Miranda warning in Montana

2023We determine whether the district court’s conclusions are correct.” State v. Hill, 2009 MT 134, ¶ 21 , 350 Mont. 296 , 207 P.3d 307 ; State v. Fuller, 276 Mont. 155 , 915 P.2d 809 . ¶6 Flansburg asserts Detective Wichman “downplayed” the Miranda1 warning he read to Flansburg before proceeding with the custodial interrogation interview and, although Flansburg signed the Miranda warning, he did not read it or understand its importance. 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).

2023We determine whether the district court’s conclusions are correct.” State v. Hill, 2009 MT 134, ¶ 21 , 350 Mont. 296 , 207 P.3d 307 ; State v. Fuller, 276 Mont. 155 , 915 P.2d 809 . ¶6 Flansburg asserts Detective Wichman “downplayed” the Miranda1 warning he read to Flansburg before proceeding with the custodial interrogation interview and, although Flansburg signed the Miranda warning, he did not read it or understand its importance. 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).

2017Nevertheless, Lackman urges us to follow other courts in holding that the State violates a defendant’s rights by commenting on the defendant’s silence regardless whether he has received Miranda warnings. ¶23 “It is well established that impeachment use of a defendant’s silence after arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings is a violation of due process.” State v. Morsette, 2013 MT 270, ¶ 35 , 372 Mont. 38 , 309 P.3d 978 (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618-19 , 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2245 (1976)).

2017Nevertheless, Lackman urges us to follow other courts in holding that the State violates a defendant’s rights by commenting on the defendant’s silence regardless whether he has received Miranda warnings. ¶23 “It is well established that impeachment use of a defendant’s silence after arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings is a violation of due process.” State v. Morsette, 2013 MT 270, ¶ 35 , 372 Mont. 38 , 309 P.3d 978 (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618-19 , 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2245 (1976)).

2009Deines argues that this Court should extend a line of cases that advise Montana courts to “view with distrust” the failure of law enforcement to preserve a record of particular evidentiary matters. ¶11 This Court first articulated this “viewed with distrust” approach in State v. Grey, in the context of a police officer’s failure to record Miranda warnings advising a suspect of his rights. 274 Mont. 206, 214 , 907 P.2d 951, 956 (1995).

2009Deines argues that this Court should extend a line of cases that advise Montana courts to “view with distrust” the failure of law enforcement to preserve a record of particular evidentiary matters. ¶11 This Court first articulated this “viewed with distrust” approach in State v. Grey, in the context of a police officer’s failure to record Miranda warnings advising a suspect of his rights. 274 Mont. 206, 214 , 907 P.2d 951, 956 (1995).

2014See State v. Reavley, 2003 MT 298, ¶ 16 , 318 Mont. 150 , 79 P.3d 270 ; State v. Phelps, 215 Mont. 217, 225 , 696 P.2d 447, 452 (1985); Allies, 186 Mont. at 113 , 606 P.2d at 1051 . ¶26 Though not specifically addressed by the District Court’s findings, we are also concerned by the manner in which Doyle administered the Miranda warning at the beginning of the 2008 interview.

2014See State v. Reavley, 2003 MT 298, ¶ 16 , 318 Mont. 150 , 79 P.3d 270 ; State v. Phelps, 215 Mont. 217, 225 , 696 P.2d 447, 452 (1985); Allies, 186 Mont. at 113 , 606 P.2d at 1051 . ¶26 Though not specifically addressed by the District Court’s findings, we are also concerned by the manner in which Doyle administered the Miranda warning at the beginning of the 2008 interview.

2017Olson, ¶ 18 (quoting State v. Belgarde, 1998 MT 152, ¶ 26 , 289 Mont. 287 , 962 P.2d 571 ). “[F]ailure to give the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally requires exclusion of any statements obtained.” Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 , 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2608 (2004). ¶12 Whether a “custodial interrogation” has occurred which requires law enforcement officers to issue Miranda warnings before questioning can begin involves a two-step inquiry: “(1) whether the individual was ‘in custody’ and (2) whether the individual was subjected to an ‘int

2017Olson, ¶ 18 (quoting State v. Belgarde, 1998 MT 152, ¶ 26 , 289 Mont. 287 , 962 P.2d 571 ). “[F]ailure to give the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally requires exclusion of any statements obtained.” Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 , 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2608 (2004). ¶12 Whether a “custodial interrogation” has occurred which requires law enforcement officers to issue Miranda warnings before questioning can begin involves a two-step inquiry: “(1) whether the individual was ‘in custody’ and (2) whether the individual was subjected to an ‘int

2009In State v. Cassell, the Court held that evidence supported a determination that the defendant voluntarily waived his rights and confessed, notwithstanding the failure of police to record the warnings and waiver. 280 Mont. 397, 403 , 932 P.2d 478, 481 (1996).

2009In State v. Cassell, the Court held that evidence supported a determination that the defendant voluntarily waived his rights and confessed, notwithstanding the failure of police to record the warnings and waiver. 280 Mont. 397, 403 , 932 P.2d 478, 481 (1996).

2009In State v. Lawrence, the Court held that police officers’ failure to tape record Miranda warnings and waiver did not vitiate other evidence supporting the conclusion that the defendant voluntarily waived his rights. 285 Mont. 140, 155-56 , 948 P.2d 186, 195 (1997).

2009In State v. Lawrence, the Court held that police officers’ failure to tape record Miranda warnings and waiver did not vitiate other evidence supporting the conclusion that the defendant voluntarily waived his rights. 285 Mont. 140, 155-56 , 948 P.2d 186, 195 (1997).

2021State v. Larson, 2010 MT 236, ¶ 30 , 358 Mont. 156 , 243 P.3d 1130 (quoting Hurlbert, ¶ 34; Elison, ¶ 29) (“law enforcement officers need not administer Miranda warnings to suspects during brief investigative encounters even if those encounters are somewhat coercive” given “the brevity of questioning and its public setting, even though few motorists would feel free to leave” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437 , 104 S. Ct. at 3148-49 (“Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which t

2021State v. Larson, 2010 MT 236, ¶ 30 , 358 Mont. 156 , 243 P.3d 1130 (quoting Hurlbert, ¶ 34; Elison, ¶ 29) (“law enforcement officers need not administer Miranda warnings to suspects during brief investigative encounters even if those encounters are somewhat coercive” given “the brevity of questioning and its public setting, even though few motorists would feel free to leave” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437 , 104 S. Ct. at 3148-49 (“Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which t

2017Additionally, “we note that while consideration of these factors might be useful, the ultimate inquiry is not whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave, but rather whether there was a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Elison, ¶ 28 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 , 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529 (1994)). ¶13 In State v. Dawson, 1999 MT 171 , 295 Mont. 212 , 983 P.2d 916 , we held that Miranda warnings were not required where a defendant was questioned in his hotel room because although the “mood in the room

2017Additionally, “we note that while consideration of these factors might be useful, the ultimate inquiry is not whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave, but rather whether there was a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Elison, ¶ 28 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 , 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529 (1994)). ¶13 In State v. Dawson, 1999 MT 171 , 295 Mont. 212 , 983 P.2d 916 , we held that Miranda warnings were not required where a defendant was questioned in his hotel room because although the “mood in the room

2010The I State responds that the investigation was analogous to a Terry stop, and Miranda warnings were not required. ¶30 This Court recognizes that “ Taw enforcement officers need not administer Miranda warnings to suspects during brief investigative encounters even if those encounters are somewhat coercive.’ ” State v. Hurlbert, 2009 MT 221, ¶ 34 , 351 Mont. 316 , 211 P.3d 869 (quoting State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 27 , 302 Mont. 228 , 14 P.3d 456 ).

2010The I State responds that the investigation was analogous to a Terry stop, and Miranda warnings were not required. ¶30 This Court recognizes that “ Taw enforcement officers need not administer Miranda warnings to suspects during brief investigative encounters even if those encounters are somewhat coercive.’ ” State v. Hurlbert, 2009 MT 221, ¶ 34 , 351 Mont. 316 , 211 P.3d 869 (quoting State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 27 , 302 Mont. 228 , 14 P.3d 456 ).

2003This Court examines the following six factors to determine whether or not a custodial interrogation has occurred: “(1) place of the interrogation; (2) time of the interrogation; (3) persons present during the interrogation; (4) whether Miranda warnings were gratuitously given; (5) the length and mood of the interrogation; and (6) whether or not the suspect was arrested following the interrogation.” Olson (2003), ¶ 15 (citing State v. Staat (1991), 251 Mont. 1, 6 , 822 P.2d 643, 646 ). *157 ¶20 An interrogation is not custodial and Miranda is not required merely because an interrogation took pl

2003This Court examines the following six factors to determine whether or not a custodial interrogation has occurred: “(1) place of the interrogation; (2) time of the interrogation; (3) persons present during the interrogation; (4) whether Miranda warnings were gratuitously given; (5) the length and mood of the interrogation; and (6) whether or not the suspect was arrested following the interrogation.” Olson (2003), ¶ 15 (citing State v. Staat (1991), 251 Mont. 1, 6 , 822 P.2d 643, 646 ). *157 ¶20 An interrogation is not custodial and Miranda is not required merely because an interrogation took pl

2017Equally well established, it does not violate “ ‘due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest [pre- Miranda] silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand.’ ” Finley, 276 Mont. at 139 , 915 P.2d at 216 (quoting Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 , 102 S. Ct. 1309, 1312 (1982)); accord State v. Schaff, 2011 MT 19, ¶ 15 , 359 Mont. 185 , 247 P.3d 727 (concluding that “Doyle does not preclude impeaching a testifying defendant using inconsistent pre- Miranda statements or omissions”); State v. Clausell, 2001 MT 62, ¶ 61 , 305 Mont. 1 , 22 P.3d 1111 (concluding

2017Equally well established, it does not violate “ ‘due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest [pre- Miranda] silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand.’ ” Finley, 276 Mont. at 139 , 915 P.2d at 216 (quoting Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 , 102 S. Ct. 1309, 1312 (1982)); accord State v. Schaff, 2011 MT 19, ¶ 15 , 359 Mont. 185 , 247 P.3d 727 (concluding that “Doyle does not preclude impeaching a testifying defendant using inconsistent pre- Miranda statements or omissions”); State v. Clausell, 2001 MT 62, ¶ 61 , 305 Mont. 1 , 22 P.3d 1111 (concluding

2014See State v. Reavley, 2003 MT 298, ¶ 16 , 318 Mont. 150 , 79 P.3d 270 ; State v. Phelps, 215 Mont. 217, 225 , 696 P.2d 447, 452 (1985); Allies, 186 Mont. at 113 , 606 P.2d at 1051 . ¶26 Though not specifically addressed by the District Court’s findings, we are also concerned by the manner in which Doyle administered the Miranda warning at the beginning of the 2008 interview.

2014See State v. Reavley, 2003 MT 298, ¶ 16 , 318 Mont. 150 , 79 P.3d 270 ; State v. Phelps, 215 Mont. 217, 225 , 696 P.2d 447, 452 (1985); Allies, 186 Mont. at 113 , 606 P.2d at 1051 . ¶26 Though not specifically addressed by the District Court’s findings, we are also concerned by the manner in which Doyle administered the Miranda warning at the beginning of the 2008 interview.

2008See also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297 (1980) (referring to “the now familiar Miranda warnings ... or their equivalent”).

2007Accordingly, if Munson was subject to a “custodial interrogation,” then she was entitled to the Miranda warnings before the Officers questioned her, and because Munson indisputably did not receive those warnings, her statements could not be used by the State in prosecuting her. ¶21 There are two separate components to the “custodial interrogation” determination: (1) whether the individual was “in custody’ and (2) whether the individual was subjected to an “interrogation.” See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299-301 , 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689 (1980); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 , 1

2017Olson, ¶ 18 (quoting State v. Belgarde, 1998 MT 152, ¶ 26 , 289 Mont. 287 , 962 P.2d 571 ). “[F]ailure to give the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally requires exclusion of any statements obtained.” Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 , 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2608 (2004). ¶12 Whether a “custodial interrogation” has occurred which requires law enforcement officers to issue Miranda warnings before questioning can begin involves a two-step inquiry: “(1) whether the individual was ‘in custody’ and (2) whether the individual was subjected to an ‘int

2017Olson, ¶ 18 (quoting State v. Belgarde, 1998 MT 152, ¶ 26 , 289 Mont. 287 , 962 P.2d 571 ). “[F]ailure to give the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally requires exclusion of any statements obtained.” Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 , 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2608 (2004). ¶12 Whether a “custodial interrogation” has occurred which requires law enforcement officers to issue Miranda warnings before questioning can begin involves a two-step inquiry: “(1) whether the individual was ‘in custody’ and (2) whether the individual was subjected to an ‘int

2014See State v. Reavley, 2003 MT 298, ¶ 16 , 318 Mont. 150 , 79 P.3d 270 ; State v. Phelps, 215 Mont. 217, 225 , 696 P.2d 447, 452 (1985); Allies, 186 Mont. at 113 , 606 P.2d at 1051 . ¶26 Though not specifically addressed by the District Court’s findings, we are also concerned by the manner in which Doyle administered the Miranda warning at the beginning of the 2008 interview.

2014See State v. Reavley, 2003 MT 298, ¶ 16 , 318 Mont. 150 , 79 P.3d 270 ; State v. Phelps, 215 Mont. 217, 225 , 696 P.2d 447, 452 (1985); Allies, 186 Mont. at 113 , 606 P.2d at 1051 . ¶26 Though not specifically addressed by the District Court’s findings, we are also concerned by the manner in which Doyle administered the Miranda warning at the beginning of the 2008 interview.

2013Overall, the “record indicates that [Beach] received ten Miranda warnings between January 4 and January 11.” Beach v. State, 217 Mont. 132, 152 , 705 P.2d 94, 106 (1985).

2013Overall, the “record indicates that [Beach] received ten Miranda warnings between January 4 and January 11.” Beach v. State, 217 Mont. 132, 152 , 705 P.2d 94, 106 (1985).

1991This Court looks to whether a “reasonable person” would not feel free to leave and has used six factors to determine “custodial interrogation.” “[P]lace of interrogation, the time of interrogation, persons present during interrogation, whether Miranda warnings were gratuitously given, the length and mood of interrogation, and whether or not the suspect was arrested following questioning.” State v. Lapp (1983), 202 Mont. 327, 331 , 658 P.2d 400, 403 .

1991This Court looks to whether a “reasonable person” would not feel free to leave and has used six factors to determine “custodial interrogation.” “[P]lace of interrogation, the time of interrogation, persons present during interrogation, whether Miranda warnings were gratuitously given, the length and mood of interrogation, and whether or not the suspect was arrested following questioning.” State v. Lapp (1983), 202 Mont. 327, 331 , 658 P.2d 400, 403 .

1991Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’ ” Dannels, 734 P.2d at 193 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason (1977), 429 U.S. 492, 495 , 97 S.Ct. 711, 714 , 50 L.Ed. 2d 714, 719 ).

1991Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him `in custody.'" Dannels, 734 P.2d at 193 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason (1977), 429 U.S. 492, 495 , 97 S.Ct. 711, 714 , 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 719 ).

2015State v. Johnson, 177 Mont. 182, 187 , 580 P.2d 1387, 1390 (1978). ¶17 Braulick also argues that his statements must be excluded because they were made after he attempted to invoke his right to counsel.

2015State v. Johnson, 177 Mont. 182, 187 , 580 P.2d 1387, 1390 (1978). ¶17 Braulick also argues that his statements must be excluded because they were made after he attempted to invoke his right to counsel.

2007With respect to the former, a person is “in custody” for purposes of Miranda “if they have been deprived of their freedom of action in any significant way or their freedom of action has been curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest.” State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 27 , 302 Mont. 228, ¶ 27 , 14 P.3d 456, ¶ 27 (citing State v. Dawson, 1999 MT 171, ¶ 30 , 295 Mont. 212, ¶ 30 , 983 P.2d 916, ¶ 30 , in turn quoting United States v. Ritchie, 35 F.3d 1477, 1485 (10th Cir. 1994)).

2007With respect to the former, a person is “in custody” for purposes of Miranda “if they have been deprived of their freedom of action in any significant way or their freedom of action has been curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest.” State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 27 , 302 Mont. 228, ¶ 27 , 14 P.3d 456, ¶ 27 (citing State v. Dawson, 1999 MT 171, ¶ 30 , 295 Mont. 212, ¶ 30 , 983 P.2d 916, ¶ 30 , in turn quoting United States v. Ritchie, 35 F.3d 1477, 1485 (10th Cir. 1994)).

1998This Court has adopted the United States Supreme Court's rule in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , "that states may not use confessions or admissions resulting from a 'custodial interrogation' unless the proper Miranda warnings have been given." State v. Rushton (1994), 264 Mont. 248, 255 , 870 P.2d 1355, 1359 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 ).

1998This Court has adopted the United States Supreme Court's rule in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , "that states may not use confessions or admissions resulting from a 'custodial interrogation' unless the proper Miranda warnings have been given." State v. Rushton (1994), 264 Mont. 248, 255 , 870 P.2d 1355, 1359 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 ).

1979In Brown v. Illinois (1975), 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 , the United States Supreme Court stated that compliance at some point in the procedure with the Miranda warnings does not ipso facto remove the taint of an illegal investigatory arrest.

1979In Brown v. Illinois (1975), 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 , the United States Supreme Court stated that compliance at some point in the procedure with the Miranda warnings does not ipso facto remove the taint of an illegal investigatory arrest.

2001Such comment makes no unfair use of silence, because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent.” State v. Wiman (1989), 236 Mont. 180, 187 , 769 P.2d 1200, 1204 (citing Anderson v. Charles (1980), 447 U.S. 404, 408 , 100 S.Ct. 2180, 2188 , 65 L.Ed.2d 222 ).

2001Such comment makes no unfair use of silence, because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent.” State v. Wiman (1989), 236 Mont. 180, 187 , 769 P.2d 1200, 1204 (citing Anderson v. Charles (1980), 447 U.S. 404, 408 , 100 S.Ct. 2180, 2188 , 65 L.Ed.2d 222 ).

2017The Justice Court determined that Maile was not intimidated or coerced into admitting to the wardens that he illegally harvested deer in both Carbon County and Yellowstone County. ¶23 While both the Justice Court and the District Court seemed to conflate the analysis of the Miranda issue above with the voluntariness issue addressed here, it is important to note that these are two distinct grounds upon which Maile challenges the admissibility of his statements and it is necessary to analyze these discrete issues accordingly.2 Unlike the Miranda doctrine, which is grounded in the Fifth Amendment

2017The Justice Court determined that Maile was not intimidated or coerced into admitting to the wardens that he illegally harvested deer in both Carbon County and Yellowstone County. ¶23 While both the Justice Court and the District Court seemed to conflate the analysis of the Miranda issue above with the voluntariness issue addressed here, it is important to note that these are two distinct grounds upon which Maile challenges the admissibility of his statements and it is necessary to analyze these discrete issues accordingly.2 Unlike the Miranda doctrine, which is grounded in the Fifth Amendment