Miranda warning in Mississippi

2013Where the issue of mental retardation is raised, as it is here, “the trial judge must first determine whether the accused, prior to the confession, understood the content and substance of the Miranda warning and the nature of the charges of which he was accused.” Martin, 871 So.2d at 701 (¶ 29) (citing Neal, 451 So.2d at 755 ).

2010Where the issue of mental retardation is raised, as it is here, “the trial judge must first determine whether the accused, prior to the confession, understood the content and substance of the Miranda warning and the nature of the charges of which he was accused.” Martin, 871 So. 2d at 701 (¶ 29) (citing Neal, 451 So. 2d at 755 ).

2026He claims that the trial 3 This Court has stated that “[t]he purpose of the Miranda warnings is to protect the individual’s constitutional rights against illegal government intrusion.” DeLoach v. State, 722 So. 2d 512, 518 (Miss. 1998) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 ).

2026He claims that the trial 3 This Court has stated that “[t]he purpose of the Miranda warnings is to protect the individual’s constitutional rights against illegal government intrusion.” DeLoach v. State, 722 So. 2d 512, 518 (Miss. 1998) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 ).

2023Additionally, this Court has stated that “[i]n a non-custodial setting where interrogation is investigatory in nature (general on-the-scene-investigation), Miranda warnings are not required in order that a defendant’s statements be admissible.” Porter v. State, 616 So. 2d 899, 907 (Miss. 1993) (quoting Nathan v. State, 552 So. 2d 99, 103 (Miss. 1989)).

2015But “[fox a non-custodial setting where interrogation is investigatory in nature (general on-the-scene-investigation), Miranda warnings are not required in order that a .defendant’s statements be admissible.” Hopkins v. State, 799 So.2d 874, 878 (Miss.2001) (quoting Porter v. State, 616 So.2d 899, 907 (Miss.1993)).

1993However, "[t]he mere giving of the Miranda warnings, no matter how meticulous, no matter how often repeated, does not render admissible any inculpatory statement thereafter given by the accused." Jones v. State, 461 So. 2d 686, 696 (Miss. 1984).

1993However, "[t]he mere giving of the Miranda warnings, no matter how meticulous, no matter how often repeated, does not render admissible any inculpatory statement thereafter given by the accused." Jones v. State, 461 So. 2d 686, 696 (Miss. 1984).

2025“The Miranda warnings contain an implicit guarantee that ‘silence will carry no penalty,’ because ‘it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.’” Robinson, 247 So. 3d at 1226 (quoting Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 , 96 S. Ct. 2240 , 49 L.

2025“The Miranda warnings contain an implicit guarantee that ‘silence will carry no penalty,’ because ‘it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.’” Robinson, 247 So. 3d at 1226 (quoting Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 , 96 S. Ct. 2240 , 49 L.

2023Additionally, this Court has stated that “[i]n a non-custodial setting where interrogation is investigatory in nature (general on-the-scene-investigation), Miranda warnings are not required in order that a defendant’s statements be admissible.” Porter v. State, 616 So. 2d 899, 907 (Miss. 1993) (quoting Nathan v. State, 552 So. 2d 99, 103 (Miss. 1989)).

2000Therefore, since Williams volun-. tarily admitted he was in possession of marijuana during a non-custodial, temporary detention, and not under custodial arrest, “the absence of Miranda warnings ... do not preclude the admissibility of any statement freely and voluntarily given during such investigation.” Nathan, 552 So.2d at 103 . ¶ 13.

2015But “[fox a non-custodial setting where interrogation is investigatory in nature (general on-the-scene-investigation), Miranda warnings are not required in order that a .defendant’s statements be admissible.” Hopkins v. State, 799 So.2d 874, 878 (Miss.2001) (quoting Porter v. State, 616 So.2d 899, 907 (Miss.1993)).

2013See Smith v. State, 96 So.3d 33, 39 (¶ 21) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (An interrogation performed during a non-custodial, “general on-the-scene” investigation, does not require a Miranda warning “in order that a defendant’s statements be admissible.” (citing Hopkins v. State, 799 So.2d 874, 878 (¶ 7) (Miss.2001))).

2001Miranda warnings are only necessary where a confession was given during the "accusatory stage" (i.e., when law enforcement charges a crime, such as when a warrant for an arrest is issued, or places the accused under arrest) of the investigation or where the interrogation is "custodial." Tolbert v. State, 511 So.2d 1368, 1375 (Miss.1987).

2001We have held that Miranda warnings are *167 not required when the interrogation is part of a "general on-the-scene investigation." Tolbert v. State, 511 So.2d 1368, 1375 (Miss.1987) (collecting authorities).

2010“A statement by the accused is admissible if the accused was given the Miranda warnings, and then knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived the rights.” Prater v. State, 18 So.3d 884, 893 (¶ 34) (Miss.Ct.App.2009) (quoting Busick v. State, 906 So.2d 846, 855 (¶ 16) (Miss.Ct.App.2005)). ¶26.

2010“A statement by the accused is admissible if the accused was given the Miranda warnings, and then knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived the rights.” Prater v. State, 18 So.3d 884, 893 (¶ 34) (Miss.Ct.App.2009) (quoting Busick v. State, 906 So.2d 846, 855 (¶ 16) (Miss.Ct.App.2005)). ¶26.

2005Thus, Moore contends that this Court must assess the statement’s ultimate admissibility by examining the five factors3 established by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), and adopted by this Court in Hall v. State, 427 So.2d 957, 959-60 (Miss. 1983). 3 The five factors are: (1) the giving of the Miranda warnings and the circumstances; (2) the temporal proximity of the arrest and confession; (3) the presence of intervening circumstances; (4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct; and (5) any other relevant cir

2005Thus, Moore contends that this Court must assess the statement’s ultimate admissibility by examining the five factors3 established by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), and adopted by this Court in Hall v. State, 427 So.2d 957, 959-60 (Miss. 1983). 3 The five factors are: (1) the giving of the Miranda warnings and the circumstances; (2) the temporal proximity of the arrest and confession; (3) the presence of intervening circumstances; (4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct; and (5) any other relevant cir

2020Moore v. State, 493 So. 2d 1301, 1303 (Miss. 1986).

2020Moore v. State, 493 So. 2d 1301, 1303 (Miss. 1986).

2018See McGrone v. State , 807 So.2d 1232 , 1235 (Miss. 2002) (holding that, in the absence of evidence that Miranda warnings were given, it does not violate due process of law to permit cross-examination as to post-arrest silence when a criminal defendant chooses to testify at trial); see also Fletcher v. Weir , 455 U.S. 603 , 607, 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 1312, 71 L.Ed. 2d 490 (1982) (same). ¶ 30.

2009Id. at 1235 (¶ 10); see also Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 , 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982) (“In the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to post[-]arrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand.”) ¶ 14.

2024“Long before Miranda warnings were mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court, it was well settled in Mississippi jurisprudence that a confession given after promises of leniency was incompetent as evidence.” Dunn v. State, 547 So. 2d 42, 44-45 (Miss. 1989).

2020“Long before Miranda warnings were mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court, it was well settled in Mississippi jurisprudence that a confession given after promises of leniency was incompetent as evidence.” Dunn v. State, 547 So. 2d 42, 44-45 (Miss. 1989).

1998See Gator v. State, 402 So.2d 316 (Miss.1981) (holding confession admissible where defendant's IQ was placed at a range between 43 and 70); Hancock v. State, 299 So.2d 188 (Miss. 1974) (holding confession admissible after Miranda warnings were given where defendant had an IQ of 87 and was considered "dull normal"); Dover v. State, *488 227 So.2d 296 (Miss.1969) (holding inadmissible confession of forty-five year old defendant with IQ of 60); Harvey v. State, 207 So.2d 108 (Miss.1968) (holding inadmissible confession of eighteen year old defendant with an IQ of 60 and suffering from brain damag

1997"This Court has held that there is no per se rule that mental retardation renders a confession involuntary and inadmissable." Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184, 1205 (Miss. 1996) (citing Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 756 (Miss. 1984)); see Gator v. State, 402 So.2d 316 (Miss. 1981) (holding confession admissible where defendant's IQ was placed at a range between 43 and 70); Hancock v. State, 299 So.2d 188 (Miss. 1974) (holding confession admissible after Miranda warnings were given where defendant had an IQ of 87 and was considered "dull normal"); Dover v. State, 227 So.2d 296 (Miss. 1969) (holdin

2000Before ruling that a confession is voluntary, the “trial judge must ‘determine whether the accused, prior to his confession, understood (a) the content and substance of the Miranda warnings and (b) the nature of the charges of which he was accused.’ ” Blue, 674 So.2d at 1205 .

2000Before ruling that a confession is voluntary, the “trial judge must ‘determine whether the accused, prior to his confession, understood (a) the content and substance of the Miranda warnings and (b) the nature of the charges of which he was accused.’ ” Blue, 674 So.2d at 1205 .

2013The “exigent circumstances” comment by the trial judge was in reference to Officer Godfrey’s testimony that Merritt would have had to be taken out of the handcuffs to sign the waiver. ¶ 13. “[0]ral Miranda warnings and waivers are effective if proven to the satisfaction of the trier of fact.” Taylor v. State, 789 So.2d 787, 793 (¶26) (Miss.2001) (quoting Dees v. State, 758 So.2d 492, 495 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2000)).

2001The Mississippi Court of Appeals recently reiterated the adequacy of orally administering Miranda warnings in stating "oral Miranda warnings and waivers are effective if proven to the satisfaction of the trier of fact," Dees v. State, 758 So.2d 492, 495 (Miss.Ct.App.2000).

2024Miranda warnings “must be given before a suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation.” Batiste, 121 So. 3d at 857 (¶121).

2021See Batiste v. State, 121 So. 3d 808, 858 (Miss. 2013) (declining to apply evidence surrounding a Miranda warning on review of a denial of a motion to suppress when the same evidence was not presented until trial). ¶16.

2018A proper Miranda warning is "an important factor ... in determining whether the confession [was] obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest." Henry , 486 So.2d at 1213 (quoting Brown , 422 U.S. at 603 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 ).

2018A proper Miranda warning is "an important factor ... in determining whether the confession [was] obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest." Henry , 486 So.2d at 1213 (quoting Brown , 422 U.S. at 603 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 ).

2022However, the State argued that the United States Supreme Court in the case of Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982), held that for purposes of cross-examination regarding post-arrest silence when a defendant chooses to testify at trial, the right to remain 5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 6 silent embodied in Miranda arises only if a defendant is questioned by law enforcement and if the defendant is given his Miranda warnings.6 In this case, Turnage was never questioned by the police.

2018See McGrone v. State , 807 So.2d 1232 , 1235 (Miss. 2002) (holding that, in the absence of evidence that Miranda warnings were given, it does not violate due process of law to permit cross-examination as to post-arrest silence when a criminal defendant chooses to testify at trial); see also Fletcher v. Weir , 455 U.S. 603 , 607, 102 S.Ct. 1309 , 1312, 71 L.Ed. 2d 490 (1982) (same). ¶ 30.

2025“The initiation of questioning of the suspect who is in custody by law enforcement officers triggers the need for Miranda; therefore, if a suspect in custody initiates the conversation, that statement may be admissible as freely and voluntarily given even without prior Miranda warnings.” Id. (quoting Alexander v. State, 736 So. 2d 1058, 1063 (¶11) (Miss.

2008According to Alexander v. State, 736 So.2d 1058, 1063 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.1999), “[e]us-todial interrogation [within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment] is defined as ‘questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’ ” The initiation of questioning by law enforcement of the suspect who is in custody triggers Miranda warnings.

2025The failure to speak occurred before the [defendant] was taken into custody and given Miranda warnings.” Id. at 238-40 (emphasis added). ¶40.

2002In Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 561 , 100 S.Ct. 1358, 1365 , 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980), we observed that the post-conviction, presentencing silence of the defendant did not resemble "postarrest silence that may be induced by the assurances contained in Miranda warnings." In Jenkins , we noted that the failure to speak involved in that case occurred before the defendant was taken into custody and was given his Miranda warnings, commenting that no governmental action induced the defendant to remain silent before his arrest. 447 U.S., at 239-240 , 100 S.Ct., at 2130.

2002This Court has set out the parameters concerning any comments pertaining to a defendant's post-arrest silence as follows: In Johnson v. State, 596 So.2d 865 (Miss.1992), this Court held that the prosecutors's repeated comments on the defendant's post-arrest silence, after receiving Miranda warnings, [FN4.

1999This Court has set out the parameters concerning any comments pertaining to a defendant's post-arrest silence as follows: In Johnson v. State, 596 So.2d 865 (Miss.1992), this Court held that the prosecutors's repeated comments on the defendant's post-arrest silence, after receiving Miranda warnings, [FN4.

2018Ed. 2d 91 (1976). “[I]n Doyle the U.S. Supreme Court held that if an accused under arrest was given a Miranda warning and told that he had a right to remain silent, and the accused did remain silent, that the government thereafter could not use his choice of remaining silent as a weapon during his trial testimony cross-examination to cast suspicion on his guilt or innocence.” Puckett v. State, 737 So. 2d 322, 350 (Miss. 1999).

2018Doyle v. Ohio , 426 U.S. 610 , 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). "[I]n Doyle the U.S. Supreme Court held that if an accused under arrest was given a Miranda warning and told that he had a right to remain silent, and the accused did remain silent, that the government thereafter could not use his choice of remaining silent as a weapon during his trial testimony cross-examination to cast suspicion on his guilt or innocence." Puckett v. State , 737 So.2d 322 , 350 (Miss. 1999).