Miranda warning in Alaska

2023Because, as we have just explained, we conclude that some of Ridenour’s November statements should have been suppressed, we instruct the superior court on remand to consider whether the violation during the November interview tainted the December interview.22 Second, Ridenour independently challenges the constitutionality of the December interview, arguing that he was in custody for Miranda purposes during that interview, and that the troopers therefore violated Miranda when they failed to read him his Miranda warnings.23 We reject this argument. present case suggested that evidence critical t

2019They then took him to the Anchorage Police Department where detectives read him a Miranda warning.5 Blalock agreed to be interviewed by the detectives, and he made incriminating statements during the interview. 5 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). –4– 2656 Blalock was subsequently charged with second-degree murder for stabbing Tanape to death.6 The case proceeded to trial, and Blalock was convicted of second- degree murder.

2006The court found that Bennett paused between the two questions, thus separating them. [4] See State v. Anderson, 117 P.3d 762, 766 (Alaska App.2005): "The standard for determining Miranda custody is objective: Miranda warnings are required [when] police interrogation [is] conducted under circumstances in which a `reasonable person would feel he was not free to leave and break off the questioning'." (quoting Carr v. State, 840 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Alaska App.1992), with the internal quote from Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 895 (Alaska 1979)). [5] See Wilburn v. State, 816 P.2d 907, 911 (Alaska App.

2006The court found that Bennett paused between the two questions, thus separating them. [4] See State v. Anderson, 117 P.3d 762, 766 (Alaska App.2005): "The standard for determining Miranda custody is objective: Miranda warnings are required [when] police interrogation [is] conducted under circumstances in which a `reasonable person would feel he was not free to leave and break off the questioning'." (quoting Carr v. State, 840 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Alaska App.1992), with the internal quote from Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 895 (Alaska 1979)). [5] See Wilburn v. State, 816 P.2d 907, 911 (Alaska App.

2006McNeill, 984 P.2d at 6-7 (emphasis omitted), citing Berkemer v, McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-440 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (holding that Miranda does not apply when a motorist is subjected to roadside questioning during a routine traffic stop); Blake v. State, 763 P.2d 511, 514-15 (Alaska App.1988) (holding that police officers are not required to give Miranda warnings during an investigative stop unless and until the initial stop ripens into “custody” as that term is defined in Miranda jurisprudence).

2005May I see the certificate of insurance?"); Campbell v. State, 97 P.3d 781, 785 (Wyo.2004) ("During a routine traffic stop, a law enforcement officer may request the driver's proof of insurance, operating license, and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation or warning."). [4] See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (holding that Miranda does not apply when a motorist is subjected to roadside questioning during a routine traffic stop); Blake v. State, 763 P.2d 511, 514-15 (Alaska App.1988) (holding that police o

2024In Graham v. State, the supreme court acknowledged the risk that an arrestee could erroneously believe that the rights contained in the Miranda warning apply to the breath test and that their right to silence includes their right to refuse a breath test.46 The court therefore held that, if a person arrested for driving under the influence appears confused about their rights, “the officer must clearly advise that person that the 44 See, e.g., Leslie v. State, 711 P.2d 575, 578 (Alaska App. 1986); Svedlund v. Anchorage, 671 P.2d 378, 381 (Alaska App. 1983); see also Palmer v. State, 604 P.2d 110

2004(Compare Graham v. State, 633 P.2d 211 (Alaska 1981), where our supreme court acknowledged that Miranda warnings can be misleading in another context.

2006McNeill, 984 P.2d at 6-7 (emphasis omitted), citing Berkemer v, McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-440 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (holding that Miranda does not apply when a motorist is subjected to roadside questioning during a routine traffic stop); Blake v. State, 763 P.2d 511, 514-15 (Alaska App.1988) (holding that police officers are not required to give Miranda warnings during an investigative stop unless and until the initial stop ripens into “custody” as that term is defined in Miranda jurisprudence).

2006McNeill, 984 P.2d at 6-7 (emphasis omitted), citing Berkemer v, McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-440 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (holding that Miranda does not apply when a motorist is subjected to roadside questioning during a routine traffic stop); Blake v. State, 763 P.2d 511, 514-15 (Alaska App.1988) (holding that police officers are not required to give Miranda warnings during an investigative stop unless and until the initial stop ripens into “custody” as that term is defined in Miranda jurisprudence).

1992Carr nevertheless argues that Tarnef v. State, 512 P.2d 923 (Alaska 1973), is controlling and that, under that case, Sandra Y. was required to give him Miranda warnings.

1992Carr nevertheless argues that Tarnef v. State, 512 P.2d 923 (Alaska 1973), is controlling and that, under that case, Sandra Y. was required to give him Miranda warnings.

2024In Graham v. State, the supreme court acknowledged the risk that an arrestee could erroneously believe that the rights contained in the Miranda warning apply to the breath test and that their right to silence includes their right to refuse a breath test.46 The court therefore held that, if a person arrested for driving under the influence appears confused about their rights, “the officer must clearly advise that person that the 44 See, e.g., Leslie v. State, 711 P.2d 575, 578 (Alaska App. 1986); Svedlund v. Anchorage, 671 P.2d 378, 381 (Alaska App. 1983); see also Palmer v. State, 604 P.2d 110

1991See also Palmer v. State, 604 P.2d 1106, 1112 (Alaska 1979) (Rabinowitz, J., concurring) (on-the-scene questioning which occurs during a traffic stop constitutes an exception to the Miranda warning requirement).

2005Norman v. State, 379 So.2d 643, 646-47 (Fla.1980); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 , 83 S.Ct. 407, 416 , 9 LEd.2d 441 (1963) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies to both physical and verbal evidence obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (affirming Wong Sun and holding that Miranda warnings are not sufficient to break the causal connection between a prior illegal search and/or arrest and a subsequent verbal confession}. 5 .

2005Norman v. State, 379 So.2d 643, 646-47 (Fla.1980); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 , 83 S.Ct. 407, 416 , 9 LEd.2d 441 (1963) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies to both physical and verbal evidence obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (affirming Wong Sun and holding that Miranda warnings are not sufficient to break the causal connection between a prior illegal search and/or arrest and a subsequent verbal confession}. 5 .

1981He was placed in an interrogation room and given Miranda warnings; he waived counsel and confessed within an hour. 442 U.S. at 203 , 99 S.Ct. at 2251, 60 L.Ed.2d at 830 .

1981He was placed in an interrogation room and given Miranda warnings; he waived counsel and confessed within an hour. 442 U.S. at 203 , 99 S.Ct. at 2251, 60 L.Ed.2d at 830 .

2011As the United States Supreme Court recognized in Brown v. Illinois, however, "[tlhe Miranda warnings are an important factor ... in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation [of a previous illegality]," 422 U.S. 590, 603 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), and a full and unqualified set of warnings at this juncture may have helped to dissipate the taint.

2011As the United States Supreme Court recognized in Brown v. Illinois, however, "[tlhe Miranda warnings are an important factor ... in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation [of a previous illegality]," 422 U.S. 590, 603 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), and a full and unqualified set of warnings at this juncture may have helped to dissipate the taint.

2023Because, as we have just explained, we conclude that some of Ridenour’s November statements should have been suppressed, we instruct the superior court on remand to consider whether the violation during the November interview tainted the December interview.22 Second, Ridenour independently challenges the constitutionality of the December interview, arguing that he was in custody for Miranda purposes during that interview, and that the troopers therefore violated Miranda when they failed to read him his Miranda warnings.23 We reject this argument. present case suggested that evidence critical t

2004In this appeal, we must assess the potential curative effect of Miranda warnings that were administered to a suspect in police custody after the police had already unlawfully obtained incriminating statements from the suspect in violation of Miranda (by interrogating him without giving him the required warnings). 1 In our last major decision on this subject, Halberg v. State, 903 P.2d 1090 (Alaska App. 1995), we described two competing analyses of this question: the older “dissipation of taint” analysis exemplified by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Illinois, 2 and the m

1984In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that where a defendant had been given Miranda warnings, it was a violation of due process for the state to impeach him by showing that he had remained silent and for the state to argue that the defendant’s silence was inconsistent with an explanation which he later gave at trial.

1984In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that where a defendant had been given Miranda warnings, it was a violation of due process for the state to impeach him by showing that he had remained silent and for the state to argue that the defendant’s silence was inconsistent with an explanation which he later gave at trial.

2006The court found that Bennett paused between the two questions, thus separating them. [4] See State v. Anderson, 117 P.3d 762, 766 (Alaska App.2005): "The standard for determining Miranda custody is objective: Miranda warnings are required [when] police interrogation [is] conducted under circumstances in which a `reasonable person would feel he was not free to leave and break off the questioning'." (quoting Carr v. State, 840 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Alaska App.1992), with the internal quote from Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 895 (Alaska 1979)). [5] See Wilburn v. State, 816 P.2d 907, 911 (Alaska App.

2006The court found that Bennett paused between the two questions, thus separating them. [4] See State v. Anderson, 117 P.3d 762, 766 (Alaska App.2005): "The standard for determining Miranda custody is objective: Miranda warnings are required [when] police interrogation [is] conducted under circumstances in which a `reasonable person would feel he was not free to leave and break off the questioning'." (quoting Carr v. State, 840 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Alaska App.1992), with the internal quote from Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 895 (Alaska 1979)). [5] See Wilburn v. State, 816 P.2d 907, 911 (Alaska App.

1996On appeal, McCracken has abandoned his Miranda argument and advances two different contentions. 1 First, he asserts that admission of his statement violated Gunnerud v. State, 611 P.2d 69, 75-76 (Alaska 1980), and Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), because the statement informed the jury that McCracken had exercised his right to remain silent.

1984Accord, Gunnerud v. State, 611 P.2d 69, 75 (Alaska 1980).

2025Cir. 2000) (concluding that an interrogation that had been non-custodial turned custodial, for purposes of issuing Miranda warnings, when the police advised the defendant they had a warrant authorizing them to take samples “of his blood, saliva, and head and pubic hair”); United States v. McCain, 556 F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir. 1977) (concluding that the defendant was in Miranda custody while she was being strip searched, and that she remained in custody after the strip search while her luggage was being re-examined); United States v. Daubmann, 474 F. Supp.2d 228, 234 (D.

2025Cir. 2000) (concluding that an interrogation that had been non-custodial turned custodial, for purposes of issuing Miranda warnings, when the police advised the defendant they had a warrant authorizing them to take samples “of his blood, saliva, and head and pubic hair”); United States v. McCain, 556 F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir. 1977) (concluding that the defendant was in Miranda custody while she was being strip searched, and that she remained in custody after the strip search while her luggage was being re-examined); United States v. Daubmann, 474 F. Supp.2d 228, 234 (D.

2025Cir. 2000) (concluding that an interrogation that had been non-custodial turned custodial, for purposes of issuing Miranda warnings, when the police advised the defendant they had a warrant authorizing them to take samples “of his blood, saliva, and head and pubic hair”); United States v. McCain, 556 F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir. 1977) (concluding that the defendant was in Miranda custody while she was being strip searched, and that she remained in custody after the strip search while her luggage was being re-examined); United States v. Daubmann, 474 F. Supp.2d 228, 234 (D.

2025Cir. 2000) (concluding that an interrogation that had been non-custodial turned custodial, for purposes of issuing Miranda warnings, when the police advised the defendant they had a warrant authorizing them to take samples “of his blood, saliva, and head and pubic hair”); United States v. McCain, 556 F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir. 1977) (concluding that the defendant was in Miranda custody while she was being strip searched, and that she remained in custody after the strip search while her luggage was being re-examined); United States v. Daubmann, 474 F. Supp.2d 228, 234 (D.

2025We agree. 78 See United States v. Turner, 761 A.2d 845, 850-53 (D.C.

2025We agree. 78 See United States v. Turner, 761 A.2d 845, 850-53 (D.C.

2005May I see the certificate of insurance?"); Campbell v. State, 97 P.3d 781, 785 (Wyo.2004) ("During a routine traffic stop, a law enforcement officer may request the driver's proof of insurance, operating license, and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation or warning."). [4] See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (holding that Miranda does not apply when a motorist is subjected to roadside questioning during a routine traffic stop); Blake v. State, 763 P.2d 511, 514-15 (Alaska App.1988) (holding that police o

1984In Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d 448, 456-59 (Alaska 1981), the Alaska Supreme Court held that it was plain error for the prosecutor to comment on the accused’s post-arrest silence.

2002State v. Ridgely, 732 P.2d 550, 554-55 (Alaska 1987).

2002State v. Ridgely, 732 P.2d 550, 554-55 (Alaska 1987).

2007And, as we are about to explain, we conclude that, despite Hershber-ger's administration of Miranda warnings, Klemz's statements to Hershberger were indeed tainted by the earlier Miranda violation, even under the rule of Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985).

2007And, as we are about to explain, we conclude that, despite Hershber-ger's administration of Miranda warnings, Klemz's statements to Hershberger were indeed tainted by the earlier Miranda violation, even under the rule of Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985).

2019Because the Batts issue had not been litigated as part of the original suppression 8 See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 . 9 See State v. Batts, 195 P.3d 144, 151-52, 157-58 (Alaska App. 2008) (holding that a defendant may be impeached with statements made in violation of his Miranda rights where “the violation consisted of a failure . . . to honor the defendant’s invocation of the right to . . . counsel,” unless the Miranda violation was either intentional or egregious). –7– 2656 proceedings, this Court vacated the trial court’s ruling that the Miranda violation in Blalock’s case was egregious.

2019Because the Batts issue had not been litigated as part of the original suppression 8 See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 . 9 See State v. Batts, 195 P.3d 144, 151-52, 157-58 (Alaska App. 2008) (holding that a defendant may be impeached with statements made in violation of his Miranda rights where “the violation consisted of a failure . . . to honor the defendant’s invocation of the right to . . . counsel,” unless the Miranda violation was either intentional or egregious). –7– 2656 proceedings, this Court vacated the trial court’s ruling that the Miranda violation in Blalock’s case was egregious.

1979That court's harsh description of the lie detector as a "psychological rubber hose" strongly suggests the court will always require Miranda warnings before lie detector tests, but the opinion does quote favorably language from Schneckloth that admissibility of confessions does not turn on "the presence or absence of a single controlling criterion... ." Id., quoting 412 U.S. at 226 , 93 S.Ct. at 2047 , 36 L.Ed.2d at 862 . [44] See also Watson v. State, 282 Md. 73 , 382 A.2d 574 (1978). [45] In United States v. Little Bear, 583 F.2d 411, 412-14 (8th Cir.1978), the police asked the defendant to t

1979That court's harsh description of the lie detector as a "psychological rubber hose" strongly suggests the court will always require Miranda warnings before lie detector tests, but the opinion does quote favorably language from Schneckloth that admissibility of confessions does not turn on "the presence or absence of a single controlling criterion... ." Id., quoting 412 U.S. at 226 , 93 S.Ct. at 2047 , 36 L.Ed.2d at 862 . [44] See also Watson v. State, 282 Md. 73 , 382 A.2d 574 (1978). [45] In United States v. Little Bear, 583 F.2d 411, 412-14 (8th Cir.1978), the police asked the defendant to t

1983In cases involving custodial interrogations, Hintz v. State, 627 P.2d 207 (Alaska 1981), Castillo v. State, 614 P.2d 756 (Alaska 1980), and Quick v. State, 599 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1979), we held that the defendant was not in custody and thus Miranda warnings were not required under the fifth amendment. 19 In Henry v. State, 621 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1980), we held that the defendant was not “in custody” and thus probable cause to arrest was not required. 20 In each of these cases, the issue of seizure was not discussed.

1983In cases involving custodial interrogations, Hintz v. State, 627 P.2d 207 (Alaska 1981), Castillo v. State, 614 P.2d 756 (Alaska 1980), and Quick v. State, 599 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1979), we held that the defendant was not in custody and thus Miranda warnings were not required under the fifth amendment. [19] In Henry v. State, 621 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1980), we held that the defendant was not "in custody" and thus probable cause to arrest was not required. [20] In each of these cases, the issue of seizure was not discussed.

1984See also United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 , 95 S.Ct. 2133 , 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975) (accused's silence after receiving Miranda warnings so lacked significant probative value and was so prejudicial that use at trial to rebut alibi entitled petitioner to a new trial).

1984See also United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 , 95 S.Ct. 2133 , 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975) (accused's silence after receiving Miranda warnings so lacked significant probative value and was so prejudicial that use at trial to rebut alibi entitled petitioner to a new trial).

2006The court found that Bennett paused between the two questions, thus separating them. [4] See State v. Anderson, 117 P.3d 762, 766 (Alaska App.2005): "The standard for determining Miranda custody is objective: Miranda warnings are required [when] police interrogation [is] conducted under circumstances in which a `reasonable person would feel he was not free to leave and break off the questioning'." (quoting Carr v. State, 840 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Alaska App.1992), with the internal quote from Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 895 (Alaska 1979)). [5] See Wilburn v. State, 816 P.2d 907, 911 (Alaska App.

2006The court found that Bennett paused between the two questions, thus separating them. [4] See State v. Anderson, 117 P.3d 762, 766 (Alaska App.2005): "The standard for determining Miranda custody is objective: Miranda warnings are required [when] police interrogation [is] conducted under circumstances in which a `reasonable person would feel he was not free to leave and break off the questioning'." (quoting Carr v. State, 840 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Alaska App.1992), with the internal quote from Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 895 (Alaska 1979)). [5] See Wilburn v. State, 816 P.2d 907, 911 (Alaska App.

2006The court found that Bennett paused between the two questions, thus separating them. [4] See State v. Anderson, 117 P.3d 762, 766 (Alaska App.2005): "The standard for determining Miranda custody is objective: Miranda warnings are required [when] police interrogation [is] conducted under circumstances in which a `reasonable person would feel he was not free to leave and break off the questioning'." (quoting Carr v. State, 840 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Alaska App.1992), with the internal quote from Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 895 (Alaska 1979)). [5] See Wilburn v. State, 816 P.2d 907, 911 (Alaska App.

2006See State v. Anderson, 117 P.3d 762, 766 (Alaska App.2005): "The standard for determining Miranda custody is objective: Miranda warnings are required [when] police interrogation [is] conducted under circumstances in which a 'reasonable person would feel he was not free to leave and break off the questioning’.” (quoting Carr v. State, 840 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Alaska App.1992), with the internal quote from Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 895 (Alaska 1979)). .

2004See Westover v. United States (a companion case of Miranda ), 9 and Clewis v. Texas. 10 See also United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 , 67 S.Ct. 1394, 1398 , 91 L.Ed. 1654 (1947); Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir.1992); and United States v. Wauneka, 770 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th Cir.1985) (discussing other cases involving prior involuntary confessions).) The Brown case is particularly important because, in Brotvn, the government argued that the taint of a prior illegality could always be negated by giving the defendant Miranda warnings.

2004See Westover v. United States (a companion case of Miranda ), 9 and Clewis v. Texas. 10 See also United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 , 67 S.Ct. 1394, 1398 , 91 L.Ed. 1654 (1947); Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir.1992); and United States v. Wauneka, 770 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th Cir.1985) (discussing other cases involving prior involuntary confessions).) The Brown case is particularly important because, in Brotvn, the government argued that the taint of a prior illegality could always be negated by giving the defendant Miranda warnings.

1991State v. Ridgely, 732 P.2d 550, 554-55 (Alaska 1987); Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218 , 222 n. 4 (Alaska 1981).

1991State v. Ridgely, 732 P.2d 550, 554-55 (Alaska 1987); Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218 , 222 n. 4 (Alaska 1981).