Miranda warning in Connecticut

2026The record was inadequate for this court to review, pursuant to Golding, the defendant’s unpreserved claim that the inculpatory statements he made while in police custody should have been excluded at the violation of proba- tion hearing because he had not been advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona ( 384 U.S. 436 ) prior to questioning, as the trial court did not make any factual findings or legal conclusions as to whether the defendant had been in custody or subject to interrogation, the record was unclear as to whether he had been advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda and he did

2026The record was inadequate for this court to review, pursuant to Golding, the defendant’s unpreserved claim that the inculpatory statements he made while in police custody should have been excluded at the violation of proba- tion hearing because he had not been advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona ( 384 U.S. 436 ) prior to questioning, as the trial court did not make any factual findings or legal conclusions as to whether the defendant had been in custody or subject to interrogation, the record was unclear as to whether he had been advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda and he did

2014The ‘‘[f]ailure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion’’ that is ‘‘irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecu- tion’s case in chief . . . .’’ Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 , 105 S. Ct. 1285 , 84 L.

2014The ‘‘[f]ailure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion’’ that is ‘‘irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecu- tion’s case in chief . . . .’’ Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 , 105 S. Ct. 1285 , 84 L.

2021An implicit waiver of the right to remain silent is sufficient to admit a suspect’s statement into evi- dence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 384 . ‘‘[When] the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.’’ Id.; see also State v. Shifflett, 199 Conn. 718 , 731–32, 508 A.2d 748 (1986) (‘‘the state must demonstrate . . . (1) that the defen- dant understood his rights, and (2) that the defendant’s course of conduct indicated that he did, in fa

2021An implicit waiver of the right to remain silent is sufficient to admit a suspect’s statement into evi- dence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 384 . ‘‘[When] the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.’’ Id.; see also State v. Shifflett, 199 Conn. 718 , 731–32, 508 A.2d 748 (1986) (‘‘the state must demonstrate . . . (1) that the defen- dant understood his rights, and (2) that the defendant’s course of conduct indicated that he did, in fa

2017In Fletcher v. Weir , 455 U.S. 603 , 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), the United States Supreme Court summarized its evolving jurisprudence under Doyle by explaining that the "use of silence for impeachment was fundamentally unfair in Doyle because Miranda warnings inform a person of his right to remain silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his silence will not be used against him. ... [Thus] Doyle bars the use against a criminal defendant of silence maintained after receipt of governmental assurances. " (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 606 , 102 S.

2017In Fletcher v. Weir , 455 U.S. 603 , 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), the United States Supreme Court summarized its evolving jurisprudence under Doyle by explaining that the "use of silence for impeachment was fundamentally unfair in Doyle because Miranda warnings inform a person of his right to remain silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his silence will not be used against him. ... [Thus] Doyle bars the use against a criminal defendant of silence maintained after receipt of governmental assurances. " (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 606 , 102 S.

2025Ed. 2d 979 (1989); accord State v. Montgomery, 254 Conn. 694, 714, 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13 State v. William A. 759 A.2d 995 (2000).’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Washington, supra, 345 Conn. 267–68. ‘‘Use of a defendant’s pre-Miranda silence, by contrast, does not raise the same constitu- tional concerns: evidence of prearrest, and specifically pre-Miranda, silence is admissible to impeach the testi- mony of a defendant who testifies at trial, since the rule of Doyle . . . is predicated on the defendant’s reli- ance on th

2025Ed. 2d 979 (1989); accord State v. Montgomery, 254 Conn. 694, 714, 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13 State v. William A. 759 A.2d 995 (2000).’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Washington, supra, 345 Conn. 267–68. ‘‘Use of a defendant’s pre-Miranda silence, by contrast, does not raise the same constitu- tional concerns: evidence of prearrest, and specifically pre-Miranda, silence is admissible to impeach the testi- mony of a defendant who testifies at trial, since the rule of Doyle . . . is predicated on the defendant’s reli- ance on th

2025The following legal principles guide our analysis. ‘‘In Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 426 U.S. 610, the United States Supreme Court held that the impeachment of a defendant through evidence of his silence following his arrest and receipt of Miranda warnings violates due process.

2025The following legal principles guide our analysis. ‘‘In Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 426 U.S. 610 , the United States Supreme Court held that the impeachment of a defendant through evidence of his silence following his arrest and receipt of Miranda warnings violates due process.

2019Cf. State v. Ferrell , 191 Conn. 37 , 42 n.5, 463 A.2d 573 (1983). 17 In **346 recently reiterating that Miranda warnings are independently required under the due process clause of article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution; State v. Barrett , 205 Conn. 437 , 447, 534 A.2d 219 (1987) ; we recognized, once again, the unique ability of counsel to protect the rights of a client undergoing, or confronting the imminent possibility of, interrogation.

2019Cf. State v. Ferrell , 191 Conn. 37 , 42 n.5, 463 A.2d 573 (1983). 17 In **346 recently reiterating that Miranda warnings are independently required under the due process clause of article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution; State v. Barrett , 205 Conn. 437 , 447, 534 A.2d 219 (1987) ; we recognized, once again, the unique ability of counsel to protect the rights of a client undergoing, or confronting the imminent possibility of, interrogation.

2017As to the subject matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all." In State v. Talton , 197 Conn. 280 , 292-93, 497 A.2d 35 (1985), our Supreme Court noted for purposes of evaluating a claimed Doyle violation that there is a distinction between a defendant who remains silent after he is arrested and advised of his rights, and a defendant who, after being given Miranda warnings, chooses to forgo such rights.

2017As to the subject matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all." In State v. Talton , 197 Conn. 280 , 292-93, 497 A.2d 35 (1985), our Supreme Court noted for purposes of evaluating a claimed Doyle violation that there is a distinction between a defendant who remains silent after he is arrested and advised of his rights, and a defendant who, after being given Miranda warnings, chooses to forgo such rights.

2025Silence under these circumstances is ‘‘insolubly ambiguous’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Lockhart, 298 Conn. 537, 580 , 4 A.3d 1176 (2010); and, although ‘‘Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assur- ance is implicit . . . . [I]t [therefore] would be funda- mentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach [him] . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Id., 580–81; see also State v. Plourde, 208 Conn. 455 , 466–67, 545 A.2d 1071 (1988) (extending Doyle to use of

2025Silence under these circumstances is ‘‘insolubly ambiguous’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Lockhart, 298 Conn. 537, 580 , 4 A.3d 1176 (2010); and, although ‘‘Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assur- ance is implicit . . . . [I]t [therefore] would be funda- mentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach [him] . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Id., 580–81; see also State v. Plourde, 208 Conn. 455 , 466–67, 545 A.2d 1071 (1988) (extending Doyle to use of

2025Ed. 2d 86 (1980) (‘‘impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not violate the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment [to the United States constitution]’’ when ‘‘[t]he [silence] occurred before the [defendant] was taken into custody and given Miranda warnings’’); State v. Angel T., supra, 292 Conn. 286 n.19 (‘‘evidence of prearrest, and specifically pre-Miranda, silence is admissible to impeach the testimony of a defendant who testifies at trial, [because] the rule of Doyle . . . is predicated on the defendant’s reliance on the implicit promise of the Miranda warnings’’); State v. Esposito, 223 Conn. 299

2025Ed. 2d 86 (1980) (‘‘impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not violate the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment [to the United States constitution]’’ when ‘‘[t]he [silence] occurred before the [defendant] was taken into custody and given Miranda warnings’’); State v. Angel T., supra, 292 Conn. 286 n.19 (‘‘evidence of prearrest, and specifically pre-Miranda, silence is admissible to impeach the testimony of a defendant who testifies at trial, [because] the rule of Doyle . . . is predicated on the defendant’s reliance on the implicit promise of the Miranda warnings’’); State v. Esposito, 223 Conn. 299

2023As I previously explained, in Missouri v. Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. 600 , the United States Supreme Court held that the police could not evade the requirements of Miranda by engaging in the ‘‘question first’’ stratagem of eliciting an unwarned con- fession before administering Miranda warnings, and then eliciting the same confession again, unless ‘‘a rea- sonable person in the suspect’s shoes would . . . have understood [the Miranda warnings] to convey a mes- sage that [he or] she retained a choice about continuing to talk.’’ Id., 617 (opinion announcing judgment).

2023As I previously explained, in Missouri v. Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. 600 , the United States Supreme Court held that the police could not evade the requirements of Miranda by engaging in the ‘‘question first’’ stratagem of eliciting an unwarned con- fession before administering Miranda warnings, and then eliciting the same confession again, unless ‘‘a rea- sonable person in the suspect’s shoes would . . . have understood [the Miranda warnings] to convey a mes- sage that [he or] she retained a choice about continuing to talk.’’ Id., 617 (opinion announcing judgment).

2026Because the record presented by the defendant does not indicate when the defendant received his Miranda warnings, an adequate record for review of the claim does not exist.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)); see also, e.g., State v. Berube, 256 Conn. 742, 751 , 775 A.2d 966 (2001) (declining to review unpreserved claim of Miranda violation under Golding due to inadequate record when record was not clear as to when defendant received Miranda warnings, as it was “essential to know” timing of defendant’s conversations with police with respect to his receipt of Miranda warnin

2026Because the record presented by the defendant does not indicate when the defendant received his Miranda warnings, an adequate record for review of the claim does not exist.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)); see also, e.g., State v. Berube, 256 Conn. 742, 751 , 775 A.2d 966 (2001) (declining to review unpreserved claim of Miranda violation under Golding due to inadequate record when record was not clear as to when defendant received Miranda warnings, as it was “essential to know” timing of defendant’s conversations with police with respect to his receipt of Miranda warnin

2011Thus, other courts have held that the test is not a useful tool to ascertain the need for Miranda warnings when someone is detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop; Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 , 104 S. Ct. 3138 , 82 L.

2011Thus, other courts have held that the test is not a useful tool to ascertain the need for Miranda warnings when someone is detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop; Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 , 104 S. Ct. 3138 , 82 L.

2009Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 17 “In Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 426 U.S. 619 , the United States Supreme Court held that ‘the use for impeachment purposes of [a defendant’s] silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violatefs] the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause of the [fjourteenth ]a]mendment.’ ‘The point of the Doyle holding is that it is fundamentally unfair to promise an arrested person that his silence will not be used against him and thereafter to breach that promise by using the silence to impeach his trial testimony.’ Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292 , 106 S. Ct. 634 , 8

2009Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 17 “In Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 426 U.S. 619 , the United States Supreme Court held that ‘the use for impeachment purposes of [a defendant’s] silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violatefs] the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause of the [fjourteenth ]a]mendment.’ ‘The point of the Doyle holding is that it is fundamentally unfair to promise an arrested person that his silence will not be used against him and thereafter to breach that promise by using the silence to impeach his trial testimony.’ Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292 , 106 S. Ct. 634 , 8

2022Use of a defendant’s pre-Miranda silence, by contrast, does not raise the same constitutional concerns: ‘‘evidence of prearrest, and specifically pre-Miranda, silence is admissible to impeach the testimony of a defendant who testifies at trial, since the rule of Doyle v. Ohio, supra, [619], is predicated on the defendant’s reliance on the implicit promise of Miranda warnings.’’ State v. Angel T., 292 Conn. 262 , 286 n.19, 973 A.2d 1207 (2009); see Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 , 100 S. Ct. 2124 , 65 L.

2022Use of a defendant’s pre-Miranda silence, by contrast, does not raise the same constitutional concerns: ‘‘evidence of prearrest, and specifically pre-Miranda, silence is admissible to impeach the testimony of a defendant who testifies at trial, since the rule of Doyle v. Ohio, supra, [619], is predicated on the defendant’s reliance on the implicit promise of Miranda warnings.’’ State v. Angel T., 292 Conn. 262 , 286 n.19, 973 A.2d 1207 (2009); see Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 , 100 S. Ct. 2124 , 65 L.

2025Silence under these circumstances is ‘‘insolubly ambiguous’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Lockhart, 298 Conn. 537, 580 , 4 A.3d 1176 (2010); and, although ‘‘Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assur- ance is implicit . . . . [I]t [therefore] would be funda- mentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach [him] . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Id., 580–81; see also State v. Plourde, 208 Conn. 455 , 466–67, 545 A.2d 1071 (1988) (extending Doyle to use of

2017In State v. Leecan , 198 Conn. 517 , 504 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 , 106 S.Ct. 2922 , 91 L.Ed.2d 550 (1986), our Supreme Court adopted the rationale of Fletcher , holding that "the absence of any indication in the record that the silence of a defendant had been preceded by a Miranda warning rendered Doyle inapplicable, even though the inquiry of the prosecutor pertained to the time of arrest." Id., at 524-25, 504 A.2d 480 ; see also State v. Berube , 256 Conn. 742 , 751-52, 775 A.2d 966 (2001) ; State v. Plourde , 208 Conn. 455 , 467, 545 A.2d 1071 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1

2025Silence under these circumstances is ‘‘insolubly ambiguous’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Lockhart, 298 Conn. 537, 580 , 4 A.3d 1176 (2010); and, although ‘‘Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assur- ance is implicit . . . . [I]t [therefore] would be funda- mentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach [him] . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Id., 580–81; see also State v. Plourde, 208 Conn. 455 , 466–67, 545 A.2d 1071 (1988) (extending Doyle to use of

2017In State v. Leecan , 198 Conn. 517 , 504 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 , 106 S.Ct. 2922 , 91 L.Ed.2d 550 (1986), our Supreme Court adopted the rationale of Fletcher , holding that "the absence of any indication in the record that the silence of a defendant had been preceded by a Miranda warning rendered Doyle inapplicable, even though the inquiry of the prosecutor pertained to the time of arrest." Id., at 524-25, 504 A.2d 480 ; see also State v. Berube , 256 Conn. 742 , 751-52, 775 A.2d 966 (2001) ; State v. Plourde , 208 Conn. 455 , 467, 545 A.2d 1071 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1

2014The court ‘decline[d] to place officers ... in the untenable position of having to consider, often in a matter of seconds, whether it best serves society for them to ask the necessary questions without the Miranda warnings and render *157 whatever probative evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them to give the warnings in order to preserve the admissibility of evidence they might uncover but possibly damage or destroy their ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the volatile situation confronting them.’ Id., 657-58.

2014The court ‘decline[d] to place officers ... in the untenable position of having to consider, often in a matter of seconds, whether it best serves society for them to ask the necessary questions without the Miranda warnings and render *157 whatever probative evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them to give the warnings in order to preserve the admissibility of evidence they might uncover but possibly damage or destroy their ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the volatile situation confronting them.’ Id., 657-58.

1994Because Meizies’ conduct was neither intended nor reasonably likely to provoke an incriminatory response from the defendant; see State v. Rosado, supra, 253-54 ; State v. Palmer, supra, 62-63 ; State v. Copeland, 205 Conn. 201, 207-208 , 530 A.2d 603 (1987); State v. Evans, 203 Conn. 212, 227 , 523 A.2d 1306 (1987); State v. Vitale, supra, 408-12 ; the officer’s prudent efforts to evaluate and ameliorate the situation, after the defendant had initiated the exchange; see State v. Doehrer, 200 Conn. 642, 645-48 , 513 A.2d 58 (1986); did not constitute interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. 9

1994Because Meizies’ conduct was neither intended nor reasonably likely to provoke an incriminatory response from the defendant; see State v. Rosado, supra, 253-54 ; State v. Palmer, supra, 62-63 ; State v. Copeland, 205 Conn. 201, 207-208 , 530 A.2d 603 (1987); State v. Evans, 203 Conn. 212, 227 , 523 A.2d 1306 (1987); State v. Vitale, supra, 408-12 ; the officer’s prudent efforts to evaluate and ameliorate the situation, after the defendant had initiated the exchange; see State v. Doehrer, 200 Conn. 642, 645-48 , 513 A.2d 58 (1986); did not constitute interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. 9

2019See State v. Whitaker, 215 Conn. 739, 757 , 578 A.2d 1031 (1990) (whether police officer truthfully testified that Miranda warnings were given is ‘‘question of credibility, and as such, is for the trier of fact to determine’’); State v. Madera, 210 Conn. 22 , 36–37, 554 A.2d 263 (1989) (whether police advised defendant of Miranda rights is question of credibility of witness for trier of fact). 7 The defendant also claims that, upon receiving a letter from the public defender’s office notifying him of the availability of its legal assistance, an attorney-client relationship was established so t

2019See State v. Whitaker, 215 Conn. 739, 757 , 578 A.2d 1031 (1990) (whether police officer truthfully testified that Miranda warnings were given is ‘‘question of credibility, and as such, is for the trier of fact to determine’’); State v. Madera, 210 Conn. 22 , 36–37, 554 A.2d 263 (1989) (whether police advised defendant of Miranda rights is question of credibility of witness for trier of fact). 7 The defendant also claims that, upon receiving a letter from the public defender’s office notifying him of the availability of its legal assistance, an attorney-client relationship was established so t

2025Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him in custody.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 , 97 S. Ct. 711 , 50 L.

2025Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him in custody.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 , 97 S. Ct. 711 , 50 L.

2019Cf. State v. Ferrell , 191 Conn. 37 , 42 n.5, 463 A.2d 573 (1983). 17 In **346 recently reiterating that Miranda warnings are independently required under the due process clause of article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution; State v. Barrett , 205 Conn. 437 , 447, 534 A.2d 219 (1987) ; we recognized, once again, the unique ability of counsel to protect the rights of a client undergoing, or confronting the imminent possibility of, interrogation.

2019Cf. State v. Ferrell , 191 Conn. 37 , 42 n.5, 463 A.2d 573 (1983). 17 In **346 recently reiterating that Miranda warnings are independently required under the due process clause of article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution; State v. Barrett , 205 Conn. 437 , 447, 534 A.2d 219 (1987) ; we recognized, once again, the unique ability of counsel to protect the rights of a client undergoing, or confronting the imminent possibility of, interrogation.

2000In support of this contention, the state relies on Anderson v. Charles, supra, 447 U.S. 404 , and a decision of this court, State v. Casey, 201 Conn. 174, 186 , 513 A.2d 1183 (1986), that followed the holding of Anderson that Doyle does not apply to cross-examination of a defendant who, upon being given Miranda warnings, provides the police with one version of the facts and then, at trial, testifies to a different version.

2000In support of this contention, the state relies on Anderson v. Charles, supra, 447 U.S. 404 , and a decision of this court, State v. Casey, 201 Conn. 174, 186 , 513 A.2d 1183 (1986), that followed the holding of Anderson that Doyle does not apply to cross-examination of a defendant who, upon being given Miranda warnings, provides the police with one version of the facts and then, at trial, testifies to a different version.