vagueness challenge in Washington

2026Because the analysis turned on whether the terms were vague, the court concluded that “there is nothing that will change between the present time and [the defendant]’s release that will affect the vagueness analysis.” Id. at 752 .

2023When deciding a vagueness challenge, “the terms are not considered in a ‘vacuum,’ rather, they are considered in the context in which they are used.” Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 754 (quoting Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 180 ).

2024RCW 7.105.500(6) does not define conduct, nor does it empower the state to arrest or prosecute parties restrained by a DVPO; rather, RCW 7.105.500(6) only allows a court to modify or terminate “an existing order.” RCW 7.105.500(1) (emphasis added); see also Baldwin, 150 Wn.2d at 459 (stating that Washington’s sentencing guidelines were not susceptible to a vagueness challenge because they “do not define conduct nor do they allow for arbitrary arrest and criminal prosecution by the State”).

2024RCW 7.105.500(6) does not define conduct, nor does it empower the state to arrest or prosecute parties restrained by a DVPO; rather, RCW 7.105.500(6) only allows a court to modify or terminate “an existing order.” RCW 7.105.500(1) (emphasis added); see also Baldwin, 150 Wn.2d at 459 (stating that Washington’s sentencing guidelines were not susceptible to a vagueness challenge because they “do not define conduct nor do they allow for arbitrary arrest and criminal prosecution by the State”).

2014See State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986) (for cases declining to apply the Gunwall analysis in the context of a vagueness challenge see City of Bellevue v. Lorang, 140 Wn.2d 19 , 23 n.3, 992 P.2d 496 (2000); State v. Lee, 135 Wn.2d 369, 386-87 , 957 P.2d 741 (1998); State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109 , 116 n.3, 857 P.2d 270 (1993); and City of Spokane v. Douglass, at 177 (1990)).

2014The purpose of the vagueness doctrine is twofold: "first, to provide citizens with fair warning of what conduct they must avoid; and second, to protect them from arbitrary, ad hoc, or discriminatory law enforcement." Halstien. 122 Wn.2d at 116-17 , 857 P.2d 270 ; Lorang. 140 Wn.2d at 30 , 992 P.2d 496 (citing Gravned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104 , 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)); State v. Lee. 135 Wn.2d 369, 393 , 957 P.2d 741 (1998); City of Tacoma v. Luvene. 118 Wn.2d 826, 844 , 827 P.2d 1374 (1992).

2014See State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986) (for cases declining to apply the Gunwall analysis in the context of a vagueness challenge see City of Bellevue v. Lorang, 140 Wn.2d 19 , 23 n.3, 992 P.2d 496 (2000); State v. Lee, 135 Wn.2d 369, 386-87 , 957 P.2d 741 (1998); State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109 , 116 n.3, 857 P.2d 270 (1993); and City of Spokane v. Douglass, at 177 (1990)).

2014The purpose of the vagueness doctrine is twofold: "first, to provide citizens with fair warning of what conduct they must avoid; and second, to protect them from arbitrary, ad hoc, or discriminatory law enforcement." Halstien. 122 Wn.2d at 116-17 , 857 P.2d 270 ; Lorang. 140 Wn.2d at 30 , 992 P.2d 496 (citing Gravned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104 , 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)); State v. Lee. 135 Wn.2d 369, 393 , 957 P.2d 741 (1998); City of Tacoma v. Luvene. 118 Wn.2d 826, 844 , 827 P.2d 1374 (1992).

2026Our Supreme Court has held a vagueness challenge to a community custody condition is ripe where “many courts have addressed, as legal questions, vagueness challenges to terms the same as, or comparable to, the terms in the conditions” challenged by an 1 Mukhammadjonov argues that the authority we relied on in Lundstrom “is all unpublished, and none of it offers any meaningful analysis.” To the contrary, Lundstrom relied on published authority guiding interpretation of community custody provisions, including, e.g., City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171 , 795 P.2d 693 (1990); State v. Orteg

2026Our Supreme Court has held a vagueness challenge to a community custody condition is ripe where “many courts have addressed, as legal questions, vagueness challenges to terms the same as, or comparable to, the terms in the conditions” challenged by an 1 Mukhammadjonov argues that the authority we relied on in Lundstrom “is all unpublished, and none of it offers any meaningful analysis.” To the contrary, Lundstrom relied on published authority guiding interpretation of community custody provisions, including, e.g., City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171 , 795 P.2d 693 (1990); State v. Orteg

2023The vagueness doctrine does not demand community custody conditions to be drafted with such precision that a person is able to “‘predict with complete certainty the exact point at which [their] actions would be classified as prohibited conduct.’” Padilla, 190 Wn.3d at 677 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 793 , 239 P.3d 1059 (2010)); see also Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 179 (“This test . . . does not demand impossible standards of specificity or absolute agreement.”).

2015First, it was a vagueness challenge, which is often a question of law because "time will not cure the problem." Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d at 788 .

2021In Johnson, the Court applied the vagueness doctrine to a provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act, which increased the applicable sentence from a maximum of 10 years to a minimum of 15 years. 576 U.S. at 593, 596 .

2021The Court stated that the vagueness doctrine applies “not only to statutes defining elements of crimes, but also to statutes fixing sentences.” Id. at 596 .

2014The purpose of the vagueness doctrine is twofold: "first, to provide citizens with fair warning of what conduct they must avoid; and second, to protect them from arbitrary, ad hoc, or discriminatory law enforcement." Halstien. 122 Wn.2d at 116-17 , 857 P.2d 270 ; Lorang. 140 Wn.2d at 30 , 992 P.2d 496 (citing Gravned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104 , 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)); State v. Lee. 135 Wn.2d 369, 393 , 957 P.2d 741 (1998); City of Tacoma v. Luvene. 118 Wn.2d 826, 844 , 827 P.2d 1374 (1992).

2014The purpose of the vagueness doctrine is twofold: "first, to provide citizens with fair warning of what conduct they must avoid; and second, to protect them from arbitrary, ad hoc, or discriminatory law enforcement." Halstien. 122 Wn.2d at 116-17 , 857 P.2d 270 ; Lorang. 140 Wn.2d at 30 , 992 P.2d 496 (citing Gravned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104 , 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)); State v. Lee. 135 Wn.2d 369, 393 , 957 P.2d 741 (1998); City of Tacoma v. Luvene. 118 Wn.2d 826, 844 , 827 P.2d 1374 (1992).

2017A vagueness challenge seeks to further two objectives: the need to define prohibited conduct with sufficient specificity to put citizens on notice, and the need to prevent the arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of law. pity of Tacoma v. Luvene, 118 Wn.2d 826, 844 , 827 P.2d 1374 (1992); City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wn.2d 635, 642-43 , 802 P.2d 1333 (1990).

2017A vagueness challenge seeks to further two objectives: the need to define prohibited conduct with sufficient specificity to put citizens on notice, and the need to prevent the arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of law. pity of Tacoma v. Luvene, 118 Wn.2d 826, 844 , 827 P.2d 1374 (1992); City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wn.2d 635, 642-43 , 802 P.2d 1333 (1990).

2025A community custody condition that is unconstitutionally vague “cannot be cured by allowing the probation officer an unfettered power of interpretation, as this would create one of the very problems against which the vagueness doctrine is meant to protect, i.e., the delegation of basic policy matters to [community corrections officers] . . . for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original) (quoting Loy, 237 F.3d at 266 ).

2025A community custody condition that is unconstitutionally vague “cannot be cured by allowing the probation officer an unfettered power of interpretation, as this would create one of the very problems against which the vagueness doctrine is meant to protect, i.e., the delegation of basic policy matters to [community corrections officers] . . . for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original) (quoting Loy, 237 F.3d at 266 ).

2025Where the statute does not infringe on rights provided by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, we evaluate a vagueness challenge “by examining the statute as applied under the particular facts of the case.” State v. Coria, 120 Wn.2d 156, 163 , 839 P.2d 890 (1992).

2025Where the statute does not infringe on rights provided by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, we evaluate a vagueness challenge “by examining the statute as applied under the particular facts of the case.” State v. Coria, 120 Wn.2d 156, 163 , 839 P.2d 890 (1992).

2017City of Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wn.2d 22, 26 , 759 P.2d 366 (1988). ¶35 “Some measure of vagueness is inherent in the use of language.” Haley, 117 Wn.2d at 740 . “[A] statute is not unconstitutionally vague merely because a person cannot predict with complete certainty the exact point at which his actions would be classified as prohibited conduct.”Eze, 111 Wn.2d at 27 . “[T]he common knowledge and understanding of members of the particular profession to which a statute applies may also provide the needed specificity to withstand a vagueness challenge.” Haley, 117 Wn.2d at 743 . ¶36 In In re Discip

2017City of Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wn.2d 22, 26 , 759 P.2d 366 (1988). ¶35 “Some measure of vagueness is inherent in the use of language.” Haley, 117 Wn.2d at 740 . “[A] statute is not unconstitutionally vague merely because a person cannot predict with complete certainty the exact point at which his actions would be classified as prohibited conduct.”Eze, 111 Wn.2d at 27 . “[T]he common knowledge and understanding of members of the particular profession to which a statute applies may also provide the needed specificity to withstand a vagueness challenge.” Haley, 117 Wn.2d at 743 . ¶36 In In re Discip

2021In Beckles, the Court held that a provision containing almost identical language to the provision at issue in Johnson was not subject to the vagueness doctrine specifically because the provision was an advisory sentencing guideline. 137 S. Ct. at 892.

2020Beckles held a vagueness challenge is not viable in the unique context of the federal sentencing guidelines. 137 S. Ct. at 890 .

2025“In a vagueness challenge, we do not analyze portions of a statute in isolation from the context in which they appear.” Id. at 741 (citing State v. Foster, 91 Wn.2d 466, 474 , 589 P.2d 789 (1979)).

2014In State v. Maciolek, 101 Wn.2d 259, 269 , 676 P.2d 996 (1984), the Washington Supreme Court upheld this portion of the statute when faced with a vagueness challenge.

2026Thus, a vagueness challenge cannot succeed merely because a person cannot predict with certainty the exact point at which conduct would be prohibited.” State v. Riles, 135 Wn.2d 326, 348 , 957 P.2d 655 (1998) (quoting State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 118 , 857 P.2d 270 (1993)).

2018The Irwin court reasoned that it was unclear whether this list included “ ‘public parks, bowling alleys, shopping 6 While the Riles court also cited the legal proposition that the party challenging a prohibition has the burden of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality, the court’s holding on the vagueness challenge was not based on Riles failing to meet his burden. 135 Wn.2d at 348-49 . 11 50250-0-II malls, theaters, churches, hiking trails,’ and other public places where there may be children.” Id. at 654.

2024Under the vagueness doctrine, community custody conditions need not be drafted with such precision that a person is able to “ ‘predict with complete certainty the exact point at which [their] actions would be classified as prohibited conduct.’ ” Id. at 8938 (quoting Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 677 ).

2023Johnson held that the court may examine extrinsic documents like the judgment and sentence and the “documents available to the CCO” when considering the second prong of the vagueness test, i.e., whether a condition is sufficiently clear to prevent arbitrary enforcement—not when considering the first prong of the vagueness test, i.e., whether a condition “‘sufficiently define[s] the proscribed conduct so an ordinary person can understand the prohibition.’” Lead opinion at 8 (quoting Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 677 (citing Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 752-53 )).

2026Thus, a vagueness challenge cannot succeed merely because a person cannot predict with certainty the exact point at which conduct would be prohibited.” State v. Riles, 135 Wn.2d 326, 348 , 957 P.2d 655 (1998) (quoting State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 118 , 857 P.2d 270 (1993)).

2026Thus, a vagueness challenge cannot succeed merely because a person cannot predict with certainty the exact point at which conduct would be prohibited.” State v. Riles, 135 Wn.2d 326, 348 , 957 P.2d 655 (1998) (quoting State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 118 , 857 P.2d 270 (1993)).

2023Id. 5 No. 57658-9-II A. THE TERM “HOSTILE” DOES NOT CLARIFY WHAT BEHAVIOR IS PROHIBITED To satisfy the first prong of the vagueness inquiry, “the proscribed conduct is [required to be] sufficiently definite in the eyes of an ordinary person.” Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 681 .

2019App. 2d 698, 704, 423 P.3d 282 (2018), review granted, 192 Wn.2d 1009 , 432 P.3d 794 (2019). 11 No. 31755-2-III State v. Peters of Washington courts’ treatment of this sort of condition, beginning with the Supreme Court’s rejection of a vagueness challenge in Riles, followed by Division One’s decision in State v. Irwin, 191 Wn.

2024To satisfy the first prong of the vagueness inquiry, “the proscribed conduct is [required to be] sufficiently definite in the eyes of an ordinary person.” Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 681 .

2023Id. 5 No. 57658-9-II A. THE TERM “HOSTILE” DOES NOT CLARIFY WHAT BEHAVIOR IS PROHIBITED To satisfy the first prong of the vagueness inquiry, “the proscribed conduct is [required to be] sufficiently definite in the eyes of an ordinary person.” Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 681 .

2017Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 , 108 S. Ct. 1853 , 100 L.

2017Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 , 108 S. Ct. 1853 , 100 L.