Miranda warning in Connecticut

2026He claims that the statements should be suppressed pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 478-79, 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), because the officers questioned him without providing the warnings required by Miranda.9 Although the defendant concedes that he did not expressly raise a Miranda claim before the trial court, he argues that he nevertheless preserved such a claim when he argued that his statements should be suppressed under the fourth amendment.

2026He claims that the statements should be suppressed pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 478-79, 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), because the officers questioned him without providing the warnings required by Miranda.9 Although the defendant concedes that he did not expressly raise a Miranda claim before the trial court, he argues that he nevertheless preserved such a claim when he argued that his statements should be suppressed under the fourth amendment.

2014The ‘‘[f]ailure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion’’ that is ‘‘irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecu- tion’s case in chief . . . .’’ Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 , 105 S. Ct. 1285 , 84 L.

2014The ‘‘[f]ailure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion’’ that is ‘‘irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecu- tion’s case in chief . . . .’’ Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 , 105 S. Ct. 1285 , 84 L.

2021An implicit waiver of the right to remain silent is sufficient to admit a suspect’s statement into evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 384 . ‘‘[When] the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.’’ Id.; see also State v. Shifflett, 199 Conn. 718 , 731-32, 508 A.2d 748 (1986) (‘‘the state must demonstrate . . . (1) that the defendant understood his rights, and (2) that the defendant’s course of conduct indicated that he did, in fact,

2021An implicit waiver of the right to remain silent is sufficient to admit a suspect’s statement into evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 384 . ‘‘[When] the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.’’ Id.; see also State v. Shifflett, 199 Conn. 718 , 731-32, 508 A.2d 748 (1986) (‘‘the state must demonstrate . . . (1) that the defendant understood his rights, and (2) that the defendant’s course of conduct indicated that he did, in fact,

2025On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) pursuant to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976),1 the state violated his fifth amendment right to remain silent when the prosecutor impermissibly asked a question and elicited testimony during the state’s case-in-chief and commented during closing argument about the defendant’s post-Miranda2 silence, 1 ‘‘In Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 426 U.S. [619], the United States Supreme Court held that the impeachment of a defendant through evidence of his silence following his arrest and receipt of Miranda warnings violates due proc

2025On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) pursuant to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976),1 the state violated his fifth amendment right to remain silent when the prosecutor impermissibly asked a question and elicited testimony during the state’s case-in-chief and commented during closing argument about the defendant’s post-Miranda2 silence, 1 ‘‘In Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 426 U.S. [619], the United States Supreme Court held that the impeachment of a defendant through evidence of his silence following his arrest and receipt of Miranda warnings violates due proc

2022In Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 , 102 S. Ct. 1309 , 71 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant’s due process rights are not violated when the government adduces evidence of the defendant’s postarrest silence unless the record affirmatively ‘‘indicate[s] that [the defendant] received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent immediately after his arrest.’’ Id., 605 .

2022In Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 , 102 S. Ct. 1309 , 71 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant’s due process rights are not violated when the government adduces evidence of the defendant’s postarrest silence unless the record affirmatively ‘‘indicate[s] that [the defendant] received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent immediately after his arrest.’’ Id., 605 .

2025State v. Plourde, 208 Conn. 455, 468, 545 A.2d 1071 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034, 109 S. Ct. 847, 102 L. Ed. 2d 979 (1989); accord State v. Montgomery, 254 Conn. 694, 714, 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13 State v. William A. 759 A.2d 995 (2000).’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Washington, supra, 345 Conn. 267-68. ‘‘Use of a defendant’s pre-Miranda silence, by contrast, does not raise the same constitutional concerns: evidence of prearrest, and specifically pre-Miranda, silence is admissible to impeach the testimony of a defendant who testifies at trial, since th

2025State v. Plourde, 208 Conn. 455, 468, 545 A.2d 1071 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034, 109 S. Ct. 847, 102 L. Ed. 2d 979 (1989); accord State v. Montgomery, 254 Conn. 694, 714, 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13 State v. William A. 759 A.2d 995 (2000).’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Washington, supra, 345 Conn. 267-68. ‘‘Use of a defendant’s pre-Miranda silence, by contrast, does not raise the same constitutional concerns: evidence of prearrest, and specifically pre-Miranda, silence is admissible to impeach the testimony of a defendant who testifies at trial, since th

2019Cf. State v. Ferrell , 191 Conn. 37 , 42 n.5, 463 A.2d 573 (1983). 17 In **346 recently reiterating that Miranda warnings are independently required under the due process clause of article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution; State v. Barrett , 205 Conn. 437 , 447, 534 A.2d 219 (1987) ; we recognized, once again, the unique ability of counsel to protect the rights of a client undergoing, or confronting the imminent possibility of, interrogation.

2019Cf. State v. Ferrell , 191 Conn. 37 , 42 n.5, 463 A.2d 573 (1983). 17 In **346 recently reiterating that Miranda warnings are independently required under the due process clause of article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution; State v. Barrett , 205 Conn. 437 , 447, 534 A.2d 219 (1987) ; we recognized, once again, the unique ability of counsel to protect the rights of a client undergoing, or confronting the imminent possibility of, interrogation.

2017As to the subject matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all." In State v. Talton , 197 Conn. 280 , 292-93, 497 A.2d 35 (1985), our Supreme Court noted for purposes of evaluating a claimed Doyle violation that there is a distinction between a defendant who remains silent after he is arrested and advised of his rights, and a defendant who, after being given Miranda warnings, chooses to forgo such rights.

2017As to the subject matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all." In State v. Talton , 197 Conn. 280 , 292-93, 497 A.2d 35 (1985), our Supreme Court noted for purposes of evaluating a claimed Doyle violation that there is a distinction between a defendant who remains silent after he is arrested and advised of his rights, and a defendant who, after being given Miranda warnings, chooses to forgo such rights.

2025State v. Angel T., 292 Conn. 262, 286 n.19, 973 A.2d 1207 (2009); see Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240, 100 S. Ct. 2124, 65 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1980) (if [t]he failure to speak occurred before the [defendant] was taken into custody and given Miranda warnings . . . [then] the fundamental unfairness present in Doyle is not [implicated], and impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not violate the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment).’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 583. ‘‘The defendant bears the burden of proving that a Doyle violation occur

2025State v. Angel T., 292 Conn. 262, 286 n.19, 973 A.2d 1207 (2009); see Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240, 100 S. Ct. 2124, 65 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1980) (if [t]he failure to speak occurred before the [defendant] was taken into custody and given Miranda warnings . . . [then] the fundamental unfairness present in Doyle is not [implicated], and impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not violate the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment).’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 583. ‘‘The defendant bears the burden of proving that a Doyle violation occur

2025State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 583 ; see, e.g., Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 , 100 S. Ct. 2124 , 65 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1980) (‘‘impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not violate the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment [to the United States constitution]’’ when ‘‘[t]he [silence] occurred before the [defendant] was taken into custody and given Miranda warnings’’); State v. Angel T., supra, 292 Conn. 286 n.19 (‘‘evidence of prearrest, and specifically pre-Miranda, silence is admissible to impeach the testimony of a defendant who testifies at trial, [because] the rule of Doyle . . . is pre

2025State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 583 ; see, e.g., Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 , 100 S. Ct. 2124 , 65 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1980) (‘‘impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not violate the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment [to the United States constitution]’’ when ‘‘[t]he [silence] occurred before the [defendant] was taken into custody and given Miranda warnings’’); State v. Angel T., supra, 292 Conn. 286 n.19 (‘‘evidence of prearrest, and specifically pre-Miranda, silence is admissible to impeach the testimony of a defendant who testifies at trial, [because] the rule of Doyle . . . is pre

2023As I previously explained, in Missouri v. Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. 600 , the United States Supreme Court held that the police could not evade the requirements of Miranda by engaging in the ‘‘question first’’ stratagem of eliciting an unwarned confession before administering Miranda warnings, and then eliciting the same confession again, unless ‘‘a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes would . . . have understood [the Miranda warnings] to convey a message that [he or] she retained a choice about continuing to talk.’’ Id., 617 (opinion announcing judgment).

2023As I previously explained, in Missouri v. Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. 600 , the United States Supreme Court held that the police could not evade the requirements of Miranda by engaging in the ‘‘question first’’ stratagem of eliciting an unwarned confession before administering Miranda warnings, and then eliciting the same confession again, unless ‘‘a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes would . . . have understood [the Miranda warnings] to convey a message that [he or] she retained a choice about continuing to talk.’’ Id., 617 (opinion announcing judgment).

2026Because the record presented by the defendant does not indicate when the defendant received his Miranda warnings, an adequate record for review of the claim does not exist.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)); see also, e.g., State v. Berube, 256 Conn. 742, 751 , 775 A.2d 966 (2001) (declining to review unpreserved claim of Miranda violation under Golding due to inadequate record when record was not clear as to when defendant received Miranda warnings, as it was “essential to know” timing of defendant’s conversations with police with respect to his receipt of Miranda warnin

2026Because the record presented by the defendant does not indicate when the defendant received his Miranda warnings, an adequate record for review of the claim does not exist.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)); see also, e.g., State v. Berube, 256 Conn. 742, 751 , 775 A.2d 966 (2001) (declining to review unpreserved claim of Miranda violation under Golding due to inadequate record when record was not clear as to when defendant received Miranda warnings, as it was “essential to know” timing of defendant’s conversations with police with respect to his receipt of Miranda warnin

2011Thus, other courts have held that the test is not a useful tool to ascertain the need for Miranda warnings when someone is detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop; Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 , 104 S. Ct. 3138 , 82 L.

2011Thus, other courts have held that the test is not a useful tool to ascertain the need for Miranda warnings when someone is detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop; Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 , 104 S. Ct. 3138 , 82 L.

2010The court . . . reaffirmed Doyle's reasoning in Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 290 , 106 S. Ct. 634 , 88 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1986), in which it held that the defendant’s silence following his arrest and receipt of Miranda warnings could not be used at trial to rebut his defense of insanity.

2010The court . . . reaffirmed Doyle's reasoning in Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 290 , 106 S. Ct. 634 , 88 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1986), in which it held that the defendant’s silence following his arrest and receipt of Miranda warnings could not be used at trial to rebut his defense of insanity.

2025State v. Plourde, 208 Conn. 455, 468, 545 A.2d 1071 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034, 109 S. Ct. 847, 102 L. Ed. 2d 979 (1989); accord State v. Montgomery, 254 Conn. 694, 714, 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13 State v. William A. 759 A.2d 995 (2000).’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Washington, supra, 345 Conn. 267-68. ‘‘Use of a defendant’s pre-Miranda silence, by contrast, does not raise the same constitutional concerns: evidence of prearrest, and specifically pre-Miranda, silence is admissible to impeach the testimony of a defendant who testifies at trial, since th

2025State v. Plourde, 208 Conn. 455, 468, 545 A.2d 1071 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034, 109 S. Ct. 847, 102 L. Ed. 2d 979 (1989); accord State v. Montgomery, 254 Conn. 694, 714, 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13 State v. William A. 759 A.2d 995 (2000).’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Washington, supra, 345 Conn. 267-68. ‘‘Use of a defendant’s pre-Miranda silence, by contrast, does not raise the same constitutional concerns: evidence of prearrest, and specifically pre-Miranda, silence is admissible to impeach the testimony of a defendant who testifies at trial, since th

1997“Since there was no ‘interrogation’ there was no need for Miranda warnings and the defendant’s statement was properly admitted into evidence.” State v. Copeland, 205 Conn. 201, 207-208 , 530 A.2d 603 (1987).

1997“Since there was no ‘interrogation’ there was no need for Miranda warnings and the defendant’s statement was properly admitted into evidence.” State v. Copeland, 205 Conn. 201, 207-208 , 530 A.2d 603 (1987).

2021See, e.g., State v. Pinder, 250 Conn. 385 , 418 n.31, 736 A.2d 857 (1999). 6 The defendant does not challenge the validity of the Miranda warning he was given at the time of his arrest. 7 We acknowledge that this second acknowledgment of understanding did not occur until after the interrogation was under way, and thus it cannot, in and of itself, serve as the basis from which to conclude that the defendant understood and waived his rights.

2021See, e.g., State v. Pinder, 250 Conn. 385 , 418 n.31, 736 A.2d 857 (1999). 6 The defendant does not challenge the validity of the Miranda warning he was given at the time of his arrest. 7 We acknowledge that this second acknowledgment of understanding did not occur until after the interrogation was under way, and thus it cannot, in and of itself, serve as the basis from which to conclude that the defendant understood and waived his rights.

2014The court ‘decline[d] to place officers ... in the untenable position of having to consider, often in a matter of seconds, whether it best serves society for them to ask the necessary questions without the Miranda warnings and render *157 whatever probative evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them to give the warnings in order to preserve the admissibility of evidence they might uncover but possibly damage or destroy their ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the volatile situation confronting them.’ Id., 657-58.

2014The court ‘decline[d] to place officers ... in the untenable position of having to consider, often in a matter of seconds, whether it best serves society for them to ask the necessary questions without the Miranda warnings and render *157 whatever probative evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them to give the warnings in order to preserve the admissibility of evidence they might uncover but possibly damage or destroy their ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the volatile situation confronting them.’ Id., 657-58.

1994Because Meizies’ conduct was neither intended nor reasonably likely to provoke an incriminatory response from the defendant; see State v. Rosado, supra, 253-54 ; State v. Palmer, supra, 62-63 ; State v. Copeland, 205 Conn. 201, 207-208 , 530 A.2d 603 (1987); State v. Evans, 203 Conn. 212, 227 , 523 A.2d 1306 (1987); State v. Vitale, supra, 408-12 ; the officer’s prudent efforts to evaluate and ameliorate the situation, after the defendant had initiated the exchange; see State v. Doehrer, 200 Conn. 642, 645-48 , 513 A.2d 58 (1986); did not constitute interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. 9

1994Because Meizies’ conduct was neither intended nor reasonably likely to provoke an incriminatory response from the defendant; see State v. Rosado, supra, 253-54 ; State v. Palmer, supra, 62-63 ; State v. Copeland, 205 Conn. 201, 207-208 , 530 A.2d 603 (1987); State v. Evans, 203 Conn. 212, 227 , 523 A.2d 1306 (1987); State v. Vitale, supra, 408-12 ; the officer’s prudent efforts to evaluate and ameliorate the situation, after the defendant had initiated the exchange; see State v. Doehrer, 200 Conn. 642, 645-48 , 513 A.2d 58 (1986); did not constitute interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. 9

2017The court in Bell cited to Anderson v. Charles , 447 U.S. 404 , 408, 100 S.Ct. 2180 , 65 L.Ed.2d 222 (1980), which held that questioning regarding prior inconsistent statements "makes no unfair use of silence, because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent.

2017The court in Bell cited to Anderson v. Charles , 447 U.S. 404 , 408, 100 S.Ct. 2180 , 65 L.Ed.2d 222 (1980), which held that questioning regarding prior inconsistent statements "makes no unfair use of silence, because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent.

2025Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him in custody.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 , 97 S. Ct. 711 , 50 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1977); see also State v. Northrop, 213 Conn. 405, 415 , 568 A.2d 439 (1990) (‘‘[a] person, even if a suspect in a crime, is not in custody every time he is asked questions at a police station’’).

2025Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him in custody.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 , 97 S. Ct. 711 , 50 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1977); see also State v. Northrop, 213 Conn. 405, 415 , 568 A.2d 439 (1990) (‘‘[a] person, even if a suspect in a crime, is not in custody every time he is asked questions at a police station’’).

2019Cf. State v. Ferrell , 191 Conn. 37 , 42 n.5, 463 A.2d 573 (1983). 17 In **346 recently reiterating that Miranda warnings are independently required under the due process clause of article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution; State v. Barrett , 205 Conn. 437 , 447, 534 A.2d 219 (1987) ; we recognized, once again, the unique ability of counsel to protect the rights of a client undergoing, or confronting the imminent possibility of, interrogation.

2019Cf. State v. Ferrell , 191 Conn. 37 , 42 n.5, 463 A.2d 573 (1983). 17 In **346 recently reiterating that Miranda warnings are independently required under the due process clause of article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution; State v. Barrett , 205 Conn. 437 , 447, 534 A.2d 219 (1987) ; we recognized, once again, the unique ability of counsel to protect the rights of a client undergoing, or confronting the imminent possibility of, interrogation.

2025See State v. Mangual, 311 Conn. 182 , 185 n.1, 85 A.3d 627 (2014) (noting that United States Supreme Court ‘‘reaffirmed’’ that Miranda warnings ‘‘are constitutionally mandated’’). 0 Conn. 0 ,0 21 State v. Haynes States Supreme Court is constrained by federalism based concerns counseling in favor of the least prophylactic rule; see, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, supra, 475 U.S. 424-25, 428; each state can and should determine whether a more protective rule comports with its own laws and traditions.

2025The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the statements he had made during the interview after concluding that the detectives were not required to read him his Miranda rights because he was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. 8 ,0 0 Conn. 1 State v. Lazaro C.-D. ‘‘To establish entitlement to Miranda warnings . . . the defendant must satisfy two conditions, namely, that (1) he was in custody when the statements were made, and (2) the statements were obtained in response to police questioning.’’ State v. Mangual, 311 Conn. 182 , 192, 85 A.3d 627 (2014).

2026I The defendant first claims that “[h]is fifth amendment right to remain silent was violated when, following his arrest and receipt of a Miranda warning, the arresting officer [Koss] testified four times—twice explicitly and twice implicitly—that [the defendant] did not provide him with exculpatory information . . . .” The defendant did not object to the testimony that he alleges improperly commented on his silence; however, he seeks review of his claim pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yas- iel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188

2026I The defendant first claims that “[h]is fifth amendment right to remain silent was violated when, following his arrest and receipt of a Miranda warning, the arresting officer [Koss] testified four times—twice explicitly and twice implicitly—that [the defendant] did not provide him with exculpatory information . . . .” The defendant did not object to the testimony that he alleges improperly commented on his silence; however, he seeks review of his claim pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yas- iel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188

2000In support of this contention, the state relies on Anderson v. Charles, supra, 447 U.S. 404 , and a decision of this court, State v. Casey, 201 Conn. 174, 186 , 513 A.2d 1183 (1986), that followed the holding of Anderson that Doyle does not apply to cross-examination of a defendant who, upon being given Miranda warnings, provides the police with one version of the facts and then, at trial, testifies to a different version.

2000In support of this contention, the state relies on Anderson v. Charles, supra, 447 U.S. 404 , and a decision of this court, State v. Casey, 201 Conn. 174, 186 , 513 A.2d 1183 (1986), that followed the holding of Anderson that Doyle does not apply to cross-examination of a defendant who, upon being given Miranda warnings, provides the police with one version of the facts and then, at trial, testifies to a different version.