Miranda warning in New Jersey

2026Proc. 3, 230-33 (2017) (footnotes omitted); and then citing State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 398 (2019)). "[W]hen 'determining the validity of a Miranda waiver,' trial courts must decide 'whether the suspect understood that he did not have to speak, the consequences of speaking, and that he had the right to counsel before doing so if he wished.'" A.M., 237 N.J. at 397 (quoting State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 402 (2009)).

2026When "determining the validity of a Miranda waiver," trial courts must decide "whether the suspect understood that he did not have to speak, the consequences of speaking, and that he had the right to counsel before doing so if he wished." Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 402 (quoting State v. Magee, 52 N.J. 352, 374 (1968)).

2026"To ensure that a person subject to custodial interrogation is 'adequately and effectively apprised of his [or her] rights,' the United States Supreme Court developed constitutional safeguards—the Miranda warnings." State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 396 (2019) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 ).

2026"To ensure that a person subject to custodial interrogation is 'adequately and effectively apprised of his [or her] rights,' the United States Supreme Court developed constitutional safeguards—the Miranda warnings." State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 396 (2019) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 ).

2026Proc. 3, 230-33 (2017) (footnotes omitted); and then citing State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 398 (2019)). "[W]hen 'determining the validity of a Miranda waiver,' trial courts must decide 'whether the suspect understood that he did not have to speak, the consequences of speaking, and that he had the right to counsel before doing so if he wished.'" A.M., 237 N.J. at 397 (quoting State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 402 (2009)).

2026Proc. 3, 230-33 (2017) (footnotes omitted); and then citing State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 398 (2019)). "[W]hen 'determining the validity of a Miranda waiver,' trial courts must decide 'whether the suspect understood that he did not have to speak, the consequences of speaking, and that he had the right to counsel before doing so if he wished.'" A.M., 237 N.J. at 397 (quoting State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 402 (2009)).

2025Notably, the familiar Miranda warnings include an advisement that the arrestee A-3406-22 18 has "the right to consult with an attorney before making any statement or answering any questions." 5 In Hartley, our Supreme Court explained that Miranda established a "prophylactic" rule. 103 N.J. at 275 .

2025Notably, the familiar Miranda warnings include an advisement that the arrestee A-3406-22 18 has "the right to consult with an attorney before making any statement or answering any questions." 5 In Hartley, our Supreme Court explained that Miranda established a "prophylactic" rule. 103 N.J. at 275 .

2026"The failure to administer Miranda warnings prior to a custodial interrogation 'creates a presumption of compulsion,' and any unwarned statements must be suppressed—even when they 'are otherwise voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.'" State v. Tiwana, 256 N.J. 33 , 41 (2023) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985)).

2026"The failure to administer Miranda warnings prior to a custodial interrogation 'creates a presumption of compulsion,' and any unwarned statements must be suppressed -- even when they 'are otherwise voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.'" Ibid. (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985)).

2025It is well settled that "[a] police officer cannot directly contradict, out of one side of his mouth, the Miranda warnings just given out of the other." Id. at 296-97 (quoting State v. Pillar, 359 N.J.

2025It is well settled that "[a] police officer cannot directly contradict, out of one side of his mouth, the Miranda warnings just given out of the other." Id. at 296-97 (quoting State v. Pillar, 359 N.J.

2026A-1271-23 39 Relying on our Supreme Court's analysis in O'Neill, 193 N.J. at 180-81 , defendant argues: First, the detectives did not obtain mere background information; they deliberate[ly] extracted a central admission about his whereabouts in relation to his accuser in a custodial setting that obviously called for Miranda warnings, and that admission served as the starting premise for the entire rest of the interrogation.

2025Our Supreme Court held "when Miranda warnings are given after a custodial interrogation has already produced incriminating statements, the admissibility of post-warning statements will turn on whether the warnings functioned effectively in providing the defendant the ability to exercise his state law privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at 180-81 (emphasis in original).

2025The Court added: We have provided that protection because the right against self-incrimination is "an integral thread in the fabric of [the] common law," and "one of the most important protections of the criminal law[.]" Accordingly, we maintain "an unyielding commitment to ensure the proper admissibility of confessions." [Ibid. (quoting State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 286 (1986); then quoting State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304 , 312 A-1416-23 19 (2000); and then quoting State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237, 252 (1993)).] Once Miranda warnings are properly administered, a defendant subject to custodial inte

2023In Presha, our Supreme Court held that juvenile interrogees have the right to have a parent or guardian present when Miranda warnings are administered. 163 N.J. at 322 (2000).

2025A.S., our Supreme Court held that "the interrogating officer violated a juvenile defendant's rights A-1013-22 22 by telling her that answering questions 'would actually benefit her'—an assertion at direct odds with the Miranda warning 'that anything she said in the interview could be used against her in a court of law.'" 203 N.J. 131 , 151 (2010).

2025See id. at 298-99 ; A.S., 203 N.J. at 151 (holding that the A-1013-22 23 detective telling the defendant that answering his questions would show that the defendant was a "good person" contradicted the Miranda warnings).

2026These procedural safeguards, commonly referred to as "Miranda warnings," P.Z., 152 N.J. at 102 , are intended "to secure the privilege against self-incrimination" and are required whenever custodial interrogation occurs.

2026Super. 378, 385 (App. Div. 1993) (holding, even though "defendant [was] illiterate, ha[d] an I.Q. of 71, and left school at 18[,]" they were capable of understanding the Miranda warnings); (3) the detectives verbally advised A-2955-23 16 defendant of his Miranda rights and the waiver form three times, see State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 400 (2019) (discussing how reading the Miranda and waiver forms aloud ameliorates issues regarding a suspect's ability to understand); (4) defendant's interrogations were cumulatively just over two hours, see Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 397-99 (2010) (fin

2025It is well settled that "[a] police officer cannot directly contradict, out of one side of his mouth, the Miranda warnings just given out of the other." Id. at 296-97 (quoting State v. Pillar, 359 N.J.

2025It is well settled that "[a] police officer cannot directly contradict, out of one side of his mouth, the Miranda warnings just given out of the other." Id. at 296-97 (quoting State v. Pillar, 359 N.J.

2025If Miranda warnings are "required but not given, the unwarned statements must be suppressed." Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 265 .

2025"Whether an individual is 'in custody' for purposes A-1977-23 5 of administering Miranda warnings is a fact sensitive inquiry." State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592 , 611 (2021) (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 266 (2015)).

2023Super. 425, 431 (App. Div. 2005), we addressed "the applicability of Miranda warnings in the context of an officer's response to a call about a domestic dispute" by analogizing the situation to "field investigations" under Terry and "traffic stops" authorized by Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).

2020See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984) (recognizing questioning during the course of a brief routine traffic stop – unlike a police station interrogation – is not sufficiently coercive to implicate the necessity of Miranda warnings).

2026A-0616-24 18 "Our law, however, does not require that a defendant's Miranda waiver be explicitly stated in order to be effective." Tillery, 238 N.J. at 316 .

2026In State v. Tillery, our Supreme Court noted that whether the defendant's Miranda waiver was voluntary presented a "close question," but ultimately concluded that any error in the trial court's admission of the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 238 N.J. 293, 302 (2019).

2024Courts also consider "statements and behaviors by the police which tend to contradict the Miranda warnings, or otherwise render them ineffective." Ibid.

2024Courts also consider "statements and behaviors by the police which tend to contradict the Miranda warnings, or otherwise render them ineffective." Ibid.

2025"The public safety exception to the requirement of giving a Miranda warning prior to interrogation was first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984)." State v. Melendez, 423 N.J.

2025The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the public safety exception in State v. O'Neal, 190 NJ. 601, 624 (2007) holding that the questioning of a suspect prior to the administration of Miranda warnings was acceptable when the situation presented an "objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger associated" with a weapon. 190 N.J. at 618 (quoting Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 n.8).

2024To determine whether a police officer's questions, posed before the officer administered the Miranda warnings, violated a defendant's rights, "we consider whether, under the circumstances, a police officer's questioning . . . was 'particularly evocative' or 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.'" State v. Tiwana, 256 N.J. 33 , 42 (2023) (quoting R.I., 446 U.S. at 303 ).

2023A. The State asks us to reverse the Appellate Division and hold that defendant’s hospital-bed statement was admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings because it was not the product of interrogation or its functional equivalent under the standard established in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).

2025The Court added: We have provided that protection because the right against self-incrimination is "an integral thread in the fabric of [the] common law," and "one of the most important protections of the criminal law[.]" Accordingly, we maintain "an unyielding commitment to ensure the proper admissibility of confessions." [Ibid. (quoting State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 286 (1986); then quoting State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304 , 312 A-1416-23 19 (2000); and then quoting State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237, 252 (1993)).] Once Miranda warnings are properly administered, a defendant subject to custodial inte

2022The Court added We have provided that protection because the right against self-incrimination is "an integral thread in the A-3764-20 20 fabric of [the] common law," and "one of the most important protections of the criminal law[.]" Accordingly, we maintain "an unyielding commitment to ensure the proper admissibility of confessions." [Ibid. (quoting State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 286 (1986); then quoting State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 312 (2000); and then quoting State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237, 252 (1993)).] Notably, in A.G.D., the Court expanded the list of familiar Miranda warnings, holding th

2022In Doyle v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that although “the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings.” 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).

2022In Doyle v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that although “the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings.” 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).

2026When "determining the validity of a Miranda waiver," trial courts must decide "whether the suspect understood that he did not have to speak, the consequences of speaking, and that he had the right to counsel before doing so if he wished." Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 402 (quoting State v. Magee, 52 N.J. 352, 374 (1968)).

2026When "determining the validity of a Miranda waiver," trial courts must decide "whether the suspect understood that he did not have to speak, the consequences of speaking, and that he had the right to counsel before doing so if he wished." Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 402 (quoting State v. Magee, 52 N.J. 352, 374 (1968)).

2025And third, "there was no objective reason to believe that—if defendant did leave the home with the handgun—he abandoned it where it posed a risk to the public." Defendant contends it is more likely the gun would have been found in his car, easily secured by the officers, which coupled with the time of day, "remov[ed] any need to question defendant without the proper Miranda warnings." A-1206-24 12 Assuming there was an objectively reasonable need to protect the officers or the public from the gun, defendant argues Patrolman Graham's question "exceeded the bounds of the safety exception." Relyi

2025And third, "there was no objective reason to believe that—if defendant did leave the home with the handgun—he abandoned it where it posed a risk to the public." Defendant contends it is more likely the gun would have been found in his car, easily secured by the officers, which coupled with the time of day, "remov[ed] any need to question defendant without the proper Miranda warnings." A-1206-24 12 Assuming there was an objectively reasonable need to protect the officers or the public from the gun, defendant argues Patrolman Graham's question "exceeded the bounds of the safety exception." Relyi

2015Moreover, “Miranda warnings are not re quired ‘simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.’” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1275, 1279-80 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 , 97 S.Ct. 711, 714 , 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 719 (1977)); see State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 225-26 , 690 A.2d 1 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850 , 118 S.Ct. 140 , 139 L.Ed.2d 88 (1997).

2015Moreover, “Miranda warnings are not re quired ‘simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.’” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1275, 1279-80 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 , 97 S.Ct. 711, 714 , 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 719 (1977)); see State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 225-26 , 690 A.2d 1 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850 , 118 S.Ct. 140 , 139 L.Ed.2d 88 (1997).

2026"Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent." Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384 .

2026Super. 378, 385 (App. Div. 1993) (holding, even though "defendant [was] illiterate, ha[d] an I.Q. of 71, and left school at 18[,]" they were capable of understanding the Miranda warnings); (3) the detectives verbally advised A-2955-23 16 defendant of his Miranda rights and the waiver form three times, see State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 400 (2019) (discussing how reading the Miranda and waiver forms aloud ameliorates issues regarding a suspect's ability to understand); (4) defendant's interrogations were cumulatively just over two hours, see Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 397-99 (2010) (fin

2022In State v. A.G.D., our Supreme Court held that a Miranda waiver is invalid "when the police fail to inform [a defendant] that a criminal complaint or arrest warrant has been filed or issued against him and he otherwise does not know that fact." 178 N.J. 56 , 58 (2003).

2022In State v. A.G.D., our Supreme Court held that a Miranda waiver is invalid if the police fail to advise an interrogee a criminal complaint has been filed or an arrest warrant has been issued against the interrogee. 178 N.J. 56 , 58-59 (2003).

2020See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (requiring police to "scrupulously honor[]" a defendant's invocation of his or her right to remain silent); State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 221 (1997) (following Mosley); see also State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252 , 278–79 (1986) (concluding that failure by police to re-administer Miranda warnings before interrogating an accused who has previously invoked the right to remain silent constitutes a failure to scrupulously honor the assertion).

2015Id. at 106 , 96 S.Ct. at 327 , 46 L.Ed.2d at 322 ; see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 310 , 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1293 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 232-33 (1985) (explaining that where statement is coerced, “the time that passes between confessions, the change in place of interrogations, and the change in identity of the interrogators all bear on whether that coercion has carried over into the second confession”); see also State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 266-67 , 511 A.2d 80 (1986) (discussing Mosely factors and requiring fresh Miranda warnings before resuming questioning).

2026"The Miranda Court held that, after an individual is given Miranda warnings and apprised of the rights, that person 'may waive effectuation of [those] rights, A-2895-22 81 provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly[,] and intelligently.'" Bullock, 253 N.J. at 533-34 (first alteration in original) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 ). "[T]he State [must] 'prove the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt.'" L.H., 239 N.J. at 27 (quoting State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 654 (1993)); see also State v. Rivas, 251 N.J. 132 , 154 (2022).

2026Super. 378, 385 (App. Div. 1993) (holding, even though "defendant [was] illiterate, ha[d] an I.Q. of 71, and left school at 18[,]" they were capable of understanding the Miranda warnings); (3) the detectives verbally advised A-2955-23 16 defendant of his Miranda rights and the waiver form three times, see State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 400 (2019) (discussing how reading the Miranda and waiver forms aloud ameliorates issues regarding a suspect's ability to understand); (4) defendant's interrogations were cumulatively just over two hours, see Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 397-99 (2010) (fin

2007State v. Leavitt, 107 N.J. 534, 536, 540 , 527 A. 2d 403 (1987); see also Macuk, supra, 57 N.J. at 16 , 268 A. 2d 1 (holding that police officers are not required to give defendants Miranda warnings prior to administration of [a B]reathalyzer test because "fundamental reason for the Miranda rules is just not present").

2007State v. Leavitt, 107 N.J. 534, 536, 540 , 527 A. 2d 403 (1987); see also Macuk, supra, 57 N.J. at 16 , 268 A. 2d 1 (holding that police officers are not required to give defendants Miranda warnings prior to administration of [a B]reathalyzer test because "fundamental reason for the Miranda rules is just not present").

2025Further, we have previously concluded "no Miranda violation [occurred] when a defendant's unexpected statements to police were in response to routine questions or incident to arrest and booking." Tiwana, 256 N.J. at 45; State v. Mallozzi, 246 N.J.

2025Defendant's response to the detective's statement was an "unexpected incriminating statement[] made by [an] in- custody defendant[] in response to non-investigative questions by the police," which would be admissible even without "prior Miranda warnings." Ibid.