Miranda warning in North Dakota

2004Red Paint v. State, 2002 ND 27, ¶ 10 , 639 N.W.2d 503 (citation and quotations omitted); State v. Fields, 294 N.W.2d 404, 407 (N.D.1980) (holding, “custody is the determinative factor in deciding if the.Miranda warnings are required.”).

2003“Mere investigatory focus does not require the giving of the Miranda warnings.” State v. Fields , 294 N.W.2d 404, 406 (N.D. 1980) (applying a custody test to determine when Miranda warnings must be given); accord State v. Stewart , 1999 ND 154 , ¶ 8 n.4, 598 N.W.2d 773 .

2018The prosecution may not impeach a defendant with his post-arrest silence if he was advised of his rights as required under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), because the Miranda warning carries an implicit "assurance that silence will carry no penalty" and it is "fundamentally unfair" to use post-warning silence.

2018The prosecution may not impeach a defendant with his post-arrest silence if he was advised of his rights as required under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), because the Miranda warning carries an implicit "assurance that silence will carry no penalty" and it is "fundamentally unfair" to use post-warning silence.

2026IV [¶14] Cooper argues that the testimony and videos show she was questioned about criminal activity, she was not advised of her rights before the questioning, and she did not waive her right to remain silent. [¶15] An officer must administer the Miranda warning “when a person is subject to custodial interrogation.” State v. Werner, 2024 ND 229, ¶ 13 , 15 N.W.3d 6 (quoting Genre, 2006 ND 77, ¶ 23 ); see also State v. Martin, 543 N.W.2d 224, 227 (N.D. 1996).

2015“When determining if a person is subject to custodial interrogation the court examines all circumstances surrounding the interrogation and considers what a ‘reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation.’” Id. (quoting State v. Martin, 543 N.W.2d 224, 226 (N.D. 1996)). [¶ 17] “Whether a suspect is ‘in custody’ and entitled to a Miranda warning is a mixed question of law and fact and, therefore, is fully reviewable on appeal.” Genre, 2006 ND 77, ¶ 23 , 712 N.W.2d 624 .

2000As we stated in Fasching , “a person temporarily detained for an ‘ordinary traffic stop’ is not ‘in custody’ for the purposes of Miranda.” Fasching, 453 N.W.2d at 763 . [¶ 18] The issue in Fasching was whether custodial interrogation without a Miranda warning requires suppression of all evidence, testimonial and non-testimonial.

1996As the Supreme Court explained in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), “the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation.” Martin concedes that “ordinary traffic stops are not usually deemed to be custodial stops triggering the need for Miranda warnings.” See Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9 , 109 S.Ct. 205 , 102 L.Ed.2d 172 (1988); Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 435-40 , 104 S.Ct. at 3147-48 ; State v. Fasching, 453 N.W.2d 761, 763-64 (N.D.1990).

2009This Court, concluding there was no indication the questioning took place while the defendant’s freedom to depart was restricted in any way, held the defendant’s pre-Miranda statements “were not made while he was in ‘custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of *477 action in any significant way.’ ” Newnam, 409 N.W.2d at 83 . [¶ 15] That questioning occurred at the police station or in a “coercive environment” is not by itself a requirement for Miranda warnings to be given.

1994See Newnam, 409 N.W.2d at 82-83 (Miranda warnings not required unless defendant taken into custody, or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action).

2024Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 , 295 n.13, 106 S.Ct. 634 , 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986) (“With respect to post-Miranda warnings ‘silence,’ we point out that silence does not mean only muteness; it includes the statement of a desire to remain silent, as well as of a desire to remain silent until an attorney has been consulted.”).

2024Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 , 295 n.13, 106 S.Ct. 634 , 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986) (“With respect to post-Miranda warnings ‘silence,’ we point out that silence does not mean only muteness; it includes the statement of a desire to remain silent, as well as of a desire to remain silent until an attorney has been consulted.”).

2019Hansford was given ample opportunity to contact an attorney. [¶24] Even if a suspect is not in custody and Miranda warnings are given gratuitously, they are not rendered "wholly irrelevant." Taillon , 470 N.W.2d at 228 ; see also U.S. v. Bautista , 145 F.3d 1140 , 1148 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Although giving a Miranda warning does not, in and of itself, convert an otherwise non-custodial interview into a custodial interrogation, it is a factor to be considered by the court.").

2019Hansford was given ample opportunity to contact an attorney. [¶24] Even if a suspect is not in custody and Miranda warnings are given gratuitously, they are not rendered "wholly irrelevant." Taillon , 470 N.W.2d at 228 ; see also U.S. v. Bautista , 145 F.3d 1140 , 1148 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Although giving a Miranda warning does not, in and of itself, convert an otherwise non-custodial interview into a custodial interrogation, it is a factor to be considered by the court.").

2019State Highway Comm'r , 423 N.W.2d 146 , 147 (N.D. 1988) (discussing the limited nature of the right to consult with an attorney prior to taking a chemical test); Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r , 405 N.W.2d 285 , 290 (N.D. 1987) (holding that if an arrested person asks to consult with an attorney before deciding to take the chemical test, he must be given a reasonable opportunity to do so if it does not materially interfere with the administration of the test); Hammeren , 315 N.W.2d at 682 (declining to adopt a "per se" confusion rule for failure of an officer to inform a driver following a Mira

2019State Highway Comm’r, 423 N.W.2d 146, 147 (N.D. 1988) (discussing the limited nature of the right to consult with an attorney prior to taking a chemical test); Kuntz v. State Highway Comm’r, 405 N.W.2d 285, 290 (N.D. 1987) (holding that if an arrested person asks to consult with an attorney 4 before deciding to take the chemical test, he must be given a reasonable opportunity to do so if it does not materially interfere with the administration of the test); Hammeren, 315 N.W.2d at 682 (declining to adopt a “per se” confusion rule for failure of an officer to inform a driver following a Miranda

2016While Miranda warnings are a factor to consider under the voluntariness test, United States v. Payne, 119 F.3d 637, 643-44 (8th Cir.1997) the lack of a Miranda warning, by itself, does not invalidate a consent to search.

2016While Miranda warnings are a factor to consider under the voluntariness test, United States v. Payne , 119 F.3d 637, 643-44 (8th Cir. 1997) the lack of a Miranda warning, by itself, does not invalidate a consent to search.

2016United States v. Lee, 356 F.3d 831, 834 (8th Cir.2003).

2016United States v. Lee , 356 F.3d 831, 834 (8th Cir. 2003).

2006Custodial interrogation is “ ‘questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’ ” State v. Connery, 441 N.W.2d 651, 654 (N.D.1989) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). [¶ 31] Public safety is one exception to the general requirement for a Miranda warning.

1999See, e.g., State v. Connery, 441 N.W.2d 651 , 653 n. 2 (N.D.1989); United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 560-61 (9th Cir.1996); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 372-73 (8th Cir.1989); State v. Pebria, 85 Hawai'i 171 , 938 P.2d 1190 , 1195 — 96 (Hawai'i Ct.App.1997); State v. Hicks, 333 N.C. 467 , 428 S.E.2d 167, 175-76 (1993). [¶ 20] The totality of the circumstances must be examined to determine voluntariness.

2010Agüero objected to this testimony, arguing it was prohibited because he invoked his right to remain silent, but the court overruled his objection. [1129] In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held Miranda warnings carry an implicit assurance that silence will not carry a penalty, and the use at trial of post-arrest, post- Miranda silence for impeachment purposes violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2010Agüero objected to this testimony, arguing it was prohibited because he invoked his right to remain silent, but the court overruled his objection. [1129] In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held Miranda warnings carry an implicit assurance that silence will not carry a penalty, and the use at trial of post-arrest, post- Miranda silence for impeachment purposes violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

1982In making that suggestion we cited Agnew v. Hjelle, 216 N.W.2d 291 (N.D.1974), where this court rejected Agnew’s contention that “he became confused as to his rights when he was first informed that he could remain silent and had a right to consult with an attorney pursuant to the Miranda warnings and then later was told that his driver’s license would be revoked if he did not submit to a test to determine the alcohol content of his blood; that therefore he did not knowingly refuse to take such a test; and that because of that the failure to comply with the Implied Consent Law was not based upo

1982In making that suggestion we cited Agnew v. Hjelle, 216 N.W.2d 291 (N.D.1974), where this court rejected Agnew’s contention that “he became confused as to his rights when he was first informed that he could remain silent and had a right to consult with an attorney pursuant to the Miranda warnings and then later was told that his driver’s license would be revoked if he did not submit to a test to determine the alcohol content of his blood; that therefore he did not knowingly refuse to take such a test; and that because of that the failure to comply with the Implied Consent Law was not based upo

1974While there is authority that where a driver refuses to take a test because he was confused by the Miranda warnings as to his constitutional rights and the demand for a test under the Implied Consent Law (see Rust v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 267 Cal.App.2d 545, 547 , 73 Cal.Rptr. 366 ), this rule does not apply when the arresting officer explicitly informs the arrestee that the Miranda rights do not apply to the taking of a chemical test pursuant to the Implied Consent Law.

1974While there is authority that where a driver refuses to take a test because he was confused by the Miranda warnings as to his constitutional rights and the demand for a test under the Implied Consent Law (see Rust v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 267 Cal.App.2d 545, 547 , 73 Cal.Rptr. 366 ), this rule does not apply when the arresting officer explicitly informs the arrestee that the Miranda rights do not apply to the taking of a chemical test pursuant to the Implied Consent Law.

1980In the more recent case of Roberts v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 1364-1365 , 63 L.Ed.2d 622, 631 (1980), the Supreme Court, in considering the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, stated: “Although Miranda’s requirement of specific warnings create a limited exception to the rule that the privilege must be claimed, the exception does not apply outside the context of the inherently coercive custodial interrogation for which it was designed.” In State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1 (N.D.1971), ce rt. denied 404 U.S. 956 , 92 S.Ct. 322 , 30 L.Ed.2d 273 (1971),

1980In the more recent case of Roberts v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 1364-1365 , 63 L.Ed.2d 622, 631 (1980), the Supreme Court, in considering the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, stated: “Although Miranda’s requirement of specific warnings create a limited exception to the rule that the privilege must be claimed, the exception does not apply outside the context of the inherently coercive custodial interrogation for which it was designed.” In State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1 (N.D.1971), ce rt. denied 404 U.S. 956 , 92 S.Ct. 322 , 30 L.Ed.2d 273 (1971),

2019Instead, “[t]he giving of Miranda warnings and the accused’s reliance on the rights described in the warnings are relevant factors in evaluating the voluntariness of any incriminating statements.” Taillon, 470 N.W.2d at 229 (emphasis added); cf. State v. Murray, 510 N.W.2d 107, 110 (N.D. 1994) (whether a defendant actually relies upon or attempts to exercise the rights advised in gratuitous Miranda warnings is considered).

2019Instead, "[t]he giving of Miranda warnings and the accused's reliance on the rights described in the warnings are relevant factors in evaluating the voluntariness of any incriminating statements." Taillon , 470 N.W.2d at 229 (emphasis added); cf. State v. Murray , 510 N.W.2d 107 , 110 (N.D. 1994) (whether a defendant actually relies upon or attempts to exercise the rights advised in gratuitous Miranda warnings is considered).

2003“Mere investigatory focus does not require the giving of the Miranda warnings.” State v. Fields , 294 N.W.2d 404, 406 (N.D. 1980) (applying a custody test to determine when Miranda warnings must be given); accord State v. Stewart , 1999 ND 154 , ¶ 8 n.4, 598 N.W.2d 773 .

2003“Mere investigatory focus does not require the giving of the Miranda warnings.” State v. Fields , 294 N.W.2d 404, 406 (N.D. 1980) (applying a custody test to determine when Miranda warnings must be given); accord State v. Stewart , 1999 ND 154 , ¶ 8 n.4, 598 N.W.2d 773 .

2009The Supreme Court in Mathiason specifically stated, “Whatever relevance this fact [the officer’s lying about having discovered the defendant’s fingerprints at the crime scene] may have to other issues in the case, it has nothing to do with whether respondent was in custody for purposes of the Miranda rule.” Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495-96 , 97 S.Ct. 711 , 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). [¶ 16] We conclude the facts in the record here were insufficient to cause a reasonable person to believe he was not free to terminate the interrogation and leave at any time despite the coercive aspects of th

2009The Supreme Court in Mathiason specifically stated, “Whatever relevance this fact [the officer’s lying about having discovered the defendant’s fingerprints at the crime scene] may have to other issues in the case, it has nothing to do with whether respondent was in custody for purposes of the Miranda rule.” Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495-96 , 97 S.Ct. 711 , 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). [¶ 16] We conclude the facts in the record here were insufficient to cause a reasonable person to believe he was not free to terminate the interrogation and leave at any time despite the coercive aspects of th

2019State Highway Comm'r , 423 N.W.2d 146 , 147 (N.D. 1988) (discussing the limited nature of the right to consult with an attorney prior to taking a chemical test); Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r , 405 N.W.2d 285 , 290 (N.D. 1987) (holding that if an arrested person asks to consult with an attorney before deciding to take the chemical test, he must be given a reasonable opportunity to do so if it does not materially interfere with the administration of the test); Hammeren , 315 N.W.2d at 682 (declining to adopt a "per se" confusion rule for failure of an officer to inform a driver following a Mira

2019State Highway Comm’r, 423 N.W.2d 146, 147 (N.D. 1988) (discussing the limited nature of the right to consult with an attorney prior to taking a chemical test); Kuntz v. State Highway Comm’r, 405 N.W.2d 285, 290 (N.D. 1987) (holding that if an arrested person asks to consult with an attorney 4 before deciding to take the chemical test, he must be given a reasonable opportunity to do so if it does not materially interfere with the administration of the test); Hammeren, 315 N.W.2d at 682 (declining to adopt a “per se” confusion rule for failure of an officer to inform a driver following a Miranda

2004Ramos, 42 F.3d at 1164 (stating “[t]he giving of Miranda warnings, followed by the making of a voluntary statement, does not, in and of itself, mandate a statement’s admissibility”) (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)). [¶ 30] The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that although a trial court finds a driver, who was illegally detained, subsequently consents voluntarily to a search, that is not the end of the inquiry.

2004Ramos, 42 F.3d at 1164 (stating “[t]he giving of Miranda warnings, followed by the making of a voluntary statement, does not, in and of itself, mandate a statement’s admissibility”) (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)). [¶ 30] The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that although a trial court finds a driver, who was illegally detained, subsequently consents voluntarily to a search, that is not the end of the inquiry.