Miranda warning in Georgia

2024But Young did not 23 See Whatley v. State, 342 Ga. App. 796, 806 (3) (d) ( 805 SE2d 599 ) (2017) (“[T]rial counsel’s performance cannot be deemed deficient based upon her failure to raise a meritless objection to the admission of the Appellant’s custodial statements.”). 24 See Murray v. State, 306 Ga. App. 106, 107 ( 701 SE2d 579 ) (2010) (“[W]here the ineffectiveness claim underlying the motion to withdraw the plea is based on counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress, the defendant must make a strong showing that the damaging evidence would have been suppressed had counsel made the moti

2024But Young did not 23 See Whatley v. State, 342 Ga. App. 796, 806 (3) (d) ( 805 SE2d 599 ) (2017) (“[T]rial counsel’s performance cannot be deemed deficient based upon her failure to raise a meritless objection to the admission of the Appellant’s custodial statements.”). 24 See Murray v. State, 306 Ga. App. 106, 107 ( 701 SE2d 579 ) (2010) (“[W]here the ineffectiveness claim underlying the motion to withdraw the plea is based on counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress, the defendant must make a strong showing that the damaging evidence would have been suppressed had counsel made the moti

2019See Mallory , 261 Ga. at 630 , 409 S.E.2d 839 (announcing that "a comment [upon a defendant's silence or failure to come forward] will not be allowed even where the defendant has not received Miranda warnings and where he takes the stand in his own defense."); State v. Sims , 296 Ga. 465 , 469, 769 S.E.2d 62 (2015) (describing Mallory as "focus[ing] on commentary on a defendant's conduct between the time of the crime and prior to arrest").

2019See Mallory , 261 Ga. at 630 , 409 S.E.2d 839 (announcing that "a comment [upon a defendant's silence or failure to come forward] will not be allowed even where the defendant has not received Miranda warnings and where he takes the stand in his own defense."); State v. Sims , 296 Ga. 465 , 469, 769 S.E.2d 62 (2015) (describing Mallory as "focus[ing] on commentary on a defendant's conduct between the time of the crime and prior to arrest").

2023Because the trial court had relied on overruled precedent requiring a Miranda warning before a request to submit to a breath test,1 we vacated the suppression order and remanded for consideration of 1 See State v. Turnquest, 305 Ga. 758, 774-775 (4) ( 827 SE2d 865 ) (2019) (the Georgia Constitution does not require a Miranda warning before a suspect in custody is asked to submit to a breath test), overruling cases including Price v. State, 269 Ga. 222 ( 498 SE2d 262 ) (1998); Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179 , 210 (IV) ( 824 SE2d 265 ) (2019) (the Georgia Constitution’s right against compelled se

2023Because the trial court had relied on overruled precedent requiring a Miranda warning before a request to submit to a breath test,1 we vacated the suppression order and remanded for consideration of 1 See State v. Turnquest, 305 Ga. 758, 774-775 (4) ( 827 SE2d 865 ) (2019) (the Georgia Constitution does not require a Miranda warning before a suspect in custody is asked to submit to a breath test), overruling cases including Price v. State, 269 Ga. 222 ( 498 SE2d 262 ) (1998); Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179 , 210 (IV) ( 824 SE2d 265 ) (2019) (the Georgia Constitution’s right against compelled se

2017Unless a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would perceive that he was in custody, Miranda warnings are not necessary” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Sewell v. State, 283 Ga. 558, 560-561 (2) ( 662 SE2d 537 ) (2008).

2017Unless a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would perceive that he was in custody, Miranda warnings are not necessary” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Sewell v. State, 283 Ga. 558, 560-561 (2) ( 662 SE2d 537 ) (2008).

2022For example, in Aldridge v. State, 247 Ga. 142, 144-145 (2) ( 274 SE2d 525 ) (1980), the Supreme 15 All in all, the investigator’s questions about the black book bag in this case did not bear the hallmarks of a “custodial interrogation,” primarily because (a) Wright’s Court of Georgia stated that, “[s]o long as the interrogation is not aimed at obtaining information to establish a suspect’s guilt but is instead aimed at determining the nature of the situation upon the arrival of the policeman on the scene, some initial inquiry may, under the circumstances, be permissible before Miranda warning

2022For example, in Aldridge v. State, 247 Ga. 142, 144-145 (2) ( 274 SE2d 525 ) (1980), the Supreme 15 All in all, the investigator’s questions about the black book bag in this case did not bear the hallmarks of a “custodial interrogation,” primarily because (a) Wright’s Court of Georgia stated that, “[s]o long as the interrogation is not aimed at obtaining information to establish a suspect’s guilt but is instead aimed at determining the nature of the situation upon the arrival of the policeman on the scene, some initial inquiry may, under the circumstances, be permissible before Miranda warning

2023State v. Walden, 311 Ga. 389, 389 ( 858 SE2d 42 ) (2021) (citations and punctuation omitted); see also Tolliver v. State, 273 Ga. 785, 786 ( 546 SE2d 525 ) (2001) (“Miranda protections adhere when an individual is (1) formally arrested or (2) restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 ( 114 SCt 1526 , 128 LE2d 293) (1994)).10 Miranda outlines the procedures to be followed once warnings have been given, making clear that once warnings are given and one of the rights referenced therein is invoked, police must honor that invocation: 10

2023State v. Walden, 311 Ga. 389, 389 ( 858 SE2d 42 ) (2021) (citations and punctuation omitted); see also Tolliver v. State, 273 Ga. 785, 786 ( 546 SE2d 525 ) (2001) (“Miranda protections adhere when an individual is (1) formally arrested or (2) restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 ( 114 SCt 1526 , 128 LE2d 293) (1994)).10 Miranda outlines the procedures to be followed once warnings have been given, making clear that once warnings are given and one of the rights referenced therein is invoked, police must honor that invocation: 10

2018However, an officer's failure to read the Miranda warnings to a suspect who is in custody "does not mean that the statements received have actually been coerced, but only that courts will presume the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination has not been intelligently exercised." Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U.S. 298 , 310, 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985).

2018However, an officer's failure to read the Miranda warnings to a suspect who is in custody "does not mean that the statements received have actually been coerced, but only that courts will presume the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination has not been intelligently exercised." Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U.S. 298 , 310, 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985).

1989Moreover, the rule in Doyle v. Ohio, supra, was narrowed in Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U. S. 603 (102 SC 1309, 71 LE2d 490) (1982), which held that a defendant can be cross-examined as to his post-arrest silence when Miranda warnings are not given.

1989Moreover, the rule in Doyle v. Ohio, supra, was narrowed in Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U. S. 603 (102 SC 1309, 71 LE2d 490) (1982), which held that a defendant can be cross-examined as to his post-arrest silence when Miranda warnings are not given.

2020See Berghuis, 560 U. S. at 381 (III) (A); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U. S. 675, 680-82 (II) ( 108 SCt 2093 , 100 LE2d 704) (1988); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291, 302 (II) (B) ( 100 SCt 1682 , 64 LE2d 297) (1980); Everett v. Fla. Dept. of Corrections, 779 F3d 1212, 1240-41 (VII) (A) (11th Cir. 2015). purposes of Miranda warnings encompasses express questioning and words and actions that officers should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the subject.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2020See Berghuis, 560 U. S. at 381 (III) (A); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U. S. 675, 680-82 (II) ( 108 SCt 2093 , 100 LE2d 704) (1988); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291, 302 (II) (B) ( 100 SCt 1682 , 64 LE2d 297) (1980); Everett v. Fla. Dept. of Corrections, 779 F3d 1212, 1240-41 (VII) (A) (11th Cir. 2015). purposes of Miranda warnings encompasses express questioning and words and actions that officers should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the subject.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2004“Miranda warnings are not required simply because questioning takes place in a building containing jail cells.” (Citations omitted.) Hardeman v. State, 252 Ga. 286, 288 (1) ( 313 SE2d 95 ) (1984).

2004“Miranda warnings are not required simply because questioning takes place in a building containing jail cells.” (Citations omitted.) Hardeman v. State, 252 Ga. 286, 288 (1) ( 313 SE2d 95 ) (1984).

2017See also State v. Dixon , 267 Ga. App. 320 , 320-321, 599 S.E.2d 284 (2004) ("Under Georgia's protections against the [s]tate compelling an arrestee to give evidence against himself, the result of a field sobriety test performed when a suspect was 'in custody' will be admissible only if the request to perform the field sobriety test was preceded by Miranda warnings.") (footnote omitted); State v. O'Donnell , 225 Ga. App. 502 , 504 (2), 484 S.E.2d 313 (1997) (whole court 9) ("field sobriety tests given to a person under arrest, without giving him or her a Miranda warning first, are inadmissible

2017See also State v. Dixon , 267 Ga. App. 320 , 320-321, 599 S.E.2d 284 (2004) ("Under Georgia's protections against the [s]tate compelling an arrestee to give evidence against himself, the result of a field sobriety test performed when a suspect was 'in custody' will be admissible only if the request to perform the field sobriety test was preceded by Miranda warnings.") (footnote omitted); State v. O'Donnell , 225 Ga. App. 502 , 504 (2), 484 S.E.2d 313 (1997) (whole court 9) ("field sobriety tests given to a person under arrest, without giving him or her a Miranda warning first, are inadmissible

2022Unless a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would perceive that he was in custody, Miranda warnings are not necessary.” State v. Troutman, 300 4 See OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (5) (permitting State’s appeal from an order excluding certain evidence the State seeks to offer at trial). 10 Ga. 616 , 617 (1) ( 797 SE2d 72 ) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022A person is considered to be in custody and Miranda warnings are required when a person is (1) formally arrested or (2) restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” State v. Troutman, 300 Ga. 616, 617 (1) ( 797 SE2d 72 ) (2017) (citation omitted).

2015As long as a person is not in custody, it is irrelevant to the Miranda analysis that investigators “(1) might have focused their suspicions upon the person being questioned, or (2) have already decided that they will take the person into custody and charge [him] with an offense.” Hardin v. State, 269 Ga. 1, 3 ( 494 SE2d 647 ) (1998).

2015As long as a person is not in custody, it is irrelevant to the Miranda analysis that investigators “(1) might have focused their suspicions upon the person being questioned, or (2) have already decided that they will take the person into custody and charge [him] with an offense.” Hardin v. State, 269 Ga. 1, 3 ( 494 SE2d 647 ) (1998).

2024With regard to whether a defendant is advised of her constitutional rights, “[i]t is axiomatic that a rendering of the Miranda warnings must be intelligible before a defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive the rights involved.” Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 825-826 (2) (A) (2) ( 725 SE2d 260 ) (2012).

2024With regard to whether a defendant is advised of her constitutional rights, “[i]t is axiomatic that a rendering of the Miranda warnings must be intelligible before a defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive the rights involved.” Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 825-826 (2) (A) (2) ( 725 SE2d 260 ) (2012).

2024Additionally, while Tripp argues that shaking his head, putting his pen down, and saying “No” when asked to sign the Miranda waiver form “evinced his desire to invoke his right to remain silent,” those acts did not unambiguously and unequivocally indicate that Tripp “wanted to remain silent or that he did not want to talk with the police,” id. at 382 (III) (A), particularly since—as noted above—he verbally acknowledged that he understood his Miranda rights and then voluntarily discussed the case with law enforcement officers.

2024Additionally, while Tripp argues that shaking his head, putting his pen down, and saying “No” when asked to sign the Miranda waiver form “evinced his desire to invoke his right to remain silent,” those acts did not unambiguously and unequivocally 30 indicate that Tripp “wanted to remain silent or that he did not want to talk with the police,” id. at 382 (III) (A), particularly since — as noted above — he verbally acknowledged that he understood his Miranda rights and then voluntarily discussed the case with law enforcement officers.

2020See Freeman v. State, 295 Ga. 820 , 822- 823 ( 764 SE2d 390 ) (2014) (“Miranda warnings are required when a person is (1) formally arrested or (2) restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.

2020See Freeman v. State, 295 Ga. 820 , 822- 823 ( 764 SE2d 390 ) (2014) (“Miranda warnings are required when a person is (1) formally arrested or (2) restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.

2025See Olevik, 302 Ga. at 252 (3) (b) (the reading of the implied consent “is not, by itself, coercive”); Fofanah v. State, 351 Ga. App. 632 , 635 ( 832 SE2d 449 ) (2019) (“an arrestee is not, under Georgia constitutional or statutory law, entitled to Miranda warnings before deciding whether to submit to the State’s request for a [blood] test”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 13 suffering the attendant evidentiary consequences.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hynes v. State, 341 Ga. App. 500, 507 ( 801 SE2d 306 ) (2017).

2025See Olevik, 302 Ga. at 252 (3) (b) (the reading of the implied consent “is not, by itself, coercive”); Fofanah v. State, 351 Ga. App. 632 , 635 ( 832 SE2d 449 ) (2019) (“an arrestee is not, under Georgia constitutional or statutory law, entitled to Miranda warnings before deciding whether to submit to the State’s request for a [blood] test”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 13 suffering the attendant evidentiary consequences.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hynes v. State, 341 Ga. App. 500, 507 ( 801 SE2d 306 ) (2017).

2021See Mangrum v. State, 285 Ga. 676, 678-679 (3) ( 681 SE2d 130 ) (2009) (“[T]he lack of a Miranda warning after [a two-hour] break is of no consequence, as [appellant] was informed of and waived his Miranda rights before the first interview and the second interview was part of a continuous series of interviews.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Williams v. State, 244 Ga. 485, 488 (4) (b) ( 260 SE2d 879 ) (1979) (“[T]he state was under no duty to repeat the Miranda warnings given the day before where, as here, the interviews were part of a continuing interrogation.”).

2021See Mangrum v. State, 285 Ga. 676, 678-679 (3) ( 681 SE2d 130 ) (2009) (“[T]he lack of a Miranda warning after [a two-hour] break is of no consequence, as [appellant] was informed of and waived his Miranda rights before the first interview and the second interview was part of a continuous series of interviews.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Williams v. State, 244 Ga. 485, 488 (4) (b) ( 260 SE2d 879 ) (1979) (“[T]he state was under no duty to repeat the Miranda warnings given the day before where, as here, the interviews were part of a continuing interrogation.”).

2017“Miranda warnings must be administered to an accused who is in custody and subject to interrogation or its functional equivalent.” State v. Troutman, 300 Ga. 616, 617 (1) ( 797 SE2d 72 ) (2017) (citing Phillips v. State, 285 Ga. 213, 215 (2) ( 675 SE2d 1 ) (2009)).

2017“Miranda warnings must be administered to an accused who is in custody and subject to interrogation or its functional equivalent.” State v. Troutman, 300 Ga. 616, 617 (1) ( 797 SE2d 72 ) (2017) (citing Phillips v. State, 285 Ga. 213, 215 (2) ( 675 SE2d 1 ) (2009)).

2018Compare Pye, 282 Ga. at 801-802 (statement made as a product of improper two-stage technique where initial pre-Miranda questions led to defendant “implicating himself in the crimes, and then, without any break in the proceedings, was given Miranda warnings . . . and gave a statement that was essentially identical to the version of events he had already revealed to the detectives”).

2018See Livingston v. State , 264 Ga. 402 , 408, 444 S.E.2d 748 (1994) *560 ("[I]f the suspect made the initial statement voluntarily, the fact that it was not preceded by Miranda warnings will not taint a subsequent voluntary statement which had the benefit of those warnings."). (b) Seibert 's"Two-Step" Interrogation Appellant further argues that her statement was inadmissible because it was the product of the "question first" or "two-step" interrogation tactic disapproved of by the United States Supreme Court in Seibert , 4 and by this Court in State v. Pye , 282 Ga. 796 , 653 S.E.2d 450 (2007).

2001Andrews, P. J, and Eldridge, J., concur. 1 OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1). 2 OCGA § 40-6-181 (b) (5). 3 OCGA § 40-6-392 (d); Forsman v. State, 239 Ga. App. 612, 613 (3) ( 521 SE2d 410 ) (1999); Turner v. State, 233 Ga. App. 413, 416-417 (1) (b) ( 504 SE2d 229 ) (1998); compare Mackey v. State, 234 Ga. App. 554, 556 ( 507 SE2d 482 ) (1998) (refusal to consent to a warrantless search of defendant’s vehicle is quite different and is not admissible to show guilty knowledge). 4 Keenan v. State, 263 Ga. 569, 571-572 (2) ( 436 SE2d 475 ) (1993); see Forsman, supra, 239 Ga. App. at 613 (3); Turner, supra, 23

2001Andrews, P. J, and Eldridge, J., concur. 1 OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1). 2 OCGA § 40-6-181 (b) (5). 3 OCGA § 40-6-392 (d); Forsman v. State, 239 Ga. App. 612, 613 (3) ( 521 SE2d 410 ) (1999); Turner v. State, 233 Ga. App. 413, 416-417 (1) (b) ( 504 SE2d 229 ) (1998); compare Mackey v. State, 234 Ga. App. 554, 556 ( 507 SE2d 482 ) (1998) (refusal to consent to a warrantless search of defendant’s vehicle is quite different and is not admissible to show guilty knowledge). 4 Keenan v. State, 263 Ga. 569, 571-572 (2) ( 436 SE2d 475 ) (1993); see Forsman, supra, 239 Ga. App. at 613 (3); Turner, supra, 23

2026See Johnson, 301 Ga. at 711 (appellant’s statement admissible despite lack of Miranda warnings where appellant initiated discussion with investigating officer and made incriminating statement that “was spontaneous, unsolicited, and not prompted by the investigators’ express questioning”); Smith v. State, 264 Ga. 857, 859 (1995) (same).

2024See Martin v. State, 277 Ga. 227, 228 (2) ( 587 SE2d 650 ) (2003) (“[T]he officer was entitled to determine the location of the knife prior to reading [the defendant] his Miranda rights[.]”); Smith 8 v. State, 264 Ga. 857, 859 (3) ( 452 SE2d 494 ) (1995) (holding that an officer’s question regarding location of a gun was not an interrogation requiring Miranda warnings but an attempt to determine whether defendant was armed).

2026See United States v. Patane, 542 US 630, 639 (2004) (“[S]tatements taken without Miranda warnings 6 (though not actually compelled) can be used to impeach a defendant’s testimony at trial.”).

2024The trial court rejected this argument, citing United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 643 ( 124 SCt 2620 , 159 LE2d 667) (2004), which holds that physical evidence obtained from a statement given without Miranda warnings is admissible if it is voluntary.

2023“Miranda warnings are required only when a person is interviewed by law enforcement while in custody.” Drake v. State, 296 Ga. 286, 288 (2) ( 766 SE2d 447 ) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2023“Miranda warnings are required only when a person is interviewed by law enforcement while in custody.” Drake v. State, 296 Ga. 286, 288 (2) ( 766 SE2d 447 ) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2020We reiterated that under the exception of Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 , statements made after a “‘two-step interrogation technique . . . used in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning’” are inadmissible.

2019It undermines the Miranda warning and obscures its meaning.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).

2019In Fletcher v. Weir , 455 U.S. 603 , 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), however, the Supreme Court held that "[i]n the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand." Id. at 607 , 102 S.Ct. 1309 .

2019In Fletcher v. Weir , 455 U.S. 603 , 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), however, the Supreme Court held that "[i]n the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand." Id. at 607 , 102 S.Ct. 1309 .

2023Because the trial court had relied on overruled precedent requiring a Miranda warning before a request to submit to a breath test,1 we vacated the suppression order and remanded for consideration of 1 See State v. Turnquest, 305 Ga. 758, 774-775 (4) ( 827 SE2d 865 ) (2019) (the Georgia Constitution does not require a Miranda warning before a suspect in custody is asked to submit to a breath test), overruling cases including Price v. State, 269 Ga. 222 ( 498 SE2d 262 ) (1998); Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179 , 210 (IV) ( 824 SE2d 265 ) (2019) (the Georgia Constitution’s right against compelled se

2023Because the trial court had relied on overruled precedent requiring a Miranda warning before a request to submit to a breath test,1 we vacated the suppression order and remanded for consideration of 1 See State v. Turnquest, 305 Ga. 758, 774-775 (4) ( 827 SE2d 865 ) (2019) (the Georgia Constitution does not require a Miranda warning before a suspect in custody is asked to submit to a breath test), overruling cases including Price v. State, 269 Ga. 222 ( 498 SE2d 262 ) (1998); Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179 , 210 (IV) ( 824 SE2d 265 ) (2019) (the Georgia Constitution’s right against compelled se