vagueness challenge in Arizona

2008Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (footnote omitted). ¶ 29 Although neither the phrase “[a]ny conduct or practice that is or might be harmful or dangerous to the health of the patient or the public” nor the phrase “previously established a doctor-patient relationship” is defined in A.R.S. § 32-1401(27), the Legislature “need not define statutory terms with linguistic precision in order to withstand a vagueness challenge,” Brighton Pharmacy, Inc. v. Colorado State Pharmacy Board, 160 P.3d 412, 420 (Colo.Ct.App.2007), nor need it describe ever

2008Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (footnote omitted). ¶ 29 Although neither the phrase “[a]ny conduct or practice that is or might be harmful or dangerous to the health of the patient or the public” nor the phrase “previously established a doctor-patient relationship” is defined in A.R.S. § 32-1401(27), the Legislature “need not define statutory terms with linguistic precision in order to withstand a vagueness challenge,” Brighton Pharmacy, Inc. v. Colorado State Pharmacy Board, 160 P.3d 412, 420 (Colo.Ct.App.2007), nor need it describe ever

2016Although Denson did not raise a vagueness challenge in the superior court, “we may consider a vagueness challenge for the first time on appeal.” See State v. Anderson, 199 Ariz. 187, 191, ¶ 14 , 16 P.3d 214, 218 (App. 2000). ¶8 We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo.

2016Although Denson did not raise a vagueness challenge in the superior court, “we may consider a vagueness challenge for the first time on appeal.” See State v. Anderson, 199 Ariz. 187, 191, ¶ 14 , 16 P.3d 214, 218 (App. 2000). ¶8 We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo.

2008Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (footnote omitted). ¶ 29 Although neither the phrase “[a]ny conduct or practice that is or might be harmful or dangerous to the health of the patient or the public” nor the phrase “previously established a doctor-patient relationship” is defined in A.R.S. § 32-1401(27), the Legislature “need not define statutory terms with linguistic precision in order to withstand a vagueness challenge,” Brighton Pharmacy, Inc. v. Colorado State Pharmacy Board, 160 P.3d 412, 420 (Colo.Ct.App.2007), nor need it describe ever

2008Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (footnote omitted). ¶ 29 Although neither the phrase “[a]ny conduct or practice that is or might be harmful or dangerous to the health of the patient or the public” nor the phrase “previously established a doctor-patient relationship” is defined in A.R.S. § 32-1401(27), the Legislature “need not define statutory terms with linguistic precision in order to withstand a vagueness challenge,” Brighton Pharmacy, Inc. v. Colorado State Pharmacy Board, 160 P.3d 412, 420 (Colo.Ct.App.2007), nor need it describe ever

2009See State v. Anderson, 199 Ariz. 187, ¶ 14 , 16 P.3d 214, 218 (App.2000). ¶ 35 A statute is “unconstitutionally vague if it does not give persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to learn what it prohibits and does not provide explicit standards for those who will apply it.” State v. Takacs, 169 Ariz. 392, 394 , 819 P.2d 978, 980 (App.1991).

2000Nor will a statute violate due process merely “because it is susceptible to more than one interpretation.” Id. ¶ 35 In analyzing a vagueness challenge, courts will look to judicial decisions, to settled common law meanings of the words used, and to the technical meanings of those words.

2020See State v. Denson, 241 Ariz. 6, 8, ¶ 7 (App. 2016).

2020See State v. Denson, 241 Ariz. 6, 8, ¶ 7 (App. 2016).

2018See State v. Ochoa, 189 Ariz. 454 , 459–60 (App. 1997).

2000See State v. Ochoa, 189 Ariz. 454, 459 , 943 P.2d 814, 819 (App.1997).

2008See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 , 99 S.Ct. 675 , 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979) (“It is settled that, as a matter of due process, a criminal statute that ‘fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,’ or is so indefinite that ‘it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions,’ is void for vagueness.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Wivell, 893 F.2d 156, 159 (8th Cir.1990) (“[T]heories supporting the vagueness doctrine presume a law that attempts to proscribe or prescribe conduct.”).

2008See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 , 99 S.Ct. 675 , 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979) (“It is settled that, as a matter of due process, a criminal statute that ‘fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,’ or is so indefinite that ‘it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions,’ is void for vagueness.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Wivell, 893 F.2d 156, 159 (8th Cir.1990) (“[T]heories supporting the vagueness doctrine presume a law that attempts to proscribe or prescribe conduct.”).

2008See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 , 99 S.Ct. 675 , 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979) (“It is settled that, as a matter of due process, a criminal statute that ‘fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,’ or is so indefinite that ‘it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions,’ is void for vagueness.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Wivell, 893 F.2d 156, 159 (8th Cir.1990) (“[T]heories supporting the vagueness doctrine presume a law that attempts to proscribe or prescribe conduct.”).

2008See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 , 99 S.Ct. 675 , 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979) (“It is settled that, as a matter of due process, a criminal statute that ‘fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,’ or is so indefinite that ‘it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions,’ is void for vagueness.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Wivell, 893 F.2d 156, 159 (8th Cir.1990) (“[T]heories supporting the vagueness doctrine presume a law that attempts to proscribe or prescribe conduct.”).

2005State v. Martin, 174 Ariz. 118, 122 , 847 P.2d 619, 623 (App.1992) (proscription against driving with a BAC of .10 or greater within two hours of driving, “when read as a whole, precisely defines the conduct that subjects a person to imposition of a criminal sanction”).

2005State v. Martin, 174 Ariz. 118, 122 , 847 P.2d 619, 623 (App.1992) (proscription against driving with a BAC of .10 or greater within two hours of driving, “when read as a whole, precisely defines the conduct that subjects a person to imposition of a criminal sanction”).

2020When, as here, there is no First Amendment challenge, a vagueness claim “must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand.” United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 (1975) (citation omitted). ¶12 Section 13-701(D)(6) provides for an enhanced penalty if an offense is committed for pecuniary gain, which describes Hernandez’ convictions here.

2014When, as here, there is no First Amendment challenge, a vagueness claim “ ‘must be examined in the light of the facts of the ease at hand.’ ” Id. at 92 , 96 S.Ct. 316 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 , 95 S.Ct. 710 , 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975)). 117 Coulter argues “ ‘[e]motional harm’ is vague because the law provides no definition of the term and because it means widely varying things to different people.” As commonly understood, “emotion” includes “ ‘a state of feeling’ ” or “ ‘a conscious mental reaction’ ” that one may subjectively experience as a strong feeling, McCauley v.

1995When the literal scope of a criminal statute is capable of reaching constitutionally-protected expression, then “the vagueness doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity.” State v. Steiger, 162 Ariz. 138, 142 , 781 P.2d 616, 620 (App.1989), citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 , 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1247 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974).

1995When the literal scope of a criminal statute is capable of reaching constitutionally-protected expression, then “the vagueness doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity.” State v. Steiger, 162 Ariz. 138, 142 , 781 P.2d 616, 620 (App.1989), citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 , 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1247 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974).

2026These are not insignificant burdens on individual rights.”). ¶196 Next, the vagueness doctrine addresses “discrete due process concerns: first, that regulated parties should know what is required of them so they may act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way.” FCC, 567 U.S. at 253.

2026And “[w]hen speech is involved, rigorous adherence to those requirements is necessary to ensure that ambiguity does not chill protected speech.” Id. at 253–54.

2022See State v. Starsky, 106 Ariz. 329, 330-32 (1970) (upholding disorderly conduct statute that included prohibitions on disturbing the peace by "[t]hreatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or fighting").

2022See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 425 (explaining that a Colorado statute prohibiting circulator compensation “trenches upon an area in which the importance of First Amendment protections is ‘at its zenith’”). ¶34 The State’s suggestion that we should impute a knowing requirement to allow the statute to withstand a vagueness challenge is untenable.

2017See State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 298 (1995) (“Failure to argue a claim on appeal constitutes waiver of that claim.”); State v. Herrera, 183 Ariz. 642, 647 (App. 1995) (issues waived on appeal cannot be resurrected in later post-conviction proceeding). ¶7 Nor did the superior court err by denying Tiggs’s motion for transfer.

2017See State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 298 (1995) (“Failure to argue a claim on appeal constitutes waiver of that claim.”); State v. Herrera, 183 Ariz. 642, 647 (App. 1995) (issues waived on appeal cannot be resurrected in later post-conviction proceeding). ¶7 Nor did the superior court err by denying Tiggs’s motion for transfer.

2016State v. Burke, 238 Ariz. 322, 325, ¶ 4 , 360 P.3d 118, 121 (App. 2015) (citation omitted).

2016State v. Burke, 238 Ariz. 322, 325, ¶ 4 , 360 P.3d 118, 121 (App. 2015) (citation omitted).

2014When, as here, there is no First Amendment challenge, a vagueness claim “ ‘must be examined in the light of the facts of the ease at hand.’ ” Id. at 92 , 96 S.Ct. 316 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 , 95 S.Ct. 710 , 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975)). 117 Coulter argues “ ‘[e]motional harm’ is vague because the law provides no definition of the term and because it means widely varying things to different people.” As commonly understood, “emotion” includes “ ‘a state of feeling’ ” or “ ‘a conscious mental reaction’ ” that one may subjectively experience as a strong feeling, McCauley v.

2014See id.; see also RTAA, 681 F.3d at 552 (refuting a vagueness challenge to 11 C.F.R. § 100.22 (b)). ¶ 39 Citizens United reaffirmed the WRTL functional equivalent test’s constitutionality and provided further support for the use of such a test to define express advocacy.

2010Indeed, police officers are capable of properly assessing the difference between “private” and “public.” See City of Baton Rouge v. Ross, 654 So. 2d 1311, 1339 (La. 1995) (Calogero, C.J., concurring) (“[P]olice officers in particular have an understanding of the distinction between „public‟ and „private‟ places since the constitutional propriety of much of their conduct depends upon this distinction.”); see also Twilight Jones Lounge v. Showers, 732 P.2d 1230 , 1231- 32 (Colo. App. 1986) (when “public view” not defined in workers‟ compensation statute, reliance on “familiar and generally accep

2010Indeed, police officers are capable of properly assessing the difference between “private” and “public.” See City of Baton Rouge v. Ross, 654 So. 2d 1311, 1339 (La. 1995) (Calogero, C.J., concurring) (“[P]olice officers in particular have an understanding of the distinction between „public‟ and „private‟ places since the constitutional propriety of much of their conduct depends upon this distinction.”); see also Twilight Jones Lounge v. Showers, 732 P.2d 1230 , 1231- 32 (Colo. App. 1986) (when “public view” not defined in workers‟ compensation statute, reliance on “familiar and generally accep

2008Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (footnote omitted). ¶ 29 Although neither the phrase “[a]ny conduct or practice that is or might be harmful or dangerous to the health of the patient or the public” nor the phrase “previously established a doctor-patient relationship” is defined in A.R.S. § 32-1401(27), the Legislature “need not define statutory terms with linguistic precision in order to withstand a vagueness challenge,” Brighton Pharmacy, Inc. v. Colorado State Pharmacy Board, 160 P.3d 412, 420 (Colo.Ct.App.2007), nor need it describe ever