Miranda warning in Ohio

2026Id. {¶15} Miranda warnings are required only when a person is both (1) in custody and (2) subject to an “interrogation.” See id.

2026Id. {¶15} Miranda warnings are required only when a person is both (1) in custody and (2) subject to an “interrogation.” See id.

2026“Accordingly, ‘[a] suspect in police custody “must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used -6- Case Nos. 14-25-40, 14-25-41 against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”’” Id., quoting State v. Lather, 2006-Ohio-4477 , ¶ 6, quoting Miranda at 479 . {¶13} “‘[T]o determine whether a person is in custody for purposes of receiving Miranda warnings, courts must first inquire into

2026Generally, “‘[t]he subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned are of no consequence in the Miranda analysis.’” Id., quoting In re R.S. at ¶ 17.

2024Rather, law enforcement “is required to administer Miranda warnings only where the individual questioned is subject to ‘custodial interrogation.’” Id., quoting State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 440 (1997). -17- Case No. 1-23-21 {¶40} “The inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation heightens the risk that a suspect will be denied the Fifth Amendment privilege not to be compelled to incriminate himself because custodial interrogation can ‘“undermine the individual’s will to resist and * * * compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.”’” State v. Barker, 149 Ohio St

2023Miranda warnings are intended to protect “a defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel.” State v. Holt, 132 Ohio App.3d 601, 605 , 725 N.E.2d 1155, 1158 (1st Dist. 1997). {¶26} “Only custodial interrogation triggers the need for Miranda warnings.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 440 , 1997-Ohio-204 , 678 N.E.2d 891, 904 (1997).

2026State v. Carter, 2010-Ohio-5189, ¶ 23 (3d Dist.). {¶15} Moreover, “‘the United States Supreme Court held that a juvenile’s age may be considered in the Miranda analysis, so long as the juvenile’s age was known to the officer at the time of questioning or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer.’” In re J.S. at ¶ 13, quoting In re R.S. at ¶ 18, citing J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271-272 (2011). “‘While a juvenile’s age -8- Case Nos. 14-25-40, 14-25-41 may be considered in the Miranda custody analysis, the Supreme Court cautioned that “this does not mean that a c

2026State v. Carter, 2010-Ohio-5189, ¶ 23 (3d Dist.). {¶15} Moreover, “‘the United States Supreme Court held that a juvenile’s age may be considered in the Miranda analysis, so long as the juvenile’s age was known to the officer at the time of questioning or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer.’” In re J.S. at ¶ 13, quoting In re R.S. at ¶ 18, citing J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271-272 (2011). “‘While a juvenile’s age -8- Case Nos. 14-25-40, 14-25-41 may be considered in the Miranda custody analysis, the Supreme Court cautioned that “this does not mean that a c

2026“Accordingly, ‘[a] suspect in police custody “must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used -6- Case Nos. 14-25-40, 14-25-41 against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”’” Id., quoting State v. Lather, 2006-Ohio-4477 , ¶ 6, quoting Miranda at 479 . {¶13} “‘[T]o determine whether a person is in custody for purposes of receiving Miranda warnings, courts must first inquire into

2024See Beheler 463 U.S. at 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3517 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 . {¶20} Factors relevant to whether a custodial interrogation occurred include: 1) the location where the questioning took place; 2) whether the defendant was a suspect at the time the interview began (bearing in mind that Miranda warnings are not required simply because the investigation has focused); 3) whether the defendant’s freedom to leave was restricted in any way; 4) whether the defendant was handcuffed or told he was under arrest; 5) whether threats were made during the interrogation; 6) whether the defendant was physical

2025A custodial interrogation occurs when law enforcement officers take a person “into custody or otherwise deprive [him] of his freedom of action in any significant way.” State v. Roberts, 32 Ohio St.3d 225, 226, fn. 1 (1987), quoting Miranda at 444 . {¶ 16} “Determining whether questioning is ‘a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings demands a fact-specific inquiry that asks whether a reasonable person -6- in the suspect's position would have understood himself or herself to be in custody while being questioned.’ ” State v. Myers, 2018-Ohio-1903, ¶ 57 , quoting Cleveland v. Oles, 201

2023Custodial interrogation is “ ‘questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’ ” State v. Roberts, 32 Ohio St.3d 225, 226 , 513 N.E.2d 720, fn. 1 (1987), quoting Miranda at 444 . {¶ 24} “Determining whether questioning is ‘a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings demands a fact-specific inquiry that asks whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood himself or herself to be in custody while being questioned.’ ” State v. Myers, 154 Ohio St

2026"Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent." Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010).

2025Further, “we are to presume that trial counsel was effective if he could have reasonably decided that filing a motion to suppress would be a futile act, even if there is some evidence in the record to support a motion.” Walters at ¶ 20 , citing Resendiz at ¶ 29 . {¶80} “ ‘A suspect's incriminatory statements ordinarily are admissible ... if law enforcement officers gave the suspect the Miranda warnings and if the suspect implicitly or explicitly waived the Fifth Amendment right against self- incrimination.’ ” State v. Pleasant, 2025-Ohio-115, ¶ 72 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Neal, 2015-Ohio-

2024Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519 , 2006- Ohio-3255, 849 N.E.2d 985, at ¶ 21-22 . “[The Elstad] court explained that evidence can be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree only after a constitutional violation and that a failure to give Miranda warnings is not equivalent to a violation of the Constitution * * *.” Farris at ¶ 25. {¶ 38} The motion-to-suppress hearing focused on the arguments made in T.D.S.’s motion.

2024Farris discussed the factors to be 14 January Term, 2024 considered in determining whether a Miranda warning given after unwarned, custodial statements are made can be effective: “[T]he completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first and the second, the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator’s questions treated the second round as continuous with the first.” Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519 , 2006-Ohio-3255 , 849 N.E.2d 985, at ¶ 28 , quoting

2025See State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144 , 153- 154 (1998) (trial court did not err in finding defendant was not in custody when questioned and, therefore, officers were not required to provide him with Miranda warnings); Cleveland v. Oles, 2017-Ohio-5834, ¶ 29 (considering the totality of the circumstances, the questioning by law enforcement did not rise to the level of a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings). -16 Case No. 1-24-62 {¶31} Horton’s second assignment of error is overruled.

2019This is so because “[i]t is the coercive nature of custodial interrogation that necessitates the Miranda warnings[.]” Greeno at ¶ 12. {¶17} In determining whether an interrogation is custodial, courts must inquire into “ ‘how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation.’ ” Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d at 154 , 694 N.E.2d 932 , quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984).

2024The Seibert court referred to this technique as “question first” and stated that “[t]he object of question first is to render Miranda warnings ineffective by waiting for a particularly opportune time to give them, after the suspect has already confessed.” Id. at 611 , 542 U.S. 600 , 124 S.Ct. 2601 , 159 L.Ed.2d 643 .

2024The Seibert court referred to this technique as “question first” and stated that “[t]he object of question first is to render Miranda warnings ineffective by waiting for a particularly opportune time to give them, after the suspect has already confessed.” Id. at 611 , 542 U.S. 600 , 124 S.Ct. 2601 , 159 L.Ed.2d 643 .

2023Citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 , 81 L.E.2d 550 (1984) and State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12 , 2014- Ohio-1019, Appellee submits that the public safety exception allows police officers to question defendants in custody before providing them Miranda warnings if the questions relate to protecting the police officers or the safety of others. {¶20} Applying the appropriate standards of review, we find that the public safety exception does not apply in this case.

2023Citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 , 81 L.E.2d 550 (1984) and State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12 , 2014- Ohio-1019, Appellee submits that the public safety exception allows police officers to question defendants in custody before providing them Miranda warnings if the questions relate to protecting the police officers or the safety of others. {¶20} Applying the appropriate standards of review, we find that the public safety exception does not apply in this case.

2022Subsequently, in Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 , 102 S.Ct. 130 , 871 L.Ed. 2d 490 (1982), the United States Supreme Court distinguished Doyle on the basis that, unlike in Doyle, the record did not indicate that the defendant had “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent immediately after his arrest.” Id. at 605.

2020Butler No. CA90-09-201, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 1905 , *5 (Apr. 29, 1991). {¶ 47} However, "in the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a [s]tate to permit cross-examination as to post-arrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand." Heinrich at *4-5, citing Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982).

2025State v. Eason, 2003-Ohio-6279, ¶ 27 (7th Dist.). {¶70} “[A] defendant who voluntarily takes the witness stand waives the right to remain silent about the testimony he gives, including testimony about the defendant's prior silence . . .” Id., citing Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408 (1980), applying Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (the state cannot use the defendant's post-arrest silence after Miranda warnings to impeach the defendant if he decides to testify at trial).

2022The court found that because Miranda warnings contain an implicit assurance that silence will carry no penalty, “it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.” Id. at 619 .

2025Id., citing Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 103-104 (2010), citing Miranda. {¶ 31} Miranda warnings are required only when there is a custodial interrogation. “ ‘Interrogation’ includes express questioning as well as ‘any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’ ” Thompson-Shabazz at ¶ 17 , citing State v. Strozier, 2007-Ohio-4575, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.), quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).

2025“Interrogation” must reflect “a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.” Id., citing Innis at 300 . {¶ 32} Only “when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom” in any significant way during questioning are Miranda warnings required.

2018The Court reaffirmed its holding in Doyle in Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 , 106 S.Ct. 634 , 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986), noting “[i]n Doyle, we held that Miranda warnings contain an implied promise, rooted in the Constitution, that ‘silence will carry no penalty.’” Wainwright at 295 , quoting Doyle at 618.

2018The Court reaffirmed its holding in Doyle in Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 , 106 S.Ct. 634 , 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986), noting “[i]n Doyle, we held that Miranda warnings contain an implied promise, rooted in the Constitution, that ‘silence will carry no penalty.’” Wainwright at 295 , quoting Doyle at 618.

2019Id. {¶ 45} “It is well-settled that when police take a suspect into custody, they are required to give Miranda warnings before subjecting the suspect to interrogation.” State v. Edwards, 2018-Ohio-1739 , 110 N.E.3d 1042, ¶ 8 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Gumm, 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 429 , 653 N.E.2d 253 (1995).

2019Id. {¶ 45} “It is well-settled that when police take a suspect into custody, they are required to give Miranda warnings before subjecting the suspect to interrogation.” State v. Edwards, 2018-Ohio-1739 , 110 N.E.3d 1042, ¶ 8 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Gumm, 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 429 , 653 N.E.2d 253 (1995).

2025Accordingly, Miranda set forth that, during a custodial interrogation, a suspect must be advised of the following four warnings: “(1) that the suspect has the right to remain silent, (2) that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, (3) that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and (4) that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 470 (2001), citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000), citing Miranda at 479 . “[A] suspect who has received and und

2025“Whether a confession is voluntary and whether a suspect has been subjected to custodial interrogation so as to require Miranda warnings are analytically separate issues.” State v. Kelly, 2005-Ohio-305, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.), citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).

2024Here, the parties agree that appellee was in custody at the time of the police interviews. {¶24} The state cites Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) when the court considered whether the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause requires the suppression of a confession, made after Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of rights, solely because the police had obtained an earlier voluntary, but unwarned admission.

2024Here, the parties agree that appellee was in custody at the time of the police interviews. {¶24} The state cites Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) when the court considered whether the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause requires the suppression of a confession, made after Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of rights, solely because the police had obtained an earlier voluntary, but unwarned admission.

2022In Ohio, it has consistently been stated that “[i]n order to determine whether a person is in custody for purposes of receiving Miranda warnings, courts must first inquire into the circumstances surrounding the questioning and, second, given those circumstances, determine whether a reasonable person would have felt that he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interview and leave.” State v. Hoffner, 102 Ohio St.3d 358 , 2004-Ohio-3430 , 811 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 27 , citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995).

2022In Ohio, it has consistently been stated that “[i]n order to determine whether a person is in custody for purposes of receiving Miranda warnings, courts must first inquire into the circumstances surrounding the questioning and, second, given those circumstances, determine whether a reasonable person would have felt that he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interview and leave.” State v. Hoffner, 102 Ohio St.3d 358 , 2004-Ohio-3430 , 811 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 27 , citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995).

2024Farris discussed the factors to be 14 January Term, 2024 considered in determining whether a Miranda warning given after unwarned, custodial statements are made can be effective: “[T]he completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first and the second, the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator’s questions treated the second round as continuous with the first.” Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519 , 2006-Ohio-3255 , 849 N.E.2d 985, at ¶ 28 , quoting

2024She provided no statements to the detectives about doing so until after the detectives had read Henry the Miranda warnings. {¶39} Citing State v. Farris, 100 Ohio St.3d 519 , 2006-Ohio-3255 , 849 N.E.2d 985 , Henry argues that because she had been up all night, had been drinking, and had been subjected to a long wait and lengthy interrogation, her waiver was invalid.

2024The appellant does not contest the trial court’s findings of fact but whether the trial court misapplied the law to the facts. {¶39} To use a statement made by the accused during a custodial interrogation, the prosecution must show: “(1) the accused, prior to any interrogation, was given the Miranda warnings; (2) at the receipt of the warnings, or thereafter, the accused made ‘an express statement’ that he desired to waive his Miranda constitutional rights; (3) the accused effected a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of those rights.” State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 38 , 358 N.E.2

2024The appellant does not contest the trial court’s findings of fact but whether the trial court misapplied the law to the facts. {¶39} To use a statement made by the accused during a custodial interrogation, the prosecution must show: “(1) the accused, prior to any interrogation, was given the Miranda warnings; (2) at the receipt of the warnings, or thereafter, the accused made ‘an express statement’ that he desired to waive his Miranda constitutional rights; (3) the accused effected a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of those rights.” State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 38 , 358 N.E.2

2025Further, “we are to presume that trial counsel was effective if he could have reasonably decided that filing a motion to suppress would be a futile act, even if there is some evidence in the record to support a motion.” Walters at ¶ 20 , citing Resendiz at ¶ 29 . {¶80} “ ‘A suspect's incriminatory statements ordinarily are admissible ... if law enforcement officers gave the suspect the Miranda warnings and if the suspect implicitly or explicitly waived the Fifth Amendment right against self- incrimination.’ ” State v. Pleasant, 2025-Ohio-115, ¶ 72 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Neal, 2015-Ohio-

2025Further, “we are to presume that trial counsel was effective if he could have reasonably decided that filing a motion to suppress would be a futile act, even if there is some evidence in the record to support a motion.” Walters at ¶ 20 , citing Resendiz at ¶ 29 . {¶80} “ ‘A suspect's incriminatory statements ordinarily are admissible ... if law enforcement officers gave the suspect the Miranda warnings and if the suspect implicitly or explicitly waived the Fifth Amendment right against self- incrimination.’ ” State v. Pleasant, 2025-Ohio-115, ¶ 72 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Neal, 2015-Ohio-

2023State v. Hoffner, 102 Ohio St.3d 358 , 2004-Ohio-3430 , 811 N.E.2d 48 , ¶ 27 {¶67} Miranda warnings are generally not required during a police officer's roadside questioning of a driver at the scene of an accident “because the questioning constitute[s] on-scene questioning done as part of the normal fact-finding process and not custodial interrogation.” State v. Garland, 116 Ohio App.3d 461, 470 , 688 N.E.2d 557 (12th Dist.1996). {¶68} Courts have employed certain factors a court should examine when applying the reasonable person test including: “‘whether the encounter takes place in surroundi

2023State v. Hoffner, 102 Ohio St.3d 358 , 2004-Ohio-3430 , 811 N.E.2d 48 , ¶ 27 {¶67} Miranda warnings are generally not required during a police officer's roadside questioning of a driver at the scene of an accident “because the questioning constitute[s] on-scene questioning done as part of the normal fact-finding process and not custodial interrogation.” State v. Garland, 116 Ohio App.3d 461, 470 , 688 N.E.2d 557 (12th Dist.1996). {¶68} Courts have employed certain factors a court should examine when applying the reasonable person test including: “‘whether the encounter takes place in surroundi