80 Wyoming opinions name it 1 courts 1976–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wyoming courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Genningsgreen2 sentences2005We have identified the following factors that trial courts may consider in determining whether a statement was made voluntarily: "'[TJhe atmosphere and events surrounding the elicitation of the statement, such as the use of violence, threats, promises, improper influence or official misconduct, the conduct of the defendant before and during the interrogation and the defendant's mental condition at the time the statement is made[,] ... whether the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and was aware of the situation; whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation and whet 2005Factors that a trial court may consider in making that determination include: “[T]he atmosphere and events surrounding the elicitation of the statement, such as the use of violence, threats, promises, improper influence or official misconduct, the conduct of the defendant before and during the interrogation and the defendant’s mental condition at the time the statement is made[,]” [[Image here]] “whether the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and was aware of the situation; whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation and whether the defendant understood and waived | 7 | 7 |
State v. Evansgreen2 sentences2005We have identified the following factors that trial courts may consider in determining whether a statement was made voluntarily: "'[TJhe atmosphere and events surrounding the elicitation of the statement, such as the use of violence, threats, promises, improper influence or official misconduct, the conduct of the defendant before and during the interrogation and the defendant's mental condition at the time the statement is made[,] ... whether the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and was aware of the situation; whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation and whet 2005Factors that a trial court may consider in making that determination include: “[T]he atmosphere and events surrounding the elicitation of the statement, such as the use of violence, threats, promises, improper influence or official misconduct, the conduct of the defendant before and during the interrogation and the defendant’s mental condition at the time the statement is made[,]” [[Image here]] “whether the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and was aware of the situation; whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation and whether the defendant understood and waived | 6 | 8 |
Simmers v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Courts consider many factors in determining whether a statement was made voluntarily, including: “[T]he atmosphere and events surrounding the elicitation of the statement, such as the use of violence, threats, promises, improper influence or official misconduct, the conduct of the defendant before and during the interrogation and the defendant’s mental condition at the time the statement is made[,] . . . whether the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and was aware of the situation; whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation and whether the defendant understood an 2005Factors that a trial court may consider in making that determination include: “[T]he atmosphere and events surrounding the elicitation of the statement, such as the use of violence, threats, promises, improper influence or official misconduct, the conduct of the defendant before and during the interrogation and the defendant’s mental condition at the time the statement is made[,]” [[Image here]] “whether the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and was aware of the situation; whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation and whether the defendant understood and waived | 5 | 6 |
People v. Pearsongreen2 sentences2005We have identified the following factors that trial courts may consider in determining whether a statement was made voluntarily: "'[TJhe atmosphere and events surrounding the elicitation of the statement, such as the use of violence, threats, promises, improper influence or official misconduct, the conduct of the defendant before and during the interrogation and the defendant's mental condition at the time the statement is made[,] ... whether the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and was aware of the situation; whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation and whet 2005Factors that a trial court may consider in making that determination include: “[T]he atmosphere and events surrounding the elicitation of the statement, such as the use of violence, threats, promises, improper influence or official misconduct, the conduct of the defendant before and during the interrogation and the defendant’s mental condition at the time the statement is made[,]” [[Image here]] “whether the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and was aware of the situation; whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation and whether the defendant understood and waived | 5 | 5 |
Braboy v. Stategreen2 sentences2006But I mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context of his interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo.App.1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 , 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App.2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ 2004But I mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context of interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo. App. 1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 , 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App. 2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ | 4 | 4 |
People v. Tallygreen2 sentences2006But I mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context of his interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo.App.1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 , 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App.2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ 2004But I mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context of interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo. App. 1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 , 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App. 2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ | 4 | 4 |
State v. Greybullgreen2 sentences2004But I mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context of interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo. App. 1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 , 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App. 2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ 2004But I mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context of interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo. App. 1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 , 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App. 2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ | 4 | 4 |
State v. Donesaygreen2 sentences2006But I mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context of his interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo.App.1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 , 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App.2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ 2006But I mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context of his interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo.App.1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 , 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App.2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ | 4 | 4 |
State v. Whipplegreen2 sentences2006But I mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context of his interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo.App.1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 , 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App.2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ 2006But I mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context of his interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo.App.1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 , 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App.2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ | 4 | 4 |
State v. Kirilukgreen2 sentences2006But I mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context of his interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo.App.1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 , 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App.2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ 2006But I mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context of his interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo.App.1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 , 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App.2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ | 4 | 4 |
Cothren v. Stategreen2 sentences2004But I mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context of interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo.App.1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 , 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App.2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ 9-1 2004But I mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context of interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo. App. 1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 , 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App. 2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ | 4 | 4 |
Goodner v. Stategreen2 sentences2004But I mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context of interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo.App.1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 , 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App.2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ 9-1 2004But I mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context of interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo. App. 1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 , 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App. 2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ | 4 | 4 |
Lewis v. Stategreen2 sentences2022When the statements should have been suppressed because of a Miranda violation, we have said “the question is whether the erroneously admitted evidence had a ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Lewis, 2002 WY 92, ¶ 26 , 48 P.3d at 1071 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 , 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1722-23 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993)). 2022When the statements should have been suppressed because of a Miranda violation, we have said “the question is whether the erroneously admitted evidence had a ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Lewis, 2002 WY 92, ¶ 26 , 48 P.3d at 1071 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 , 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1722-23 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993)). | 3 | 5 |
Stemple v. Stategreen2 sentences2006But I mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context of his interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo.App.1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 , 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App.2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ 2006But I mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context of his interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo.App.1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 , 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App.2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ | 3 | 4 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2004But I mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context of interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo. App. 1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 , 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App. 2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ 2002But I mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context of interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo.App.1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 , 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App.2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ 9-1 | 3 | 3 |
Doyle v. Ohiogreen2 sentences1995Comments Concerning Silence Appellant alleges that his state and federal constitutional rights against compelled self-incrimination were violated when the prosecutor elicited testimony and made comments about Appellant's exercise of his right to remain silent. "`[T]he use for impeachment purposes of [a defendant's] silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violate[s] the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" Brecht v. Abrahamson, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1716 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) ( quoting Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 , 96 S.Ct. 2240, 22 1995Comments Concerning Silence Appellant alleges that his state and federal constitutional rights against compelled self-incrimination were violated when the prosecutor elicited testimony and made comments about Appellant's exercise of his right to remain silent. "`[T]he use for impeachment purposes of [a defendant's] silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violate[s] the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" Brecht v. Abrahamson, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1716 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) ( quoting Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 , 96 S.Ct. 2240, 22 | 2 | 6 |
Gunn v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Courts consider many factors in determining whether a statement was made voluntarily, including: “[T]he atmosphere and events surrounding the elicitation of the statement, such as the use of violence, threats, promises, improper influence or official misconduct, the conduct of the defendant before and during the interrogation and the defendant’s mental condition at the time the statement is made[,] . . . whether the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and was aware of the situation; whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation and whether the defendant understood an 2005We have identified the following factors that trial courts may consider in determining whether a statement was made voluntarily: "'[TJhe atmosphere and events surrounding the elicitation of the statement, such as the use of violence, threats, promises, improper influence or official misconduct, the conduct of the defendant before and during the interrogation and the defendant's mental condition at the time the statement is made[,] ... whether the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and was aware of the situation; whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation and whet | 2 | 4 |
Jelle v. Stategreen2 sentences2022Mr. Mills’ interrogation became custodial at that point, and he should have been given a Miranda warning. [¶71] “Miranda requires statements made by a suspect during a custodial interrogation be excluded if the suspect is not given the requisite advisements.” Schwartz, 2021 WY 48, ¶ 10 , 483 P.3d at 864 (citing Jelle, 2005 WY 111, ¶ 14 , 119 P.3d at 407 ). 2022Mr. Mills’ interrogation became custodial at that point, and he should have been given a Miranda warning. [¶71] “Miranda requires statements made by a suspect during a custodial interrogation be excluded if the suspect is not given the requisite advisements.” Schwartz, 2021 WY 48, ¶ 10 , 483 P.3d at 864 (citing Jelle, 2005 WY 111, ¶ 14 , 119 P.3d at 407 ). | 2 | 4 |
Garcia v. Stategreen2 sentences2004It's fine, you know, . . ." and then, "I'd be glad to answer." We quote from the decision letter of the district court at length because, after our de novo review, we find that the district court appropriately analyzed the issue. [¶10] When reviewing whether a motion to suppress should be granted, this Court must first determine if the Miranda rules have been complied with and then we must determine if any statements made were voluntary. "[W]henever the State obtains a confession it has the burden by a preponderance to demonstrate that the statement was not obtained in violation of the Miranda 2004It's fine, you know, . . ." and then, "I'd be glad to answer." We quote from the decision letter of the district court at length because, after our de novo review, we find that the district court appropriately analyzed the issue. [¶10] When reviewing whether a motion to suppress should be granted, this Court must first determine if the Miranda rules have been complied with and then we must determine if any statements made were voluntary. "[W]henever the State obtains a confession it has the burden by a preponderance to demonstrate that the statement was not obtained in violation of the Miranda | 2 | 4 |
Spinner v. Stategreen2 sentences2007Abeyta v. State, 2003 WY 136, ¶ 10 , 78 P.3d 664, 667 (Wyo.2003); Spinner v. State, 2003 WY 106, ¶ 13 , 75 P.3d 1016, 1019 (Wyo.2003). [T15] Art. 1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution provides that "[nlo person shall be compelled to testify against himself in any criminal case." In Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 390 (Wyo.1995), we held that an individual's "constitutional right to silence exists at all times-before arrest, at arrest, and after arrest; before a Miranda warning and after it"-and is self-executing. 2007Abeyta v. State, 2003 WY 136, ¶ 10 , 78 P.3d 664, 667 (Wyo.2003); Spinner v. State, 2003 WY 106, ¶ 13 , 75 P.3d 1016, 1019 (Wyo.2003). [T15] Art. 1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution provides that "[nlo person shall be compelled to testify against himself in any criminal case." In Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 390 (Wyo.1995), we held that an individual's "constitutional right to silence exists at all times-before arrest, at arrest, and after arrest; before a Miranda warning and after it"-and is self-executing. | 2 | 2 |
| Frias v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Kolb v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Dice v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Wunder v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2005Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477-78 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 . [[Image here]] The giving of Miranda warnings, by itself, does not suffice to render a statement admissible. 2005Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477-78 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 . [[Image here]] The giving of Miranda warnings, by itself, does not suffice to render a statement admissible. | 1 | 7 |
Colorado v. Connellygreen2 sentences2022The Miranda rule aims to protect “defendants against government coercion leading them to surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment.” Jendresen v. State, 2021 WY 82, ¶ 30 , 491 P.3d 273, 282 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 523 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986)). 2022The Miranda rule aims to protect “defendants against government coercion leading them to surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment.” Jendresen v. State, 2021 WY 82, ¶ 30 , 491 P.3d 273, 282 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 523 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986)). | 1 | 4 |
Tortolito v. Stategreen2 sentences2022The right is self-executing.’” Spinner v. State, 2003 WY 106, ¶ 18 , 75 P.3d 1016, 1023 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387 , 390–91 (Wyo. 1995)). [¶13] In United States v. Cabrera, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the sentencing court plainly erred when it considered the defendant’s failure to testify. 2007Abeyta v. State, 2003 WY 136, ¶ 10 , 78 P.3d 664, 667 (Wyo.2003); Spinner v. State, 2003 WY 106, ¶ 13 , 75 P.3d 1016, 1019 (Wyo.2003). [T15] Art. 1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution provides that "[nlo person shall be compelled to testify against himself in any criminal case." In Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 390 (Wyo.1995), we held that an individual's "constitutional right to silence exists at all times-before arrest, at arrest, and after arrest; before a Miranda warning and after it"-and is self-executing. | 1 | 2 |
Solis v. Stategreen2 sentences2021A Miranda waiver must be “made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” Solis v. State, 851 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 142 (Wyo. 1986)). 2021Solis, 851 P.2d at 1299 . [¶32] The district court found, based on “all of the evidence presented at the hearing and through the video recordings,” that Mr. Jendresen “did have awareness of the nature of his Miranda rights and . . . understood sufficiently the consequences of his decision to waive those rights.” The evidence showed: - The Miranda warning was read relatively fast, but not so quickly as to not be understandable. - Mr. Jendresen indicated he understood his rights with a nod. - He did not appear to be out of control, or even agitated at the hospital, as he had at the apartment bui | 1 | 2 |
| Mitchell v. Stategreen | 1 | 2 |
| Edwards v. Arizonagreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Oldhamgreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Steingreen | 1 | 2 |
| Walters v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Siler v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nicholas J. Jendresen v. The State of Wyominggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lara v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Williams v. Northwestern R.green | 1 | 1 |
| O'BOYLE v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cherniwchan v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Abeyta v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Billups v. Stategreen2 sentences2004But I mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context of interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo.App.1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 , 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App.2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ 9-1 2004But I mean;" and, "What do you think a lawyer would tell me right now?"; however, in full context of interview and clarity of Miranda warnings given, those statements were ambiguous); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 179-81 (Colo.App.1999) (Although the defendant asked many questions about his right to counsel, he ended up saying, "Yeah, I'll talk to you."); State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 , 5 P.3d 478, 482 (Idaho App.2000) (adopting Davis rule, but in context of right to remain silent where defendant repeatedly said, "No more!" to questions being put to him); Stemple v. State, 2000 OK CR 4 ¶¶ 9-1 | 4 | 4 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Oregon v. Elstad
green
2 sentences2002In Eistad, the Court held that "[a]) subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement." - Id. at 313, 105 S.Ct. 1285 . [T18] Although statements must be suppressed upon a showing of a Miranda violation, even when Miranda has been complied with, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as Wyo. 2002In Eistad, the Court held that "[a]) subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement." - Id. at 313, 105 S.Ct. 1285 . [T18] Although statements must be suppressed upon a showing of a Miranda violation, even when Miranda has been complied with, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as Wyo. | 4 | 1993–2014 |
In Interest of LDO
green
2 sentences1995This Court held that the counsel’s performance was ineffective because he did not fully investigate the facts which would have revealed that the police official had failed to give Miranda warnings. 858 P.2d at 557-59 . 1995We held that the counsel’s performance had been ineffective because he did not fully investigate the facts which would have revealed that the police official failed to give Miranda warnings. 858 P.2d at 559 . | 3 | 1995–2002 |
Wong Sun v. United States
green
2 sentences1993Elstad contended, as does Roderick in the case before us, that his questioning before the Miranda warning tainted the subsequent confession as “fruit of the poisonous tree,” citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 1993Elstad contended, as does Roderick in the case before us, that his questioning before the Miranda warning tainted the subsequent confession as “fruit of the poisonous tree,” citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). | 3 | 1979–1993 |
Carter v. State
green
2 sentences2025Id. at ¶ 15, 241 P.3d at 485–86 (citation modified). [¶32] In Carter, we applied these factors to consider whether an intoxicated, sleep- deprived suspect voluntarily confessed to murder. 2025Id. at ¶ 18, 241 P.3d at 487 . | 2 | 2012–2025 |
Brecht v. Abrahamson
green
2 sentences2022When the statements should have been suppressed because of a Miranda violation, we have said “the question is whether the erroneously admitted evidence had a ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Lewis, 2002 WY 92, ¶ 26 , 48 P.3d at 1071 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 , 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1722-23 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993)). 2022When the statements should have been suppressed because of a Miranda violation, we have said “the question is whether the erroneously admitted evidence had a ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Lewis, 2002 WY 92, ¶ 26 , 48 P.3d at 1071 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 , 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1722-23 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993)). | 2 | 1995–2022 |
| United States v. Patane green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| Mincey v. Arizona green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| New York v. Quarles green | 2 | 1992–2004 |
| Michigan v. Tucker green | 2 | 1981–2004 |
| State v. Reeves green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| Oregon v. Mathiason green | 2 | 1996–2004 |
| Stone v. State green | 2 | 1993–1997 |
| Beckwith v. United States green | 2 | 1993–1993 |
| Maxwell B. Schwartz v. The State of Wyoming green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| United States v. Guillen green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Dixon v. State green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Nathaniel Castellanos v. State green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| United States v. Vincent Anthony Perdue green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Tina D. Engdahl v. The State of Wyoming green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Brown v. State green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Hannon v. State green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Nesius v. State Department of Revenue & Taxation, Motor Vehicle Division green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Yarborough v. Alvarado green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. McKessor green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| United States v. Franklin Neil Brady green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| United States v. Tonnie Franklin Williams green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| United States v. Nicholas Salvatore Digiacomo green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Mayfield v. Collins neutral | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Lawrence v. Texas Employment Commission green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.