Miranda warning in Delaware

2024Mar. 1, 2022) (“In a suppression hearing, the Court sits as the finder of fact and evaluates the credibility of the witnesses.”). 60 For further analysis of “interrogation” see infra at page 20–22. 61 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–68. 16 right is “so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule” that Miranda warnings must always be given, even if the accused already knows the right.62 Once the right is invoked, a subsequent statement is only admissible if courts apply a two-part test: (1) the prosecution must prove that the accused reinitiated contact with police, and (2) that the accused valid

2024Mar. 1, 2022) (“In a suppression hearing, the Court sits as the finder of fact and evaluates the credibility of the witnesses.”). 60 For further analysis of “interrogation” see infra at page 20–22. 61 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–68. 16 right is “so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule” that Miranda warnings must always be given, even if the accused already knows the right.62 Once the right is invoked, a subsequent statement is only admissible if courts apply a two-part test: (1) the prosecution must prove that the accused reinitiated contact with police, and (2) that the accused valid

2014Admissibility Of Mauk’s Statements Miranda warnings are only required when a suspect is both in custody and subject to interrogation by a State agent. 50 A law enforcement officer becomes obligated to administer Miranda warnings “only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him in custody.” 51 The legal standard used to determine custody is “whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” 52 “When determining whether an interrogation has occurred in a custodial setting . . . the court must r

2008See also Pryor v. State, 453 A.2d 98, 100 (Del.1982). 7 . " 'The sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is governmental coercion.’ ‘[T]he voluntariness of a Miranda waiver [does not] ... require an abstract inquiry into the defendant’s ‘free will’ or subjective view of reality.’ Such voluntariness does not concern ‘moral or psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.’ ” State v. Shirey, 2002 WL 316595 , at *3 (Del.Super.) (quoting DeJesus v. State, 655 A.2d 1180, 1192 (Del.1995); State v. Russo, 700 A.2d 161, 174 (Del.Super.

2023Again, Defendant exhibited 37 See Berkemer v. McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420, 421 (1984) (Miranda warnings are not required for roadside investigations); see also Fuentes v. State, 2002 WL 32071656 , at *2 (Del.

2015The adequacy of the Miranda warnings is a question of law for the court, not a question of fact for the jury. 157 154 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 429 (1984). 155 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 , 443–44 (2000). 156 Rush v. State, 939 A.2d 689, 703 (Md. 2008). 157 Connell, 869 F.2d at 1351 (“Whether Connell was given adequate Miranda warnings is a question of law.”); United States v. Caldwell, 954 F.2d 496, 501 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Campbell, 2008 WL 202555 , at *2 (S.D.

2024Mar. 1, 2022) (“In a suppression hearing, the Court sits as the finder of fact and evaluates the credibility of the witnesses.”). 60 For further analysis of “interrogation” see infra at page 20–22. 61 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–68. 16 right is “so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule” that Miranda warnings must always be given, even if the accused already knows the right.62 Once the right is invoked, a subsequent statement is only admissible if courts apply a two-part test: (1) the prosecution must prove that the accused reinitiated contact with police, and (2) that the accused valid

2022He was 63 years of age, was provided his Miranda warnings, was not visibly under the influence as observed on the video by the Court, was not physically threatened or intimidated, was interviewed in the soft interview room which, although it may not have been overly soft, was the least formal—at least it was the least 5 Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185 , 1195–96 (Del. 1992) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). 4 formal interview room available at Troop 3, and was not lied to or tricked by the investigating detectives.

2022He was 63 years of age, was provided his Miranda warnings, was not visibly under the influence as observed on the video by the Court, was not physically threatened or intimidated, was interviewed in the soft interview room which, although it may not have been overly soft, was the least formal—at least it was the least 5 Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185 , 1195–96 (Del. 1992) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). 4 formal interview room available at Troop 3, and was not lied to or tricked by the investigating detectives.

2016Super. 2005). 5 interrogation. 3 A law enforcement officer’s obligation to administer Miranda warnings attaches only in the context of a “custodial interrogation.” 4 A custodial interrogation is “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 5 The Court must review the totality of the circumstances, and the “initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or

2024Mar. 1, 2022) (“In a suppression hearing, the Court sits as the finder of fact and evaluates the credibility of the witnesses.”). 60 For further analysis of “interrogation” see infra at page 20–22. 61 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–68. 16 right is “so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule” that Miranda warnings must always be given, even if the accused already knows the right.62 Once the right is invoked, a subsequent statement is only admissible if courts apply a two-part test: (1) the prosecution must prove that the accused reinitiated contact with police, and (2) that the accused valid

2024Mar. 1, 2022) (“In a suppression hearing, the Court sits as the finder of fact and evaluates the credibility of the witnesses.”). 60 For further analysis of “interrogation” see infra at page 20–22. 61 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–68. 16 right is “so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule” that Miranda warnings must always be given, even if the accused already knows the right.62 Once the right is invoked, a subsequent statement is only admissible if courts apply a two-part test: (1) the prosecution must prove that the accused reinitiated contact with police, and (2) that the accused valid

2024A. Miranda Only Applies When an Individual Is Subject to Custodial Interrogation We begin by recognizing that “police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question.”49 This Court has noted that “[f]or Miranda to apply, the defendant must be: (i) in custody or in a custodial setting, and (ii) the questioning must rise to the level of an interrogation.”50 Both prongs of this inquiry 45 McDougal v. State, 314 A.3d 1077 , 1086 (Del. 2024) (citing Garnett v. State, 308 A.3d 625 , 641 (Del. 2023)). 46 Juliano v. State, 254 A.3d 369 , 376 (Del. 2020). 47 Garn

2016Super. 2005). 5 interrogation. 3 A law enforcement officer’s obligation to administer Miranda warnings attaches only in the context of a “custodial interrogation.” 4 A custodial interrogation is “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 5 The Court must review the totality of the circumstances, and the “initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or

2021The Defendant’s invocation of the right to remain silent eliminates the need to review those cases dealing with “ambiguous invocations.” Where a defendant’s invocation under Miranda is ambiguous, Delaware follows the “clarifying approach,” which permits law enforcement to continuing questioning the suspect, but only as to the ambiguity in the invocation of Miranda warnings.1 Because the parties concede that the Defendant’s invocation was not ambiguous, the law requires that the police “scrupulously honor” the invocation.2 In Rhode Island v. Innis, the Supreme Court clarified the “scrupulous ho

1987Addressing the taint issue first, we find defendant’s reliance upon Oregon v. Elstad to be misplaced, but Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), to state the controlling law. 28 In Mosley , the Supreme Court addressed the question of the scope or limits of the Miranda waiver and held that whenever a suspect later indicates that he wishes to reassert his right to remain silent, the questioning must immediately cease. 423 U.S. at 104 , 96 S.Ct. at 326 .

2024First, the court held that Coello was not in Miranda custody and, therefore, Coello’s Miranda rights were not triggered.31 The court relied on cases including Laury v. State32 for the principle that officers do not need to Mirandize suspects when police are performing initial investigatory functions at the scene of a crime.33 The court considered the seriousness of the accident and concluded that “under the totality of the circumstances, custody status was lacking, and Miranda was therefore not triggered.”34 Second, the court rejected Coello’s claim that his statements were not knowing and vol

2024True, Coello may have felt pressure to follow the officers’ requests, but officer testimony supports the position that a primary goal of the request was to get Coello medical assistance and to protect his welfare.86 Therefore, this case is more akin to State v. DesLaurier and People v. Bohler where officer instructions to the defendants did not require Miranda warnings because they were for the defendants’ own safety. 83 See Laury v. State, 260 A.2d 907, 908 (Del. 1969) (initial investigatory function at crime scene does not trigger Miranda). 84 Null, 233 P.3d at 677 . 85 Id. 86 App. to Openin

2016Super. 2005). 5 interrogation. 3 A law enforcement officer’s obligation to administer Miranda warnings attaches only in the context of a “custodial interrogation.” 4 A custodial interrogation is “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 5 The Court must review the totality of the circumstances, and the “initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or

2014Admissibility Of Mauk’s Statements Miranda warnings are only required when a suspect is both in custody and subject to interrogation by a State agent. 50 A law enforcement officer becomes obligated to administer Miranda warnings “only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him in custody.” 51 The legal standard used to determine custody is “whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” 52 “When determining whether an interrogation has occurred in a custodial setting . . . the court must r

2025For example, in Tolson v. State, our Supreme Court used the term to explain that an “interrogation” to which Miranda warnings apply “need not amount to actual questioning, but may be the functional equivalent of questioning.” 900 A.2d 639, 643 (Del. 2006).

2017Del. 2014). 50 E.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980); Tolson v. State, 900 A.2d 639, 643 (Del. 2006). 51 Tolson, 900 A.2d at 643 . 52 Id. at 643–44. 19 In this regard, “[a]n interrogation only encompasses actions or words by the officer that he or she should have known would elicit an incriminating response.” 53 Here, the issue is whether, in the twelve minutes before the detective read Mr. White his Miranda warnings, the interaction amounted to an interrogation or its functional equivalent, making it unlawful for the police to not provide the Miranda warnings at the outset.

2024May 8, 2017). 36 Turner v. State, 957 A.2d 565, 574 (Del. 2008). 37 See supra Section I. a. 11 officers.”38 Waiver of the Sixth Amendment right “depends in each case ‘upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’”39 While Miranda warnings are a factor in finding a valid waiver of the Sixth Amendment right, “this Court must consider, in addition to police warnings, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the accused’s waiver.”40 When the accused is given Miranda warnings, he “has been sufficiently appr

2024In Turner v. State, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right was not violated when he initiated conversation with police, the officers gave him Miranda warnings, the defendant did not request counsel, and then reaffirmed his desire to speak.46 In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court noted that Turner’s “ample experience in the criminal justice system” sufficiently showed that he “understood the nature of the right that he was forfeiting.”47 In Keis v. State, the Court held that a defendant’s rights were not violated when he was properly read his Mira

2024Feb. 7, 1992) (TABLE) (quoting United States v. Phillips, 812 F.2d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 1987)). 53 Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012). 54 Id. 12 Not all police questioning requires police to give Miranda warnings.

2024Feb. 7, 1992) (TABLE) (quoting United States v. Phillips, 812 F.2d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 1987)). 53 Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012). 54 Id. 12 Not all police questioning requires police to give Miranda warnings.

2024A. Miranda Only Applies When an Individual Is Subject to Custodial Interrogation We begin by recognizing that “police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question.”49 This Court has noted that “[f]or Miranda to apply, the defendant must be: (i) in custody or in a custodial setting, and (ii) the questioning must rise to the level of an interrogation.”50 Both prongs of this inquiry 45 McDougal v. State, 314 A.3d 1077 , 1086 (Del. 2024) (citing Garnett v. State, 308 A.3d 625 , 641 (Del. 2023)). 46 Juliano v. State, 254 A.3d 369 , 376 (Del. 2020). 47 Garn

2023In addition to Miranda warnings, whether the taint of a prior illegality has been purged, the court noted, should be determined with reference to three factors: “(1) the temporal proximity of the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence to which the instant objection is made; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official conduct.”55 The court found that the “temporal proximity” factor was “neutral”56 and that the third factor—the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct—weighed 52 Id. 53 956 A.2d 1280 (Del. 2008). 54 Id. at 1293

2023Nevertheless, where a defendant decides to "cast aside the cloak of immunity" and "take the stand in his own behalf, he does so as any other witness, and within the limits of appropriate rules, he may be cross examined as to the facts in issue. 61 The Court recognized that "cross examination based upon prior inconsistent 60 Id. at *2. 61 MacDonald v. State, 816 A.2d 750, 753 (Del. 2003) (internal citations omitted). 30 statements made by the defendant does not constitute 'unfair use of silence because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to r

2004Transcript of Trial Proceedings on October 7, 2003 at 133. 17 . 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976) (holding that it is unfair and a deprivation of due process to use the defendant’s silence to impeach their explanation at trial). 18 . 816 A.2d 750, 753 (Del.2003) (referencing the well settled principle that a “criminal defendant’s silence may not be used against him after he has received governmental assurances through Miranda warnings.”). 19 .

2023In addition to Miranda warnings, whether the taint of a prior illegality has been purged, the court noted, should be determined with reference to three factors: “(1) the temporal proximity of the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence to which the instant objection is made; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official conduct.”55 The court found that the “temporal proximity” factor was “neutral”56 and that the third factor—the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct—weighed 52 Id. 53 956 A.2d 1280 (Del. 2008). 54 Id. at 1293

2022A, at 6:00–6:25. 81 See Brown 422 U.S. at 603 (“The Miranda warnings are an important factor, to be sure, in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest.”). 18 IV.

2022To succeed there, Mr. Peters must “demonstrate more than a mere ‘conceivable’ chance of a different result.”165 The “objective inquiry is not mathematically precise” but there can only be a finding of the required prejudice “when there is a substantial likelihood—i.e., a meaningful chance—that a different outcome would have occurred but for counsel’s deficient performance.”166 Mr. Peters alleges that had the interrogation been suppressed, he would not have had to have argued self-defense and thus he would not have testified.167 Since 162 See Burns v. State, 76 A.3d 780, 788 (Del. 2013); Hoskin

2022To succeed there, Mr. Peters must “demonstrate more than a mere ‘conceivable’ chance of a different result.”165 The “objective inquiry is not mathematically precise” but there can only be a finding of the required prejudice “when there is a substantial likelihood—i.e., a meaningful chance—that a different outcome would have occurred but for counsel’s deficient performance.”166 Mr. Peters alleges that had the interrogation been suppressed, he would not have had to have argued self-defense and thus he would not have testified.167 Since 162 See Burns v. State, 76 A.3d 780, 788 (Del. 2013); Hoskin

2022To succeed there, Mr. Peters must “demonstrate more than a mere ‘conceivable’ chance of a different result.”165 The “objective inquiry is not mathematically precise” but there can only be a finding of the required prejudice “when there is a substantial likelihood—i.e., a meaningful chance—that a different outcome would have occurred but for counsel’s deficient performance.”166 Mr. Peters alleges that had the interrogation been suppressed, he would not have had to have argued self-defense and thus he would not have testified.167 Since 162 See Burns v. State, 76 A.3d 780, 788 (Del. 2013); Hoskin

2022To succeed there, Mr. Peters must “demonstrate more than a mere ‘conceivable’ chance of a different result.”165 The “objective inquiry is not mathematically precise” but there can only be a finding of the required prejudice “when there is a substantial likelihood—i.e., a meaningful chance—that a different outcome would have occurred but for counsel’s deficient performance.”166 Mr. Peters alleges that had the interrogation been suppressed, he would not have had to have argued self-defense and thus he would not have testified.167 Since 162 See Burns v. State, 76 A.3d 780, 788 (Del. 2013); Hoskin

2021The Defendant’s invocation of the right to remain silent eliminates the need to review those cases dealing with “ambiguous invocations.” Where a defendant’s invocation under Miranda is ambiguous, Delaware follows the “clarifying approach,” which permits law enforcement to continuing questioning the suspect, but only as to the ambiguity in the invocation of Miranda warnings.1 Because the parties concede that the Defendant’s invocation was not ambiguous, the law requires that the police “scrupulously honor” the invocation.2 In Rhode Island v. Innis, the Supreme Court clarified the “scrupulous ho

2017Del. 2014). 50 E.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980); Tolson v. State, 900 A.2d 639, 643 (Del. 2006). 51 Tolson, 900 A.2d at 643 . 52 Id. at 643–44. 19 In this regard, “[a]n interrogation only encompasses actions or words by the officer that he or she should have known would elicit an incriminating response.” 53 Here, the issue is whether, in the twelve minutes before the detective read Mr. White his Miranda warnings, the interaction amounted to an interrogation or its functional equivalent, making it unlawful for the police to not provide the Miranda warnings at the outset.

2020Further, by entering a guilty plea, Defendant waived his right to challenge any lack of Miranda warnings. 8 Yast, without even an allegation that Defendant would not have pled guilty but 26 Grosvenor v. State, 849 A.2d 33, 35 (Del. 2004), citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 27 Td. 28 See Duffy v. State, 2019 WL 459982 , at *2 (Del. 2019) (citing to Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2003)). for counsel’s alleged errors, Defendant cannot succeed on any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel after entering a guilty plea.” As such, this claim fails.

2019Duffy waived his Miranda claim and his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence when he knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty.12 Given the multiple charges against him and his criminal history, the guilty plea provided Duffy with a 8 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 9 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 10 Younger, 580 A.2d at 556 . 11 Albury, 551 A.2d at 59 . 12 See supra n.7.

2019Duffy waived his Miranda claim and his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence when he knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty.12 Given the multiple charges against him and his criminal history, the guilty plea provided Duffy with a 8 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 9 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 10 Younger, 580 A.2d at 556 . 11 Albury, 551 A.2d at 59 . 12 See supra n.7.

2019Duffy waived his Miranda claim and his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence when he knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty.12 Given the multiple charges against him and his criminal history, the guilty plea provided Duffy with a 8 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 9 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 10 Younger, 580 A.2d at 556 . 11 Albury, 551 A.2d at 59 . 12 See supra n.7.

2015Although the Supreme Court and this Court have previously considered certain contentions about Wright’s confession, the adequacy of his Miranda warnings was not among 23 At the time of the Supreme Court’s 2013 opinion Criminal Rule 61(i)(4) provided that any post-conviction ground “for relief that was formerly adjudicated ... is thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice.” 24 State v. Wright, 67 A.3d 319, 323 (Del. 2013). 25 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 26 The State does not rely upon Criminal Rule 61 in its response to the motion

2015Although the Supreme Court and this Court have previously considered certain contentions about Wright’s confession, the adequacy of his Miranda warnings was not among 23 At the time of the Supreme Court’s 2013 opinion Criminal Rule 61(i)(4) provided that any post-conviction ground “for relief that was formerly adjudicated ... is thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice.” 24 State v. Wright, 67 A.3d 319, 323 (Del. 2013). 25 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 26 The State does not rely upon Criminal Rule 61 in its response to the motion

2004Transcript of Trial Proceedings on October 7, 2003 at 133. 17 . 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976) (holding that it is unfair and a deprivation of due process to use the defendant’s silence to impeach their explanation at trial). 18 . 816 A.2d 750, 753 (Del.2003) (referencing the well settled principle that a “criminal defendant’s silence may not be used against him after he has received governmental assurances through Miranda warnings.”). 19 .

2004Transcript of Trial Proceedings on October 7, 2003 at 133. 17 . 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976) (holding that it is unfair and a deprivation of due process to use the defendant’s silence to impeach their explanation at trial). 18 . 816 A.2d 750, 753 (Del.2003) (referencing the well settled principle that a “criminal defendant’s silence may not be used against him after he has received governmental assurances through Miranda warnings.”). 19 .

2016Super. 2009); Chao, 604 A.2d at 1355 (“[I]n the absence of an actual arrest the critical variable in defining ‘custody’ is the extent to which a particular detention resembles an actual arrest.”). 10 California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (holding Miranda warnings were not required where the defendant, although a suspect, was not placed under arrest, voluntarily came to police station, and was allowed to leave unhindered after brief interview); Chao, 604 A.2d at 1356–57 (holding that the defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation even though the defendant was escorted from her h

2014Admissibility Of Mauk’s Statements Miranda warnings are only required when a suspect is both in custody and subject to interrogation by a State agent. 50 A law enforcement officer becomes obligated to administer Miranda warnings “only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him in custody.” 51 The legal standard used to determine custody is “whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” 52 “When determining whether an interrogation has occurred in a custodial setting . . . the court must r

2021The Defendant’s invocation of the right to remain silent eliminates the need to review those cases dealing with “ambiguous invocations.” Where a defendant’s invocation under Miranda is ambiguous, Delaware follows the “clarifying approach,” which permits law enforcement to continuing questioning the suspect, but only as to the ambiguity in the invocation of Miranda warnings.1 Because the parties concede that the Defendant’s invocation was not ambiguous, the law requires that the police “scrupulously honor” the invocation.2 In Rhode Island v. Innis, the Supreme Court clarified the “scrupulous ho

1998If clarifying questions or repeated Miranda warnings indicate that the suspect does not wish the assistance of counsel, the interrogation may continue. 580 A.2d at 577 .

2016Seitz, Jr. Justice 2 542 U.S. 600, 614-17 (2004) (holding post-Miranda confession was inadmissible where Miranda warnings were not given until the middle of the interrogation, after the defendant confessed for the first time). 3 Caldwell v. State, 2015 WL 4975291, at *1 (Del.

2016In Mattison, the defendant was taken into custody following a custody for purposes of the Miranda rule.”); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004) (“Instead of pressuring Alvarado with the threat of arrest and prosecution, she appealed to his interest in telling the truth and being helpful to a police officer.”); United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715, 721 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he coercive aspects of a police interview are largely irrelevant to the custody determination except where a reasonable person would perceive the coercion as restricting his or her freedom to depart.”). 15 Seiber

2024A. Miranda Only Applies When an Individual Is Subject to Custodial Interrogation We begin by recognizing that “police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question.”49 This Court has noted that “[f]or Miranda to apply, the defendant must be: (i) in custody or in a custodial setting, and (ii) the questioning must rise to the level of an interrogation.”50 Both prongs of this inquiry 45 McDougal v. State, 314 A.3d 1077 , 1086 (Del. 2024) (citing Garnett v. State, 308 A.3d 625 , 641 (Del. 2023)). 46 Juliano v. State, 254 A.3d 369 , 376 (Del. 2020). 47 Garn

2018Miranda warnings are required only where (1) questioning of a suspect rises to the level of interrogation and (2) the interrogation occurs while the suspect is either in ‘custody’ or in a custodial setting.”1 Interrogation under Miranda need not amount to actual questioning, 1 McAllister v. State, 807 A.2d 1119, 1125-26 (Del. 2002). 3 but may be the functional equivalent of questioning.”2 The functional equivalent of questioning includes ‘any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely

2019Duffy waived his Miranda claim and his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence when he knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty.12 Given the multiple charges against him and his criminal history, the guilty plea provided Duffy with a 8 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 9 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 10 Younger, 580 A.2d at 556 . 11 Albury, 551 A.2d at 59 . 12 See supra n.7.

2017Aug. 14, 2000) (citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (1990)). 11 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58-60 (Del. 1988). 5 ineffective counsel claim is without merit and cannot serve as “cause” to avoid the procedural bar under Rule 61(i)(3). (12) To the extent Fields argues stand-alone claims of illegal search and seizure, inadequate Miranda warnings, and prosecutorial misconduct, those claims are waived by the guilty plea.