Miranda warning in Kentucky

2025ANALYSIS On appeal, Tribble argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements, which Tribble alleges were the result of police deception undermining the rights set out in Miranda v. Arizona, supra. Specifically, Tribble relies on Leger v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.3d 745 (Ky. 2013), to argue that Detective Schaefer’s statement regarding going to court “with” as opposed to “against” Tribble vitiated the previously given Miranda warnings, rendering his waiver and ensuing statements involuntary and/or unknowing.

2025In the context of a Miranda waiver, “[a]ny evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added).

2026“Miranda warnings are due only when a suspect interrogated by the police is ‘in custody.’” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 102 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). “[W]hether a defendant is in custody is a mixed question of law and fact to be reviewed de novo.” Commonwealth v. Lucas, 195 S.W.3d 403, 405 (Ky. 2006).

2022“Miranda warnings are due only when a suspect interrogated by the police is ‘in custody.’” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 102 (1995). “[W]hether a defendant is in custody is a mixed question of law and fact to be reviewed de novo.” Commonwealth v. Lucas, 195 S.W.3d 403, 405 (Ky. 2006).

2024As the defense points out, in [Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989)], the Miranda warnings have to be reasonably conveyed.

2024As the defense points out, in [Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989)], the Miranda warnings have to be reasonably conveyed.

2020They are 82See Smith v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 353, 358 (Ky. 2010) (holding that Miranda warnings are only required when a person is in the custody of a state actor conducting an interrogation). 83 Wells v. Commonwealth, 892 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Ky. 1995) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)). 34 likely to say something like “I didn’t do anything” or, in this instance, “I didn’t murder anyone.” Further, we have held in other cases that similar conduct to that of Jailer Fugate did not constitute an interrogation.

2020“Interrogation” under Miranda and its progeny means both the colloquial understanding of the word, and its broader definition of “any words or actions 81 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 82 See Smith v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 353, 358 (Ky. 2010) (holding that Miranda warnings are only required when a person is in the custody of a state actor conducting an interrogation). 34 on the part of police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect...focusing] primarily up

2018The motion alleged Roden had been questioned at the scene without benefit of a Miranda warning, he was in custody when questioned about whether the vehicle contained contraband, and Roden had been subjected to what amounted to a two-stage interview prohibited by Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 300, 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 1288, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985).

2018The motion alleged Roden had been questioned at the scene without benefit of a Miranda warning, he was in custody when questioned about whether the vehicle contained contraband, and Roden had been subjected to what amounted to a two-stage interview prohibited by Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 300, 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 1288, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985).

2022Returning to Callihan, we emphasize that our Supreme Court interpreted Seibert as requiring exclusion of post-warning statements only “where police deliberately employ the technique to circumvent the suspect’s Miranda rights” and stated that such a determination cannot be made “absent an evidentiary hearing” addressing that specific issue. 142 S.W.3d at 125-26 (emphasis added).

2017Callihan v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 123, 126 (Ky. 2004).

2025Although such a statement is generally inadmissible, since taken in violation of Miranda . . . , the interrogating officer follows it with Miranda warnings and then leads the suspect to cover the same ground a second time.” Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604 , 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2605 , 159 L.

2025Although such a statement is generally inadmissible, since taken in violation of Miranda . . . , the interrogating officer follows it with Miranda warnings and then leads the suspect to cover the same ground a second time.” Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604 , 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2605 , 159 L.

2021But in reaching this decision, the [Salinas] plurality noted in a footnote, citing Doyle and Jenkins, that “Petitioner is correct that due process prohibits prosecutors from pointing to the fact that a defendant was silent after he heard Miranda warnings, but that rule does not apply where a suspect has not received the warnings' implicit promise that any silence will not be used against him.”28 Bartley ultimately held that “the giving of Miranda warnings generally bars the use of any ensuing silence.”29 And, even when Miranda warnings are given unnecessarily, “[w]hen an accused receives the M

2021But in reaching this decision, the [Salinas] plurality noted in a footnote, citing Doyle and Jenkins, that “Petitioner is correct that due process prohibits prosecutors from pointing to the fact that a defendant was silent after he heard Miranda warnings, but that rule does not apply where a suspect has not received the warnings' implicit promise that any silence will not be used against him.”28 Bartley ultimately held that “the giving of Miranda warnings generally bars the use of any ensuing silence.”29 And, even when Miranda warnings are given unnecessarily, “[w]hen an accused receives the M

2024In fact, the Court had previously explained that “the ‘rigidity’ of Miranda [does not] exten[d] to the precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant,” and that “no talismanic incantation [is] required to satisfy its strictures.” Id. at 202-03 (quoting California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2020In fact, the Court had previously explained that “the ‘rigidity’ of Miranda [does not] exten[d] to the precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant,” and that “no talismanic incantation [is] required to satisfy its strictures.” Id. at 202-03 (quoting California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2019For example, in Romans we held it was error to permit the Commonwealth to elicit from a police detective that at the time of arrest and interrogation, and after receiving Miranda warnings, the defendant “did not come forth with the explanation ... upon which he ultimately relied for his defense.” Romans, 547 S.W.2d at 130 ; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 468 n. 37 (1966), and Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1985).

1995Appellant cites to the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 , 106 S.Ct. 684 , 88 L.Ed.2d 628 (1986), where they held it was fundamentally unfair to use the defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda warnings silence as evidence against him.

2014Similarly, in Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 , 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), the Supreme Court held that a defendant could be impeached by his post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence noting that “the record does not indicate that respondent Weir received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent immediately after his arrest,” id. at 605, 102 S.Ct. 1309 , and “[i]n the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence wh

2014Similarly, in Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 , 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), the Supreme Court held that a defendant could be impeached by his post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence noting that “the record does not indicate that respondent Weir received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent immediately after his arrest,” id. at 605, 102 S.Ct. 1309 , and “[i]n the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence wh

2014The giving of Miranda warnings and an uncoerced statement must also be accompanied by a showing that the “accused understood these rights.” Id. (quoting Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384 , 130 S.Ct. 2250 ).

2014The giving of Miranda warnings and an uncoerced statement must also be accompanied by a showing that the “accused understood these rights.” Id. (quoting Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384 , 130 S.Ct. 2250 ).

2025If, after Miranda warnings are given, a defendant exercises the right to remain silent, Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619 , holds that such silence cannot be used against the defendant as evidence of guilt.

2024This tenet was born out of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Doyle v. Ohio that, because Miranda warnings implicitly inform an individual that their silence will not be used against him or her, it would be fundamentally unfair to allow that individual’s post-Miranda silence to be used against him or her at trial. 426 U.S. 610 , 617- 18 (1976). 32 However, Doyle and subsequent cases make it clear that not every isolated instance referring to post-arrest silence will be reversible error.

2025ANALYSIS On appeal, Tribble argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements, which Tribble alleges were the result of police deception undermining the rights set out in Miranda v. Arizona, supra. Specifically, Tribble relies on Leger v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.3d 745 (Ky. 2013), to argue that Detective Schaefer’s statement regarding going to court “with” as opposed to “against” Tribble vitiated the previously given Miranda warnings, rendering his waiver and ensuing statements involuntary and/or unknowing.

2025“The question of whether a defendant has voluntarily waived his Miranda rights is analyzed somewhat differently than the question of -15- Accordingly, we address Tribble’s arguments: first, whether Leger requires remand; second, whether the detectives’ statements during the interrogation were coercive; and third, whether Tribble’s waiver was unknowing. a) Application of Leger Tribble argues that the trial court failed to recognize that Leger embodies the broader principle that it is improper for police to use deceptive tactics to subvert any of the constitutional rights protected by the Mirand

2020In Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408 , 100 S.Ct. 2180 , 65 L.Ed.2d 222 (1980), however, the Court explained that the prohibition in Doyle “does not apply to cross-examination that merely inquires into prior inconsistent statements.” Thus, if after receiving the Miranda warnings the defendant does not invoke his right to remain silent and instead provides a statement to the police, it is permissible to cross-examine the defendant on how and why his prior statement is inconsistent with his trial testimony.

2020In Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408 , 100 S.Ct. 2180 , 65 L.Ed.2d 222 (1980), however, the Court explained that the prohibition in Doyle “does not apply to cross-examination that merely inquires into prior inconsistent statements.” Thus, if after receiving the Miranda warnings the defendant does not invoke his right to remain silent and instead provides a statement to the police, it is permissible to cross-examine the defendant on how and why his prior statement is inconsistent with his trial testimony.

2023The inquiry for making a custodial determination is whether the person was under formal arrest or whether there was a restraint of his freedom or whether there was a restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated with formal arrest.13 Stalcup cites Smith v. Commonwealth14 and Howes v. Fields,15 in support of his argument that he was in custody from the point of the officer’s show of 10 Smith v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 353, 358 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985)). 11 Id. (citing Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975)). 12 Id. (quoting Lucas, 195 S.W.3d at 405

2023The inquiry for making a custodial determination is whether the person was under formal arrest or whether there was a restraint of his freedom or whether there was a restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated with formal arrest.13 Stalcup cites Smith v. Commonwealth14 and Howes v. Fields,15 in support of his argument that he was in custody from the point of the officer’s show of 10 Smith v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 353, 358 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985)). 11 Id. (citing Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975)). 12 Id. (quoting Lucas, 195 S.W.3d at 405

2020They are 82See Smith v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 353, 358 (Ky. 2010) (holding that Miranda warnings are only required when a person is in the custody of a state actor conducting an interrogation). 83 Wells v. Commonwealth, 892 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Ky. 1995) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)). 34 likely to say something like “I didn’t do anything” or, in this instance, “I didn’t murder anyone.” Further, we have held in other cases that similar conduct to that of Jailer Fugate did not constitute an interrogation.

2013Second, although it could be argued that the question is one that is “normally attendant to arrest and custody,” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , it is not the sort of “booking question” for which a Miranda exception has been created.

2026“Miranda warnings are due only when a suspect interrogated by the police is ‘in custody.’” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 102 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). “[W]hether a defendant is in custody is a mixed question of law and fact to be reviewed de novo.” Commonwealth v. Lucas, 195 S.W.3d 403, 405 (Ky. 2006).

2026“Miranda warnings are due only when a suspect interrogated by the police is ‘in custody.’” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 102 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). “[W]hether a defendant is in custody is a mixed question of law and fact to be reviewed de novo.” Commonwealth v. Lucas, 195 S.W.3d 403, 405 (Ky. 2006).

2025When -19- undertaking a voluntariness analysis, a court must look at the totality of the circumstances, including “both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation[.]” Bailey, 194 S.W.3d at 300 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).

2013Several years later in Schneck-loth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), a case involving the voluntariness of a consent to search, the Supreme Court adopted the meaning of voluntariness used in the previous confession cases.

2014But in reaching this decision, the plurality noted in a footnote, citing Doyle and Jenkins , that “Petitioner is correct that due process prohibits prosecutors from pointing to the fact that a defendant was silent after he heard Miranda warnings, but that rule does not apply where a suspect has not received the warnings’ implicit promise that any silence will not be used against him.” Id. at 2182 n. 3. (citations omitted).

2014Again, the Salinas plurality stated “that due process prohibits prosecutors from pointing to the fact that a defendant was silent after he heard Miranda warnings,” id., but declined to apply that rule because the defendant “ha[d] not received the warnings’ implicit promise that any silence will not be used against him,” id.

2013See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 , 110 S.Ct. 2638 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (finding that Miranda warnings need not be given when questioning a person incident to the booking process at the police station); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 , 110 S.Ct. 2394 , 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990) (holding that Miranda warnings are not required where an undercover officer is acting as a prisoner for the purpose of acquiring information from other incarcerated inmates); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (stating that a roadside traffic stop is not custody within t

2013See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 , 110 S.Ct. 2638 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (finding that Miranda warnings need not be given when questioning a person incident to the booking process at the police station); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 , 110 S.Ct. 2394 , 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990) (holding that Miranda warnings are not required where an undercover officer is acting as a prisoner for the purpose of acquiring information from other incarcerated inmates); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (stating that a roadside traffic stop is not custody within t

2013See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 , 110 S.Ct. 2638 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (finding that Miranda warnings need not be given when questioning a person incident to the booking process at the police station); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 , 110 S.Ct. 2394 , 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990) (holding that Miranda warnings are not required where an undercover officer is acting as a prisoner for the purpose of acquiring information from other incarcerated inmates); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (stating that a roadside traffic stop is not custody within t

2013See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 , 110 S.Ct. 2638 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (finding that Miranda warnings need not be given when questioning a person incident to the booking process at the police station); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 , 110 S.Ct. 2394 , 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990) (holding that Miranda warnings are not required where an undercover officer is acting as a prisoner for the purpose of acquiring information from other incarcerated inmates); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (stating that a roadside traffic stop is not custody within t

2011Mills v. Commonwealth, 996 S.W.2d 473 (Ky.1999).

2010In fact, we noted in Mills , that "[t]he question of whether a defendant has voluntarily waived his Miranda rights is analyzed somewhat differently than the question of whether the underlying confession is voluntary." 996 S.W.2d at 481 .