Miranda warning in Maryland

2020“One of the Court’s stated aims in establishing the Miranda rule is to ‘assure that the individual’s right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.’” Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 149 , 12 A.3d 1238 (2011) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ).

2020“One of the Court’s stated aims in establishing the Miranda rule is to ‘assure that the individual’s right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.’” Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 149 , 12 A.3d 1238 (2011) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ).

2018The Supreme Court articulated this concept in Doyle v. Ohio , 426 U.S. 610 , 617-18, 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 2244-45, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), opining that following receipt of Miranda warnings, "post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise the person arrested." In Doyle , the Supreme Court explored the obstacles that post-arrest silence can pose.

2018The Supreme Court articulated this concept in Doyle v. Ohio , 426 U.S. 610 , 617-18, 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 2244-45, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), opining that following receipt of Miranda warnings, "post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise the person arrested." In Doyle , the Supreme Court explored the obstacles that post-arrest silence can pose.

2018See Harris , 401 U.S. at 226, 91 S.Ct. at 646 (holding that statements taken in violation of Miranda could be used to impeach Harris's inconsistent trial testimony); Hass , 420 U.S. at 722, 95 S.Ct. at 1221 (allowing information obtained after Miranda warnings were given to be used for impeachment purposes).

2010He contends that Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), which held that in-custody statements made after an illegal arrest, were not admissible despite Miranda warnings, supports his contention that his statement was tainted and therefore inadmissible as the indirect fruit of an illegal search and arrest.

2011After his motion to suppress his statement was denied and he was found guilty of first-degree burglary, the Supreme Court granted certiorari eventually “to consider the question of whether the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the suppression of a confession, made after proper Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of rights, solely because the police had obtained an earlier voluntary but *587 unwarned admission from the defendant.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308 , 105 S.Ct. at 1290 , 84 L.Ed.2d at 228 .

2011After his motion to suppress his statement was denied and he was found guilty of first-degree burglary, the Supreme Court granted certiorari eventually “to consider the question of whether the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the suppression of a confession, made after proper Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of rights, solely because the police had obtained an earlier voluntary but *587 unwarned admission from the defendant.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308 , 105 S.Ct. at 1290 , 84 L.Ed.2d at 228 .

2017Prior to questioning, a suspect “must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 , 86 S.Ct. at 1612 ; see also Vines v. State, 285 Md. 369, 374 , 402 A.2d 900, 903 (1979) (noting that statements obtained from a defendant not advised of Miranda warnings must be excluded from evidence if the statements flow from a custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda).

2017Prior to questioning, a suspect “must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 , 86 S.Ct. at 1612 ; see also Vines v. State, 285 Md. 369, 374 , 402 A.2d 900, 903 (1979) (noting that statements obtained from a defendant not advised of Miranda warnings must be excluded from evidence if the statements flow from a custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda).

2012The functional equivalent of interrogation “refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reason *531 ably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (footnotes omitted); see Drury v. State, 368 Md. 331, 337 , 793 A.2d 567 (functional equivalent of interrogation occurred when, before being given his Miranda warnings, the defendant was placed in an inte

2012The functional equivalent of interrogation “refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reason *531 ably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (footnotes omitted); see Drury v. State, 368 Md. 331, 337 , 793 A.2d 567 (functional equivalent of interrogation occurred when, before being given his Miranda warnings, the defendant was placed in an inte

2024Protecting the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self- Incrimination “[T]o provide practical reinforcement for the right against compulsory self-incrimination,” the Miranda Court “suggested safeguards,” Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-44 (1974), namely, the so-called Miranda warnings discussed above, see supra Part I.A.

2024Protecting the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self- Incrimination “[T]o provide practical reinforcement for the right against compulsory self-incrimination,” the Miranda Court “suggested safeguards,” Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-44 (1974), namely, the so-called Miranda warnings discussed above, see supra Part I.A.

2015See State v. Logan, 394 Md. 378, 388-91 , 906 A.2d 374 (2006) (applying harmless error analysis *116 to a Miranda violation but holding error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); see also Bartram v. State, 33 Md.App. 115, 153 , 364 A.2d 1119 (1976) (“It is, of course, settled law that a Miranda error can, indeed, be harmless error”) (citations omitted), aff'd, 280 Md. 616 , 374 A.2d 1144 (1977); Cummings v. State, 27 Md.App. 361 , 385 n. 5, 341 A.2d 294 (1975) (“That a Miranda violation can be harmless error is not to be doubted”) (citations omitted).

2015See State v. Logan, 394 Md. 378, 388-91 , 906 A.2d 374 (2006) (applying harmless error analysis *116 to a Miranda violation but holding error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); see also Bartram v. State, 33 Md.App. 115, 153 , 364 A.2d 1119 (1976) (“It is, of course, settled law that a Miranda error can, indeed, be harmless error”) (citations omitted), aff'd, 280 Md. 616 , 374 A.2d 1144 (1977); Cummings v. State, 27 Md.App. 361 , 385 n. 5, 341 A.2d 294 (1975) (“That a Miranda violation can be harmless error is not to be doubted”) (citations omitted).

2017See e.g., Smith v. State, 186 Md.App. 498, 512 , 974 A.2d 991 (2009), aff'd, 414 Md. 357 , 995 A.2d 685 (2010) (noting that the Supreme Court has consistently held that Miranda warnings are a prophylactic measure “designed to implement the under-girding Fifth Amendment privilege”).

2017See e.g., Smith v. State, 186 Md.App. 498, 512 , 974 A.2d 991 (2009), aff'd, 414 Md. 357 , 995 A.2d 685 (2010) (noting that the Supreme Court has consistently held that Miranda warnings are a prophylactic measure “designed to implement the under-girding Fifth Amendment privilege”).

2017See e.g., Smith v. State, 186 Md.App. 498, 512 , 974 A.2d 991 (2009), aff'd, 414 Md. 357 , 995 A.2d 685 (2010) (noting that the Supreme Court has consistently held that Miranda warnings are a prophylactic measure “designed to implement the under-girding Fifth Amendment privilege”).

2017See e.g., Smith v. State, 186 Md.App. 498, 512 , 974 A.2d 991 (2009), aff'd, 414 Md. 357 , 995 A.2d 685 (2010) (noting that the Supreme Court has consistently held that Miranda warnings are a prophylactic measure “designed to implement the under-girding Fifth Amendment privilege”).

2012The public safety exception to the Miranda requirement was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 , 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984), in which the Court held that there is a narrow exception to the rule that Miranda warnings must be given to a suspect in custody before interrogation may begin in instances in which there exists a threat to public safety. .

2012The public safety exception to the Miranda requirement was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 , 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984), in which the Court held that there is a narrow exception to the rule that Miranda warnings must be given to a suspect in custody before interrogation may begin in instances in which there exists a threat to public safety. .

2021In Gonzalez, id. at 648, 652 , 57 A.3d at 493, 495 , in examining the Miranda waiver of an eighteen-year-old who was a recent immigrant to the United States, this Court stated: First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.

2020In Gonzalez v. State, the Court held that Miranda warnings provided in English to the defendant, a Mexican immigrant who did not speak or comprehend English, were constitutionally sufficient only when the officer “painstakingly—and, ultimately, successfully—conveyed to Petitioner in Spanish the balance of the Miranda warnings.” 429 Md. 632, 653 (2012).

1991See also Brown v. State, 6 Md.App. 564, 569 , 252 A.2d 272 (1968), where we held that Miranda warnings need not be given anew each time officers question the accused.

1991See also Brown v. State, 6 Md.App. 564, 569 , 252 A.2d 272 (1968), where we held that Miranda warnings need not be given anew each time officers question the accused.

2010The Court noted that its decision in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 , 120 S.Ct. 2326 , 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000), in which it characterized Miranda to be a “constitutional rule,” did not affect its observations because, in the end, the focus of the Miranda rule is on the continued protections of the Self-Incrimination Clause, which deals with testimony, and Dickerson’s characterization of Miranda as a constitutional rule does not lessen the need to maintain the closest possible fit between the Self-Incrimination Clause and any rule designed to protect it.

2010The Court noted that its decision in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 , 120 S.Ct. 2326 , 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000), in which it characterized Miranda to be a “constitutional rule,” did not affect its observations because, in the end, the focus of the Miranda rule is on the continued protections of the Self-Incrimination Clause, which deals with testimony, and Dickerson’s characterization of Miranda as a constitutional rule does not lessen the need to maintain the closest possible fit between the Self-Incrimination Clause and any rule designed to protect it.

2025See, e.g., Rush v. State, 403 Md. 68, 93 , 939 A.2d 689, 703 (2008) (stating, in relevant part, that whether a suspect in custody is “a repeat offender familiar with the criminal justice system or an individual with a previously clean record does not vary the fact that sufficient Miranda warnings must be given”); Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 692 , 861 A.2d 727, 732 (2004) (stating that “[t]he purpose of any repeat-offender penalty enhancement is to create a differential in the potential punishments imposed upon first- time and repeat offenders”); Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 680 , 659 A.2d 1

2025See, e.g., Rush v. State, 403 Md. 68, 93 , 939 A.2d 689, 703 (2008) (stating, in relevant part, that whether a suspect in custody is “a repeat offender familiar with the criminal justice system or an individual with a previously clean record does not vary the fact that sufficient Miranda warnings must be given”); Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 692 , 861 A.2d 727, 732 (2004) (stating that “[t]he purpose of any repeat-offender penalty enhancement is to create a differential in the potential punishments imposed upon first- time and repeat offenders”); Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 680 , 659 A.2d 1

2023Indeed, Berkemer, while determining that traffic stops did not require Miranda warnings, also explained, “It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest.’ If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (citations omitted).

2012Even assuming that Thomas’s assumption was relevant, his belief was predicated upon uncommunicated thoughts, which cannot form the basis for requiring Miranda warnings, as the Supreme Court recognized in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984).

2025It is clear, however, that “police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question.” Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 333 (2006) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam)).

2011The Supreme Court has “explicitly recognized that Miranda warnings are not required ‘simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.’ ” Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3517 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 , 97 S.Ct. 711 , 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)).

2020“One of the Court’s stated aims in establishing the Miranda rule is to ‘assure that the individual’s right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.’” Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 149 , 12 A.3d 1238 (2011) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ).

2020“One of the Court’s stated aims in establishing the Miranda rule is to ‘assure that the individual’s right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.’” Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 149 , 12 A.3d 1238 (2011) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ).

2018Before this Court and the Court of Special Appeals, Reynolds relied on our decision in Grier , where we concluded that "[e]vidence of post-arrest silence, after Miranda warnings are given, is inadmissible for any purpose, including impeachment." Grier v. State , 351 Md. 241 , 258, 718 A.2d 211 , 219 (1998) (citing Doyle , 426 U.S. at 619 , 96 S.Ct. at 2245 (1976) ).

2018Before this Court and the Court of Special Appeals, Reynolds relied on our decision in Grier , where we concluded that "[e]vidence of post-arrest silence, after Miranda warnings are given, is inadmissible for any purpose, including impeachment." Grier v. State , 351 Md. 241 , 258, 718 A.2d 211 , 219 (1998) (citing Doyle , 426 U.S. at 619 , 96 S.Ct. at 2245 (1976) ).

2011Justice Kennedy authored a concurring opinion, offering what he called “a narrower test applicable only in the infrequent case.... ” Whereas “[t]he plurality conclude[d] that whenever a two-stage interview occurs, admissibility of the postwarning statement should depend on whether [the] Miranda warnings delivered midstream could have been effective enough to accomplish their object given the specific facts of the case,” Justice Kennedy would hold that “[t]he admissibility of post-warning statements should continue to be governed by the principles of Elstad unless the deliberate two-step strate

2011Justice Kennedy authored a concurring opinion, offering what he called “a narrower test applicable only in the infrequent case.... ” Whereas “[t]he plurality conclude[d] that whenever a two-stage interview occurs, admissibility of the postwarning statement should depend on whether [the] Miranda warnings delivered midstream could have been effective enough to accomplish their object given the specific facts of the case,” Justice Kennedy would hold that “[t]he admissibility of post-warning statements should continue to be governed by the principles of Elstad unless the deliberate two-step strate

2021In Hof v. State, 337 Md. 581, 596-97 , 655 A.2d 370 , 377-78 (1995), this Court set forth several examples of circumstances that this Court and the Court of Special Appeals have considered when assessing the totality of the circumstances as to the voluntariness of a confession, stating: The “totality of the circumstances” includes a number of factors, e.g. where the interrogation was conducted; its length; who was present; how it was conducted; its content; whether the defendant was given Miranda warnings; the mental and physical condition of the defendant; the age, background, experience, edu

2000In Hof v. State, 337 Md. 581, 596-97 , 655 A.2d 370 (1995), the Court of Appeals explained that the factors within the “totality of the circumstances” standard include: where the interrogation was conducted, its length, who was present, how it was conducted, its content, whether the defendant was given Miranda warnings, the mental and physical condition of the defendant, the age, background, experience, education, character, and intelligence of the defendant, when the defendant was taken before a court commissioner following arrest, and whether the defendant was physically mistreated, physical

2010The Court stated, id. at 299-300, 108 S.Ct. 2389 : So long as the accused is made aware of the “dangers and disadvantages of self-representation” during postindictment questioning, by use of the Miranda warnings, his waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at such questioning is “knowing and intelligent.” In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), the Supreme Court had held that the Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during custo- *487 dial interrogation had been violated when the police reinitiated interrogation after the suspect had reques

2010The Court stated, id. at 299-300, 108 S.Ct. 2389 : So long as the accused is made aware of the “dangers and disadvantages of self-representation” during postindictment questioning, by use of the Miranda warnings, his waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at such questioning is “knowing and intelligent.” In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), the Supreme Court had held that the Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during custo- *487 dial interrogation had been violated when the police reinitiated interrogation after the suspect had reques

2026Accordingly, our analysis focuses on the second dimension of the Miranda waiver analysis, namely whether the waiver was “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Id. (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 ). “[A] valid waiver does not require that an individual be informed of all information ‘useful’ in making [their] decision or all information that ‘might . . . affect[t] [their] decision to confess.’” Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576 (1987) (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at 422 ) (third alteration in original).

2011See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (applying Miranda analysis to determine admissibility of juvenile’s custodial statement in subsequent juvenile court proceeding).