Miranda warning in New York

2026Defendant's incriminating statement at the precinct, approximately six hours later and preceded by administration of Miranda warnings, was sufficiently attenuated from any impropriety in the parole officer's question about the whereabouts of the gun in defendant's apartment ( see People v Paulman , 5 NY3d 122, 130-131 [2005]).

2026Defendant's incriminating statement at the precinct, approximately six hours later and preceded by administration of Miranda warnings, was sufficiently attenuated from any impropriety in the parole officer's question about the whereabouts of the gun in defendant's apartment ( see People v Paulman , 5 NY3d 122, 130-131 [2005]).

2025As the court properly determined, at the time in question, "a reasonable person in defendant's position, innocent of any crime, would not have believed that [they were] in custody, and thus Miranda warnings were not required" ( People v Gladney , 235 AD3d 1255 , 1256 [4th Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Thomas , 166 AD3d 1499 , 1500 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1178 [2019]; see generally People v Yukl , 25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]).

2025The evidence at the Huntley hearing establishes that defendant was not in custody when he made the statements, and thus Miranda warnings were not required ( see People v Bell-Scott , 162 AD3d 1558 , 1559 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1169 [2019]; see generally Miranda v Arizona , 384 US 436, 467 [1966]; People v Yukl , 25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]).

2026Miranda warnings are only required when an individual is subjected to a "custodial interrogation" ( Miranda v Arizona , 384 US 436, 444 ).

2026Miranda warnings are required prior to "custodial interrogation [that is] questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). "[B]oth the elements of police 'custody' and police 'interrogation' must be present before law enforcement officials constitutionally are obligated to provide the procedural safeguards imposed upon them by Miranda ." People v. Huffman , 41 NY2d 29 , 33 (1976).

2023"To determine whether there is a 'single continuous chain of events,'" we may consider "a number of factors, including. . . the circumstances surrounding the Miranda violation. . . ." ( id. at 130 ). "[E]ach case must be viewed on its unique facts" and "[t]he purpose of the inquiry is to assess where there was a sufficiently 'definite, pronounced break in the interrogation' to dissipate the taint from the Miranda violation" ( id. at 131 , quoting People v Chapple , 38 NY2d 112, 115 [1975]).

2023In determining whether there is a “single continuous chain of events” (People v Chapple, 38 NY2d 112, 115 [1975]) or a “sufficiently ‘definite, pronounced break in the interrogation’ to dissipate the taint from the Miranda violation” (Paulman, 5 NY3d at 131 , quoting Chapple, 38 NY2d at 115 ]), we have considered various factors as set forth in People v Paulman ( 5 NY3d at 130-131 ).

2024Such would allow the Court to properly determine, among other issues, (1) when and how defendant was taken into custody; (2) whether defendant was fully informed of his Miranda rights and before any questioning commenced; (2) whether defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before his inculpatory statements and confession to Investigator Simone; and (3) whether the statements he made after he had been administered his Miranda warnings are admissible ( see People v Williams , 62 NY2d 285, 289 [1984]; People v Celleri , 29 AD3d 707, 707-708 [2d Dept 2006], lvs denied 7 NY3d

2024Such would allow the Court to properly determine, among other issues, (1) when and how defendant was taken into custody; (2) whether defendant was fully informed of his Miranda rights and before any questioning commenced; (2) whether defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before his inculpatory statements and confession to Investigator Simone; and (3) whether the statements he made after he had been administered his Miranda warnings are admissible ( see People v Williams , 62 NY2d 285, 289 [1984]; People v Celleri , 29 AD3d 707, 707-708 [2d Dept 2006], lvs denied 7 NY3d

2025As such, it was not subject to the Miranda rule ( see Rhode Island v Innis, supra; People v Fero , 63 NY2d 316 ).

2025As such, it was not subject to the Miranda rule ( see Rhode Island v Innis, supra; People v Fero , 63 NY2d 316 ).

2024The Miranda warnings are an "'absolute prerequisite to interrogation'" ( People v Crawford , 163 AD3d 986 , 986, quoting Miranda v Arizona , 384 US at 471 ; see People v Dunbar , 24 NY3d 304, 314 ). "'At a hearing to suppress statements made to law enforcement officials, the People have the burden of demonstrating, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant's statements were voluntary [*2]and, if applicable, that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her Miranda rights prior to making the statements'" ( People v Stevens , 203 AD3d 1181, 1182 , quoting People

2024The Miranda warnings are an "'absolute prerequisite to interrogation'" ( People v Crawford , 163 AD3d 986 , 986, quoting Miranda v Arizona , 384 US at 471 ; see People v Dunbar , 24 NY3d 304, 314 ). "'At a hearing to suppress statements made to law enforcement officials, the People have the burden of demonstrating, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant's statements were voluntary [*2]and, if applicable, that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her Miranda rights prior to making the statements'" ( People v Stevens , 203 AD3d 1181, 1182 , quoting People

2025Said differently, "[a] temporary roadside detention for the investigation of traffic-related matters, including suspected driving while intoxicated offenses, are generally non-custodial in nature and encompass limited questioning appropriate to such investigations . . . without the necessity of the rendering and waiver of the Miranda warnings" ( People v Mackenzie , 9 Misc 3d 129[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51535[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 807 [2005]; see Berkemer v McCarty , 468 US 420, 436-437 [1984]; People v Parris , 26 AD3d 393, 394-395 [2d Dept 2006],

2025Said differently, "[a] temporary roadside detention for the investigation of traffic-related matters, including suspected driving while intoxicated offenses, are generally non-custodial in nature and encompass limited questioning appropriate to such investigations . . . without the necessity of the rendering and waiver of the Miranda warnings" ( People v Mackenzie , 9 Misc 3d 129[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51535[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 807 [2005]; see Berkemer v McCarty , 468 US 420, 436-437 [1984]; People v Parris , 26 AD3d 393, 394-395 [2d Dept 2006],

2025As the court properly determined, at the time in question, "a reasonable person in defendant's position, innocent of any crime, would not have believed that [they were] in custody, and thus Miranda warnings were not required" ( People v Gladney , 235 AD3d 1255 , 1256 [4th Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Thomas , 166 AD3d 1499 , 1500 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1178 [2019]; see generally People v Yukl , 25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]).

2025The evidence at the Huntley hearing establishes that defendant was not in custody when he made the statements, and thus Miranda warnings were not required ( see People v Bell-Scott , 162 AD3d 1558 , 1559 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1169 [2019]; see generally Miranda v Arizona , 384 US 436, 467 [1966]; People v Yukl , 25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]).

2024Some of the factors that New York courts have considered include the time differential between the Miranda violation and the subsequent admission; whether the same police personnel were present and involved in eliciting each statement; whether there was a change in the location or nature of the interrogation; the circumstances surrounding the Miranda violation, such as the extent of the improper questioning; and whether, prior to the Miranda violation, the defendant had indicated a willingness to speak to the police ( see White , 10 NY3d at 291 ; Paulman , 5 NY3d at 130-131 ).

2024Some of the factors that New York courts have considered include the time differential between the Miranda violation and the subsequent admission; whether the same police personnel were present and involved in eliciting each statement; whether there was a change in the location or nature of the interrogation; the circumstances surrounding the Miranda violation, such as the extent of the improper questioning; and whether, prior to the Miranda violation, the defendant had indicated a willingness to speak to the police ( see White , 10 NY3d at 291 ; Paulman , 5 NY3d at 130-131 ).

2023In a correctional facility, when an incarcerated individual is questioned, Miranda warnings are unnecessary unless "the circumstances of the detention and interrogation of [the incarcerated individual] are no longer analogous to those kinds of detentions found not custodial in nonprison settings, but instead entail added constraint that would lead [an incarcerated individual] reasonably to believe that there has been a restriction on that person's freedom over and above that of ordinary confinement in a correctional facility" ( People v Alls , 83 NY2d 94, 100 [1993], cert denied 511 US 1090 [1

2019A Miranda warning is not necessary for a relatively brief, generally public, or otherwise on-the-scene investigatory detentions that are typically not custodial" ( People v Davis , 167 AD3d 1330 , 1330 [2018] [internal quotation marks and citations [*4]omitted]; see People v Alls , 83 NY2d 94, 100 [1993]; People v Decker , 159 AD3d 1190 , 1191-1192 [2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1116 [2018]).

2025Normally, the effect of a Miranda violation is the suppression of all subsequent [*8]statements, regardless of whether Miranda warnings were later administered. ( See People v. Bethea , 67 NY2d 364 (1986)]).

2025Normally, the effect of a Miranda violation is the suppression of all subsequent [*8]statements, regardless of whether Miranda warnings were later administered. ( See People v. Bethea , 67 NY2d 364 (1986)]).

2025As such, it was not subject to the Miranda rule ( see Rhode Island v Innis, supra; People v Fero , 63 NY2d 316 ).

2025As such, it was not subject to the Miranda rule ( see Rhode Island v Innis, supra; People v Fero , 63 NY2d 316 ).

2025It is well settled that Miranda warnings must be given when a defendant is subject to custodial interrogation ( see People v Paulman , 5 NY3d 122, 129 [2005]; People v Berg , 92 NY2d 701, 704 [1999]; People v Torres , 172 AD3d 758 , 760 [2d Dept 2019]).

2025Among other things, this constitutional right prohibits the People from using a statement made by a defendant during "custodial interrogation" unless the prosecution can demonstrate use of the now-familiar Miranda warnings (384 US at 444; People v Berg , 92 NY2d 701, 704 [1999]).

2024Although defendant was in custody and had not yet received Miranda warnings, the record supports the hearing court's finding that his statement, "I might have bumped" the victim, was spontaneous and not the product of custodial interrogation ( see People v Rivers , 56 NY2d 476 [1982]; People v Rastaldo , 132 AD3d 455 [2015], lvs denied 26 NY3d 1111, 1149 [2017]).

2024Although defendant was in custody and had not yet received Miranda warnings, the record supports the hearing court's finding that his statement, "I might have bumped" the victim, was spontaneous and not the product of custodial interrogation ( see People v Rivers , 56 NY2d 476 [1982]; People v Rastaldo , 132 AD3d 455 [2015], lvs denied 26 NY3d 1111 , 1149 [2017]).

2026The absence of Miranda warnings prior to defendant's statement admitting possession of a gun was not improper because given in non-custodial circumstances ( see People v Bennett , 70 NY2d 891, 893-894 [1987]).

2026The absence of Miranda warnings prior to defendant's statement admitting possession of a gun was not improper because given in non-custodial circumstances ( see People v Bennett , 70 NY2d 891, 893-894 [1987]).

2026The public safety exception to the Miranda requirement permits law enforcement to ask necessary questions to secure a police officer's safety or the safety of the public ( see New York v Quarles , 467 US 649 [1984]; People v Jenkins , 208 AD2d 459, 460 [1st Dept 1994] [ Miranda warnings not required when officer conducting a pat-down of defendant asked him whether he had anything on his person that might cut the officer]).

2026The public safety exception to the Miranda requirement permits law enforcement to ask necessary questions to secure a police officer's safety or the safety of the public ( see New York v Quarles , 467 US 649 [1984]; People v Jenkins , 208 AD2d 459, 460 [1st Dept 1994] [ Miranda warnings not required when officer conducting a pat-down of defendant asked him whether he had anything on his person that might cut the officer]).

2018To the extent that the lower court may have erred in admitting the statement defendant made at the precinct prior to being given any Miranda warnings, any error was harmless ( see People v. Crimmins , 36 N.Y.2d 230 , 237, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213 , 326 N.E.2d 787 [1975] ).

2018To the extent that the lower court may have erred in admitting the statement defendant made at the precinct prior to being given any Miranda warnings, any error was harmless ( see People v. Crimmins , 36 N.Y.2d 230 , 237, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213 , 326 N.E.2d 787 [1975] ).

2012Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the hearing court correctly concluded that she was not in custody when she made certain statements to detectives (see People v Centano, 76 NY2d 837, 838 [1990]; People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]) and, therefore, that the administration of Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 444-445 [1966]) was not required during the interview.

2012Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the hearing court correctly concluded that she was not in custody when she made certain statements to detectives (see People v Centano, 76 NY2d 837, 838 [1990]; People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]) and, therefore, that the administration of Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 444-445 [1966]) was not required during the interview.

2025Colon's questions about defendant's place and hours of employment, it is well settled that routine "pedigree questions, such as those involved in booking, may be asked of defendant without providing Miranda warnings, ( see People v Rodney , 85 NY2d 289 , citing Pennsylvania v Muniz , 496 US 582 ; People v Kreydatus , 305 AD2d 935 ), so long as they are limited in scope to those necessary to administratively processing a defendant ( see People v Acevedo , 258 AD2d 140 ; People v Greenleaf , 222 AD2d 838 ).

2025Colon's questions about defendant's place and hours of employment, it is well settled that routine "pedigree questions, such as those involved in booking, may be asked of defendant without providing Miranda warnings, ( see People v Rodney , 85 NY2d 289 , citing Pennsylvania v Muniz , 496 US 582 ; People v Kreydatus , 305 AD2d 935 ), so long as they are limited in scope to those necessary to administratively processing a defendant ( see People v Acevedo , 258 AD2d 140 ; People v Greenleaf , 222 AD2d 838 ).

2021Where, as here, "a person in police custody was issued Miranda warnings and waived those rights voluntarily and intelligently, 'it is not necessary to repeat the warnings prior to subsequent questioning within a reasonable time thereafter, so long as the custody has remained continuous'" ( id. at 604, quoting People v Glinsman , 107 AD2d 710, 710 ).

2018There is "no need for the police to readminister Miranda warnings[ where, as here,] defendant remained in continuous custody, nothing occurred that would have induced defendant to believe he was no longer the focal point of the investigation, and there was [*2]no reason to believe that defendant no longer understood his constitutional rights" ( People v Dudley , 31 AD3d 264, 265 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 866 [2006]; see People v Mendez , 77 AD3d 1312, 1312 [4th Dept 2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 799 [2011]; cf. People v Guilford , 21 NY3d 205, 209-213 [2013]; see generally People v Glinsman

2025As we have explained, "routine police investigation of suspicious conduct on the street generally does not entail a significant deprivation of freedom which would require Miranda warnings" ( Matter of Kwok T. , 43 NY2d 213, 218 [1977]).

2025As we have explained, "routine police investigation of suspicious conduct on the street generally does not entail a significant deprivation of freedom which would require Miranda warnings" ( Matter of Kwok T. , 43 NY2d 213, 218 [1977]).

2021The court also correctly determined that the People met their burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant's statements to the police, made after receiving and waiving Miranda warnings, were voluntary under the totality of circumstances ( see generally Arizona v Fulminante , 499 US 279, 285-288 [1991]; People v Anderson , 42 NY2d 35, 38-39 [1977]).

2021The court also correctly determined that the People met their burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant's statements to the police, made after receiving and waiving Miranda warnings, were voluntary under the totality of circumstances ( see generally Arizona v Fulminante , 499 US 279, 285-288 [1991]; People v Anderson , 42 NY2d 35, 38-39 [1977]).

2023In a correctional facility, when an incarcerated individual is questioned, Miranda warnings are unnecessary unless "the circumstances of the detention and interrogation of [the incarcerated individual] are no longer analogous to those kinds of detentions found not custodial in nonprison settings, but instead entail added constraint that would lead [an incarcerated individual] reasonably to believe that there has been a restriction on that person's freedom over and above that of ordinary confinement in a correctional facility" ( People v Alls , 83 NY2d 94, 100 [1993], cert denied 511 US 1090 [1

2023Although it does not appear that defendant would be subject to the "added constraint" requirement ( id. ), the Court of Appeals has nonetheless recognized that, in certain situations, Miranda warnings must be administered [*3]in a correctional facility.

2013Thus, the procedural safeguards mandated by the Supreme Court are the now familiar “Miranda warnings”: Prior to any questioning, suspects must be warned that they have a right to remain silent, that anything they say can and will be used against them in a court of law, that they have the right to the presence of an attorney prior to and during the course of questioning, and that if they cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for them prior to any questioning (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US at 444, 479 ; People v Hutchinson, 59 NY2d 923 [1983]; People v Rodney P. [Anonymous], 21 NY2d 1,

2013Thus, the procedural safeguards mandated by the Supreme Court are the now familiar “Miranda warnings”: Prior to any questioning, suspects must be warned that they have a right to remain silent, that anything they say can and will be used against them in a court of law, that they have the right to the presence of an attorney prior to and during the course of questioning, and that if they cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for them prior to any questioning (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US at 444, 479 ; People v Hutchinson, 59 NY2d 923 [1983]; People v Rodney P. [Anonymous], 21 NY2d 1,