Miranda warning in Ohio

2026Id. {¶15} Miranda warnings are required only when a person is both (1) in custody and (2) subject to an “interrogation.” See id.

2026Id. {¶15} Miranda warnings are required only when a person is both (1) in custody and (2) subject to an “interrogation.” See id.

2024Rather, law enforcement “is required to administer Miranda warnings only where the individual questioned is subject to ‘custodial interrogation.’” Id., quoting State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 440 (1997). -17- {¶40} “The inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation heightens the risk that a suspect will be denied the Fifth Amendment privilege not to be compelled to incriminate himself because custodial interrogation can ‘“undermine the individual’s will to resist and * * * compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.”’” State v. Barker, 149 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2016-Ohio

2023In other words, if “Miranda warnings -11- are not given prior to a custodial interrogation, the prosecution may not use the statements obtained from the suspect at trial.” In re M.H. at ¶ 18, citing Miranda at 444 . {¶ 23} “Police, however, are not required to administer Miranda warnings to every person they question, even if the person being questioned is a suspect.” Hudson at ¶ 31, citing State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 440 , 678 N.E.2d 891 (1997), citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 , 97 S.Ct. 711 , 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977).

2026State v. Carter, 2010-Ohio-5189, ¶ 23 (3d Dist.). {¶15} Moreover, “‘the United States Supreme Court held that a juvenile’s age may be considered in the Miranda analysis, so long as the juvenile’s age was known to the officer at the time of questioning or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer.’” In re J.S. at ¶ 13, quoting In re R.S. at ¶ 18, citing J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271-272 (2011). “‘While a juvenile’s age -8- Case Nos. 14-25-40, 14-25-41 may be considered in the Miranda custody analysis, the Supreme Court cautioned that “this does not mean that a c

2026State v. Carter, 2010-Ohio-5189, ¶ 23 (3d Dist.). {¶15} Moreover, “‘the United States Supreme Court held that a juvenile’s age may be considered in the Miranda analysis, so long as the juvenile’s age was known to the officer at the time of questioning or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer.’” In re J.S. at ¶ 13, quoting In re R.S. at ¶ 18, citing J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271-272 (2011). “‘While a juvenile’s age -8- Case Nos. 14-25-40, 14-25-41 may be considered in the Miranda custody analysis, the Supreme Court cautioned that “this does not mean that a c

2026Generally, “‘[t]he subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned are of no consequence in the Miranda analysis.’” Id., quoting In re R.S. at ¶ 17.

2026“Accordingly, ‘[a] suspect in police custody “must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used -6- Case Nos. 14-25-40, 14-25-41 against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”’” Id., quoting State v. Lather, 2006-Ohio-4477 , ¶ 6, quoting Miranda at 479 . {¶13} “‘[T]o determine whether a person is in custody for purposes of receiving Miranda warnings, courts must first inquire into

2026We need not address this argument as it was not raised before the trial court and thus not preserved for appellate review. 4 independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court’s conclusion, whether they meet the applicable legal standard.” Id. {¶ 13} “The right to Miranda warnings is grounded in the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against compelled self-incrimination.” State v. Strozier, 2007-Ohio-4575, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420 (1986).

2025Id., citing Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 103-104 (2010), citing Miranda. {¶ 31} Miranda warnings are required only when there is a custodial interrogation. “ ‘Interrogation’ includes express questioning as well as ‘any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’ ” Thompson-Shabazz at ¶ 17 , citing State v. Strozier, 2007-Ohio-4575, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.), quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).

2026“Accordingly, ‘[a] suspect in police custody “must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used -6- Case Nos. 14-25-40, 14-25-41 against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”’” Id., quoting State v. Lather, 2006-Ohio-4477 , ¶ 6, quoting Miranda at 479 . {¶13} “‘[T]o determine whether a person is in custody for purposes of receiving Miranda warnings, courts must first inquire into

2024See Beheler 463 U.S. at 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3517 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 . {¶20} Factors relevant to whether a custodial interrogation occurred include: 1) the location where the questioning took place; 2) whether the defendant was a suspect at the time the interview began (bearing in mind that Miranda warnings are not required simply because the investigation has focused); 3) whether the defendant’s freedom to leave was restricted in any way; 4) whether the defendant was handcuffed or told he was under arrest; 5) whether threats were made during the interrogation; 6) whether the defendant was physical

2025A custodial interrogation occurs when law enforcement officers take a person “into custody or otherwise deprive [him] of his freedom of action in any significant way.” State v. Roberts, 32 Ohio St.3d 225, 226, fn. 1 (1987), quoting Miranda at 444 . {¶ 16} “Determining whether questioning is ‘a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings demands a fact-specific inquiry that asks whether a reasonable person -6- in the suspect's position would have understood himself or herself to be in custody while being questioned.’ ” State v. Myers, 2018-Ohio-1903, ¶ 57 , quoting Cleveland v. Oles, 201

2023Custodial interrogation is “ ‘questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’ ” State v. Roberts, 32 Ohio St.3d 225, 226 , 513 N.E.2d 720, fn. 1 (1987), quoting Miranda at 444 . {¶ 24} “Determining whether questioning is ‘a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings demands a fact-specific inquiry that asks whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood himself or herself to be in custody while being questioned.’ ” State v. Myers, 154 Ohio St

2026"Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent." Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010).

2025Accordingly, Miranda set forth that, during a custodial interrogation, a suspect must be advised of the following four warnings: “(1) that the suspect has the right to remain silent, (2) that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, (3) that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and (4) that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 470 (2001), citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000), citing Miranda at 479 . “[A] suspect who has received and und

2026(Feb. 5, 2025 Tr. at 232-233). {¶58} Perdue contends that the above discussion, particularly the section referencing his request for an attorney because had “consciousness of guilt” is a violation of his Fifth Amendment and Due Process rights to such a degree that his convictions must be overturned. {¶59} In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 (1976), the defendants received Miranda warnings upon arrest.

2026(Feb. 5, 2025 Tr. at 232-233). {¶58} Perdue contends that the above discussion, particularly the section referencing his request for an attorney because had “consciousness of guilt” is a violation of his Fifth Amendment and Due Process rights to such a degree that his convictions must be overturned. {¶59} In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 (1976), the defendants received Miranda warnings upon arrest.

2024Farris discussed the factors to be 14 January Term, 2024 considered in determining whether a Miranda warning given after unwarned, custodial statements are made can be effective: “[T]he completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first and the second, the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator’s questions treated the second round as continuous with the first.” Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519 , 2006-Ohio-3255 , 849 N.E.2d 985, at ¶ 28 , quoting

2024Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519 , 2006- Ohio-3255, 849 N.E.2d 985, at ¶ 21-22 . “[The Elstad] court explained that evidence can be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree only after a constitutional violation and that a failure to give Miranda warnings is not equivalent to a violation of the Constitution * * *.” Farris at ¶ 25. {¶ 38} The motion-to-suppress hearing focused on the arguments made in T.D.S.’s motion.

2025See State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144 , 153- 154 (1998) (trial court did not err in finding defendant was not in custody when questioned and, therefore, officers were not required to provide him with Miranda warnings); Cleveland v. Oles, 2017-Ohio-5834, ¶ 29 (considering the totality of the circumstances, the questioning by law enforcement did not rise to the level of a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings). -16 {¶31} Horton’s second assignment of error is overruled.

2019This is so because “[i]t is the coercive nature of custodial interrogation that necessitates the Miranda warnings[.]” Greeno at ¶ 12. {¶17} In determining whether an interrogation is custodial, courts must inquire into “ ‘how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation.’ ” Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d at 154 , 694 N.E.2d 932 , quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984).

2024Farris discussed the factors to be 14 January Term, 2024 considered in determining whether a Miranda warning given after unwarned, custodial statements are made can be effective: “[T]he completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first and the second, the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator’s questions treated the second round as continuous with the first.” Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519 , 2006-Ohio-3255 , 849 N.E.2d 985, at ¶ 28 , quoting

2024Farris discussed the factors to be 14 January Term, 2024 considered in determining whether a Miranda warning given after unwarned, custodial statements are made can be effective: “[T]he completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first and the second, the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator’s questions treated the second round as continuous with the first.” Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519 , 2006-Ohio-3255 , 849 N.E.2d 985, at ¶ 28 , quoting

2023Citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 , 81 L.E.2d 550 (1984) and State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12 , 2014- Ohio-1019, Appellee submits that the public safety exception allows police officers to question defendants in custody before providing them Miranda warnings if the questions relate to protecting the police officers or the safety of others. {¶20} Applying the appropriate standards of review, we find that the public safety exception does not apply in this case.

2023Citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 , 81 L.E.2d 550 (1984) and State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12 , 2014- Ohio-1019, Appellee submits that the public safety exception allows police officers to question defendants in custody before providing them Miranda warnings if the questions relate to protecting the police officers or the safety of others. {¶20} Applying the appropriate standards of review, we find that the public safety exception does not apply in this case.

2022Subsequently, in Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 , 102 S.Ct. 130 , 871 L.Ed. 2d 490 (1982), the United States Supreme Court distinguished Doyle on the basis that, unlike in Doyle, the record did not indicate that the defendant had “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent immediately after his arrest.” Id. at 605.

2020Butler No. CA90-09-201, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 1905 , *5 (Apr. 29, 1991). {¶ 47} However, "in the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a [s]tate to permit cross-examination as to post-arrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand." Heinrich at *4-5, citing Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982).

2025Accordingly, Miranda set forth that, during a custodial interrogation, a suspect must be advised of the following four warnings: “(1) that the suspect has the right to remain silent, (2) that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, (3) that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and (4) that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 470 (2001), citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000), citing Miranda at 479 . “[A] suspect who has received and und

2025Accordingly, Miranda set forth that, during a custodial interrogation, a suspect must be advised of the following four warnings: “(1) that the suspect has the right to remain silent, (2) that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, (3) that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and (4) that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 470 (2001), citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000), citing Miranda at 479 . “[A] suspect who has received and und

2025See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292 (1986) (“[I]t is fundamentally unfair to promise an arrested person that his silence will not be used against him and thereafter to breach that promise by using the silence to impeach his trial testimony.”); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (“[T]he use for impeachment MEIGS, 22CA12 81 purposes of [a defendant’s] silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); compare Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980) (impeaching defendant by using evidence of h

2018Cuyahoga No. 100658, 2014-Ohio-4801, ¶ 11 , citing Doyle at 611. “‘Miranda warnings carry the state’s ‘implicit assurance’ that an arrestee’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent will not later be used against him.’” Id., quoting Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 290-291 , 106 S.Ct. 634 , 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986). {¶25} The Fifth Amendment is not implicated where prearrest silence is involved because the state has not “‘induce[d] a defendant to remain silent.’” Id. at ¶ 12, quoting Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606 , 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982).

2025“Interrogation” must reflect “a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.” Id., citing Innis at 300 . {¶ 32} Only “when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom” in any significant way during questioning are Miranda warnings required.

2025Id., citing Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 103-104 (2010), citing Miranda. {¶ 31} Miranda warnings are required only when there is a custodial interrogation. “ ‘Interrogation’ includes express questioning as well as ‘any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’ ” Thompson-Shabazz at ¶ 17 , citing State v. Strozier, 2007-Ohio-4575, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.), quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).

2019Id. {¶ 45} “It is well-settled that when police take a suspect into custody, they are required to give Miranda warnings before subjecting the suspect to interrogation.” State v. Edwards, 2018-Ohio-1739 , 110 N.E.3d 1042, ¶ 8 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Gumm, 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 429 , 653 N.E.2d 253 (1995).

2019Id. {¶ 45} “It is well-settled that when police take a suspect into custody, they are required to give Miranda warnings before subjecting the suspect to interrogation.” State v. Edwards, 2018-Ohio-1739 , 110 N.E.3d 1042, ¶ 8 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Gumm, 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 429 , 653 N.E.2d 253 (1995).

2024Here, the parties agree that appellee was in custody at the time of the police interviews. {¶24} The state cites Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) when the court considered whether the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause requires the suppression of a confession, made after Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of rights, solely because the police had obtained an earlier voluntary, but unwarned admission.

2024Here, the parties agree that appellee was in custody at the time of the police interviews. {¶24} The state cites Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) when the court considered whether the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause requires the suppression of a confession, made after Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of rights, solely because the police had obtained an earlier voluntary, but unwarned admission.

2022In Ohio, it has consistently been stated that “[i]n order to determine whether a person is in custody for purposes of receiving Miranda warnings, courts must first inquire into the circumstances surrounding the questioning and, second, given those circumstances, determine whether a reasonable person would have felt that he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interview and leave.” State v. Hoffner, 102 Ohio St.3d 358 , 2004-Ohio-3430 , 811 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 27 , citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995).

2022In Ohio, it has consistently been stated that “[i]n order to determine whether a person is in custody for purposes of receiving Miranda warnings, courts must first inquire into the circumstances surrounding the questioning and, second, given those circumstances, determine whether a reasonable person would have felt that he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interview and leave.” State v. Hoffner, 102 Ohio St.3d 358 , 2004-Ohio-3430 , 811 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 27 , citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995).

2024She provided no statements to the detectives about doing so until after the detectives had read Henry the Miranda warnings. {¶39} Citing State v. Farris, 100 Ohio St.3d 519 , 2006-Ohio-3255 , 849 N.E.2d 985 , Henry argues that because she had been up all night, had been drinking, and had been subjected to a long wait and lengthy interrogation, her waiver was invalid.

2024She provided no statements to the detectives about doing so until after the detectives had read Henry the Miranda warnings. {¶39} Citing State v. Farris, 100 Ohio St.3d 519 , 2006-Ohio-3255 , 849 N.E.2d 985 , Henry argues that because she had been up all night, had been drinking, and had been subjected to a long wait and lengthy interrogation, her waiver was invalid.

2024To determine whether a waiver was valid, courts should consider “ ‘the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of any threat or inducement.’ ” State v. Green, 90 Ohio St.3d 352, 366 , 738 N.E.2d 1208 (2000), quoting State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31 , 358 N.E.2d 1051 (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶38} Henry argues that her waiver of her rights under Miranda was invalid because the detectives had questioned her before providing the Mira

2024To determine whether a waiver was valid, courts should consider “ ‘the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of any threat or inducement.’ ” State v. Green, 90 Ohio St.3d 352, 366 , 738 N.E.2d 1208 (2000), quoting State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31 , 358 N.E.2d 1051 (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶38} Henry argues that her waiver of her rights under Miranda was invalid because the detectives had questioned her before providing the Mira

2026We need not address this argument as it was not raised before the trial court and thus not preserved for appellate review. 4 independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court’s conclusion, whether they meet the applicable legal standard.” Id. {¶ 13} “The right to Miranda warnings is grounded in the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against compelled self-incrimination.” State v. Strozier, 2007-Ohio-4575, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420 (1986).

2022Id. {¶74} Therefore, when Miranda warnings are given in the middle of a “coordinated and continuing interrogation”, they will likely mislead and “depriv[e] a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.” Id. quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). “[I]t would ordinarily be unrealistic to treat two spates of integrated and proximately conducted questioning as independent interrogations subject to independent evaluation simply because Miranda warnings formally punctuat

2023State v. Hoffner, 102 Ohio St.3d 358 , 2004-Ohio-3430 , 811 N.E.2d 48 , ¶ 27 {¶67} Miranda warnings are generally not required during a police officer's roadside questioning of a driver at the scene of an accident “because the questioning constitute[s] on-scene questioning done as part of the normal fact-finding process and not custodial interrogation.” State v. Garland, 116 Ohio App.3d 461, 470 , 688 N.E.2d 557 (12th Dist.1996). {¶68} Courts have employed certain factors a court should examine when applying the reasonable person test including: “‘whether the encounter takes place in surroundi

2023State v. Hoffner, 102 Ohio St.3d 358 , 2004-Ohio-3430 , 811 N.E.2d 48 , ¶ 27 {¶67} Miranda warnings are generally not required during a police officer's roadside questioning of a driver at the scene of an accident “because the questioning constitute[s] on-scene questioning done as part of the normal fact-finding process and not custodial interrogation.” State v. Garland, 116 Ohio App.3d 461, 470 , 688 N.E.2d 557 (12th Dist.1996). {¶68} Courts have employed certain factors a court should examine when applying the reasonable person test including: “‘whether the encounter takes place in surroundi

2025We conclude the trial court did not err by failing to suppress the drug evidence. {¶ 54} Regarding the alleged Miranda violation, we note that “Miranda requires police to give a suspect certain prescribed warnings before custodial interrogation commences and provides that if the warnings are not given, any statements elicited from the suspect through police interrogation in that circumstance must be suppressed.” State v. Petitjean, 140 Ohio App.3d 517, 523 , (2d Dist. 2000).

2025We conclude the trial court did not err by failing to suppress the drug evidence. {¶ 54} Regarding the alleged Miranda violation, we note that “Miranda requires police to give a suspect certain prescribed warnings before custodial interrogation commences and provides that if the warnings are not given, any statements elicited from the suspect through police interrogation in that circumstance must be suppressed.” State v. Petitjean, 140 Ohio App.3d 517, 523 , (2d Dist. 2000).

2025Further, “we are to presume that trial counsel was effective if he could have reasonably decided that filing a motion to suppress would be a futile act, even if there is some evidence in the record to support a motion.” Walters at ¶ 20 , citing Resendiz at ¶ 29 . {¶80} “ ‘A suspect's incriminatory statements ordinarily are admissible ... if law enforcement officers gave the suspect the Miranda warnings and if the suspect implicitly or explicitly waived the Fifth Amendment right against self- incrimination.’ ” State v. Pleasant, 2025-Ohio-115, ¶ 72 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Neal, 2015-Ohio-

2025Further, “we are to presume that trial counsel was effective if he could have reasonably decided that filing a motion to suppress would be a futile act, even if there is some evidence in the record to support a motion.” Walters at ¶ 20 , citing Resendiz at ¶ 29 . {¶80} “ ‘A suspect's incriminatory statements ordinarily are admissible ... if law enforcement officers gave the suspect the Miranda warnings and if the suspect implicitly or explicitly waived the Fifth Amendment right against self- incrimination.’ ” State v. Pleasant, 2025-Ohio-115, ¶ 72 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Neal, 2015-Ohio-