Miranda warning in Nebraska

2025Whether those facts meet constitutional standards is a question of law, which an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court’s determination. 34 [23] Whether the Miranda warnings that were given were sufficient to form the basis of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Fifth Amendment is reviewed de novo, but 32 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

2025Whether those facts meet constitutional standards is a question of law, which an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court’s determination. 34 [23] Whether the Miranda warnings that were given were sufficient to form the basis of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Fifth Amendment is reviewed de novo, but 32 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

2025Of particular significance to the Court’s conclusion that the pre-Miranda confession made the later Miranda warnings ineffective was the fact that question- ing before the Miranda warnings was “systematic, exhaustive, and managed with psychological skill” to such an extent that after the unwarned interrogation, “there was little, if anything, of incriminating potential left unsaid.” Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616 .

2025Of particular significance to the Court’s conclusion that the pre-Miranda confession made the later Miranda warnings ineffective was the fact that question- ing before the Miranda warnings was “systematic, exhaustive, and managed with psychological skill” to such an extent that after the unwarned interrogation, “there was little, if anything, of incriminating potential left unsaid.” Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616 .

2025Although Price also argues that the interrogations violated California law because the State failed to prove they were recorded in their entirety, Price did not specifically assign this as error, and we will not address it. (i) Waiver of Miranda Rights Whether the Miranda warnings that were given were suf- ficient to form the basis of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Fifth Amendment is reviewed de novo, but whether the waiver, based on the totality of the circumstances, was volun- tary is reviewed for clear error. 36 These rights must be know- ingly and voluntarily waived. 37 [24,25] A

2025Although Price also argues that the interrogations violated California law because the State failed to prove they were recorded in their entirety, Price did not specifically assign this as error, and we will not address it. (i) Waiver of Miranda Rights Whether the Miranda warnings that were given were suf- ficient to form the basis of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Fifth Amendment is reviewed de novo, but whether the waiver, based on the totality of the circumstances, was volun- tary is reviewed for clear error. 36 These rights must be know- ingly and voluntarily waived. 37 [24,25] A

2022See State v. Custer, 292 Neb. 88, 111 , 871 N.W.2d 243 , 261 (2015) (State’s comments in closing arguments were not improper since the State’s reference to defendant’s actions immediately after shooting when defendant did not call police “clearly refer to [defendant’s] silence at a time before he was arrested and given Miranda warnings”).

2016See, also, State v. Custer, 292 Neb. 88 , 871 N.W.2d 243 (2015) (determining that prosecutor’s comment on defendant’s prearrest, pre-Miranda silence was permissible because prior cases have viewed giving Miranda warnings as triggering event that prevents State from using defendant’s silence).

1988See Miranda v. Arizona, supra. The three-part Miranda warning, see State v. Norfolk, 221 Neb. 810 , 381 N.W.2d 120 (1986), does not include a requirement that police inform a suspect or defendant of a charge against him or her, whether the charge is actual, probable, or merely possible.

1988See Miranda v. Arizona, supra. The three-part Miranda warning, see State v. Norfolk, 221 Neb. 810 , 381 N.W.2d 120 (1986), does not include a requirement that police inform a suspect or defendant of a charge against him or her, whether the charge is actual, probable, or merely possible.

2016See, State v. Harms, 263 Neb. 814 , 643 N.W.2d 359 (2002); State v. Lofquest, 223 Neb. 87 , 388 N.W.2d 115 (1986).

2016See, State v. Harms, 263 Neb. 814 , 643 N.W.2d 359 (2002); State v. Lofquest, 223 Neb. 87 , 388 N.W.2d 115 (1986).

2002In Doyle, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the State may not “seek to impeach a defendant’s exculpatory story, told for the first time at trial, by cross-examining the defendant about his failure to have told the story after receiving Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest.” 426 U.S. at 611 .

2002The Supreme Court found that a defendant’s postarrest, post-Miranda silence is “insolubly *823 ambiguous” as to whether the defendant is guilty or merely exercising his rights in accordance with the implicit assurance in the Miranda warnings that “silence will carry no penalty.” 426 U.S. at 617-18 .

1997We note that a “‘spontaneously volunteered statement’ of a suspect or defendant is admissible in the absence of the Miranda warning.” State v. Gibson, 228 Neb. 455, 464, 422 N.W.2d 570, 576 (1988). “ ‘Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence.’” State v. Taylor, 221 Neb. 114, 116 , 375 N.W.2d 610, 612-13 (1985).

1997We note that a “‘spontaneously volunteered statement’ of a suspect or defendant is admissible in the absence of the Miranda warning.” State v. Gibson, 228 Neb. 455, 464, 422 N.W.2d 570, 576 (1988). “ ‘Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence.’” State v. Taylor, 221 Neb. 114, 116 , 375 N.W.2d 610, 612-13 (1985).

2018Miranda warnings are " ' "an absolute prerequisite to interrogation" ... and "fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege." ' " State v. Burries , 297 Neb. 367 , 388, 900 N.W.2d 483 , 503 (2017), quoting Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

2018Miranda warnings are " ' "an absolute prerequisite to interrogation" ... and "fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege." ' " State v. Burries , 297 Neb. 367 , 388, 900 N.W.2d 483 , 503 (2017), quoting Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

2018A "defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver," may establish a valid, implied waiver. [ North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979).] Thus, "[w]here the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent. [ Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384 , 130 S.Ct. 2250 .] Hernandez, 299 Neb. at 919 , 911 N.W.2d at 544 .

2018A "defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver," may establish a valid, implied waiver. [ North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979).] Thus, "[w]here the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent. [ Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384 , 130 S.Ct. 2250 .] Hernandez, 299 Neb. at 919 , 911 N.W.2d at 544 .

1992The Supreme Court has held that “a ‘spontaneously volunteered statement’ of a suspect or defendant is admissible in the absence of a Miranda warning.” Gibson, 228 Neb. at 464 , 422 N.W.2d at 575 -76 (quoting State v. Red Feather, 205 Neb. 734 , 289 N.W.2d 768 (1980)).

1992The Supreme Court has held that “a ‘spontaneously volunteered statement’ of a suspect or defendant is admissible in the absence of a Miranda warning.” Gibson, 228 Neb. at 464 , 422 N.W.2d at 575 -76 (quoting State v. Red Feather, 205 Neb. 734 , 289 N.W.2d 768 (1980)).

2025In State v. Clifton, 296 Neb. 135 , 892 N.W.2d 112 (2017), the Nebraska Supreme Court found that the defend­ant was questioned for 5 minutes prior to receiving the Miranda warning, mostly about background information, and the defend­ant did not make any incriminating statements; thus, the post-Miranda confession was valid.

2025In State v. Clifton, 296 Neb. 135 , 892 N.W.2d 112 (2017), the Nebraska Supreme Court found that the defend­ant was questioned for 5 minutes prior to receiving the Miranda warning, mostly about background information, and the defend­ant did not make any incriminating statements; thus, the post-Miranda confession was valid.

2020See State v. Juranek, supra. A plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that “when Miranda warnings are inserted in the midst of coordinated and continuing interrogation, they are likely to mislead and ‘depriv[e] a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.’” See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613 - 14 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 , 106 S. Ct. 1135 , - 610 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 28 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. CAVITTE Cite as 28 Neb.

2020See State v. Juranek, supra. A plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that “when Miranda warnings are inserted in the midst of coordinated and continuing interrogation, they are likely to mislead and ‘depriv[e] a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.’” See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613 - 14 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 , 106 S. Ct. 1135 , - 610 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 28 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. CAVITTE Cite as 28 Neb.

1986In the case of Fulmer v. Jensen, 221 Neb. 582, 587 , 379 N.W.2d 736, 740 (1986), we said: “We adhere to our previous determination that there is no requirement that Miranda warnings be given prior to a request to submit to a chemical analysis of blood, breath, or urine under the Nebraska implied consent law,” citing Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724 , 211 N.W.2d 906 (1973).

1986In the case of Fulmer v. Jensen, 221 Neb. 582, 587 , 379 N.W.2d 736, 740 (1986), we said: “We adhere to our previous determination that there is no requirement that Miranda warnings be given prior to a request to submit to a chemical analysis of blood, breath, or urine under the Nebraska implied consent law,” citing Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724 , 211 N.W.2d 906 (1973).

2025SUTTON Cite as 319 Neb. 581 clear error and whether those facts meet constitutional stan- dards independently of the trial court’s determination. 32 Miranda requires law enforcement to give a particular set of warnings to a person in custody before interrogation, includ- ing that the suspect has the right to remain silent, that any statement the suspect makes may be used as evidence against him or her, and that the suspect has the right to an attorney, either retained or appointed. 33 These warnings are considered prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant during c

2025SUTTON Cite as 319 Neb. 581 clear error and whether those facts meet constitutional stan- dards independently of the trial court’s determination. 32 Miranda requires law enforcement to give a particular set of warnings to a person in custody before interrogation, includ- ing that the suspect has the right to remain silent, that any statement the suspect makes may be used as evidence against him or her, and that the suspect has the right to an attorney, either retained or appointed. 33 These warnings are considered prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant during c

2019Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on one’s freedom as to render one “in custody.”26 Being in custody does not require an arrest, but refers to situ- ations where a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would not have felt free to leave and, thus, would feel the restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.27 [11] Miranda prohibits the use of statements derived during custodial interrogation unless the prosecution demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards that are effective to secure the privilege against se

2019Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on one’s freedom as to render one “in custody.”26 Being in custody does not require an arrest, but refers to situ- ations where a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would not have felt free to leave and, thus, would feel the restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.27 [11] Miranda prohibits the use of statements derived during custodial interrogation unless the prosecution demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards that are effective to secure the privilege against se

1987In Fulmer v. Jensen, 221 Neb. 582 , 379 N.W.2d 736 (1986), we reaffirmed our position that Miranda warnings are not required prior to a request to submit to a chemical analysis under the Nebraska implied consent law.

1987In Fulmer v. Jensen, 221 Neb. 582 , 379 N.W.2d 736 (1986), we reaffirmed our position that Miranda warnings are not required prior to a request to submit to a chemical analysis under the Nebraska implied consent law.

2025Similarly, in State v. Williams, 26 Neb.

2018In this case, before administering to Williams a Miranda warning, Blice spoke with him while he was handcuffed and - 495 - Nebraska Court of A ppeals A dvance Sheets 26 Nebraska A ppellate R eports STATE v. WILLIAMS Cite as 26 Neb.

2018State v. Goodwin , 278 Neb. 945 , 956, 774 N.W.2d 733 , 743 (2009). " 'The Miranda rule and its requirements are met if a suspect receives adequate Miranda warnings, understands them, and has an opportunity to invoke the rights before giving any answers or admissions.' " State v. Burries , 297 Neb. at 389 , 900 N.W.2d at 504 , quoting Berghuis v. Thompkins , 560 U.S. 370 , 130 S.Ct. 2250 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010).

2018State v. Goodwin , 278 Neb. 945 , 956, 774 N.W.2d 733 , 743 (2009). " 'The Miranda rule and its requirements are met if a suspect receives adequate Miranda warnings, understands them, and has an opportunity to invoke the rights before giving any answers or admissions.' " State v. Burries , 297 Neb. at 389 , 900 N.W.2d at 504 , quoting Berghuis v. Thompkins , 560 U.S. 370 , 130 S.Ct. 2250 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010).

2016In the present case, the record does not reflect when Mitchell received Miranda warnings and we will therefore treat Mitchell’s silence as occurring pre-Miranda. [11,12] In a series of cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that reading a defendant his or her - 668 - Decisions of the Nebraska Court of A ppeals 23 Nebraska A ppellate R eports STATE v. MITCHELL Cite as 23 Neb.

2016The court noted that per Doyle and Fletcher, the giving of Miranda warnings is the point in time after which - 669 - Decisions of the Nebraska Court of A ppeals 23 Nebraska A ppellate R eports STATE v. MITCHELL Cite as 23 Neb.

2016Lastly, in Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 , 106 S. Ct. 634 , 88 L.

2002In Wainwright , the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “[w]ith respect to post-Miranda warnings ‘silence,’ we point out that silence does not mean only muteness; it includes the statement of a desire to remain silent, as well as of a desire to remain silent until an attorney has been consulted.” 474 U.S. at 295 n.13.

1988Finally, if the prosecutor’s comments refer to the defendant’s prearrest silence, then State v. Duis, 207 Neb. 851 , 301 N.W.2d 587 (1981) Inapplicable.

1988Finally, if the prosecutor’s comments refer to the defendant’s prearrest silence, then State v. Duis, 207 Neb. 851 , 301 N.W.2d 587 (1981) Inapplicable.