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10 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kolender v. Lawsongreen2 sentences2020Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991)( “First Amendment freedoms are not infringed by [the statute], so the vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of this case.”); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)(“It is well established that vagueness challenged to statute which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the fats of the case at hand.” (citations omitted); Stinson, 396 S.W.3d at 907 ; Tobar v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d 133, 134-35 (Ky. 2009). 24 See 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018/ The Sessions decision followed 2006Though both inquiries are important, "the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but . . . the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement." Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 , 103 S.Ct. at 1858 (citation and quotation omitted). | 3 | 5 |
Chapman v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2020Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991)( “First Amendment freedoms are not infringed by [the statute], so the vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of this case.”); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)(“It is well established that vagueness challenged to statute which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the fats of the case at hand.” (citations omitted); Stinson, 396 S.W.3d at 907 ; Tobar v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d 133, 134-35 (Ky. 2009). 24 See 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018). 2020Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991)( “First Amendment freedoms are not infringed by [the statute], so the vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of this case.”); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)(“It is well established that vagueness challenged to statute which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the fats of the case at hand.” (citations omitted); Stinson, 396 S.W.3d at 907 ; Tobar v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d 133, 134-35 (Ky. 2009). 24 See 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018/ The Sessions decision followed | 3 | 3 |
Tobar v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2020Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991)( “First Amendment freedoms are not infringed by [the statute], so the vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of this case.”); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)(“It is well established that vagueness challenged to statute which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the fats of the case at hand.” (citations omitted); Stinson, 396 S.W.3d at 907 ; Tobar v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d 133, 134-35 (Ky. 2009). 24 See 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018). 2020Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991)( “First Amendment freedoms are not infringed by [the statute], so the vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of this case.”); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)(“It is well established that vagueness challenged to statute which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the fats of the case at hand.” (citations omitted); Stinson, 396 S.W.3d at 907 ; Tobar v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d 133, 134-35 (Ky. 2009). 24 See 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018/ The Sessions decision followed | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Mazuriegreen2 sentences2020Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991)( “First Amendment freedoms are not infringed by [the statute], so the vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of this case.”); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)(“It is well established that vagueness challenged to statute which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the fats of the case at hand.” (citations omitted); Stinson, 396 S.W.3d at 907 ; Tobar v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d 133, 134-35 (Ky. 2009). 24 See 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018). 2020Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991)( “First Amendment freedoms are not infringed by [the statute], so the vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of this case.”); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)(“It is well established that vagueness challenged to statute which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the fats of the case at hand.” (citations omitted); Stinson, 396 S.W.3d at 907 ; Tobar v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d 133, 134-35 (Ky. 2009). 24 See 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018/ The Sessions decision followed | 2 | 2 |
City of Chicago v. Moralesgreen2 sentences2020The Sessions decision followed the Court’s opinion in Johnson v. United States, which facially invalidated a similar provision in the Armed Career Criminal Act. 576 U.S. at 595 . 25 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (performing facial review of the constitutionality of the federal honest-services statute); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (plurality opinion) (facially reviewing city loitering ordinance); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. at 353 (facially reviewing an anti-loitering provision). 7 Similarly, Kentucky case law takes a variety of approaches to this question. 2020Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991)( “First Amendment freedoms are not infringed by [the statute], so the vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of this case.”); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)(“It is well established that vagueness challenged to statute which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the fats of the case at hand.” (citations omitted); Stinson, 396 S.W.3d at 907 ; Tobar v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d 133, 134-35 (Ky. 2009). 24 See 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018/ The Sessions decision followed | 1 | 3 |
United States v. Evansgreen2 sentences2003Further, where a statute does not implicate First Amendment values, “[a] vagueness challenge ... cannot be aimed at the statute on its face but must be limited to the application of the statute to the particular conduct charged.” United States v. Evans, 318 F.3d 1011, 1016 (10th Cir.2003) (quotation omitted); see Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 , 111 S.Ct. 1919, 1929 , 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (“First Amendment freedoms are not infringed by [the statute], so the vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of this case.”); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 3 2003Further, where a statute does not implicate First Amendment values, "[a] vagueness challenge ... cannot be aimed at the statute on its face but must be limited to the application of the statute to the particular conduct charged." United States v. Evans, 318 F.3d 1011, 1016 (10th Cir.2003) (quotation omitted); see Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 , 111 S.Ct. 1919, 1929 , 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) ("First Amendment freedoms are not infringed by [the statute], so the vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of this case."); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 3 | 1 | 1 |
Newman v. Conovergreen2 sentences2003E.g., Hamling v. United States, supra, 418 U.S. at 120 , 94 S.Ct. at 2909 , rejecting an argument that conviction under an obscenity statute required proof that the defendant "knew or believed that such [material] could be properly or justly characterized as obscene" and holding that the proper inquiry *62 was whether (1) the material was, in fact, obscene and (2) the defendant "knew or had notice" at the time of its content (not whether he knew or believed it was obscene which, of course, would constitute a mens rea of "intent"); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643-44 , 88 S.Ct. 1274, 128 2003E.g., Hamling v. United States, supra, 418 U.S. at 120 , 94 S.Ct. at 2909 , rejecting an argument that conviction under an obscenity statute required proof that the defendant “knew or believed that such [material] could be properly or justly characterized as obscene” and holding that the proper inquiry was whether (1) the material was, in fact, obscene and (2) the defendant “knew or had notice” at the time of its content (not whether he knew or believed it was obscene which, of course, would constitute a mens rea of “intent”); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643-44 , 88 S.Ct. 1274, 1283 , | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Doegreen2 sentences2003Kirkpatrick, 529 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tenn.1975) (same); State v. Scott, 460 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex.1970) (same); Commonwealth v. Doe, 316 Pa.Super. 1 , 462 A.2d 762, 766 (1983) ("having general knowledge of or reason to know, or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry or both"); Great Speckled Bird of Atlanta Coop. 2003Kirkpatrick, 529 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tenn.1975) (same); State v. Scott, 460 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex.1970) (same); Commonwealth v. Doe, 316 Pa.Super. 1 , 462 A.2d 762, 766 (1983) ("having general knowledge of or reason to know, or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry or both"); Great Speckled Bird of Atlanta Coop. | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. State Ex Rel. Kirkpatrickgreen2 sentences2003Kirkpatrick, 529 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tenn.1975) (same); State v. Scott, 460 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex.1970) (same); Commonwealth v. Doe, 316 Pa.Super. 1 , 462 A.2d 762, 766 (1983) ("having general knowledge of or reason to know, or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry or both"); Great Speckled Bird of Atlanta Coop. 2003Kirkpatrick, 529 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tenn.1975) (same); State v. Scott, 460 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex.1970) (same); Commonwealth v. Doe, 316 Pa.Super. 1 , 462 A.2d 762, 766 (1983) (“having general knowledge of or reason to know, or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry or both”); Great Speckled Bird of Atlanta Coop. | 1 | 1 |
Buckley v. Valeogreen2 sentences2003In addition to avoiding the vagueness challenge, this interpretation attempted to make former § 608(e)(1) as constitutionally palatable as possible by leaving unregulated "funds spent [independently] to propagate one's views on issues without expressly calling for a candidate's election or defeat," Buckley, supra, at 44 , 96 S.Ct. at 646 (quotation omitted), otherwise referred to as "issue advocacy." Massachusetts Citizens for Life, supra at 252 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. at 625 n. 6. 2003See also Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., supra, 479 U.S. at 248-49 , 107 S.Ct. at 623 (construing the definition of "expenditure" in 2 U.S.C. § 432 (9)(A) to mean "expenditure for express advocacy"); Buckley, supra, 424 U.S. at 41-44 , 96 S.Ct. at 645-47 (attempting to mute a vagueness challenge by construing the phrase "expenditure... relative to a clearly identified candidate" to mean "expenditure ... advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate"). | 1 | 1 |
Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.green2 sentences2003In addition to avoiding the vagueness challenge, this interpretation attempted to make former § 608(e)(1) as constitutionally palatable as possible by leaving unregulated "funds spent [independently] to propagate one's views on issues without expressly calling for a candidate's election or defeat," Buckley, supra, at 44 , 96 S.Ct. at 646 (quotation omitted), otherwise referred to as "issue advocacy." Massachusetts Citizens for Life, supra at 252 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. at 625 n. 6. 2003See also Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., supra, 479 U.S. at 248-49 , 107 S.Ct. at 623 (construing the definition of "expenditure" in 2 U.S.C. § 432 (9)(A) to mean "expenditure for express advocacy"); Buckley, supra, 424 U.S. at 41-44 , 96 S.Ct. at 645-47 (attempting to mute a vagueness challenge by construing the phrase "expenditure... relative to a clearly identified candidate" to mean "expenditure ... advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate"). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Scottgreen2 sentences2003Kirkpatrick, 529 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tenn.1975) (same); State v. Scott, 460 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex.1970) (same); Commonwealth v. Doe, 316 Pa.Super. 1 , 462 A.2d 762, 766 (1983) ("having general knowledge of or reason to know, or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry or both"); Great Speckled Bird of Atlanta Coop. 2003Kirkpatrick, 529 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tenn.1975) (same); State v. Scott, 460 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex.1970) (same); Commonwealth v. Doe, 316 Pa.Super. 1 , 462 A.2d 762, 766 (1983) (“having general knowledge of or reason to know, or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry or both”); Great Speckled Bird of Atlanta Coop. | 1 | 1 |
Maynard v. Cartwrightgreen2 sentences2003Further, where a statute does not implicate First Amendment values, “[a] vagueness challenge ... cannot be aimed at the statute on its face but must be limited to the application of the statute to the particular conduct charged.” United States v. Evans, 318 F.3d 1011, 1016 (10th Cir.2003) (quotation omitted); see Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 , 111 S.Ct. 1919, 1929 , 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (“First Amendment freedoms are not infringed by [the statute], so the vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of this case.”); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 3 2003Further, where a statute does not implicate First Amendment values, “[a] vagueness challenge ... cannot be aimed at the statute on its face but must be limited to the application of the statute to the particular conduct charged.” United States v. Evans, 318 F.3d 1011, 1016 (10th Cir.2003) (quotation omitted); see Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 , 111 S.Ct. 1919, 1929 , 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (“First Amendment freedoms are not infringed by [the statute], so the vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of this case.”); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 3 | 1 | 1 |
Fanelli v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2003And in Fanelli v. Commonwealth, Ky., 418 S.W.2d 740 (1967), our predecessor Court upheld against a vagueness challenge the provision of KRS 61.190 that provides a penalty for "[a]ny public officer who shall receive, directly or indirectly, any interest, profits or perquisites arising from the use or loan of public funds...." Id. at 745 (emphasis added). 2003And in Fanelli v. Commonwealth, Ky., 418 S.W.2d 740 (1967), our predecessor Court upheld against a vagueness challenge the provision of KRS 61.190 that provides a penalty for "[a]ny public officer who shall receive, directly or indirectly, any interest, profits or perquisites arising from the use or loan of public funds...." Id. at 745 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroadgreen1 sentence1997Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796-801 , 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2124-26 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772, 781-85 (1984) (“[I]n short, there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds.”) See also City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458-59 , 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2508 , 96 L.Ed.2d 398, 410 (1987) (criminal statutes to be “scrutinized with particular care”; there must be a substantial amount of constitutionally p | 1 | 1 |
Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincentgreen2 sentences1997Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796-801 , 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2124-26 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772, 781-85 (1984) (“[I]n short, there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds.”) See also City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458-59 , 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2508 , 96 L.Ed.2d 398, 410 (1987) (criminal statutes to be “scrutinized with particular care”; there must be a substantial amount of constitutionally p 1997Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796-801 , 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2124-26 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772, 781-85 (1984) (“[I]n short, there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds.”) See also City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458-59 , 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2508 , 96 L.Ed.2d 398, 410 (1987) (criminal statutes to be “scrutinized with particular care”; there must be a substantial amount of constitutionally p | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stinson v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2020Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991)( “First Amendment freedoms are not infringed by [the statute], so the vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of this case.”); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)(“It is well established that vagueness challenged to statute which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the fats of the case at hand.” (citations omitted); Stinson, 396 S.W.3d at 907 ; Tobar v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d 133, 134-35 (Ky. 2009). 24 See 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018). 2020Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991)( “First Amendment freedoms are not infringed by [the statute], so the vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of this case.”); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)(“It is well established that vagueness challenged to statute which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the fats of the case at hand.” (citations omitted); Stinson, 396 S.W.3d at 907 ; Tobar v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d 133, 134-35 (Ky. 2009). 24 See 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018/ The Sessions decision followed | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Skilling v. United States
green
2 sentences2020The Sessions decision followed the Court’s opinion in Johnson v. United States, which facially invalidated a similar provision in the Armed Career Criminal Act. 576 U.S. at 595 . 25 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (performing facial review of the constitutionality of the federal honest-services statute); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (plurality opinion) (facially reviewing city loitering ordinance); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. at 353 (facially reviewing an anti-loitering provision). 7 Similarly, Kentucky case law takes a variety of approaches to this question. 2020Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991)( “First Amendment freedoms are not infringed by [the statute], so the vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of this case.”); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)(“It is well established that vagueness challenged to statute which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the fats of the case at hand.” (citations omitted); Stinson, 396 S.W.3d at 907 ; Tobar v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d 133, 134-35 (Ky. 2009). 24 See 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018/ The Sessions decision followed | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Sessions v. Dimaya
green
2 sentences2020Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991)( “First Amendment freedoms are not infringed by [the statute], so the vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of this case.”); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)(“It is well established that vagueness challenged to statute which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the fats of the case at hand.” (citations omitted); Stinson, 396 S.W.3d at 907 ; Tobar v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d 133, 134-35 (Ky. 2009). 24 See 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018). 2020Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991)( “First Amendment freedoms are not infringed by [the statute], so the vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of this case.”); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)(“It is well established that vagueness challenged to statute which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the fats of the case at hand.” (citations omitted); Stinson, 396 S.W.3d at 907 ; Tobar v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d 133, 134-35 (Ky. 2009). 24 See 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018/ The Sessions decision followed | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Johnson v. United States
green
2 sentences2020The Sessions decision followed the Court’s opinion in Johnson v. United States, which facially invalidated a similar provision in the Armed Career Criminal Act. 576 U.S. at 595 . 25 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (performing facial review of the constitutionality of the federal honest-services statute); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (plurality opinion) (facially reviewing city loitering ordinance); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. at 353 (facially reviewing an anti-loitering provision). 7 Similarly, Kentucky case law takes a variety of approaches to this question. 2020Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991)( “First Amendment freedoms are not infringed by [the statute], so the vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of this case.”); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)(“It is well established that vagueness challenged to statute which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the fats of the case at hand.” (citations omitted); Stinson, 396 S.W.3d at 907 ; Tobar v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d 133, 134-35 (Ky. 2009). 24 See 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018/ The Sessions decision followed | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Smith v. Goguen
green
2 sentences2014Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974)); see also Tobar v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d 133, 135 (Ky.2009) (outlining that to satisfy a vagueness challenge, a statute must: "1) provide fair notice to those targeted by the statute, 'by containing sufficient definiteness so that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited’ and 2) it must have been drafted in such a way to discourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' ”). . 2014Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974)); see also Tobar v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d 133, 135 (Ky.2009) (outlining that to satisfy a vagueness challenge, a statute must: "1) provide fair notice to those targeted by the statute, 'by containing sufficient definiteness so that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited’ and 2) it must have been drafted in such a way to discourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' ”). . | 2 | 1997–2014 |
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
green
2 sentences1985In support of its argument, the Commonwealth points to Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 , 62 S.Ct. 766 , 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942), which upheld a vagueness challenge to a statute prohibiting the use of “offensive, derisive or annoying” language. 1985In support of its argument, the Commonwealth points to Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 , 62 S.Ct. 766 , 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942), which upheld a vagueness challenge to a statute prohibiting the use of “offensive, derisive or annoying” language. | 2 | 1985–1985 |
Commonwealth v. Kash
green
1 sentence2014Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974)); see also Tobar v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d 133, 135 (Ky.2009) (outlining that to satisfy a vagueness challenge, a statute must: "1) provide fair notice to those targeted by the statute, 'by containing sufficient definiteness so that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited’ and 2) it must have been drafted in such a way to discourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' ”). . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Kotila v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2006While the intent requirement does satisfy the “notice” inquiry by curing any uncertainty in the mind of the defendant as to the nature of the conduct proscribed, Koti-la, 114 S.W.3d at 249 , the majority’s conclusion that the intent requirement overcomes the vagueness challenge because it “makes certain what conduct is proscribed,” ante, at 604, completely ignores the more important inquiry into whether the statute encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 2006While the intent requirement does satisfy the "notice" inquiry by curing any uncertainty in the mind of the defendant as to the nature of the conduct proscribed, Kotila, 114 S.W.3d at 249 , the majority's conclusion that the intent requirement overcomes the vagueness challenge because it "makes certain what conduct is proscribed," ante, at 604, completely ignores the more important inquiry into whether the statute encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville
green
2 sentences2006However, the "arbitrary enforcement" prohibition of the vagueness doctrine is premised upon not only discouraging arbitrary convictions but also upon discouraging "arbitrary and erratic arrests," Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162 , 92 S.Ct. at 843 , i.e., wrongful subjection to the inconvenience or harassment of arrest, interrogation, and indictment based solely on the possession of two or more universally-owned household products. 2006However, the "arbitrary enforcement" prohibition of the vagueness doctrine is premised upon not only discouraging arbitrary convictions but also upon discouraging "arbitrary and erratic arrests," Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162 , 92 S.Ct. at 843 , i.e., wrongful subjection to the inconvenience or harassment of arrest, interrogation, and indictment based solely on the possession of two or more universally-owned household products. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Ginsberg v. New York
green
2 sentences2003E.g., Hamling v. United States, supra, 418 U.S. at 120 , 94 S.Ct. at 2909 , rejecting an argument that conviction under an obscenity statute required proof that the defendant "knew or believed that such [material] could be properly or justly characterized as obscene" and holding that the proper inquiry *62 was whether (1) the material was, in fact, obscene and (2) the defendant "knew or had notice" at the time of its content (not whether he knew or believed it was obscene which, of course, would constitute a mens rea of "intent"); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643-44 , 88 S.Ct. 1274, 128 2003E.g., Hamling v. United States, supra, 418 U.S. at 120 , 94 S.Ct. at 2909 , rejecting an argument that conviction under an obscenity statute required proof that the defendant "knew or believed that such [material] could be properly or justly characterized as obscene" and holding that the proper inquiry *62 was whether (1) the material was, in fact, obscene and (2) the defendant "knew or had notice" at the time of its content (not whether he knew or believed it was obscene which, of course, would constitute a mens rea of "intent"); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643-44 , 88 S.Ct. 1274, 128 | 1 | 2003–2003 |
National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button
green
2 sentences2003First, former § 608(e)(1) was subject to a vagueness analysis pursuant to NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 , 83 S.Ct. 328 , 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963), which requires that Congress regulate in the area of the First Amendment "only with narrow specificity." Id. at 418 , 83 S.Ct. at 338 . 2003First, former § 608(e)(1) was subject to a vagueness analysis pursuant to NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 , 83 S.Ct. 328 , 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963), which requires that Congress regulate in the area of the First Amendment "only with narrow specificity." Id. at 418 , 83 S.Ct. at 338 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Hamling v. United States
green
2 sentences2003E.g., Hamling v. United States, supra, 418 U.S. at 120 , 94 S.Ct. at 2909 , rejecting an argument that conviction under an obscenity statute required proof that the defendant "knew or believed that such [material] could be properly or justly characterized as obscene" and holding that the proper inquiry *62 was whether (1) the material was, in fact, obscene and (2) the defendant "knew or had notice" at the time of its content (not whether he knew or believed it was obscene which, of course, would constitute a mens rea of "intent"); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643-44 , 88 S.Ct. 1274, 128 2003E.g., Hamling v. United States, supra, 418 U.S. at 120 , 94 S.Ct. at 2909 , rejecting an argument that conviction under an obscenity statute required proof that the defendant "knew or believed that such [material] could be properly or justly characterized as obscene" and holding that the proper inquiry *62 was whether (1) the material was, in fact, obscene and (2) the defendant "knew or had notice" at the time of its content (not whether he knew or believed it was obscene which, of course, would constitute a mens rea of "intent"); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643-44 , 88 S.Ct. 1274, 128 | 1 | 2003–2003 |
City of Houston v. Hill
green
2 sentences1997Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796-801 , 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2124-26 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772, 781-85 (1984) (“[I]n short, there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds.”) See also City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458-59 , 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2508 , 96 L.Ed.2d 398, 410 (1987) (criminal statutes to be “scrutinized with particular care”; there must be a substantial amount of constitutionally p 1997Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796-801 , 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2124-26 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772, 781-85 (1984) (“[I]n short, there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds.”) See also City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458-59 , 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2508 , 96 L.Ed.2d 398, 410 (1987) (criminal statutes to be “scrutinized with particular care”; there must be a substantial amount of constitutionally p | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.