Miranda warning in Minnesota

2023Police are not required to give a Miranda warning when engaging in “general on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477 .

2016“Ordinarily, the State satisfies its burden of proving a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights if it shows: (1) Miranda warnings were given, (2) the defendant stated that he or she understood those warnings, and (3) then the defendant gave a statement.” Id. (citations omitted).

2023Safety, 357 N.W.2d 413, 416 (Minn. App. 1984) (“[U]pon arriving at the scene of an accident an officer need not give a Miranda warning to a person suspected of DWI.”); see also State v. Werner, 725 N.W.2d 767, 769-71 (Minn. App. 2007) (stating that asking a DWI suspect about alcohol consumption does not constitute an interrogation); State v. Herem, 384 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Minn. 1986) (observing that an “officer’s subjective intent or . . . belief that defendant was driving under the influence” does not on its own “necessitate a Miranda warning”).

2007Vonderharr asserts that he “did not feel he was free to leave because the officer had already asked the same question.” But a Miranda warning was not required because Vonderharr was not subjected to “treatment which can fairly be characterized as the functional equivalent of formal arrest.” Herem, 384 N.W.2d at 883 .

2024Camacho, 561 N.W.2d at 168 (citing State v. Linder, 268 N.W.2d 734, 735 (Minn. 1978)).

2016State v. Linder, 268 N.W.2d 734, 735 (Minn. 1978). 11 Walker argues that he invoked his right to remain silent when he told police, “No, I don’t have any recollection of an assault.” The district court found that Walker was given a Miranda warning, said he understood his rights, and then gave a voluntary statement.

2018See id. at 301-02 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 ; State v. Greenleaf , 591 N.W.2d 488 , 497 (Minn. 1999) (holding that questions that are unlikely to elicit incriminating responses do not require Miranda warnings).

2018See id. at 301-02 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 ; State v. Greenleaf , 591 N.W.2d 488 , 497 (Minn. 1999) (holding that questions that are unlikely to elicit incriminating responses do not require Miranda warnings).

2017As stated above, Miranda warnings are only required where “a suspect is both in custody and subject to interrogation.” Thompson, 788 N.W.2d at 491 . “[S]pontaneous, volunteered statement[s] not made in response to interrogation” will not be suppressed as a result of an arrestee not being given a Miranda warning.

2017As stated above, Miranda warnings are only required where “a suspect is both in custody and subject to interrogation.” Thompson, 788 N.W.2d at 491 . “[S]pontaneous, volunteered statement[s] not made in response to interrogation” will not be suppressed as a result of an arrestee not being given a Miranda warning.

2016“We review findings of fact surrounding a purported Miranda waiver for clear error, and we review legal conclusions based on those facts de novo to determine whether the state has shown by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the suspect’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” State v. Burrell, 697 N.W.2d 579, 591 (Minn. 2005).

2009Burrell, 697 N.W.2d at 592 (concluding that knowledge could be imputed when, before the Miranda warning, defendant had been handcuffed and told the investigators were looking into a little girl being shot); Jones, 566 N.W.2d at 325 n. 10 (holding that knowledge could be imputed when a number of police cars followed defendant in a high-speed chase, the officers handcuffed him, advised him that he was a suspect in a shooting, and that they worked for the sheriffs office).

2014Since Scales, law enforcement officers have been “legally obliged to tape record not just the so-called ‘formal statement’ by the defendant but the entire custodial interrogation, including the 4 giving of the Miranda warning, the obtaining of a waiver, and that part of the interrogation that [officers] euphemistically refer[] to as the ‘pre-interview.’” State v. Thaggard, 527 N.W.2d 804, 808 (Minn. 1995).

2007Similarly, in Thaggard , we upheld the voluntariness of a confession because even though the defendant thought he might receive drug treatment, he understood the Miranda warnings and knew that what he said could be used against him, and the defendant was never told, nor did the officer imply, that he would not be prosecuted if he gave a statement. 527 N.W.2d at 811-12 .

2023“The issue of whether a suspect is in custody and therefore entitled to a Miranda warning presents a mixed question of law and fact qualifying for independent review.” State v. Sterling, 834 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2013).

2016“The issue of whether a suspect is in custody and therefore entitled to a Miranda warning presents a mixed question of law and fact qualifying for independent review.” Sterling, 834 N.W.2d at 167 (quotation omitted).

2016“Statements made by a suspect during custodial interrogation are generally inadmissible unless the suspect is first given a Miranda warning.” State v. Edrozo, 578 N.W.2d 719, 724 (Minn. 1998).

2007Vonderharr also argues that the district court erred in concluding that he was not entitled to receive a Miranda warning before the trooper asked questions during the “second investigation.” “Statements made by a suspect during custodial interrogation are generally inadmissible unless the suspect is first given a Miranda warning.” State v. Edrozo, 578 N.W.2d 719, 724 (Minn.1998) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)).

1998Whatever relevance this fact may have to other issues in the case, it has nothing to do with whether respondent was in custody for purposes of the Miranda rule. 429 U.S. at 495-96 , 97 S.Ct. 711 .

1998Whatever relevance this fact may have to other issues in the case, it has nothing to do with whether respondent was in custody for purposes of the Miranda rule. 429 U.S. at 495-96 , 97 S.Ct. 711 .

2012See State v. Rosse, 478 N.W.2d 482, 486 (Minn.1991) (concluding that a Miranda warning should have been given looking at the record as a whole, including the presence of seven police officers).

2010See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); State v. Rosse, 478 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Minn.1991).

2014Accordingly, a Scales violation is not substantial “[i]f it is undisputed that the Miranda warning was administered, or that the accused waived his or her right to remain silent” because in such a case “the lack of a recording creates no prejudice to the accused.” Id.; see also Buckingham, 772 N.W.2d at 69 ; State v. Miller, 573 N.W.2d 661, 674-75 (Minn. 1998); Williams, 535 N.W.2d at 289 .

2013See, e.g., Waddell, 655 N.W.2d at 811 n. 3 (stating “criminal defendants are ... protected against coerced confessions by the recording requirement”); Miller, 573 N.W.2d at 674 (“The underlying rationale for our decision in Scales was to prevent factual disputes about the existence and context of Miranda warnings and any ensuing waiver of rights.”).

1988As appellant provided no testimony at the omnibus hearing to rebut the tape recordings, we must conclude the tapes reflect her true feelings of whether she was “in custody.” Appellant relies on State v. Stai, 381 N.W.2d 60 (Minn.Ct.App.1986) in arguing a Miranda warning must be given when the police have “reasonable grounds to believe both that a crime has been committed and that the defendant is the culprit.” Id. at 63 (quoting State v. Kinn, 288 Minn. 31, 35 , 178 N.W.2d 888, 891 (1970)).

1988As appellant provided no testimony at the omnibus hearing to rebut the tape recordings, we must conclude the tapes reflect her true feelings of whether she was “in custody.” Appellant relies on State v. Stai, 381 N.W.2d 60 (Minn.Ct.App.1986) in arguing a Miranda warning must be given when the police have “reasonable grounds to believe both that a crime has been committed and that the defendant is the culprit.” Id. at 63 (quoting State v. Kinn, 288 Minn. 31, 35 , 178 N.W.2d 888, 891 (1970)).

2010The State meets its burden of proving a knowing, intelligent, voluntary waiver of Miranda rights if it shows the “Miranda warnings were given and that the individual stated that he or she understood those rights and then gave a statement.” State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 168 (Minn.1997).

2005For a Miranda waiver to be valid, all suspects regardless of their age must fully understand their rights, including the right against self-incrimination that is guaranteed by both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution. 3 See id.

2015See Gross, 335 N.W.2d at 510 (explaining that a Miranda warning is not required).

1984ANALYSIS Here, it is unnecessary to deal at length with the “Miranda” question raised by the state, except to cite State v. Gross, 335 N.W.2d 509 (Minn.1983), for the holding that the police are not required to give a Miranda warning to a person before they give an implied consent advisory.

2012See State v. Greenleaf, 591 N.W.2d 488, 497 (Minn.1999) (noting that routine booking statements do not require Miranda warnings); State v. Link, 289 N.W.2d 102, 107 (Minn.1979) (stating that biographical questions do not require Miranda warnings); State v. Widell, 258 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Minn.1977) (explaining that routine booking questions relating to name, address, or other similar matters do not require a Miranda warning).

2012See State v. Greenleaf, 591 N.W.2d 488, 497 (Minn.1999) (noting that routine booking statements do not require Miranda warnings); State v. Link, 289 N.W.2d 102, 107 (Minn.1979) (stating that biographical questions do not require Miranda warnings); State v. Widell, 258 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Minn.1977) (explaining that routine booking questions relating to name, address, or other similar matters do not require a Miranda warning).

2004See, e.g., United States v. Lares-Valdez, 939 F.2d 688, 689-90 (9th Cir.1991) (defendant need not be warned of right to stop questioning, of option to answer some questions but not others or that some questions may produce incriminating responses); State v. Ouk, 516 N.W.2d 180, 185 (Minn.1994) (no requirement that juvenile be advised of possibility of being tried as an adult). [23] The assertion that a deliberate failure to give Miranda warnings can mandate the suppression of a post-warning confession despite the voluntariness of both statements, though supported by United States v. Carter, 88

2002There is no requirement that Miranda warnings “take a rigid form so long as they are correct in substance.” State v. Ouk, 516 N.W.2d 180, 185 (Minn.1994) (citation omitted).

2008Nevertheless, in Crisler we warned that “a cryptic or paraphrased warning or a warning that deviates from the standard Miranda warning may later be determined.* * * to be inadequate.” Id.

1995The error in the court's advisory is similar to the error found in Miranda warnings that link the Miranda right to counsel to "some future point in time after the police interrogation." State v. McBroom, 394 N.W.2d 806, 812 (Minn.App.1986) (warning that counsel would be appointed if defendant went to court was improper), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 1987); see also State v. Crisler, 438 N.W.2d 670, 671 (Minn.1989) (clarifying that suspect should be told he has a right to an attorney, and one will be appointed, before any questioning).

2011To decide the question presented in Billups , we applied Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that Miranda warnings carry the implicit assurance that “silence will carry no penalty....

2011To decide the question presented in Billups , we applied Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that Miranda warnings carry the implicit assurance that “silence will carry no penalty....

2023State v. Zabawa, 787 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Minn. 2010); see also State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277, 287 (Minn. 1995) (stating that the voluntariness requirement is separate from the Miranda requirement).

2014Accordingly, a Scales violation is not substantial “[i]f it is undisputed that the Miranda warning was administered, or that the accused waived his or her right to remain silent” because in such a case “the lack of a recording creates no prejudice to the accused.” Id.; see also Buckingham, 772 N.W.2d at 69 ; State v. Miller, 573 N.W.2d 661, 674-75 (Minn. 1998); Williams, 535 N.W.2d at 289 .

1991In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151-3152 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the prearrest roadside questioning of a defendant pursuant to a routine traffic stop did not constitute a “custodial interrogation” for purposes of the Miranda rule.

1991In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151-3152 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the prearrest roadside questioning of a defendant pursuant to a routine traffic stop did not constitute a “custodial interrogation” for purposes of the Miranda rule.

2014But if no party disputes whether the Miranda warning was given or whether the accused waived his right to remain silent, “the lack of a recording creates no prejudice to the accused.” Id.

2005In order to enforce our previous advisories, we exercised our supervisory power in Scales and held that “all custodial interrogation including any information about rights, any waiver of those rights, and all questioning shall be electronically recorded where feasible and must be recorded when questioning occurs at a place of detention.” Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 592 ; see also Thaggard, 527 N.W.2d at 808 (noting that when Scales applies, the interrogating officer would be “legally obliged to tape record not just the so-called ‘formal statement’ by the defendant but the entire custodial interrogat

2016State v. Dunkel, 466 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Minn. App. 1991); see State v. Billups, 264 N.W.2d 137, 139 (Minn. 1978) (holding that counsel- advised silence is protected to the same extent as silence following a Miranda warning). 4 In Dunkel, the investigating deputy testified that she spoke briefly to the defendant and verified his name and date of birth, but that he “declined an interview.” 466 N.W.2d at 427 .

2011In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.” Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 (cited in Billups, 264 N.W.2d at 138 ).

2014“The issue of whether a suspect is ‘in custody’ and therefore entitled to a Miranda warning ‘presents a mixed question of law and fact qualifying for independent review.’” State v. Sterling, 834 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2013) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 102 , 116 S. Ct. 457, 460 (1995)).

2014“The issue of whether a suspect is ‘in custody’ and therefore entitled to a Miranda warning ‘presents a mixed question of law and fact qualifying for independent review.’” State v. Sterling, 834 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2013) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 102 , 116 S. Ct. 457, 460 (1995)).

2007See State v. Combs, 292 Minn. 317, 322 , 195 N.W.2d 176, 179 (1972) (concluding that police officer’s testimony that defendant was given Miranda warnings was proper foundation for admission of defendant’s statement to the officer).

2007See State v. Combs, 292 Minn. 317, 322 , 195 N.W.2d 176, 179 (1972) (concluding that police officer’s testimony that defendant was given Miranda warnings was proper foundation for admission of defendant’s statement to the officer).