Miranda warning in New Mexico

2026There are four such time periods: “before arrest; 10 after arrest, but before the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 11 . . . (1966), have been given; after Miranda warnings have been given; and at trial.” 12 DeGraff, 2006-NMSC-011, ¶ 11 .

2024The district court granted Defendant 3 Chiaramonte’s motion to suppress, explaining that the Miranda warnings were 4 insufficient under Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 , and Serna, 2018-NMCA-074 .

2023See Foster, 1998-NMCA-163, ¶ 14 (“[I]t is fundamentally unfair under the United States Constitution to impeach the defendant’s testimony by means of evidence of the defendant’s invocation of the right to silence after receiving Miranda warnings.”). {25} Officer Postenrieder’s request of Defendant did not describe or ask her consent for any portion of the DRE examination other than conducting an interrogation, nor did he distinguish the consequences of a refusal by Defendant to provide physical evidence from the Miranda warning’s assurance that her refusal to answer his questions would not be u

2023A defendant has a 16 right to rely on the state’s promise that their silence will not be used to convict them. 17 See Foster, 1998-NMCA-163, ¶ 14 (“[I]t is fundamentally unfair under the United 18 States Constitution to impeach the defendant’s testimony by means of evidence of 19 the defendant’s invocation of the right to silence after receiving Miranda 20 warnings.”). 11 1 {25} Officer Postenrieder’s request of Defendant did not describe or ask her 2 consent for any portion of the DRE examination other than conducting an 3 interrogation, nor did he distinguish the consequences of a refusal by

2016See State v. Nieto, 2000-NMSC-031 , ¶ 19, 129 N.M. 688 , 12 P.3d 442 (applying de novo review of question whether there was a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings).

2016See State v. Nieto, 2000-NMSC-031 , ¶ 19, 129 N.M. 688 , 12 P.3d 442 (applying de novo review of question whether there was a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings).

2015See Jonathan M., 1990-NMSC-046 , ¶ 8 (explaining that children over fifteen and adults are unlikely to make involuntary statements after Miranda warnings due to their higher level of sophistication); see also Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, ¶ 18 (stating that Section 32A-2-14 codifies that the adult rule for a successful waiver of rights applies to children fifteen years old and older).

2014See Jonathan M., 1990-NMSC- 14 046, ¶ 8 (explaining that children over fifteen and adults are unlikely to make 15 involuntary statements after Miranda warnings due to their higher level of 16 sophistication); see also Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, ¶ 18 (stating that Section 32A- 17 2-14 codifies that the adult rule for a successful waiver of rights applies to children 18 fifteen years old and older).

2017New Mexico 13 case law has made clear that children of similar age, even those suffering from 14 “conditions and disorders” significantly affecting their cognitive abilities, may 15 nonetheless be capable of understanding their rights and the consequences of waiver. 16 State v. Setser, 1997-NMSC-004, ¶ 14 , 122 N.M. 794 , 932 P.2d 484 ; see also 17 Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024, ¶¶ 14-15 (internal quotation marks and citation 18 omitted); cf. State v. Jonathan M., 1990-NMSC-046 , ¶ 8, 109 N.M. 789 , 791 P.2d 64 16 1 (comparing older children with children “under age fifteen” and concluding “a child

2017New Mexico 13 case law has made clear that children of similar age, even those suffering from 14 “conditions and disorders” significantly affecting their cognitive abilities, may 15 nonetheless be capable of understanding their rights and the consequences of waiver. 16 State v. Setser, 1997-NMSC-004, ¶ 14 , 122 N.M. 794 , 932 P.2d 484 ; see also 17 Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024, ¶¶ 14-15 (internal quotation marks and citation 18 omitted); cf. State v. Jonathan M., 1990-NMSC-046 , ¶ 8, 109 N.M. 789 , 791 P.2d 64 16 1 (comparing older children with children “under age fifteen” and concluding “a child

2024That is because the Miranda warning—which informs the defendant that he or she has a “right to remain silent[ and] that anything he says may be used against him”—implies that “silence will carry no penalty.” Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-18 (1976); see also DeGraff, 2006-NMSC- 011, ¶ 12.

2023In its decision in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence that a defendant exercised their Fifth Amendment right and remained silent in the face of police questioning, after having been assured by a Miranda warning that there would be no penalty for doing so, would be a violation of due process.

2026There are four such time periods: “before arrest; 10 after arrest, but before the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 11 . . . (1966), have been given; after Miranda warnings have been given; and at trial.” 12 DeGraff, 2006-NMSC-011, ¶ 11 .

2026“The Fifth Amendment protections 6 stated in the Miranda warnings are a general right against self-incrimination.” 7 DeGraff, 2006-NMSC-011, ¶ 19 .

2016It is settled that a suspect is not “in custody” and Miranda’s requirements do not apply unless “a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Nieto, 2000-NM SC-031, ¶¶ 20-21 (stating these requirements and that “[cjustody is determined objectively, not from the subjective perception of any of the members to the interview” and holding that Miranda warnings were not required where facts showed routine, non-custodial police questioning). {14} Minnesota v. Mu

2014In Wilson, 2007- NMCA-111, ¶ 21, we rejected the argument that “Miranda warnings are never required during an investigatory detention.” Relying on federal case law, we explained that “‘[i]f a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by [Miranda].’” Id. ¶ 20 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 421 (1984)).

2023See, e.g., State v. Barrera, 2001-NMSC-014, ¶ 27 , 130 N.M. 227 , 22 P.3d 1177 (concluding the defendant’s Miranda waiver and confession were voluntary where law enforcement did not make threats or promises of leniency or use physical force, notwithstanding that the defendant was questioned in close and restrictive quarters by two officers).

2023See, e.g., State v. Barrera, 2001-NMSC-014, ¶ 27 , 130 N.M. 227 , 22 P.3d 1177 (concluding the defendant’s Miranda waiver and confession were voluntary where law enforcement did not make threats or promises of leniency or use physical force, notwithstanding that the defendant was questioned in close and restrictive quarters by two officers).

2025But Miranda warnings are required only “when a person is (1) interrogated while (2) in custody.” State v. Wilson, 2007-NMCA-111, ¶ 12 , 142 N.M. 737 , 169 P.3d 1184 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {4} Defendant maintains that the metropolitan court should have granted the motion to suppress because the officer exploited her confinement in the ambulance in order to conduct a custodial interrogation.

2025But Miranda warnings are required only “when a person is (1) interrogated while (2) in custody.” State v. Wilson, 2007-NMCA-111, ¶ 12 , 142 N.M. 737 , 169 P.3d 1184 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {4} Defendant maintains that the metropolitan court should have granted the motion to suppress because the officer exploited her confinement in the ambulance in order to conduct a custodial interrogation.

2023“Suppression of an accused’s statements made to a law enforcement officer prior to the giving of Miranda warnings is only required when the statements are the product of a custodial interrogation.” State v. Fekete, 1995-NMSC- 049, ¶ 41, 120 N.M. 290 , 901 P.2d 708 ; see also State v. Quiñones, 2011-NMCA-018, ¶ 10 , 149 N.M. 294 , 248 P.3d 336 (stating that “when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation,” the accused “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him” (alterations, internal qu

2023“Suppression of an accused’s statements made to a law enforcement officer prior to the giving of Miranda warnings is only required when the statements are the product of a custodial interrogation.” State v. Fekete, 1995-NMSC- 049, ¶ 41, 120 N.M. 290 , 901 P.2d 708 ; see also State v. Quiñones, 2011-NMCA-018, ¶ 10 , 149 N.M. 294 , 248 P.3d 336 (stating that “when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation,” the accused “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him” (alterations, internal qu

2016It is settled that a suspect is not “in custody” and Miranda’s requirements do not apply unless “a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Nieto, 2000-NM SC-031, ¶¶ 20-21 (stating these requirements and that “[cjustody is determined objectively, not from the subjective perception of any of the members to the interview” and holding that Miranda warnings were not required where facts showed routine, non-custodial police questioning). {14} Minnesota v. Mu

2016It is settled that a suspect is not “in custody” and Miranda’s requirements do not apply unless “a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Nieto, 2000-NM SC-031, ¶¶ 20-21 (stating these requirements and that “[cjustody is determined objectively, not from the subjective perception of any of the members to the interview” and holding that Miranda warnings were not required where facts showed routine, non-custodial police questioning). {14} Minnesota v. Mu

2018See State v. Gilbert, 1982-NMSC-095 , ¶ 12, 98 N.M. 530 , 650 P.2d 814 13 (holding that Miranda warnings did not have to be given again where a second 14 interview of the defendant had taken place hours after he was Mirandized). 15 {7} Issue 2: Defendant continues to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 16 support his convictions. [MIO 5] A sufficiency of the evidence review involves a 17 two-step process.

2018See State v. Gilbert, 1982-NMSC-095 , ¶ 12, 98 N.M. 530 , 650 P.2d 814 13 (holding that Miranda warnings did not have to be given again where a second 14 interview of the defendant had taken place hours after he was Mirandized). 15 {7} Issue 2: Defendant continues to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 16 support his convictions. [MIO 5] A sufficiency of the evidence review involves a 17 two-step process.

2018See State v. Munoz, 6 1998-NMSC-048, ¶ 40 , 126 N.M. 535 , 972 P.2d 847 . 7 {6} Even assuming, arguendo, that Defendant had been subject to custodial 8 interrogation after the polygraph test, he had been Mirandized prior to taking the test, 9 and signed a waiver to that effect. [MIO 1-2; DS 2] To the extent Defendant is arguing 10 that he had to be Mirandized a second time after he failed the polygraph test, repeated 11 Miranda warnings are not necessary where a defendant has been made aware of his 12 rights.

2018See State v. Munoz, 6 1998-NMSC-048, ¶ 40 , 126 N.M. 535 , 972 P.2d 847 . 7 {6} Even assuming, arguendo, that Defendant had been subject to custodial 8 interrogation after the polygraph test, he had been Mirandized prior to taking the test, 9 and signed a waiver to that effect. [MIO 1-2; DS 2] To the extent Defendant is arguing 10 that he had to be Mirandized a second time after he failed the polygraph test, repeated 11 Miranda warnings are not necessary where a defendant has been made aware of his 12 rights.

2024According to Defendant he was in custody during the interrogation and was therefore entitled to, but did not receive, Miranda warnings prior to being questioned. {16} To ensure that a person suspected of a crime is not compelled to make incriminating statements, the United States Supreme Court held in Miranda that a person “must be warned that [they have] a right to remain silent, that any statement [they do] make may be used as evidence against [them], and that [they have] a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” 384 U.S. at 444; State v. Snell, 2007-NMCA-113, ¶

2024According to Defendant he was in custody during the interrogation and was therefore entitled to, but did not receive, Miranda warnings prior to being questioned. {16} To ensure that a person suspected of a crime is not compelled to make incriminating statements, the United States Supreme Court held in Miranda that a person “must be warned that [they have] a right to remain silent, that any statement [they do] make may be used as evidence against [them], and that [they have] a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” 384 U.S. at 444; State v. Snell, 2007-NMCA-113, ¶

2024According to Defendant he was in custody during the interrogation and was therefore entitled to, but did not receive, Miranda warnings prior to being questioned. {16} To ensure that a person suspected of a crime is not compelled to make incriminating statements, the United States Supreme Court held in Miranda that a person “must be warned that [they have] a right to remain silent, that any statement [they do] make may be used as evidence against [them], and that [they have] a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” 384 U.S. at 444; State v. Snell, 2007-NMCA-113, ¶

2023According to Defendant he was in custody during the interrogation and was therefore entitled to, but did not receive, Miranda warnings prior to being questioned. {16} To ensure that a person suspected of a crime is not compelled to make incriminating statements, the United States Supreme Court held in Miranda that a person “must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” 384 U.S. 436, 444 ; see State v. Snell, 2007- NMCA-113, ¶ 9, 142

2025“Whether a defendant was subject to a custodial interrogation and whether a defendant’s statement was voluntarily given are legal determinations that we review de novo on appeal.” State v. Olivas, 2011-NMCA-030, ¶ 8 , 149 N.M. 498 , 252 P.3d 722 . {18} Pursuant to Miranda, “law enforcement officers are obligated to administer Miranda warnings only when a suspect is subject to a custodial interrogation or, in other words, when [they are] (1) interrogated while (2) in custody.” Olivas, 2011-NMCA-030, ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2025“Whether a defendant was subject to a custodial interrogation and whether a defendant’s statement was voluntarily given are legal determinations that we review de novo on appeal.” State v. Olivas, 2011-NMCA-030, ¶ 8 , 149 N.M. 498 , 252 P.3d 722 . {18} Pursuant to Miranda, “law enforcement officers are obligated to administer Miranda warnings only when a suspect is subject to a custodial interrogation or, in other words, when [they are] (1) interrogated while (2) in custody.” Olivas, 2011-NMCA-030, ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2026See id. ¶ 13; Gutierrez, 2003- At the beginning of the officers’ interaction with Defendant at the jail on June 3 13, 2018, the agent mentioned “the other night when we spoke to you.” We understand this to refer to a prior interaction in which the officers questioned Defendant—exactly when this interview occurred or whether Defendant was given Miranda warnings at that time are not of record, however. 1 NMCA-077, ¶ 10; State v. Garcia, 1994-NMCA-147 , ¶ 11, 118 N.M. 773 , 887 P.2d 2 767 .

2019See DeGraff, 2006-NMSC-011, ¶¶ 13 , 18 4 (noting the lack of New Mexico law on this issue, and assuming for purposes of 5 that case that Miranda warnings were given); State v. Gutierrez, 2003-NMCA-077 , 6 ¶ 10, 133 N.M. 797 , 70 P.3d 787 (same); State v. Garcia, 1994-NMCA-147 , 7 ¶¶ 10-11, 118 N.M. 773 , 887 P.2d 767 (assuming for the purposes of that case that 8 the same standard of review applies to post- and pre-Miranda silence).

2024Id. at 659 . {18} Our Supreme Court in Widmer adopted the Quarles public safety exception, holding that the exception will apply so long as the police questioning prior to giving Miranda warnings is not “solely to elicit incriminating testimony,” and the question is “objectively reasonable based on a need to protect [either the police or the public] from an immediate danger.” Widmer, 2020-NMSC-007, ¶¶ 35, 37 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2023See State v. Widmer, 2020-NMSC-007, ¶ 19 , 461 P.3d 881 (explaining that 8 any questioning related to evidence of a crime is subject to Miranda safeguards). 9 Officer Postenrieder did not ask to physically examine Defendant, nor did he seek 10 her permission for breath or blood testing, as required by the Implied Consent Act. 11 {22} After giving Defendant Miranda warnings, Officer Postenrieder testified that 12 he asked her whether she would agree to a DRE examination.

2024Procedural history 8 {6} Defendant Atencio was charged as relevant here with one count of criminal 9 sexual penetration of a minor (CSPM), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-9- 10 11(D)(1) (2009), and twenty-five counts of criminal sexual contact of a minor in the 11 second degree (CSCM), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-9-13(B)(1) (2003). 12 {7} Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to admit Detective Babadi’s interview 13 of Atencio, asserting that Atencio was “properly Mirandized and his statements were 14 knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.” Defendant Atencio did not respond

2024The Court of Appeals explained 14 that its holding “does not impose a requirement that Miranda warnings must include 15 specific language that an individual subject to custodial interrogation has the right 2 The Atencio Court of Appeals did not address Defendant Atencio’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim “in light of [its] holding regarding the admission of [Atencio]’s statements,” Atencio, 2021-NMCA-061, ¶ 3 , and Defendant Atencio does not challenge that determination or otherwise raise the issue before this Court. 5 1 to counsel before and during questioning.” Id. ¶ 35.

2020Defendant answered the detectives’ questions during which he admitted to stabbing the Victim multiple times and “slash[ing]” the Victim’s throat. {12} Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress physical and testimonial evidence, including (1) evidence obtained during the warrantless search of the Victim’s apartment; and (2) the statements Defendant made at the police station contending that the Miranda warnings given to him were ineffective under Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). {13} After presiding over a hearing on the motions, the district court ruled that Defendant

2020Defendant answered the detectives’ questions during which he admitted to stabbing the Victim multiple times and “slash[ing]” the Victim’s throat. {12} Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress physical and testimonial evidence, including (1) evidence obtained during the warrantless search of the Victim’s apartment; and (2) the statements Defendant made at the police station contending that the Miranda warnings given to him were ineffective under Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). {13} After presiding over a hearing on the motions, the district court ruled that Defendant

2018We then determine "what, if any, additional protections are available to the Child under the statute." Id. {23} With respect to these minimal constitutional guarantees, the Miranda warnings are typically required in circumstances of custodial interrogation.

2018We then determine "what, if any, additional protections are available to the Child under the statute." Id. {23} With respect to these minimal constitutional guarantees, the Miranda warnings are typically required in circumstances of custodial interrogation.

2020See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 631 (2004) (“[T]he Miranda rule creates a presumption of coercion in custodial interrogations, in the absence of specific warnings, that is generally irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecution’s case in chief.”). {13} However, the Miranda rule is “only applicable when (1) the suspect is in ‘custody,’ and (2) any ‘questioning [] meet[s] the legal definition of interrogation.’” United States v. Cash, 733 F.3d 1264, 1276-77 (10th Cir. 2013) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Benard, 680 F.3d 1206, 1211 (10th Cir. 2012)).

2020See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 631 (2004) (“[T]he Miranda rule creates a presumption of coercion in custodial interrogations, in the absence of specific warnings, that is generally irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecution’s case in chief.”). {13} However, the Miranda rule is “only applicable when (1) the suspect is in ‘custody,’ and (2) any ‘questioning [] meet[s] the legal definition of interrogation.’” United States v. Cash, 733 F.3d 1264, 1276-77 (10th Cir. 2013) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Benard, 680 F.3d 1206, 1211 (10th Cir. 2012)).

2024See State v. Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024, ¶ 7 , 150 N.M. 232 , 258 P.3d 1024 (“The ultimate determination of whether a valid waiver of Miranda rights has occurred, however, is a question of law which we review de novo.” (text only) 5 (citation omitted)); see also State v. Verdugo, 2007-NMCA-095, ¶ 12 , 142 N.M. 267 , 164 P.3d 966 (noting that the adequacy of Miranda warnings is a question of law subject to de novo review). 1.

2019State v. Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024, ¶ 7 , 150 N.M. 232 , 258 P.3d 1024 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); State v. Young, 1994-NMCA-061 , ¶ 12, 117 N.M. 688 , 875 P.2d 1119 (providing that, in reviewing a Miranda waiver, “[t]he trial court’s decision will not be disturbed on appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence, unless predicated on a mistake of law”).

2023He told her “that [he] was just going to continue to talk to her about what was going on and ask her more questions.” Stated differently, when asked by Defendant what the DRE examination entailed, Officer Postenrieder’s response was effectively an expression of his intent to question Defendant about her guilt. {23} The purpose of Miranda warnings is to “grant the suspect an awareness of the right so the suspect can make a knowing, intelligent and voluntary choice to speak.” State v. Filemon V., 2018-NMSC-011, ¶ 48 , 412 P.3d 1089 .

2023He told her “that [he] was just going to continue to talk to her about what was 14 going on and ask her more questions.” Stated differently, when asked by Defendant 15 what the DRE examination entailed, Officer Postenrieder’s response was effectively 16 an expression of his intent to question Defendant about her guilt. 17 {23} The purpose of Miranda warnings is to “grant the suspect an awareness of the 18 right so the suspect can make a knowing, intelligent and voluntary choice to speak.” 19 State v. Filemon V., 2018-NMSC-011, ¶ 48 , 412 P.3d 1089 .

2016See State v. Chamberlain, 1991-NMSC- 6 094, ¶ 17, 112 N.M. 723 , 819 P.2d 673 (noting that Miranda warnings are not 7 required “every time the police interview a suspect, even though there may be 8 coercive aspects to the questioning; a coercive environment requiring warnings occurs 9 only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him 10 in custody.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State 11 v. Swise, 1983-NMSC-071 , ¶ 12, 100 N.M. 256 , 669 P.2d 732 (concluding that the 12 defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes and

2016See State v. Chamberlain, 1991-NMSC- 6 094, ¶ 17, 112 N.M. 723 , 819 P.2d 673 (noting that Miranda warnings are not 7 required “every time the police interview a suspect, even though there may be 8 coercive aspects to the questioning; a coercive environment requiring warnings occurs 9 only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him 10 in custody.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State 11 v. Swise, 1983-NMSC-071 , ¶ 12, 100 N.M. 256 , 669 P.2d 732 (concluding that the 12 defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes and