10 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. McMastergreen2 sentences1981“What might be unconstitutional if only the parents’ rights were involved is constitutional if the statute adopts legitimate and necessary means to protect the child’s interests.” State v. McMaster, 259 Or. 291, 296 , 486 P. 2d 567, 569 (1971) (rejecting a vagueness claim to the Oregon statute for termination of parental rights). 1981“What might be unconstitutional if only the parents’ rights were involved is constitutional if the statute adopts legitimate and necessary means to protect the child’s interests.” State v. McMaster, 259 Or. 291, 296 , 486 P. 2d 567, 569 (1971) (rejecting a vagueness claim to the Oregon statute for termination of parental rights). | 2 | 2 |
Matter of Daniel, Deborah and Leslie H.green2 sentences1981Accord, In re Daniel H., 591 P. 2d 1175 (Okla. 1979). 1981Accord, In re Daniel H., 591 P. 2d 1175 (Okla. 1979). | 2 | 2 |
Coates v. City of Cincinnatigreen1 sentence2026PALMITER Opinion of the Court between statutes that ‘require[ ] a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard’ and those that specify ‘no standard of conduct.’ ” Doe v. Cooper, 842 F.3d 833, 842 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)). | 1 | 1 |
Doe 1 v. Coopergreen1 sentence2026PALMITER Opinion of the Court between statutes that ‘require[ ] a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard’ and those that specify ‘no standard of conduct.’ ” Doe v. Cooper, 842 F.3d 833, 842 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Burrusgreen2 sentences2016Id. (citing In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517 , 531, 169 S.E.2d 879 , 888 (1969) ("When the language of a statute provides an adequate warning as to the conduct it condemns and prescribes boundaries *362 sufficiently distinct for judges and juries to interpret and administer it uniformly, constitutional requirements are fully met.")) As in Green , defendant only challenges the second prong of the vagueness standard, the "guidance" component, in this case. 2016Id. (citing In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517 , 531, 169 S.E.2d 879 , 888 (1969) ("When the language of a statute provides an adequate warning as to the conduct it condemns and prescribes boundaries *362 sufficiently distinct for judges and juries to interpret and administer it uniformly, constitutional requirements are fully met.")) As in Green , defendant only challenges the second prong of the vagueness standard, the "guidance" component, in this case. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Trangreen1 sentence2005See also People v. Tran, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (stalking statute upheld as to the vagueness challenge); People v. White, 536 N.W.2d 876 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Connally v. General Construction Co.green2 sentences1999Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926). 1999Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Laniergreen2 sentences1999Second, "as a sort of `junior version of the vagueness doctrine,' the canon of strict construction of criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair notice by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered." United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S.Ct. 1219 , 137 L.Ed.2d 432, 442 (1997) (citation omitted). 1999Second, "as a sort of `junior version of the vagueness doctrine,' the canon of strict construction of criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair notice by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered." United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S.Ct. 1219 , 137 L.Ed.2d 432, 442 (1997) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Marks v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1999Third, "although clarity at the requisite level may be supplied by judicial gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute, due process bars courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed within its scope." Id.; see also Marks, 430 U.S. at 191-92, 97 S.Ct. at 990-93 , 51 L.Ed.2d at 260 . 1999Third, "although clarity at the requisite level may be supplied by judicial gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute, due process bars courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed within its scope." Id.; see also Marks, 430 U.S. at 191-92, 97 S.Ct. at 990-93 , 51 L.Ed.2d at 260 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Grayned v. City of Rockford
green
1 sentence2016Id. (citing In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517 , 531, 169 S.E.2d 879 , 888 (1969) ("When the language of a statute provides an adequate warning as to the conduct it condemns and prescribes boundaries *362 sufficiently distinct for judges and juries to interpret and administer it uniformly, constitutional requirements are fully met.")) As in Green , defendant only challenges the second prong of the vagueness standard, the "guidance" component, in this case. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Brianna Stephenson v. Davenport Community School District Davenport Community School Board Jim Foy, Individually William Rettko, Individually
green
2 sentences2008A person of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the undefined meaning of `gang related activities.'" Id. 2008A person of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the undefined meaning of ‘gang related activities.’ ” Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
People v. White
green
1 sentence2005See also People v. Tran, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (stalking statute upheld as to the vagueness challenge); People v. White, 536 N.W.2d 876 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (same). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Kolender v. Lawson
green
2 sentences1999The more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is “the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.” Id. at 358 , 75 L. 1999The more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is “the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.” Id. at 358 , 75 L. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences1994The vagueness error was not raised and therefore not specifically reviewed by this Court in Smith’s direct appeal. 305 N.C. 691 , 292 S.E.2d 264 (1982). 1994The vagueness error was not raised and therefore not specifically reviewed by this Court in Smith’s direct appeal. 305 N.C. 691 , 292 S.E.2d 264 (1982). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Crabtree
green
2 sentences1988App. 491 , 209 S.E. 2d 299 (1974), reversed on other grounds, 286 N.C. 541 , 212 S.E. 2d 103 (1975), this Court rejected a vagueness challenge to the statutory predecessor of G.S. 20-141(m), G.S. 20441(c), which read as follows: [t]he fact that the speed of a vehicle is lower than the foregoing limits shall not relieve the driver from the duty to decrease speed when approaching and crossing an intersection, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, or when special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or oth 1988App. 491 , 209 S.E. 2d 299 (1974), reversed on other grounds, 286 N.C. 541 , 212 S.E. 2d 103 (1975), this Court rejected a vagueness challenge to the statutory predecessor of G.S. 20-141(m), G.S. 20441(c), which read as follows: [t]he fact that the speed of a vehicle is lower than the foregoing limits shall not relieve the driver from the duty to decrease speed when approaching and crossing an intersection, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, or when special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or oth | 1 | 1988–1988 |
State v. Crabtree
neutral
1 sentence1988App. 491 , 209 S.E. 2d 299 (1974), reversed on other grounds, 286 N.C. 541 , 212 S.E. 2d 103 (1975), this Court rejected a vagueness challenge to the statutory predecessor of G.S. 20-141(m), G.S. 20441(c), which read as follows: [t]he fact that the speed of a vehicle is lower than the foregoing limits shall not relieve the driver from the duty to decrease speed when approaching and crossing an intersection, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, or when special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or oth | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.