vagueness challenge in Washington

2026And, “although that would help the condition satisfy the first prong of the vagueness analysis, it would leave the condition vulnerable to arbitrary enforcement.” Id. (citing Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 753 ; Sansone, 127 Wn. App. at 639 ).

2026And, “although that would help the condition satisfy the first prong of the vagueness analysis, it would leave the condition vulnerable to arbitrary enforcement.” Id. (citing Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 753 ; Sansone, 127 Wn. App. at 639 ).

2024In State v. Baldwin, our Supreme Court held that sentencing guideline statutes are exempt from a vagueness challenge. 150 Wn.2d 448, 458-59 , 78 P.3d 1005 (2003).

2024In State v. Baldwin, our Supreme Court held that sentencing guideline statutes are exempt from a vagueness challenge. 150 Wn.2d 448, 458-59 , 78 P.3d 1005 (2003).

2014See State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986) (for cases declining to apply the Gunwall analysis in the context of a vagueness challenge see City of Bellevue v. Lorang, 140 Wn.2d 19 , 23 n.3, 992 P.2d 496 (2000); State v. Lee, 135 Wn.2d 369, 386-87 , 957 P.2d 741 (1998); State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109 , 116 n.3, 857 P.2d 270 (1993); and City of Spokane v. Douglass, at 177 (1990)).

2014See State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986) (for cases declining to apply the Gunwall analysis in the context of a vagueness challenge see City of Bellevue v. Lorang, 140 Wn.2d 19 , 23 n.3, 992 P.2d 496 (2000); State v. Lee, 135 Wn.2d 369, 386-87 , 957 P.2d 741 (1998); State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109 , 116 n.3, 857 P.2d 270 (1993); and City of Spokane v. Douglass, at 177 (1990)).

2026Our Supreme Court has held a vagueness challenge to a community custody condition is ripe where “many courts have addressed, as legal questions, vagueness challenges to terms the same as, or comparable to, the terms in the conditions” challenged by an 1 Mukhammadjonov argues that the authority we relied on in Lundstrom “is all unpublished, and none of it offers any meaningful analysis.” To the contrary, Lundstrom relied on published authority guiding interpretation of community custody provisions, including, e.g., City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171 , 795 P.2d 693 (1990); State v. Orteg

2026Our Supreme Court has held a vagueness challenge to a community custody condition is ripe where “many courts have addressed, as legal questions, vagueness challenges to terms the same as, or comparable to, the terms in the conditions” challenged by an 1 Mukhammadjonov argues that the authority we relied on in Lundstrom “is all unpublished, and none of it offers any meaningful analysis.” To the contrary, Lundstrom relied on published authority guiding interpretation of community custody provisions, including, e.g., City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171 , 795 P.2d 693 (1990); State v. Orteg

2023The vagueness doctrine does not demand community custody conditions to be drafted with such precision that a person is able to “‘predict with complete certainty the exact point at which [their] actions would be classified as prohibited conduct.’” Padilla, 190 Wn.3d at 677 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 793 , 239 P.3d 1059 (2010)); see also Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 179 (“This test . . . does not demand impossible standards of specificity or absolute agreement.”).

2023The vagueness doctrine does not demand community custody conditions to be drafted with such precision that a person is able to “‘predict with complete certainty the exact point at which [their] actions would be classified as prohibited conduct.’” Padilla, 190 Wn.3d at 677 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 793 , 239 P.3d 1059 (2010)); see also Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 179 (“This test . . . does not demand impossible standards of specificity or absolute agreement.”).

2021The Court stated that the vagueness doctrine applies “not only to statutes defining elements of crimes, but also to statutes fixing sentences.” Id. at 596 .

2021In Johnson, the Court applied the vagueness doctrine to a provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act, which increased the applicable sentence from a maximum of 10 years to a minimum of 15 years. 576 U.S. at 593, 596 .

2014The purpose of the vagueness doctrine is twofold: "first, to provide citizens with fair warning of what conduct they must avoid; and second, to protect them from arbitrary, ad hoc, or discriminatory law enforcement." Halstien. 122 Wn.2d at 116-17 , 857 P.2d 270 ; Lorang. 140 Wn.2d at 30 , 992 P.2d 496 (citing Gravned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104 , 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)); State v. Lee. 135 Wn.2d 369, 393 , 957 P.2d 741 (1998); City of Tacoma v. Luvene. 118 Wn.2d 826, 844 , 827 P.2d 1374 (1992).

2014The purpose of the vagueness doctrine is twofold: "first, to provide citizens with fair warning of what conduct they must avoid; and second, to protect them from arbitrary, ad hoc, or discriminatory law enforcement." Halstien. 122 Wn.2d at 116-17 , 857 P.2d 270 ; Lorang. 140 Wn.2d at 30 , 992 P.2d 496 (citing Gravned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104 , 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)); State v. Lee. 135 Wn.2d 369, 393 , 957 P.2d 741 (1998); City of Tacoma v. Luvene. 118 Wn.2d 826, 844 , 827 P.2d 1374 (1992).

2017A vagueness challenge seeks to further two objectives: the need to define prohibited conduct with sufficient specificity to put citizens on notice, and the need to prevent the arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of law. pity of Tacoma v. Luvene, 118 Wn.2d 826, 844 , 827 P.2d 1374 (1992); City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wn.2d 635, 642-43 , 802 P.2d 1333 (1990).

2017A vagueness challenge seeks to further two objectives: the need to define prohibited conduct with sufficient specificity to put citizens on notice, and the need to prevent the arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of law. pity of Tacoma v. Luvene, 118 Wn.2d 826, 844 , 827 P.2d 1374 (1992); City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wn.2d 635, 642-43 , 802 P.2d 1333 (1990).

2025A community custody condition that is unconstitutionally vague “cannot be cured by allowing the probation officer an unfettered power of interpretation, as this would create one of the very problems against which the vagueness doctrine is meant to protect, i.e., the delegation of basic policy matters to [community corrections officers] . . . for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original) (quoting Loy, 237 F.3d at 266 ).

2025A community custody condition that is unconstitutionally vague “cannot be cured by allowing the probation officer an unfettered power of interpretation, as this would create one of the very problems against which the vagueness doctrine is meant to protect, i.e., the delegation of basic policy matters to [community corrections officers] . . . for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original) (quoting Loy, 237 F.3d at 266 ).

2025Where the statute does not infringe on rights provided by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, we evaluate a vagueness challenge “by examining the statute as applied under the particular facts of the case.” State v. Coria, 120 Wn.2d 156, 163 , 839 P.2d 890 (1992).

2025Where the statute does not infringe on rights provided by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, we evaluate a vagueness challenge “by examining the statute as applied under the particular facts of the case.” State v. Coria, 120 Wn.2d 156, 163 , 839 P.2d 890 (1992).

2025“In a vagueness challenge, we do not analyze portions of a statute in isolation from the context in which they appear.” Id. at 741 (citing State v. Foster, 91 Wn.2d 466, 474 , 589 P.2d 789 (1979)).

2014In State v. Maciolek, 101 Wn.2d 259, 269 , 676 P.2d 996 (1984), the Washington Supreme Court upheld this portion of the statute when faced with a vagueness challenge.

2017City of Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wn.2d 22, 26 , 759 P.2d 366 (1988). ¶35 “Some measure of vagueness is inherent in the use of language.” Haley, 117 Wn.2d at 740 . “[A] statute is not unconstitutionally vague merely because a person cannot predict with complete certainty the exact point at which his actions would be classified as prohibited conduct.”Eze, 111 Wn.2d at 27 . “[T]he common knowledge and understanding of members of the particular profession to which a statute applies may also provide the needed specificity to withstand a vagueness challenge.” Haley, 117 Wn.2d at 743 . ¶36 In In re Discip

2017City of Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wn.2d 22, 26 , 759 P.2d 366 (1988). ¶35 “Some measure of vagueness is inherent in the use of language.” Haley, 117 Wn.2d at 740 . “[A] statute is not unconstitutionally vague merely because a person cannot predict with complete certainty the exact point at which his actions would be classified as prohibited conduct.”Eze, 111 Wn.2d at 27 . “[T]he common knowledge and understanding of members of the particular profession to which a statute applies may also provide the needed specificity to withstand a vagueness challenge.” Haley, 117 Wn.2d at 743 . ¶36 In In re Discip

2021In Beckles, the Court held that a provision containing almost identical language to the provision at issue in Johnson was not subject to the vagueness doctrine specifically because the provision was an advisory sentencing guideline. 137 S. Ct. at 892.

2020Beckles held a vagueness challenge is not viable in the unique context of the federal sentencing guidelines. 137 S. Ct. at 890 .

2026Thus, a vagueness challenge cannot succeed merely because a person cannot predict with certainty the exact point at which conduct would be prohibited.” State v. Riles, 135 Wn.2d 326, 348 , 957 P.2d 655 (1998) (quoting State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 118 , 857 P.2d 270 (1993)).

2026Thus, a vagueness challenge cannot succeed merely because a person cannot predict with certainty the exact point at which conduct would be prohibited.” State v. Riles, 135 Wn.2d 326, 348 , 957 P.2d 655 (1998) (quoting State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 118 , 857 P.2d 270 (1993)).

2024Under the vagueness doctrine, community custody conditions need not be drafted with such precision that a person is able to “ ‘predict with complete certainty the exact point at which [their] actions would be classified as prohibited conduct.’ ” Id. at 8938 (quoting Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 677 ).

2023Johnson held that the court may examine extrinsic documents like the judgment and sentence and the “documents available to the CCO” when considering the second prong of the vagueness test, i.e., whether a condition is sufficiently clear to prevent arbitrary enforcement—not when considering the first prong of the vagueness test, i.e., whether a condition “‘sufficiently define[s] the proscribed conduct so an ordinary person can understand the prohibition.’” Lead opinion at 8 (quoting Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 677 (citing Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 752-53 )).

2008Id. at 108-09 (footnotes omitted); see also State v. Williams, 144 Wn.2d 197, 203 , 26 P.3d 890 (2001). ¶89 The Post Home contends the Act violates the first aspect of the vagueness test.

2008Id. at 108-09 (footnotes omitted); see also State v. Williams, 144 Wn.2d 197, 203 , 26 P.3d 890 (2001). ¶89 The Post Home contends the Act violates the first aspect of the vagueness test.

2023Restraint of Ansell (Peter), No. 100753-1 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) And rightly so—because one of the key purposes of the vagueness doctrine is to protect a defendant’s “right to conditions of supervised release that are sufficiently clear to inform him of what conduct will result in his being returned to prison.” Guagliardo, 278 F.3d at 872 .

2018Id. at 756 (CCO could interpret the condition to "include any nude depiction" as including "a photograph of Michelangelo's sculpture of David." {dding States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 2002)).

2026Thus, a vagueness challenge cannot succeed merely because a person cannot predict with certainty the exact point at which conduct would be prohibited.” State v. Riles, 135 Wn.2d 326, 348 , 957 P.2d 655 (1998) (quoting State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 118 , 857 P.2d 270 (1993)).

2026Thus, a vagueness challenge cannot succeed merely because a person cannot predict with certainty the exact point at which conduct would be prohibited.” State v. Riles, 135 Wn.2d 326, 348 , 957 P.2d 655 (1998) (quoting State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 118 , 857 P.2d 270 (1993)).

2023Id. 5 No. 57658-9-II A. THE TERM “HOSTILE” DOES NOT CLARIFY WHAT BEHAVIOR IS PROHIBITED To satisfy the first prong of the vagueness inquiry, “the proscribed conduct is [required to be] sufficiently definite in the eyes of an ordinary person.” Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 681 .

2019App. 2d 698, 704, 423 P.3d 282 (2018), review granted, 192 Wn.2d 1009 , 432 P.3d 794 (2019). 11 No. 31755-2-III State v. Peters of Washington courts’ treatment of this sort of condition, beginning with the Supreme Court’s rejection of a vagueness challenge in Riles, followed by Division One’s decision in State v. Irwin, 191 Wn.

2024App. 2d 522 , 538, 486 P.3d 925 (2021). “ʻIf the statute does not involve First Amendment rights [under the United States Constitution], then the vagueness challenge is to be evaluated by examining the statute as applied under the particular facts of the case.’” State v. Watson, 160 Wn.2d 1, 6 , 154 P.3d 909 (2007).

2024App. 2d 522 , 538, 486 P.3d 925 (2021). “ʻIf the statute does not involve First Amendment rights [under the United States Constitution], then the vagueness challenge is to be evaluated by examining the statute as applied under the particular facts of the case.’” State v. Watson, 160 Wn.2d 1, 6 , 154 P.3d 909 (2007).

2026And, “although that would help the condition satisfy the first prong of the vagueness analysis, it would leave the condition vulnerable to arbitrary enforcement.” Id. (citing Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 753 ; Sansone, 127 Wn. App. at 639 ).

2016An unconstitutionally vague condition cannot be cured by allowing the probation officer an unfettered power of interpretation, as this would create one of the very problems against which the vagueness doctrine is meant to protect, i.e., the 9 No 47399-2-II delegation of “‘basic policy matters to policemen . . . for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.’” Sansone, 127 Wn.

2024To satisfy the first prong of the vagueness inquiry, “the proscribed conduct is [required to be] sufficiently definite in the eyes of an ordinary person.” Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 681 .

2023Id. 5 No. 57658-9-II A. THE TERM “HOSTILE” DOES NOT CLARIFY WHAT BEHAVIOR IS PROHIBITED To satisfy the first prong of the vagueness inquiry, “the proscribed conduct is [required to be] sufficiently definite in the eyes of an ordinary person.” Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 681 .

2017Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 , 108 S. Ct. 1853 , 100 L.

2017Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 , 108 S. Ct. 1853 , 100 L.