Miranda warning in Oregon

2026Finally, the state argues that, like in State v. Vondehn, 348 Or 462 , 485- 86, 236 P3d 691 (2010), the questioning before the Miranda warnings was conversational and short in duration, and the circumstances were far less coercive here because defendant was not sitting in the back of a patrol car.

2026Finally, the state argues that, like in State v. Vondehn, 348 Or 462 , 485- 86, 236 P3d 691 (2010), the questioning before the Miranda warnings was conversational and short in duration, and the circumstances were far less coercive here because defendant was not sitting in the back of a patrol car.

2026Ultimately, because the encounter occurred at the scene of a fatal accident and the officers attempted to lessen the coercive impact of defendant’s position, the officers did not create “the sort of police-dominated atmosphere that Miranda warnings were intended to counteract.” Roble- Baker, 340 Or at 641 .

2026Ultimately, because the encounter occurred at the scene of a fatal accident and the officers attempted to lessen the coercive impact of defendant’s position, the officers did not create “the sort of police-dominated atmosphere that Miranda warnings were intended to counteract.” Roble- Baker, 340 Or at 641 .

2026When law enforcement fails to give Miranda warnings, we suppress not only the statements that a suspect makes in response to questioning but also evidence that “derives from or is a product of that constitu- tional violation.” Id.

2026To determine whether evidence derives from a prior Miranda violation, we consider the totality of the circumstances, including: “[T]he nature of the violation, the amount of time between the violation and any later statements, whether the suspect remained in custody before making any later statements, subsequent events that may have dissipated the taint of the earlier violation, and the use that the state has made of the unwarned statements.” Id. at 716 .

2026Article I, section 12 states in relevant part, “[n]o person shall be * * * compelled in any criminal prosecution to testify against himself.” To comply with the constitutional guarantee, offi- cers must give Miranda warnings before questioning “a per- son who is in full custody or in circumstances that create a setting which judges would and officers should recognize to be compelling.” State v. Shaff, 343 Or 639, 645 , 175 P3d 454 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2026Article I, section 12 states in relevant part, “[n]o person shall be * * * compelled in any criminal prosecution to testify against himself.” To comply with the constitutional guarantee, offi- cers must give Miranda warnings before questioning “a per- son who is in full custody or in circumstances that create a setting which judges would and officers should recognize to be compelling.” State v. Shaff, 343 Or 639, 645 , 175 P3d 454 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2026See Schwerbel, 233 Or App at 395 -98 700 State v. Crawford (concluding that the officer’s routine traffic stop of the defen- dant for driving with an unsafe vehicle became compelling circumstances and required Miranda warnings once the officer suspected the defendant of driving with a suspended license after running the defendant’s identification and detaining him); State v. McMillan, 184 Or App 63, 68-69 , 55 P3d 537 (2002), rev den, 335 Or App 355 (2003) (concluding that the officer’s statement to the defendant during a stop that a second officer will “come back and make a decision as to whe

2026See Schwerbel, 233 Or App at 395 -98 700 State v. Crawford (concluding that the officer’s routine traffic stop of the defen- dant for driving with an unsafe vehicle became compelling circumstances and required Miranda warnings once the officer suspected the defendant of driving with a suspended license after running the defendant’s identification and detaining him); State v. McMillan, 184 Or App 63, 68-69 , 55 P3d 537 (2002), rev den, 335 Or App 355 (2003) (concluding that the officer’s statement to the defendant during a stop that a second officer will “come back and make a decision as to whe

2026We explained that the concept of “full custody” was helpful because it “informs officers of a point at which no further question about the need to warn a detained person arises[,]” but that its “usefulness ends” when addressing other settings “that judges would and officers should recognize to be compelling[.]” 304 Or at 265 . 182 State v. Miller an independent basis” for requiring Miranda warnings in compelling circumstances, an analysis that this court has “consistently” applied since Magee).7 In addition to guaranteeing a right to remain silent, Article I, section 12, provides for “a ‘deriv

2025State v. Magee, 304 Or 261, 265-66 , 744 P2d 250 (1987) (Article I, section 12, “furnishes an independent basis” for requir- ing that police administer Miranda warnings.); State v. Mains, 295 Or 640, 645 , 669 P2d 1112 (1983) (Miranda-like 2 On appeal, defendant argues that Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution as well as the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution require that Miranda warnings are given before interrogating a probationer in compelling circumstances.

2015In Ayles , the Supreme Court held that, “ [g] iven that defendant’s illegal seizure led to an illegal search of defendant’s person that revealed defendant’s possession of a controlled substance and that that discovery, in turn, led to defendant’s arrest (which triggered the giving of the Miranda warnings), it is impossible to conclude that the Miranda warnings alone were adequate to break the causal chain between the illegal police conduct and the subsequent incriminating statements and discovery of evidence.” Id.

2015In Ayles , the Supreme Court held that, “ [g] iven that defendant’s illegal seizure led to an illegal search of defendant’s person that revealed defendant’s possession of a controlled substance and that that discovery, in turn, led to defendant’s arrest (which triggered the giving of the Miranda warnings), it is impossible to conclude that the Miranda warnings alone were adequate to break the causal chain between the illegal police conduct and the subsequent incriminating statements and discovery of evidence.” Id.

2026Those Miranda warnings are thus “prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant.” Id. at 476 .

2026Those Miranda warnings are thus “prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant.” Id. at 476 .

2019See Jackson, 364 Or at 21 (provision of Miranda warnings weighs in favor of voluntariness); State v. McAnulty, 356 Or 432, 459 , 338 P3d 653 (2014), cert den, ___ US ___, 136 S Ct 34 (2015) (the defendant’s confession was voluntary where it followed a valid Miranda waiver and where the defendant ini- tiated the interrogation herself); State v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 273 Or App 627, 638-39 , 359 P3d 532 (2015), rev den, 358 Or 611 (2016) (provision of Miranda warnings generally weighs in favor of voluntariness); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 US 420 , 433 n 20, 104 S Ct 3138 , 82 L Ed 2d 317 (198

2019See Jackson, 364 Or at 21 (provision of Miranda warnings weighs in favor of voluntariness); State v. McAnulty, 356 Or 432, 459 , 338 P3d 653 (2014), cert den, ___ US ___, 136 S Ct 34 (2015) (the defendant’s confession was voluntary where it followed a valid Miranda waiver and where the defendant ini- tiated the interrogation herself); State v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 273 Or App 627, 638-39 , 359 P3d 532 (2015), rev den, 358 Or 611 (2016) (provision of Miranda warnings generally weighs in favor of voluntariness); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 US 420 , 433 n 20, 104 S Ct 3138 , 82 L Ed 2d 317 (198

2026See State ex rel City of Pendleton v. Woodell, 338 Or App 85, 90 , 565 P3d 80 , rev den, 373 Or 815 (2025) (“[A]n officer is not required to obtain a waiver of the rights enumerated in Miranda warnings from a defendant who is not in cus- tody or compelling circumstances.”); Reed, 371 Or at 488 (“The state bears the burden of proving that a defendant’s unwarned statements were made under circumstances that were not compelling,” such that the Miranda warnings were not required.).

2026See State ex rel City of Pendleton v. Woodell, 338 Or App 85, 90 , 565 P3d 80 , rev den, 373 Or 815 (2025) (“[A]n officer is not required to obtain a waiver of the rights enumerated in Miranda warnings from a defendant who is not in cus- tody or compelling circumstances.”); Reed, 371 Or at 488 (“The state bears the burden of proving that a defendant’s unwarned statements were made under circumstances that were not compelling,” such that the Miranda warnings were not required.).

2026Thus, it is now well established that, to protect a person’s Article I, section 12, rights, before the police may ask any questions, they “are required to give Miranda warn- ings to persons in custody or otherwise compelling circum- stances.” Reed, 371 Or at 486 (emphases in original; internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. McAnulty, 356 Or 432, 454 , 338 P3d 653 (2014) (stating that, before questioning a suspect, “police are required to give Miranda warnings to persons in custody or otherwise compelling circumstances”).

2026Thus, it is now well established that, to protect a person’s Article I, section 12, rights, before the police may ask any questions, they “are required to give Miranda warn- ings to persons in custody or otherwise compelling circum- stances.” Reed, 371 Or at 486 (emphases in original; internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. McAnulty, 356 Or 432, 454 , 338 P3d 653 (2014) (stating that, before questioning a suspect, “police are required to give Miranda warnings to persons in custody or otherwise compelling circumstances”).

2026We explained that the concept of “full custody” was helpful because it “informs officers of a point at which no further question about the need to warn a detained person arises[,]” but that its “usefulness ends” when addressing other settings “that judges would and officers should recognize to be compelling[.]” 304 Or at 265 . 182 State v. Miller an independent basis” for requiring Miranda warnings in compelling circumstances, an analysis that this court has “consistently” applied since Magee).7 In addition to guaranteeing a right to remain silent, Article I, section 12, provides for “a ‘deriv

2025In her assignment of error, defendant contends that the state failed to “meet its burden to show a knowing waiver under [the] circumstances.” Specifically, defendant argues that her “intoxication, involvement in a significant automo- bile crash, and treatment in the hospital * * * rendered the waiver invalid” and that the record lacks evidence “about defendant repeating her rights, nodding along, signing a card, or explicitly responding with a ‘Yes, I understand.’ ” We disagree with defendant’s arguments. “[A] defendant’s statements obtained during a cus- todial interrogation are admissible on

2025State v. Delong, 357 Or 365, 373 , 350 P3d 433 (2015) (“The statements that the court held admissible in Vondehn followed belated Miranda warnings, and the test that the court articulated (whether the belated warnings were effective) applies in that circumstance.”); Jarnagin, 351 Or at 716 n 8 (the Vondehn test applies “when a defendant remains in custody and officers seek to remedy an earlier Miranda violation”).

2025State v. Delong, 357 Or 365, 373 , 350 P3d 433 (2015) (“The statements that the court held admissible in Vondehn followed belated Miranda warnings, and the test that the court articulated (whether the belated warnings were effective) applies in that circumstance.”); Jarnagin, 351 Or at 716 n 8 (the Vondehn test applies “when a defendant remains in custody and officers seek to remedy an earlier Miranda violation”).

2021See Jarnagin, 351 Or 703 (applying a derivative evidence analysis for statements made under cir- cumstances that were neither compelling nor custodial and after a Miranda violation and applying an analysis using the factors adopted from Missouri v. Seibert, 542 US 600 , 124 S Ct 2601 , 159 L Ed 2d 643 (2004), for statements that were made after Miranda was given).

2021See Jarnagin, 351 Or 703 (applying a derivative evidence analysis for statements made under cir- cumstances that were neither compelling nor custodial and after a Miranda violation and applying an analysis using the factors adopted from Missouri v. Seibert, 542 US 600 , 124 S Ct 2601 , 159 L Ed 2d 643 (2004), for statements that were made after Miranda was given).

2022See State v. Kell, 303 Or 89, 99 , 734 P2d 334 (1987) (concluding that there was no Miranda violation when the defendant unequivocally asked for a law- yer before discussing certain subjects, but otherwise con- tinued speaking to police; a defendant is “entitled to pick and choose what he wishe[s] to talk about”); see also State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 10 , 791 P2d 836 (1990) (concluding that the defendant had not invoked his right to remain silent when he said, “I have nothing to say” in response to a hypothet- ical description of how he might have killed his wife, and the defendant instead “mere

2022See State v. Kell, 303 Or 89, 99 , 734 P2d 334 (1987) (concluding that there was no Miranda violation when the defendant unequivocally asked for a law- yer before discussing certain subjects, but otherwise con- tinued speaking to police; a defendant is “entitled to pick and choose what he wishe[s] to talk about”); see also State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 10 , 791 P2d 836 (1990) (concluding that the defendant had not invoked his right to remain silent when he said, “I have nothing to say” in response to a hypothet- ical description of how he might have killed his wife, and the defendant instead “mere

2026See State v. Nelson, 285 Or App 345, 351 , 397 P3d 536 (2017) (explaining that a traffic stop or an investigatory detention does not require Miranda warnings “so long as the stop is no more lengthy or coercive than is typical”); State v. Prickett, 324 Or 489, 494-95 , 930 P2d 221 (1997) (administering FSTs does not, by itself, constitute compelling circumstances).

2026See State v. Nelson, 285 Or App 345, 351 , 397 P3d 536 (2017) (explaining that a traffic stop or an investigatory detention does not require Miranda warnings “so long as the stop is no more lengthy or coercive than is typical”); State v. Prickett, 324 Or 489, 494-95 , 930 P2d 221 (1997) (administering FSTs does not, by itself, constitute compelling circumstances).

2026Specifically, we have concluded that an officer “expressly confronting a suspect with evidence of probable cause * * * may make the circumstances sufficiently compel- ling to require Miranda warnings.” McMillan, 184 Or App at 68 ; see also State v. Werowinski, 179 Or App 522, 532 , 40 P3d 545 , rev den, 334 Or 632 (2002) (explaining that confronting the defendant with witness statements that incriminated the defendant would have made a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation understand that he was being ques- tioned in compelling circumstances).

2026Specifically, we have concluded that an officer “expressly confronting a suspect with evidence of probable cause * * * may make the circumstances sufficiently compel- ling to require Miranda warnings.” McMillan, 184 Or App at 68 ; see also State v. Werowinski, 179 Or App 522, 532 , 40 P3d 545 , rev den, 334 Or 632 (2002) (explaining that confronting the defendant with witness statements that incriminated the defendant would have made a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation understand that he was being ques- tioned in compelling circumstances).

1999See State v. Sparklin, 296 Or 85, 89 , 672 P2d 1182 (1983) (at least as long as the text of the federal Miranda warnings remains the law, the convenience of a single text exceeds any gain from improving that text); 3 State v. Olson, *407 83 Or App 516 , 731 P2d 1072 (1987) (suppression reversed where trial court held that the defendant must be advised that he may terminate questioning at any time, because such a warning exceeds Miranda requirements and full Miranda warnings were given).

1999See State v. Sparklin, 296 Or 85, 89 , 672 P2d 1182 (1983) (at least as long as the text of the federal Miranda warnings remains the law, the convenience of a single text exceeds any gain from improving that text); 3 State v. Olson, *407 83 Or App 516 , 731 P2d 1072 (1987) (suppression reversed where trial court held that the defendant must be advised that he may terminate questioning at any time, because such a warning exceeds Miranda requirements and full Miranda warnings were given).

2025See, e.g., State v. Beeson, 307 Or App 808, 825 , 479 P3d 576 (2020), adh’d to on recons, 309 Or App 787 , 482 P3d 821 (2021) (observing that “belated Miranda warnings, in certain contexts, can effectively cure an ear- lier violation”).

2025See, e.g., State v. Beeson, 307 Or App 808, 825 , 479 P3d 576 (2020), adh’d to on recons, 309 Or App 787 , 482 P3d 821 (2021) (observing that “belated Miranda warnings, in certain contexts, can effectively cure an ear- lier violation”).

2015The court in Jarnagin distinguished the attenuation inquiry under Article I, section 12, from the attenuation analysis under Article I, section 9: “Defendant argues that we should apply the particular methodology set out in State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 24-25 , 115 P3d 908 (2005), to determine whether evidence is the product of a Miranda violation.

2015The court in Jarnagin distinguished the attenuation inquiry under Article I, section 12, from the attenuation analysis under Article I, section 9: “Defendant argues that we should apply the particular methodology set out in State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 24-25 , 115 P3d 908 (2005), to determine whether evidence is the product of a Miranda violation.

2026See State v. Nelson, 285 Or App 345, 351 , 397 P3d 536 (2017) (explaining that a traffic stop or an investigatory detention does not require Miranda warnings “so long as the stop is no more lengthy or coercive than is typical”); State v. Prickett, 324 Or 489, 494-95 , 930 P2d 221 (1997) (administering FSTs does not, by itself, constitute compelling circumstances).

2026See State v. Nelson, 285 Or App 345, 351 , 397 P3d 536 (2017) (explaining that a traffic stop or an investigatory detention does not require Miranda warnings “so long as the stop is no more lengthy or coercive than is typical”); State v. Prickett, 324 Or 489, 494-95 , 930 P2d 221 (1997) (administering FSTs does not, by itself, constitute compelling circumstances).

2025See State v. Mendacino, 288 Or 231, 238 , 603 P2d 1376 (1979) (when detectives “persist[ ] in questioning” after adequate Miranda warnings and obtain confessions, those confessions “partake more of actual coercion” and can affect voluntariness); Ward, 367 Or at 191 (to ensure that any waiver is both knowing and voluntary, “officers must provide a person with the so-called Miranda warnings * * * in part ‘[b]ecause a custodial interrogation is inherently compelling’ ” (quoting Vondehn, 348 Or at 474 (brackets in Ward))).

2025See State v. Mendacino, 288 Or 231, 238 , 603 P2d 1376 (1979) (when detectives “persist[ ] in questioning” after adequate Miranda warnings and obtain confessions, those confessions “partake more of actual coercion” and can affect voluntariness); Ward, 367 Or at 191 (to ensure that any waiver is both knowing and voluntary, “officers must provide a person with the so-called Miranda warnings * * * in part ‘[b]ecause a custodial interrogation is inherently compelling’ ” (quoting Vondehn, 348 Or at 474 (brackets in Ward))).

2026See State ex rel City of Pendleton v. Woodell, 338 Or App 85, 90 , 565 P3d 80 , rev den, 373 Or 815 (2025) (“[A]n officer is not required to obtain a waiver of the rights enumerated in Miranda warnings from a defendant who is not in cus- tody or compelling circumstances.”); Reed, 371 Or at 488 (“The state bears the burden of proving that a defendant’s unwarned statements were made under circumstances that were not compelling,” such that the Miranda warnings were not required.).

2026See State ex rel City of Pendleton v. Woodell, 338 Or App 85, 90 , 565 P3d 80 , rev den, 373 Or 815 (2025) (“[A]n officer is not required to obtain a waiver of the rights enumerated in Miranda warnings from a defendant who is not in cus- tody or compelling circumstances.”); Reed, 371 Or at 488 (“The state bears the burden of proving that a defendant’s unwarned statements were made under circumstances that were not compelling,” such that the Miranda warnings were not required.).

2006Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a police officer is not obligated to administer Miranda warnings unless the suspect is “subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 US 420, 441 , 104 S Ct 3138 , 82 L Ed 2d 317 (1984); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 US 318, 320 , 114 S Ct 1526 , 128 L Ed 2d 293 (1994) (“An officer’s obligation to administer Miranda warnings attaches, however, ‘only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him “in custody.” ’ ” (quoting Oregon v. Mathia

2006Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a police officer is not obligated to administer Miranda warnings unless the suspect is “subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 US 420, 441 , 104 S Ct 3138 , 82 L Ed 2d 317 (1984); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 US 318, 320 , 114 S Ct 1526 , 128 L Ed 2d 293 (1994) (“An officer’s obligation to administer Miranda warnings attaches, however, ‘only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him “in custody.” ’ ” (quoting Oregon v. Mathia

2026A court must “suppress not only a defendant’s state- ments obtained in violation of Miranda but also evidence derived from that violation.” State v. Jarnagin, 351 Or 703 , 706 State v. Crawford 715-16, 277 P3d 535 (2012). “[T]he question whether testi- monial or physical evidence derives from a prior Miranda violation cannot be reduced to a mechanical formula but will vary depending on the totality of the circumstances.” Swan, 363 Or at 131 .

2026A court must “suppress not only a defendant’s state- ments obtained in violation of Miranda but also evidence derived from that violation.” State v. Jarnagin, 351 Or 703 , 706 State v. Crawford 715-16, 277 P3d 535 (2012). “[T]he question whether testi- monial or physical evidence derives from a prior Miranda violation cannot be reduced to a mechanical formula but will vary depending on the totality of the circumstances.” Swan, 363 Or at 131 .

2025E.g., State v. Turnidge, 359 Or 364, 402 , 374 P3d 853 , cert den, 580 US 1021 (2016) (that questioning occurred “at or within close proximity to [the defendant’s] home” “sig- nificantly” reduced “the likelihood that the circumstances were inherently compelling for purposes of the Article I, sec- tion 12, analysis”); State v. Shaff, 343 Or 639, 646 , 175 P3d 454 (2007) (“[T]he fact that the interview occurs in familiar surroundings diminishes the police-dominated atmosphere that Miranda warnings were intended to counteract.”).

2025E.g., State v. Turnidge, 359 Or 364, 402 , 374 P3d 853 , cert den, 580 US 1021 (2016) (that questioning occurred “at or within close proximity to [the defendant’s] home” “sig- nificantly” reduced “the likelihood that the circumstances were inherently compelling for purposes of the Article I, sec- tion 12, analysis”); State v. Shaff, 343 Or 639, 646 , 175 P3d 454 (2007) (“[T]he fact that the interview occurs in familiar surroundings diminishes the police-dominated atmosphere that Miranda warnings were intended to counteract.”).