Miranda warning in California

2026Both ‘custody’ and ‘police questioning’ are necessary to invoke Miranda, and both concepts are viewed from the suspect’s 2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). 6 perspective. [Citation.] Even when the suspect is in the process of a custodial interrogation, voluntary statements to someone the suspect does not believe is a police officer or agent, in a conversation the suspect assumes is private, simply does not involve one of these two critical concerns.” (Id. at p. 686; see also People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 165-166 [incriminating statements made to cellmate working as a g

2026(People v. Orozco (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 802, 811 (Orozco).) Miranda was based on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, which “has consistently been accorded a liberal construction.” ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 8 at p. 461 .) The exercise of that privilege “will be scrupulously honored,” and “the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right ‘to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.’ ” (Id. at pp. 460, 479.) “Critically, however, Miranda’s rule has a limit: It only applies when the suspect-defendant was the

2025We conclude that the officers did not employ a deliberate strategy designed to undermine the purpose of Miranda warnings as prohibited by Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600 (Seibert), and that Adan’s voluntary post- Miranda statements at the station were admissible pursuant to Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298 (Elstad).

2025(Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 622 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) Adan contends a reasonable officer should have known that Adan was in custody at the hotel, such that the allegedly “negligent” failure to give a Miranda warning there amounted to “intentionally withholding” the Miranda advisement as part of a deliberate two-step interrogation procedure.

2025We conclude that the officers did not employ a deliberate strategy designed to undermine the purpose of Miranda warnings as prohibited by Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600 (Seibert), and that Adan’s voluntary post- Miranda statements at the station were admissible pursuant to Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298 (Elstad).

2025(Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 322 .) 12 But “the mere fact that a defendant has made unwarned admissions does not render subsequent warned confessions inadmissible.” (People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 299 (Krebs), citing Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 307 .) In Elstad, the United States Supreme Court held that the “subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.” (Elstad, at p. 314.) In Seibert, the United States Su

2026(See Perkins, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 297 [“Questioning by captors, who appear to control the suspect’s fate, may create mutually reinforcing pressures that the Court has assumed will weaken the suspect’s will, but where a suspect does not know that he is conversing with a government agent, these pressures do not exist”].) As our Supreme Court has stated, “Miranda warnings serve to dispel the coercive effect of police custodial questioning.

2026(People v. Mosley (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1081 , 1088–1089.) We primarily focus on interrogation because there is no dispute that Zapata was in custody when he spoke to the undercover agents. 9 There, an undercover officer (dressed as an inmate), along with a cooperating former inmate entered a suspect’s jail cell and, without first giving Miranda warnings, inquired of the suspect regarding the crime the officer was investigating. ( Perkins, supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 294–295.) The high court held “that an undercover law enforcement officer posing as a fellow inmate need not give Miranda warnings to

2025(People v. Lewis (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 246, 256 .) Given that representation, a prosecutor that later comments on the defendant’s silence―or failure to answer questions or disclose exculpatory facts or evidence―after the defendant has been arrested and read a Miranda warning may violate the defendant’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Doyle, supra, 426 U.S. at pp. 619–620.) Such errors are commonly referred to as Doyle errors, and a prosecutor can commit a prejudicial Doyle error by asking a single question that improperly refers to the defendant’s silence.

2025Doyle Error If a suspect receives Miranda warnings and then invokes her right to silence or an attorney at any time during questioning, that silence cannot be used against her at trial, whether for impeachment purposes or as evidence of guilt during the prosecution’s case-in-chief. ( Doyle, supra, 426 U.S. at pp. 617–619; Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 118 .) However, Doyle does not apply when a defendant offers exculpatory testimony at trial that is inconsistent with a voluntary post-Miranda statement.

2024(Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 429 .) But an officer’s obligation to administer Miranda warnings attaches only when the person questioned is in custody.

2024(Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 429 .) An officer’s obligation to administer Miranda warnings, however, attaches only when the person questioned is in “custody.” (Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 322 (per curiam).) The relevant inquiry when considering whether an interrogation was custodial is whether, in light of the objective circumstances, a “ ‘reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’ ” (Howes v. Fields (2012) 565 U.S. 499, 509 (Howes).) Relevant factors when determining whether someone is in custody in

2025(See, e.g., Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 459 [post-waiver invocation of Miranda right to counsel must be clear and unambiguous]; Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370, 382 [post-waiver invocation of Miranda right to remain silent must be clear and unambiguous].) Although the United States Supreme Court has not set out a different standard when a suspect ambiguously invokes the right to counsel after being advised of his Miranda rights but before waiving those rights, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded in Rodriguez, supra, 518 F.3d at page 1080 , that a different standard applies

2025(See, e.g., Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 459 [post-waiver invocation of Miranda right to counsel must be clear and unambiguous]; Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370, 382 [post-waiver invocation of Miranda right to remain silent must be clear and unambiguous].) Although the United States Supreme Court has not set out a different standard when a suspect ambiguously invokes the right to counsel after being advised of his Miranda rights but before waiving those rights, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded in Rodriguez, supra, 518 F.3d at page 1080 , that a different standard applies

2024The United States Supreme Court has made clear that Miranda warnings are not required simply because the questioning takes place at a police station (Mathiason, supra, 429 U.S. at p. 495 ) and it is reasonable to assume they reached this decision despite knowing a suspect likely would have to walk past at least some armed officers in order to exercise the right to terminate the interview and leave the station.

2024(Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) 429 U.S. 492, 495 .) Miranda warnings are only required when a person is subject to “custodial interrogation” by law enforcement officers.

2026(People v. Orozco (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 802, 811 (Orozco).) Miranda was based on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, which “has consistently been accorded a liberal construction.” ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 8 at p. 461 .) The exercise of that privilege “will be scrupulously honored,” and “the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right ‘to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.’ ” (Id. at pp. 460, 479.) “Critically, however, Miranda’s rule has a limit: It only applies when the suspect-defendant was the

2024(People v. O’Sullivan (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 237, 241 [spontaneous utterance admissible even in the absence of Miranda warnings], citing Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 300-302 .) Officer Rosas did nothing to elicit J.S.’s statement.

2025(Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 322 .) 12 But “the mere fact that a defendant has made unwarned admissions does not render subsequent warned confessions inadmissible.” (People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 299 (Krebs), citing Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 307 .) In Elstad, the United States Supreme Court held that the “subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.” (Elstad, at p. 314.) In Seibert, the United States Su

2024(Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 429 .) An officer’s obligation to administer Miranda warnings, however, attaches only when the person questioned is in “custody.” (Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 322 (per curiam).) The relevant inquiry when considering whether an interrogation was custodial is whether, in light of the objective circumstances, a “ ‘reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’ ” (Howes v. Fields (2012) 565 U.S. 499, 509 (Howes).) Relevant factors when determining whether someone is in custody in

2026(People v. Orozco (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 802, 811 (Orozco).) Miranda was based on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, which “has consistently been accorded a liberal construction.” ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 8 at p. 461 .) The exercise of that privilege “will be scrupulously honored,” and “the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right ‘to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.’ ” (Id. at pp. 460, 479.) “Critically, however, Miranda’s rule has a limit: It only applies when the suspect-defendant was the

2022“In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a claimed Miranda violation, ‘we accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by 8 Edwards held that a suspect who has invoked his or her Miranda right to counsel may not be “subject[ed] to further interrogation by the authorities” on any crime at all unless (1) counsel is present at the time of any further questioning, or (2) the suspect “himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police.” (Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 , 484–485.) 22 s

2024(See Fletcher v. Weir (1982) 455 U.S. 603, 607 [“In the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand”]; Brecht v. Abrahamson (1993) 507 U.S. 4 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 3834 U.S. 436 . 8 619, 628 [“[T]he Constitution does not prohibit the use for impeachment purposes of a defendant’s silence prior to arrest, [citation], or after arrest if no Miranda warnings are given [citation]”].) The prosecutor’s

2024(See Fletcher v. Weir (1982) 455 U.S. 603, 607 [“In the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand”]; Brecht v. Abrahamson (1993) 507 U.S. 4 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 3834 U.S. 436 . 8 619, 628 [“[T]he Constitution does not prohibit the use for impeachment purposes of a defendant’s silence prior to arrest, [citation], or after arrest if no Miranda warnings are given [citation]”].) The prosecutor’s

2023(Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370 , 381–382.) To be effective, a defendant’s Miranda waiver must be made “ ‘ “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” ’ ” (People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 845 , quoting Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 .) Relinquishment of Miranda rights, including the right to remain silent, “ ‘must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.’ ” (People v. Combs, at p. 845.) In reviewing the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, “[w]e accept [the] trial court’

2022(Duckworth, at p. 202 .) “We apply federal standards in reviewing defendant’s claim that the challenged statements were elicited from him in violation of Miranda.” (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1033 .) “Statements made by a custodial defendant in 9 the absence of Miranda warnings are inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief.” ( Weaver, supra, at p. 918 .) When a criminal defendant challenges the voluntariness of his confession at trial, “the prosecution must prove at least by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary.” (Lego v. Twomey (1972) 404 U.S

2025(Id. at p. 314; see id. at p. 318; Seibert, at pp. 608-609 (plur. opn.) [“giving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility; maintaining that a statement is involuntary even though given after warnings and voluntary waiver of rights requires unusual stamina, and litigation over voluntariness tends to end with the finding of a valid waiver”]; see also People v. Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 448 [“Even when a first statement is taken in the absence of proper advisements and is incriminating, so long as the first statement was voluntary a subseq

2025(Id. at p. 314; see id. at p. 318; Seibert, at pp. 608-609 (plur. opn.) [“giving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility; maintaining that a statement is involuntary even though given after warnings and voluntary waiver of rights requires unusual stamina, and litigation over voluntariness tends to end with the finding of a valid waiver”]; see also People v. Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 448 [“Even when a first statement is taken in the absence of proper advisements and is incriminating, so long as the first statement was voluntary a subseq

2026Relevant Legal Principles “Before they begin custodial interrogation of a suspect, the police have an obligation to deliver Miranda warnings . . . . [Citation.] The warning is meant to protect the suspect’s privilege against self-incrimination, which is jeopardized by the inherently coercive nature of police custodial questioning.” (People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 491 .) “Statements taken in violation of Miranda are inadmissible in the government’s case-in-chief.” (Id. at p. 492.) “The erroneous admission of statements obtained in violation of Miranda is reviewed for prejudice pursuant to

2025Chism argues that under Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 18 , the court’s error in admitting his statements was not harmless as he and A.P. provided contrasting testimony; “both parties were armed with weapons”; the deputies never recovered any boxcutter; and his statements to police were inflammatory as he used profanities and racial slurs, claimed “to be a member of Hells Angels and Aryan Brothers gangs, and . . . threat[ened] to ‘green light’ or kill one or more [deputies].” He contends that if he had received Miranda warnings, “there is every possibility [he] would have been more circumspect, and

2024In Quarles, the United States Supreme Court recognized that “in a situation posing a threat to the public safety,” “the need for answers to questions . . . outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.” (Quarles, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 657 .) The public safety exception avoids “plac[ing] officers . . . in the untenable position of having to consider . . . whether it best serves society for them to ask the necessary questions without the Miranda warnings and render whatever probative evidence they uncover inadmissible.” (Id. a

2024In Quarles, the United States Supreme Court recognized that “in a situation posing a threat to the public safety,” “the need for answers to questions . . . outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.” (Quarles, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 657 .) The public safety exception avoids “plac[ing] officers . . . in the untenable position of having to consider . . . whether it best serves society for them to ask the necessary questions without the Miranda warnings and render whatever probative evidence they uncover inadmissible.” (Id. a

2018In Peevy , this court concluded that the balance of interests did not warrant the exclusion of a statement that had been deliberately elicited in violation of Miranda for purposes of impeaching *464 the defendant's trial testimony. ( Peevy , supra , 17 Cal.4th at pp. 1193-1194, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 865 , 953 P.2d 1212 ; cf. Harris v. New York , supra , 401 U.S. at p. 224 , 91 S.Ct. 643 .) Defendant argues, however, that *381 the balance of interests here is different, because there is no danger that excluding the witnesses' statements will turn the prophylactic Miranda rule into a shield for a defen

2018In Peevy , this court concluded that the balance of interests did not warrant the exclusion of a statement that had been deliberately elicited in violation of Miranda for purposes of impeaching *464 the defendant's trial testimony. ( Peevy , supra , 17 Cal.4th at pp. 1193-1194, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 865 , 953 P.2d 1212 ; cf. Harris v. New York , supra , 401 U.S. at p. 224 , 91 S.Ct. 643 .) Defendant argues, however, that *381 the balance of interests here is different, because there is no danger that excluding the witnesses' statements will turn the prophylactic Miranda rule into a shield for a defen

2026When a defendant talks to a fellow inmate, the coercive atmosphere of custodial police interrogation is absent.” (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1127, 1142 .) In People v. Rodriguez, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th 194 , the defendant claimed, similar to what Garcia argues here, that a Miranda warning was required before the defendant talked to an informant while in jail as “he ‘felt coerced’ because the informant posed as ‘an older, well-connected gang member.’ ” (Rodriguez, at p. 198.) The Court of Appeal rejected this argument because such “coercion” “is not the sort that concerned the Miranda c

2022(Perkins, at p. 296; People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 283 [no Miranda violation when defendant spoke to fellow inmate wearing a recording device]; People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1127, 1141-1142 [Miranda “has never been applied to conversations between an inmate and an undercover agent”].) Gonzalez argues that the use of Perkins agents, following the invocation of his right to counsel the preceding day, violated 7 Miranda requires that a suspect in law enforcement custody must be advised of the right to remain silent, that anything the suspect says may be used as evidenc

2026(See Anderson v. Charles (1980) 447 U.S. 404, 408 [“a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent.

2024(Anderson, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 404 .) Detectives interviewed the defendant and provided him Miranda warnings.

2024(See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) 429 U.S. 492, 495 [Miranda warnings are not required “simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect”]; accord, People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 402 .) However, a police station is a highly confrontational environment, which is controlled by law enforcement.

2023(E.g., Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 403 [no Miranda violation under the 17 totality of the circumstances, despite “indications of police skepticism” and formal arrest of suspect at end of interview].) As to the remaining factors going to the location and the nature of the interrogation, that Perry’s interrogation took place at a sheriff’s station and had some accusatory or strategic interrogation aspects to it does not inevitably render it custodial.

2025“A defendant who is in custody . . . must be given Miranda warnings before police officers may interrogate him.” (People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 300 .)4 Custodial interrogation is defined as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444 .) “Custody determinations are resolved by an objective standard: Would a reasonable person interpret the restraints used by the police as tantamount to a formal arrest? [Citations.] The totality of

2024This, however, is of no moment because whether a person is in custody under Miranda “‘is not whether a reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave, but rather whether such a person would believe he was in police custody of the degree associated with formal arrest.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1403, fn. 1 ); see also United States v. Pelayo–Ruelas (8th Cir. 2003) 345 F.3d 589, 592 [rejecting Miranda challenge on grounds that defendant was not free to leave during brief Terry stop]; United States v. Swanson (6th Cir. 2003) 341 F.3d 524, 529 [holding

2025(Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 725 ; People v. Nelson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 367, 375 (Nelson).) “In reviewing the validity of a Miranda waiver, ‘“we accept the trial court’s determination of disputed facts if supported by 8 substantial evidence, but we independently decide whether the challenged statements were obtained in violation of Miranda.” [Citation.]’” (Jones, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 809 , quoting People v. Hensley (2014) 59 Cal.4th 788, 809 ; M.S., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1189 .) Here, the juvenile court determined that appellant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary

2025(People v. Nelson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 367 , 374–375.) “Although there is a threshold presumption against finding a waiver of Miranda rights [citation], ultimately the question becomes whether the Miranda waiver was knowing and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.” (People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 668 .) The relinquishment of Miranda rights also needs to have been made voluntarily—it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, and deception—and it must have been made with a full awareness of both the natur

2025Only if the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.’” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 501-502 (Smith), quoting Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 [ 89 L.Ed.2d 410 ].) “‘The prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating the validity of the defendant's waiver by a preponderance of the 4 evidence.’ [Citations.] In addition, ‘[a]lthough there is a threshold presumption against finding a waiver of Miranda rights [citat

2025Only if the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.’” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 501-502 (Smith), quoting Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 [ 89 L.Ed.2d 410 ].) “‘The prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating the validity of the defendant's waiver by a preponderance of the 4 evidence.’ [Citations.] In addition, ‘[a]lthough there is a threshold presumption against finding a waiver of Miranda rights [citat

2025(Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 322 .) 12 But “the mere fact that a defendant has made unwarned admissions does not render subsequent warned confessions inadmissible.” (People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 299 (Krebs), citing Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 307 .) In Elstad, the United States Supreme Court held that the “subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.” (Elstad, at p. 314.) In Seibert, the United States Su

2025(See Krebs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 311 ; see also id. at p. 312 [ “simply because an officer could have given an advisement earlier is not enough to show that he delayed ‘in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning’ ”].) We note Adan was forthcoming with Kulbin and continued to be so in the later conversation with Lane—even “effusive[ly]” as the trial court recognized.

2022(People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401 (Ochoa).) There is no Miranda violation where the police question a suspect who is not in custody.

2018We reject I.F.'s argument that B.F.'s conflict of interest required the suppression of his pre-arrest statements, and decline to reach his argument that the juvenile court should have admitted the polygraph evidence. *759 A. Miranda Police officers are not required to give Miranda warnings to everyone they question. ( Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) 429 U.S. 492 , 495, 97 S.Ct. 711 , 50 L.Ed.2d 714 .) Rather, an officer's obligation to administer a Miranda warning arises only when a person is "in custody." ( Ibid. ) " 'Absent "custodial interrogation," Miranda simply does not come into play.' " ( P

2023(Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444 .) By requiring the police to inform a suspect of his right to remain silent and consult with an attorney, the high court sought to implement the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and ensure “the individual’s right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.” (Id. at p. 469; accord, Dickerson v. United States (2000) 530 U.S. 428 [reaffirming that Miranda warnings are a constitutionally based component of our national culture allowing suspects the opportunity to exercise their Fifth Amendment

2022Miranda established the now familiar rule that any statements of a criminal suspect that stem from a custodial police interrogation are inadmissible against the suspect in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, unless the suspect has been advised of certain rights—including the right to remain silent and to the presence of an attorney—and the suspect has expressly or implicitly waived those rights. ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445; see Dickerson v. United States (2000) 530 U.S. 428, 443 [“Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part

2026Relevant Legal Principles “Before they begin custodial interrogation of a suspect, the police have an obligation to deliver Miranda warnings . . . . [Citation.] The warning is meant to protect the suspect’s privilege against self-incrimination, which is jeopardized by the inherently coercive nature of police custodial questioning.” (People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 491 .) “Statements taken in violation of Miranda are inadmissible in the government’s case-in-chief.” (Id. at p. 492.) “The erroneous admission of statements obtained in violation of Miranda is reviewed for prejudice pursuant to

2025(Elizalde, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 542 [Miranda violation]; Jimenez, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 882 [coerced confessions].) That test requires the People “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman, at p. 24.) “The Chapman test is a challenging burden for the prosecution: ‘The test is not whether a hypothetical jury, no matter how reasonable or rational, would render the same verdict in the absence of the error, but 17 whether there is any reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the conviction i

2024(California v. Beheler (1983) 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 ; People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1167 [police investigatory questions of defendant at his home was not an in custodial interrogation]; United States v. Infante (1st Cir. 2012) 701 F.3d 386, 397 [hospital was a “neutral setting” and police 7 questioning a suspect there was “non-custodial”]; United States v. Martin (9th Cir. 1985) 781 F.2d 671, 673 [police interview of a suspect at a hospital was not a custodial setting requiring a Miranda warning].) Soto described what she did to the baby in a recorded interview with Suarez.

2022Defendant attempts to distinguish Mosley because “[s]uspicion had focused on her” and “she was strapped to a gurney in the hospital, where Provencio was interrogating her about a fatal collision.” In Mosley, the officer was trying to find out what had happened and did not know how the defendant was involved, whether he was a victim or not. ( Mosley, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1089-1091.) However, “Miranda warnings are not required simply because a person has become a suspect in the officer’s mind.” (Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1167 ; see also Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) 429 U.S. 492, 495

2025(See, e.g., People v. Siripongs (1988) 45 Cal.3d 548, 575 [a defendant’s spontaneous statement made after his arrest and while being searched is admissible]; People v. O’Sullivan (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 237, 241 [a defendant’s spontaneous utterance is admissible even in the absence of Miranda warnings].) Additionally, investigatory tactics “‘that do not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak are not within Miranda’s concerns.’” (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1402 [Miranda warnings not required before conversation between defendant and his father in an interrogation room

2021(See People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370,1376, 1401-1402 [although defendant was in custody 2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 . 2 for murder, Miranda warnings not required prior to video-taped conversation with his father that took place in interrogation room; police “did not compel or coerce defendant to talk to his father”]; People v. Macklem (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 674, 686-696 [extensive analysis of when defendant already in custody is subject to custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes; Miranda warnings not required before defendant, who was in custody on murder charges, sp