrine of vagueness] demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts. [Fn. omitted.]”]; see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. (1982) 455 U.S. 489, 499 [if “the law interferes with the right of free speech . . . , a more stringent vagueness test should apply”]; see also Tobe, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1109 .) More recently, the Unite

2020(See Smith v. Goguen (1974) 415 U.S. 566, 573 [“[w]here a statute’s literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the [due process doctrine of vagueness] demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts. [Fn. omitted.]”]; see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. (1982) 455 U.S. 489, 499 [if “the law interferes with the right of free speech . . . , a more stringent vagueness test should apply”]; see also Tobe, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1109 .) More recently, the Unite

2020(Welch, at p. 235; In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887-889 (Sheena K.); In re Justin S. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 811, 814-816 .) In this situation, our review is limited to “a term of probation on the ground of unconstitutional vagueness or overbreadth that is capable of correction without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court.” (Sheena K., at p. 887.) A. Vagueness Challenge “[T]he underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of ‘fair warning.’ [Citation.] The rule of fair warning consists of ‘the 3 due process concepts of preventing

2016(In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 912-913 [modifying probation condition to prohibit knowing presence of weapons or ammunition]; In re Justin S. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 811, 816 [modifying prohibition on association with gang members to prohibit association with known gang members]; In re Kacy S. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 704, 713 [modifying probation condition that defendant not associate with any persons not approved by his probation officer].) “Inherent in the very nature of probation is that probationers ‘do not enjoy “the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.” ’ [Citat

2020(See Smith v. Goguen (1974) 415 U.S. 566, 573 [“[w]here a statute’s literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the [due process doctrine of vagueness] demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts. [Fn. omitted.]”]; see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. (1982) 455 U.S. 489, 499 [if “the law interferes with the right of free speech . . . , a more stringent vagueness test should apply”]; see also Tobe, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1109 .) More recently, the Unite

2020(See Smith v. Goguen (1974) 415 U.S. 566, 573 [“[w]here a statute’s literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the [due process doctrine of vagueness] demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts. [Fn. omitted.]”]; see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. (1982) 455 U.S. 489, 499 [if “the law interferes with the right of free speech . . . , a more stringent vagueness test should apply”]; see also Tobe, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1109 .) More recently, the Unite

2013Although to survive a vagueness challenge statutory factors used in sentence selection must have “a commonsense core of meaning that criminal juries should be capable of understanding” (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 168 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 , 38 P.3d 461 ], citing Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975 [ 129 L.Ed.2d 750 , 114 S.Ct. 2630 ]), the prosecutor here was not purporting to define the section 190.3 statutory sentence selection factors, but to point out “circumstances of the offense” the jury might consider aggravating under section 190.3, factor (a).

2013Although to survive a vagueness challenge statutory factors used in sentence selection must have “a commonsense core of meaning that criminal juries should be capable of understanding” (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 168 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 , 38 P.3d 461 ], citing Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975 [ 129 L.Ed.2d 750 , 114 S.Ct. 2630 ]), the prosecutor here was not purporting to define the section 190.3 statutory sentence selection factors, but to point out “circumstances of the offense” the jury might consider aggravating under section 190.3, factor (a).

2015(See Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 .) Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized in the context of a vagueness challenge, “[c]ondemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.” (Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972) 408 U.S. 104, 110 [ 92 S.Ct. 2294 ], fn. omitted.) We recognize, however, the challenged graffiti condition suffers from a Sheena K. type of deficiency in that A.R. might be unaware that a particular item comes within the generally described class of materials.

2015(See Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 .) Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized in the context of a vagueness challenge, “[c]ondemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.” (Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972) 408 U.S. 104, 110 [ 92 S.Ct. 2294 ], fn. omitted.) We recognize, however, the challenged graffiti condition suffers from a Sheena K. type of deficiency in that A.R. might be unaware that a particular item comes within the generally described class of materials.

2021Mandatory Supervision Condition No. 45 is Unconstitutionally Vague The underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of “fair warning.” (People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 751 .) The rule of fair warning consists of “the due process concepts of preventing arbitrary law enforcement and providing adequate notice to potential offenders.” (Ibid.) The vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of “ ‘a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men [and women] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to it

2016The underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of "fair warning." (People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 751 .) The rule of fair warning consists of "the due process concepts of preventing arbitrary law enforcement and providing adequate notice to potential offenders." (Ibid.) The vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of " 'a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' " (People ex. rel.

2026(See Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 887–888.) In any event, like in overbreadth challenges, we consider vagueness challenges to probation conditions by applying “ ‘the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader.’ ” (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 382 , accord, People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 606 [probation condition is not impermissibly vague “ ‘ “simply because there may be difficulty in determining whether some marginal or hypothetical act is covered by its language” ’ ”]; In re I.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 249, 261 [“A probation condition survives a vagueness ch

2025(Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 .) Lastly, “[a] probation condition survives a vagueness challenge if it can be given any reasonable and practical construction.” (I.V., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 261 [citing Hall, supra, at p. 501 ]; People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 [“A probation condition should be given ‘the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader.”].) In Sheena K., our high court considered whether a juvenile’s probation condition requiring the minor to not associate with anyone “disapproved of by probation” was unconstitutionally vague.

2021(See Batchelder, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 123 [rejecting a vagueness challenge to statutes that overlapped in prohibiting felons from receiving firearms but authorized different maximum penalties]; Davis v. Municipal Court (1988) 46 Cal.3d 64, 88-89 [citing Batchelder to reject a challenge to rules giving the district attorney the authority to decide whether to charge a crime as a misdemeanor or a felony]; cf. People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 834-835 [citing Batchelder to reject an equal 12 protection challenge to statutes allowing more severe punishment for battery on a custodial offic

2020Void for Vagueness Principles Due process requires “a reasonable degree of certainty in legislation, especially in the criminal law . . . .” (People v. Superior Court (Caswell) (1988) 46 Cal.3d 381, 389 ; People v. Custodio (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 807, 811 (Custodio), italics added.) To satisfy due process and survive a vagueness challenge, a criminal statute must “ ‘ “ ‘be definite enough to provide (1) a standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed and (2) a standard for police enforcement and for ascertainment of guilt.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 605 (Mor

2026We find no vagueness but accept the People’s concession on the latter point.3 “ ‘ “[T]he underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of ‘fair warning.’ [Citation.] The rule of fair warning consists of ‘the due process concepts of preventing arbitrary law enforcement and providing adequate notice to potential offenders’ [citation], protections that are ‘embodied in the due process clauses of the federal and California Constitutions.’ ” ’ ” (In re D.H. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 722, 727 .) Emrick insists the first and last sentences of condition no. 24 are inconsistent as to whet

2025(Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 503 .) Instead, the vagueness doctrine “demands ‘“no more than a reasonable degree of certainty.”’” (Ibid.) In In re D.H. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 722 , a juvenile was placed on probation after admitting that he committed indecent exposure on a city bus. (§ 314(1).) As a condition of his probation, the juvenile court ordered, “‘You’re not to access pornography on any electronic devices or otherwise.’” (In re D.H., supra, at p. 725 .) The court of appeal held, “the term ‘pornography’ is inherently vague . . . .” (Id. at p. 728.) Because the term “pornography” is “subje

1995In determining whether a statute is sufficiently certain to comport with due process standards, the court will “look first to the language of the statute, then to its legislative history, and finally to California decisions construing the statutory language.” (Pryor v. Municipal Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 246 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 330 , 599 P.2d 636 ].) A similar analytical framework is used when a vagueness claim is grounded on Eighth Amendment principles.

1995In determining whether a statute is sufficiently certain to comport with due process standards, the court will “look first to the language of the statute, then to its legislative history, and finally to California decisions construing the statutory language.” (Pryor v. Municipal Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 246 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 330 , 599 P.2d 636 ].) A similar analytical framework is used when a vagueness claim is grounded on Eighth Amendment principles.

2022No. 177 amended Penal Code section 1465.9, subdivision (b) to state: “On and after January 1, 2022, the balance of any court-imposed costs pursuant to Section 1001.15, 1001.16, 1001.90, 1202.4, 1203.1, 1203.1ab, 1203.1c, 1203.1m, 1203.4a, 1203.9, 1205, 1214.5, 2085.5, 2085.6, or 2085.7, as those sections read on December 31, 2021, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those costs shall be vacated.” 11 meaning, which is well settled.’” (In re R.P. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 562, 566 .) Thus, to withstand a vagueness challenge, “a probation condition ‘must b

2016In addition, you are not to knowingly possess anything that you intend to use as a weapon or that you know someone else might consider to be a weapon.' " ( Id. at p. 366, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 144 .) The Attorney General argues that the weapons condition imposed by the juvenile court here is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad because the specification of "any other deadly or dangerous weapon"-language that was not included in the Kevin F. condition-provides notice that Mark "must not possess any inherently dangerous item that is designed for use as a weapon, or any item being used in a way th

2025(In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143 .) “The criteria for assessing the constitutionality of conditions of probation also applies to conditions of parole.” (In re Stevens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1233 .) “[T]he underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of ‘fair warning.’ ” (In re Sheena K., (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 .) “The vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of ‘ “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” [Cita

2025(In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143 .) “The criteria for assessing the constitutionality of conditions of probation also applies to conditions of parole.” (In re Stevens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1233 .) “[T]he underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of ‘fair warning.’ ” (In re Sheena K., (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 .) “The vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of ‘ “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” [Cita

2021(Cranston v. City of Richmond (1985) 40 Cal.3d 755 , 763–764, citing Connally v. General Const. Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391 .) Moreover, the regulation cannot be “unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious” and “the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.” (Nebbia v. New York (1934) 291 U.S. 502, 525 .) In considering a vagueness challenge to an administrative regulation, we do not view the regulation in the abstract; rather we consider whether it is vague when applied to the complaining party’s conduct in light of the specific facts of the p

2018Because the constitutional guarantee of due process generally secures the right to notice and the opportunity to be heard ( Dusenbery v. United States (2002) 534 U.S. 161 , 167, 122 S.Ct. 694 , 151 L.Ed.2d 597 ), a law is unconstitutionally *533 vague only it if fails to " 'give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited' " or to know "what conduct on [his or her] part will render [him or her] liable to [the law's] penalties." ( Cranston v. City of Richmond (1985) 40 Cal.3d 755 , 763, 221 Cal.Rptr. 779 , 710 P.2d 845 ; Connally v. General Const. Co.

2017In Sheena K. , we approved the Court of Appeal's reliance on the vagueness doctrine to order modification of a probation condition barring the probationer from associating with " 'anyone disapproved of by probation.' " ( Sheena K. , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 889 , 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 , 153 P.3d 282 .) Unlike in this case, though, the probationer in Sheena K. did not object that the condition was vague in failing to articulate the requisite scienter. ( People v. Hartley , supra , 248 Cal.App.4th at pp. 633-634, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 [distinguishing Sheena K. ]; People v. Moore , supra , 211 Cal.App

2017In Sheena K. , we approved the Court of Appeal's reliance on the vagueness doctrine to order modification of a probation condition barring the probationer from associating with " 'anyone disapproved of by probation.' " ( Sheena K. , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 889 , 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 , 153 P.3d 282 .) Unlike in this case, though, the probationer in Sheena K. did not object that the condition was vague in failing to articulate the requisite scienter. ( People v. Hartley , supra , 248 Cal.App.4th at pp. 633-634, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 [distinguishing Sheena K. ]; People v. Moore , supra , 211 Cal.App