Miranda warning in Oregon

2026Vondehn, 348 Or at 480 (“The Oregon Constitution requires Miranda warnings to ensure that a waiver of the rights conferred by Article I, section 12, is knowing as well as voluntary.”).

2026“The state bears the burden of production and persuasion to show that subsequently obtained evidence did not derive from an [earlier] Article I, section 12, violation.” State v. Crawford, 350 Or App 689, 705 , ___ P3d ___ (2026) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Vondehn, 348 Or 462, 467 , 236 P3d 691 (2010) (“[A] trial court must exclude defendant’s warned post-Miranda statements unless the state establishes that, considering the totality of the circumstances, when the police belatedly administer Miranda warnings, they effectively and accurately informed the defendant of hi

2026The totality of the circumstances must be considered, however, with the “overarching inquiry” being “whether the officers created the sort of police-dominated atmosphere that Miranda warnings were intended to counteract.” State v. Roble-Baker, 340 Or 631, 641 , 136 P3d 22 (2006).

2026Ultimately, because the encounter occurred at the scene of a fatal accident and the officers attempted to lessen the coercive impact of defendant’s position, the officers did not create “the sort of police-dominated atmosphere that Miranda warnings were intended to counteract.” Roble-Baker, 340 Or at 641 .

2026To determine whether evidence derives from a prior Miranda violation, we consider the totality of the circumstances, including: “[T]he nature of the violation, the amount of time between the violation and any later statements, whether the suspect remained in custody before making any later statements, subsequent events that may have dissipated the taint of the earlier violation, and the use that the state has made of the unwarned statements.” Id. at 716 .

2026When law enforcement fails to give Miranda warnings, we suppress not only the statements that a suspect makes in response to questioning but also evidence that “derives from or is a product of that constitutional violation.” Id.

2026See State v. Shaff, 343 Or 639, 642 , 175 P3d 454 (2007) (one officer’s presence inside a defendant’s trailer while a second officer questioned him from the front door did not require Miranda warnings); State v. Prickett, 324 Or 489, 494 , 930 P2d 221 (1997) (a person stopped by a single trooper for a traffic infraction “is neither in custody nor under compulsion in the constitutional sense”).

2026See State v. Shaff, 343 Or 639, 642 , 175 P3d 454 (2007) (one officer’s presence inside a defendant’s trailer while a second officer questioned him from the front door did not require Miranda warnings); State v. Prickett, 324 Or 489, 494 , 930 P2d 221 (1997) (a person stopped by a single trooper for a traffic infraction “is neither in custody nor under compulsion in the constitutional sense”).

2026The Miranda warnings “serve to counteract ‘the potentiality for compulsion’ and ensure that, if an individual makes a statement during a custodial interrogation, the statement is ‘the product of free choice.’ ” Reed, 371 Or at 485 (quoting Miranda, 384 US at 457 ).

2026The Miranda warnings “serve to counteract ‘the potentiality for compulsion’ and ensure that, if an individual makes a statement during a custodial interrogation, the statement is ‘the product of free choice.’ ” Reed, 371 Or at 485 (quoting Miranda, 384 US at 457 ).

2026Stopping a person to investigate a crime typically does not result in compelling circumstances, even if the person being questioned does not feel free to leave; however, Miranda warnings may be required if questioning involves “expressly confronting a suspect with evidence of probable cause to arrest.” State v. McMillan, 184 Or App 63, 67-68 , 55 P3d 537 (2002), rev den, 335 Or 355 (2003); see also State v. Gallegos-Torres, 343 Or App 65, 70-71 , 577 P3d 822 (2025) (concluding that, although the circumstances “likely were highly stressful” for the defendant, the amount of pressure exerted on t

2026Stopping a person to investigate a crime typically does not result in compelling circumstances, even if the person being questioned does not feel free to leave; however, Miranda warnings may be required if questioning involves “expressly confronting a suspect with evidence of probable cause to arrest.” State v. McMillan, 184 Or App 63, 67-68 , 55 P3d 537 (2002), rev den, 335 Or 355 (2003); see also State v. Gallegos-Torres, 343 Or App 65, 70-71 , 577 P3d 822 (2025) (concluding that, although the circumstances “likely were highly stressful” for the defendant, the amount of pressure exerted on t

2026The Miranda warnings “serve to counteract ‘the potentiality for compulsion’ and ensure that, if an individual makes a statement during a custodial interrogation, the statement is ‘the product of free choice.’ ” Reed, 371 Or at 485 (quoting Miranda, 384 US at 457 ).

2026The Miranda warnings “serve to counteract ‘the potentiality for compulsion’ and ensure that, if an individual makes a statement during a custodial interrogation, the statement is ‘the product of free choice.’ ” Reed, 371 Or at 485 (quoting Miranda, 384 US at 457 ).

2026We explained that the concept of “full custody” was helpful because it “informs officers of a point at which no further question about the need to warn a detained person arises[,]” but that its “usefulness ends” when addressing other settings “that judges would and officers should recognize to be compelling[.]” 304 Or at 265 . an independent basis” for requiring Miranda warnings in compelling circumstances, an analysis that this court has “consistently” applied since Magee).7 In addition to guaranteeing a right to remain silent, Article I, section 12, provides for “a ‘derivative or adjunct rig

2025After the officer questioned defendant about his evening, with two other officers present, defendant consented to, and the officer conducted three Field Sobriety 1 Defendant also argues that State v. Nelson, 285 Or App 345 , 397 P3d 536 (2017) (holding that “routine traffic stops” are not “sufficiently compelling to require Miranda warnings”), and the Oregon Supreme Court cases on which it was based (State v. Prickett, 324 Or 489 , 930 P2d 221 (1997); State v. Vu, 307 Or 419 , 770 P2d 577 (1989); and State v. Magee, 304 Or 261 , 744 P2d 250 (1987)) were wrongly decided.

2022See State v. Kell, 303 Or 89, 99 , 734 P2d 334 (1987) (concluding that there was no Miranda violation when the defendant unequivocally asked for a lawyer before discussing certain subjects, but otherwise continued speaking to police; a defendant is “entitled to pick and choose what he wishe[s] to talk about”); see also State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 10 , 791 P2d 836 (1990) (concluding that the defendant had not invoked his right to remain silent when he said, “I have nothing to say” in response to a hypothetical description of how he might have killed his wife, and the defendant instead “merely exe

2022See State v. Kell, 303 Or 89, 99 , 734 P2d 334 (1987) (concluding that there was no Miranda violation when the defendant unequivocally asked for a lawyer before discussing certain subjects, but otherwise continued speaking to police; a defendant is “entitled to pick and choose what he wishe[s] to talk about”); see also State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 10 , 791 P2d 836 (1990) (concluding that the defendant had not invoked his right to remain silent when he said, “I have nothing to say” in response to a hypothetical description of how he might have killed his wife, and the defendant instead “merely exe

2026Thus, it is now well established that, to protect a person’s Article I, section 12, rights, before the police may ask any questions, they “are required to give Miranda warnings to persons in custody or otherwise compelling circumstances.” Reed, 371 Or at 486 (emphases in original; internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. McAnulty, 356 Or 432, 454 , 338 P3d 653 (2014) (stating that, before questioning a suspect, “police are required to give Miranda warnings to persons in custody or otherwise compelling circumstances”).

2026Thus, it is now well established that, to protect a person’s Article I, section 12, rights, before the police may ask any questions, they “are required to give Miranda warnings to persons in custody or otherwise compelling circumstances.” Reed, 371 Or at 486 (emphases in original; internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. McAnulty, 356 Or 432, 454 , 338 P3d 653 (2014) (stating that, before questioning a suspect, “police are required to give Miranda warnings to persons in custody or otherwise compelling circumstances”).

2015In Ayles , the Supreme Court held that, “ [g] iven that defendant’s illegal seizure led to an illegal search of defendant’s person that revealed defendant’s possession of a controlled substance and that that discovery, in turn, led to defendant’s arrest (which triggered the giving of the Miranda warnings), it is impossible to conclude that the Miranda warnings alone were adequate to break the causal chain between the illegal police conduct and the subsequent incriminating statements and discovery of evidence.” Id.

2015In Ayles , the Supreme Court held that, “ [g] iven that defendant’s illegal seizure led to an illegal search of defendant’s person that revealed defendant’s possession of a controlled substance and that that discovery, in turn, led to defendant’s arrest (which triggered the giving of the Miranda warnings), it is impossible to conclude that the Miranda warnings alone were adequate to break the causal chain between the illegal police conduct and the subsequent incriminating statements and discovery of evidence.” Id.

2026See State v. Shaff, 343 Or 639, 642 , 175 P3d 454 (2007) (one officer’s presence inside a defendant’s trailer while a second officer questioned him from the front door did not require Miranda warnings); State v. Prickett, 324 Or 489, 494 , 930 P2d 221 (1997) (a person stopped by a single trooper for a traffic infraction “is neither in custody nor under compulsion in the constitutional sense”).

2026See State v. Shaff, 343 Or 639, 642 , 175 P3d 454 (2007) (one officer’s presence inside a defendant’s trailer while a second officer questioned him from the front door did not require Miranda warnings); State v. Prickett, 324 Or 489, 494 , 930 P2d 221 (1997) (a person stopped by a single trooper for a traffic infraction “is neither in custody nor under compulsion in the constitutional sense”).

2019See Jackson, 364 Or at 21 (provision of Miranda warnings weighs in favor of voluntariness); State v. McAnulty, 356 Or 432, 459 , 338 P3d 653 (2014), cert den, ___ US ___, 136 S Ct 34 (2015) (the defendant’s confession was voluntary where it followed a valid Miranda waiver and where the defendant initiated the interrogation herself); State v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 273 Or App 627, 638-39 , 359 P3d 532 (2015), rev den, 358 Or 611 (2016) (provision of Miranda warnings generally weighs in favor of voluntariness); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 US 420 , 433 n 20, 104 S Ct 3138 , 82 L Ed 2d 317 (1984)

2019See Jackson, 364 Or at 21 (provision of Miranda warnings weighs in favor of voluntariness); State v. McAnulty, 356 Or 432, 459 , 338 P3d 653 (2014), cert den, ___ US ___, 136 S Ct 34 (2015) (the defendant’s confession was voluntary where it followed a valid Miranda waiver and where the defendant initiated the interrogation herself); State v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 273 Or App 627, 638-39 , 359 P3d 532 (2015), rev den, 358 Or 611 (2016) (provision of Miranda warnings generally weighs in favor of voluntariness); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 US 420 , 433 n 20, 104 S Ct 3138 , 82 L Ed 2d 317 (1984)

2026Specifically, we have concluded that an officer “expressly confronting a suspect with evidence of probable cause * * * may make the circumstances sufficiently compelling to require Miranda warnings.” McMillan, 184 Or App at 68 ; see also State v. Werowinski, 179 Or App 522, 532 , 40 P3d 545 , rev den, 334 Or 632 (2002) (explaining that confronting the defendant with witness statements that incriminated the defendant would have made a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation understand that he was being questioned in compelling circumstances).

2026Specifically, we have concluded that an officer “expressly confronting a suspect with evidence of probable cause * * * may make the circumstances sufficiently compelling to require Miranda warnings.” McMillan, 184 Or App at 68 ; see also State v. Werowinski, 179 Or App 522, 532 , 40 P3d 545 , rev den, 334 Or 632 (2002) (explaining that confronting the defendant with witness statements that incriminated the defendant would have made a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation understand that he was being questioned in compelling circumstances).

2025State v. Delong, 357 Or 365, 373 , 350 P3d 433 (2015) (“The statements that the court held admissible in Vondehn followed belated Miranda warnings, and the test that the court articulated (whether the belated warnings were effective) applies in that circumstance.”); Jarnagin, 351 Or at 716 n 8 (the Vondehn test applies “when a defendant remains in custody and officers seek to remedy an earlier Miranda violation”).

2025State v. Delong, 357 Or 365, 373 , 350 P3d 433 (2015) (“The statements that the court held admissible in Vondehn followed belated Miranda warnings, and the test that the court articulated (whether the belated warnings were effective) applies in that circumstance.”); Jarnagin, 351 Or at 716 n 8 (the Vondehn test applies “when a defendant remains in custody and officers seek to remedy an earlier Miranda violation”).

2020But see State v. Ward, 367 Or 188, 205 , 475 P3d 420 (2020) (“[A] short delay and change of location, alone, will generally not preclude the state from proving a valid waiver.”). *824 C.

2020But see State v. Ward, 367 Or 188, 205 , 475 P3d 420 (2020) (“[A] short delay and change of location, alone, will generally not preclude the state from proving a valid waiver.”). *824 C.

2021See Jarnagin, 351 Or 703 (applying a derivative evidence analysis for statements made under circumstances that were neither compelling nor custodial and after a Miranda violation and applying an analysis using the factors adopted from Missouri v. Seibert, 542 US 600 , 124 S Ct 2601 , 159 L Ed 2d 643 (2004), for statements that were made after Miranda was given).

2021See Jarnagin, 351 Or 703 (applying a derivative evidence analysis for statements made under circumstances that were neither compelling nor custodial and after a Miranda violation and applying an analysis using the factors adopted from Missouri v. Seibert, 542 US 600 , 124 S Ct 2601 , 159 L Ed 2d 643 (2004), for statements that were made after Miranda was given).

1999See State v. Sparklin, 296 Or 85, 89 , 672 P2d 1182 (1983) (at least as long as the text of the federal Miranda warnings remains the law, the convenience of a single text exceeds any gain from improving that text); 3 State v. Olson, *407 83 Or App 516 , 731 P2d 1072 (1987) (suppression reversed where trial court held that the defendant must be advised that he may terminate questioning at any time, because such a warning exceeds Miranda requirements and full Miranda warnings were given).

1999See State v. Sparklin, 296 Or 85, 89 , 672 P2d 1182 (1983) (at least as long as the text of the federal Miranda warnings remains the law, the convenience of a single text exceeds any gain from improving that text); 3 State v. Olson, *407 83 Or App 516 , 731 P2d 1072 (1987) (suppression reversed where trial court held that the defendant must be advised that he may terminate questioning at any time, because such a warning exceeds Miranda requirements and full Miranda warnings were given).

2025See State v. Beeson, 307 Or App 808, 827 , 479 P3d 576 (2020), adh’d to as modified on recons, 309 Or App 787 , 482 P3d 821 (2021) (subsequent events following Miranda violation, including fresh Miranda warnings and change in location to police station were a “clear change of circumstances * * * sufficient to remove the taint of the violation”); cf. Ward, 367 Or at 201 (fresh Miranda warnings after four days insufficient to attenuate violation of police failing to honor suspect’s invocation of his rights because that violation may give the impression that assertion of one’s rights is meaningle

2025See State v. Beeson, 307 Or App 808, 827 , 479 P3d 576 (2020), adh’d to as modified on recons, 309 Or App 787 , 482 P3d 821 (2021) (subsequent events following Miranda violation, including fresh Miranda warnings and change in location to police station were a “clear change of circumstances * * * sufficient to remove the taint of the violation”); cf. Ward, 367 Or at 201 (fresh Miranda warnings after four days insufficient to attenuate violation of police failing to honor suspect’s invocation of his rights because that violation may give the impression that assertion of one’s rights is meaningle

2015The court in Jarnagin distinguished the attenuation inquiry under Article I, section 12, from the attenuation analysis under Article I, section 9: “Defendant argues that we should apply the particular methodology set out in State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 24-25 , 115 P3d 908 (2005), to determine whether evidence is the product of a Miranda violation.

2015The court in Jarnagin distinguished the attenuation inquiry under Article I, section 12, from the attenuation analysis under Article I, section 9: “Defendant argues that we should apply the particular methodology set out in State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 24-25 , 115 P3d 908 (2005), to determine whether evidence is the product of a Miranda violation.

2026See Mathiason, 429 US at 492-96 (holding that it did not violate the Fifth Amendment to admit the defendant’s stationhouse confession, which he made without Miranda warnings, because the defendant was not in custody and was free to leave).

2006Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a police officer is not obligated to administer Miranda warnings unless the suspect is “subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 US 420, 441 , 104 S Ct 3138 , 82 L Ed 2d 317 (1984); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 US 318, 320 , 114 S Ct 1526 , 128 L Ed 2d 293 (1994) (“An officer’s obligation to administer Miranda warnings attaches, however, ‘only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him “in custody.” ’ ” (quoting Oregon v. Mathia

2026Article I, section 12, provides, in part, that no person “shall be * * * compelled in any criminal prosecution to testify against himself.” That constitutional right requires an officer to provide Miranda warnings before interrogating a suspect when the suspect is in full custody or is in “compelling circumstances.” State v. Nelson, 285 Or App 345, 349 , 397 P3d 536 (2017); State v. Roble-Baker, 340 Or 631, 640-41 , 136 P3d 22 (2006) (outlining nonexclusive factors that a court may consider in determining whether circumstances are compelling, including the location and length of the encounter,

2026Article I, section 12, provides, in part, that no person “shall be * * * compelled in any criminal prosecution to testify against himself.” That constitutional right requires an officer to provide Miranda warnings before interrogating a suspect when the suspect is in full custody or is in “compelling circumstances.” State v. Nelson, 285 Or App 345, 349 , 397 P3d 536 (2017); State v. Roble-Baker, 340 Or 631, 640-41 , 136 P3d 22 (2006) (outlining nonexclusive factors that a court may consider in determining whether circumstances are compelling, including the location and length of the encounter,

2025See State v. Mendacino, 288 Or 231, 238 , 603 P2d 1376 (1979) (when detectives “persist[ ] in questioning” after adequate Miranda warnings and obtain confessions, those confessions “partake more of actual coercion” and can affect voluntariness); Ward, 367 Or at 191 (to ensure that any waiver is both knowing and voluntary, “officers must provide a person with the so-called Miranda warnings * * * in part ‘[b]ecause a custodial interrogation is inherently compelling’ ” (quoting Vondehn, 348 Or at 474 (brackets in Ward))).

2025See State v. Mendacino, 288 Or 231, 238 , 603 P2d 1376 (1979) (when detectives “persist[ ] in questioning” after adequate Miranda warnings and obtain confessions, those confessions “partake more of actual coercion” and can affect voluntariness); Ward, 367 Or at 191 (to ensure that any waiver is both knowing and voluntary, “officers must provide a person with the so-called Miranda warnings * * * in part ‘[b]ecause a custodial interrogation is inherently compelling’ ” (quoting Vondehn, 348 Or at 474 (brackets in Ward))).

2026See State ex rel City of Pendleton v. Woodell, 338 Or App 85, 90 , 565 P3d 80 , rev den, 373 Or 815 (2025) (“[A]n officer is not required to obtain a waiver of the rights enumerated in Miranda warnings from a defendant who is not in custody or compelling circumstances.”); Reed, 371 Or at 488 (“The state bears the burden of proving that a defendant’s unwarned statements were made under circumstances that were not compelling,” such that the Miranda warnings were not required.).

2026See State ex rel City of Pendleton v. Woodell, 338 Or App 85, 90 , 565 P3d 80 , rev den, 373 Or 815 (2025) (“[A]n officer is not required to obtain a waiver of the rights enumerated in Miranda warnings from a defendant who is not in custody or compelling circumstances.”); Reed, 371 Or at 488 (“The state bears the burden of proving that a defendant’s unwarned statements were made under circumstances that were not compelling,” such that the Miranda warnings were not required.).

2026A court must “suppress not only a defendant’s statements obtained in violation of Miranda but also evidence derived from that violation.” State v. Jarnagin, 351 Or 703, 715-16 , 277 P3d 535 (2012). “[T]he question whether testimonial or *706 physical evidence derives from a prior Miranda violation cannot be reduced to a mechanical formula but will vary depending on the totality of the circumstances.” Swan, 363 Or at 131 .

2026A court must “suppress not only a defendant’s statements obtained in violation of Miranda but also evidence derived from that violation.” State v. Jarnagin, 351 Or 703, 715-16 , 277 P3d 535 (2012). “[T]he question whether testimonial or *706 physical evidence derives from a prior Miranda violation cannot be reduced to a mechanical formula but will vary depending on the totality of the circumstances.” Swan, 363 Or at 131 .

2020Comparing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 US 600 , 124 S Ct 2601 , 159 L Ed 2d 643 (2004), to Oregon v. Elstad, 470 US 298 , 105 S Ct 1285 , 84 L Ed 2d 222 (1985),4 the Jarnagin 4 In Elstad, the officers arrested the defendant in his house, but, before providing him with Miranda warnings, asked whether he was involved in a burglary. 470 US at 300-01 .

2020Comparing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 US 600 , 124 S Ct 2601 , 159 L Ed 2d 643 (2004), to Oregon v. Elstad, 470 US 298 , 105 S Ct 1285 , 84 L Ed 2d 222 (1985),4 the Jarnagin 4 In Elstad, the officers arrested the defendant in his house, but, before providing him with Miranda warnings, asked whether he was involved in a burglary. 470 US at 300-01 .

2026If a person in custody or compelling circumstances is given Miranda warnings and makes a “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary” waiver, then the police may proceed to interrogate them, and the person’s statements may be used against them at trial.1 State v. Nichols, 361 Or 101, 107 , 390 P3d 1001 (2017); see also Miranda, 384 US at 444 (“The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”).

2026If a person in custody or compelling circumstances is given Miranda warnings and makes a “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary” waiver, then the police may proceed to interrogate them, and the person’s statements may be used against them at trial.1 State v. Nichols, 361 Or 101, 107 , 390 P3d 1001 (2017); see also Miranda, 384 US at 444 (“The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”).