Miranda warning in District of Columbia

2007Moreover, whether or not Ford was under guard in the interview room (where he was not told he was free to leave, see id. at 260), the questioning that followed “t[ook] place in ‘police dominated surroundings’ similar to the interrogation at issue in Miranda,” United States v. Turner, 761 A.2d 845, 852 (D.C.2000), and continued for a substantial length of time — the judge found it be approximately an hour — before he was given his Miranda warnings.

2006In evaluating whether a person was in custody, "the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 662 , 124 S.Ct. 2140 ("[C]ustody must be determined based on how a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would perceive his circumstances.") In determining whether a suspect is in custody, the court is to consider the totality of the circumstances, and "must be informed by the underlying purpose of the Miranda rule, namely to

2012“Whether, on the duly established facts, [appellant] was subjected to custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings ... is a question of law that the court reviews de novo.” Reid v. United States, 581 A.2d 359, 363 (D.C.1990).

2012Hill v. United States, 858 A.2d 435, 442 (D.C.2004) (quoting Reid v. United States, 581 A.2d 359, 363 (D.C.1990)) (“[Wjhether ‘on the duly established facts, [appellant] was subjected to custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings is a question of law,’ which we review de novo.”) (second alteration in original); Guzman v. United States, 821 A.2d 895, 897 (D.C.2003) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 756 A.2d 458, 461 (D.C.2000)) (“[T]he standard by which we review a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is de novo, and we, ‘like the trial court, determine whether the

2018"In determining whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a confession is voluntary, the trial court should consider the same factors it takes into account in determining the validity of a waiver following Miranda warnings[,]" Beasley v. United States , 512 A.2d 1007 , 1015 (D.C. 1986) (citing Bliss v. United States , 445 A.2d 625 , 631 (D.C. 1982) ), including "the suspect's age, education, prior experience with the law, and physical and mental condition," as well as the "duration and intensity [of the interrogation], the use of physical punishment, threats or trickery, and whether th

2016Robinson argues that the statement he made on May 11-12, 2012, should have been suppressed because he did not validly waive his Miranda rights, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and that the statement'he made on November 27, 2012, should be suppressed because he was subjected to custodial interrogation without being given Miranda warnings.

2022Mr. Kinney argues that under Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), his statements should have been suppressed as the product of a two-step interrogation designed to undermine the Miranda warnings he received midway through a stationhouse interrogation.

2022Mr. Kinney argues that under Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), his statements should have been suppressed as the product of a two-step interrogation designed to undermine the Miranda warnings he received midway through a stationhouse interrogation.

2012We “view the record in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed in the trial court ... and we must sustain any reasonable inference that the trial judge has drawn from the evidence.” Morris v. United States, 728 A.2d 1210, 1215 (D.C.1999). “[0]ur role ... [in reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress] ‘is to ensure that the trial court had a substantial basis for concluding’ that no constitutional violation occurred.” Joseph v. United States, 926 A.2d 1156, 1160 (D.C.2007) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 540 A.2d 1090 , 1091 n. 2 (D.C.1988)).

2001NOTES [1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] After Jones had acknowledged "holding" the drugs, the officers asked him additional questions, e.g., "if he wanted to volunteer information on who[m] he bought it from, stuff like that." According to Officer Groomes, however, Jones "didn't want to say anything about that." It appears that the officers also posed these substantive questions to Jones without giving him a Miranda warning, but by this time Jones had already made his incriminating statement. [3] Jones testified on his own behalf at the motions h

2006See, e.g., id. at 1465 (holding that although police actions did not constitute an arrest within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the encounter was nonetheless custodial for Miranda purposes); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1097 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that although the encounter stayed within the scope of a Terry stop, it was custodial within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1291 (9th Cir.1982) (" Miranda warnings are necessary even during a Terry stop if the suspect has been taken into custody or if the questioning otherwise takes place

2005See, e.g., id. at 1465 (holding that although police actions did not constitute an arrest within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the encounter was nonetheless custodial for Miranda purposes); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1097 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that although the encounter stayed within the scope of a Terry stop, it was custodial within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1291 (9th Cir.1982) (“Miranda warnings are necessary even during a Terry stop if the suspect has been taken into custody or if the questioning otherwise takes place

2022See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435-41 (1984) (the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop does not constitute “custodial interrogation” for the purposes of the Miranda rule); Karamychev v. District of Columbia, 772 A.2d 806, 809 (D.C. 2001) (“[A]n individual who has been temporarily detained for a traffic stop generally is not considered to be ‘in custody’ for purposes of Miranda.”). 17 However, we have noted that there are exceptions to this general rule.

2013If the answer to these questions is in the affirmative, then the detention amounts to a Terry stop rather than a custodial arrest, and ordinarily, no Miranda violation has occurred or is even “suggested.” See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 .

2016See id. at 257 (“although an encounter between the police and a suspect may not necessarily be deemed an arrest — requiring probable cause — within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the same encounter may nevertheless be custodial and require Miranda warnings when assessed against the different goals of the Fifth Amendment.”).

2016While the seizure inquiry focuses on the actions of the police, the Miranda inquiry focuses on “how a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation . would perceive his circumstances.” Id. (citation omitted).

2018We implicitly rejected this argument in our en banc decision in Jones , where we held that questions asked at the scene of the arrest fell within the routine booking exception, and we also noted that this so-called exception is best viewed as an application of Miranda principles, under which "questions posed to a suspect regarding his identity are not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Jones , 779 A.2d at 282 -83 , 283 n.6. 6 We note that, even assuming arguendo that there had been a Miranda violation in this case, it would seem that the evidence in question would inevitab

2018We implicitly rejected this argument in our en banc decision in Jones , where we held that questions asked at the scene of the arrest fell within the routine booking exception, and we also noted that this so-called exception is best viewed as an application of Miranda principles, under which "questions posed to a suspect regarding his identity are not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Jones , 779 A.2d at 282 -83 , 283 n.6. 6 We note that, even assuming arguendo that there had been a Miranda violation in this case, it would seem that the evidence in question would inevitab

2018"In determining whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a confession is voluntary, the trial court should consider the same factors it takes into account in determining the validity of a waiver following Miranda warnings[,]" Beasley v. United States , 512 A.2d 1007 , 1015 (D.C. 1986) (citing Bliss v. United States , 445 A.2d 625 , 631 (D.C. 1982) ), including "the suspect's age, education, prior experience with the law, and physical and mental condition," as well as the "duration and intensity [of the interrogation], the use of physical punishment, threats or trickery, and whether th

1993Monday); Bliss, supra, 445 A.2d at 627 -28 & n. 4, 633 (arrest at about 3:10 a.m., Miranda warnings given, waiver sometime after 3:15 a.m., shortly thereafter defendant told he was not under arrest and taken to hospital, arrested again sometime before 8:45 a.m., waived rights and made statement at about 10:30 a.m.; held at least overnight before arraigned); Pettyjohn v. United States, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 69 , 71-72, 74-75, 419 F.2d 651, 653-54, 656-57 (1969) (arrest at about 2:40 a.m., statements at 2:50 a.m.; arraigned at 10:00 a.m.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1058 , 90 S.Ct. 1383 , 25 L.Ed.2d 676

1991This was not “custodial interrogation.” See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48 , 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1616-17 , 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976) (statements held admissible where made absent Miranda warnings by a taxpayer to IRS agents during a discussion in the taxpayer’s dining room because he voluntarily invited the agents in and was never arrested or held against his will).

1991This was not “custodial interrogation.” See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48 , 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1616-17 , 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976) (statements held admissible where made absent Miranda warnings by a taxpayer to IRS agents during a discussion in the taxpayer’s dining room because he voluntarily invited the agents in and was never arrested or held against his will).

2016As far as the record reveals) any prewarning interactions between Detective Patterson and *570 Robinson did not "obfuscate” the Miranda warnings.' Detective Patterson's prewarning actions were similar to those in Hairston v. United States, 905 A.2d 765, 770-81 (D.C.2006) (detective advised suspect he was under arrest for murder, expressed interest in suspect’s "side of the story,” shared with the suspect "some of the facts in the case that [he] was aware of,” and played part of another suspect’s video statement) and In re S.W., 124 A.3d at 109 (detective told suspect, "I stand between you and

2016As far as the record reveals) any prewarning interactions between Detective Patterson and *570 Robinson did not "obfuscate” the Miranda warnings.' Detective Patterson's prewarning actions were similar to those in Hairston v. United States, 905 A.2d 765, 770-81 (D.C.2006) (detective advised suspect he was under arrest for murder, expressed interest in suspect’s "side of the story,” shared with the suspect "some of the facts in the case that [he] was aware of,” and played part of another suspect’s video statement) and In re S.W., 124 A.3d at 109 (detective told suspect, "I stand between you and

2013See also Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 , 686 n. 6, 108 S.Ct. 2093 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988), where the Court addressed the point as follows: The United States ... suggests ... that 'respondent’s failure to reiterate his request for counsel ... even after [the officer] gave respondent complete Miranda warnings, could not have been the result of any doubt on respondent’s part that the police would honor a request for counsel if one were made.' ...

2013See also Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 , 686 n. 6, 108 S.Ct. 2093 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988), where the Court addressed the point as follows: The United States ... suggests ... that 'respondent’s failure to reiterate his request for counsel ... even after [the officer] gave respondent complete Miranda warnings, could not have been the result of any doubt on respondent’s part that the police would honor a request for counsel if one were made.' ...

2012Hill v. United States, 858 A.2d 435, 442 (D.C.2004) (quoting Reid v. United States, 581 A.2d 359, 363 (D.C.1990)) (“[Wjhether ‘on the duly established facts, [appellant] was subjected to custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings is a question of law,’ which we review de novo.”) (second alteration in original); Guzman v. United States, 821 A.2d 895, 897 (D.C.2003) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 756 A.2d 458, 461 (D.C.2000)) (“[T]he standard by which we review a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is de novo, and we, ‘like the trial court, determine whether the

2006Nevertheless, if the defendant’s “statement was the coerced product of the functional equivalent of express questioning, ... it should ... [be] suppressed [where] it was made in the absence of Miranda warnings.” Hill, supra, 858 A.2d at 447 .

2007In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), the Supreme Court held that evidence of a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda warning silence was inadmissible even for impeachment purposes because such silence “is insolubly ambiguous” in light of the implied assur- *362 anee within the Miranda warning “that silence will carry no penalty.” 426 U.S. at 617-18 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 .

2007In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), the Supreme Court held that evidence of a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda warning silence was inadmissible even for impeachment purposes because such silence “is insolubly ambiguous” in light of the implied assur- *362 anee within the Miranda warning “that silence will carry no penalty.” 426 U.S. at 617-18 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 .

2015And attacks were mounted against Miranda warnings — both direct, see, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 , 120 S.Ct. 2326 , 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000), and indirect.

2015And attacks were mounted against Miranda warnings — both direct, see, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 , 120 S.Ct. 2326 , 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000), and indirect.

1995Cf. Peoples, 395 A.2d at 44 (affirming admission of statement where interview by detective occurred only after (1) arrestee had been taken before a judicial officer; (2) he had requested the interview; (3) it had been six hours since his last session; (4) he had just been reread his Miranda rights). 10 Had the government established that fresh Miranda warnings were properly given at the outset of the nighttime interrogation in the squad office, the police would have met its obligations under Mosley , and we would now affirm.

1995Cf. Peoples, 395 A.2d at 44 (affirming admission of statement where interview by detective occurred only after (1) arrestee had been taken before a judicial officer; (2) he had requested the interview; (3) it had been six hours since his last session; (4) he had just been reread his Miranda rights). [10] Had the government established that fresh Miranda warnings were properly given at the outset of the nighttime interrogation in the squad office, the police would have met its obligations under Mosley , and we would now affirm.

2024See Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding Miranda warnings inadequate because, among other things, “[d]espite . . . [defendant’s] subsequently conveyed confusion . . . [the detective] ignored [defendant’s] query[] and moved on to the next item on his printed list”); cf., e.g., Di Giovanni, 810 A.2d at 894 (in assessing whether police officer’s “embellishments” of advice of Miranda rights 14 “vitiated the validity” of suspect’s waiver of rights, court states, “Here, we are presented with an appellant who was clearly having trouble understanding [] his rights[] and was there

2018This court and others have recognized that this means that "the interrogator may not say or do something during the ensuing interrogation that subverts th[e] [ Miranda ] warnings and [prospectively] vitiates the suspect's earlier waiver by rendering it unknowing, involuntary, or both." Lee , 12 A.3d at 1241, 1250-51 (holding that an officer's statement that the interrogation is "between you and me" subverted the Miranda warning that any statement the suspect makes "can and will be used against" him, "rendering in violation of Miranda all statements the suspect thereafter made during that inter

2006If this court detects “a Miranda violation, [it] must [] determine whether the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress the statement constitutes reversible constitutional error.” Id. (citing Stewart v. United States, 668 A.2d 857, 868 (D.C.1995) (applying Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 20 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)).

2006If this court detects “a Miranda violation, [it] must [] determine whether the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress the statement constitutes reversible constitutional error.” Id. (citing Stewart v. United States, 668 A.2d 857, 868 (D.C.1995) (applying Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 20 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)).

2012In Quarles , the Supreme Court held that “there is a ‘public safety’ exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect’s answers may be admitted into evidence.” Id. at 655, 104 5.Ct. 2626.

2009The trial judge specifically found, and that finding is not clearly erroneous, that the guns were pointed downward at an angle and not directly at Mr. Green's body. 24 . 530 U.S. 428, 431-32 , 120 S.Ct 2326 , 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000); see also Graham v. United States, 950 A.2d 717, 730 (D.C.2008) (“Police questioning of a suspect ... in any police facility ... raises significant concerns for which Miranda warnings are an appropriate prophylactic against compelled self-incrimination.'') (footnote omitted); In re I.J., supra note 14, 906 A.2d at 259 (“The Fifth Amendment ... shields a person who h