Miranda warning in Colorado

2026Before a custodial interrogation, police must inform a suspect “that he has a right to remain silent, 7 that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 . ¶ 19 It is improper for a prosecutor to allude to a defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent “as indicating a consciousness of guilt,” People v. Wright, 511 P.2d 460, 462 (Colo. 1973), “because the Miranda warnings implicitly assure the defendant that his silence will carry no penalty,” People v. Davis

2026Before a custodial interrogation, police must inform a suspect “that he has a right to remain silent, 7 that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 . ¶ 19 It is improper for a prosecutor to allude to a defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent “as indicating a consciousness of guilt,” People v. Wright, 511 P.2d 460, 462 (Colo. 1973), “because the Miranda warnings implicitly assure the defendant that his silence will carry no penalty,” People v. Davis

1999To this end, the Court held that the fact that statements were made pursuant to an otherwise valid, voluntary waiver following Miranda warnings does not necessarily purge the taint of an underlying Fourth Amendment violation, such as an illegal arrest. 18 See id. at 603, 605 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 ; see also Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216-17 , 99 S.Ct. 2248 ; People v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18, 33 (Colo.1981); McCall, 623 P.2d at 398 .

1999The Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603, 605 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), held that the mere giving of "Miranda warnings, alone and per se, cannot always make the act sufficiently a product of free will to break, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the causal connection between the illegality and the confession.

2026Applicable Law ¶ 12 “Miranda warnings are not required ‘simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.’” Matheny, 46 P.3d at 463 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).

2024See Cline , ¶ 21, 439 P.3d at 1238 (listing cases in which police-suspect encounters that occurred outside the suspect's home weighed against a custody determination); Garcia , ¶¶ 21-22, 409 P.3d at 317 (same). " Miranda warnings were expressly developed as an added protection against ' incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere.'" People v. Figueroa-Ortega , 2012 CO 51, ¶ 7, 283 P.3d 691, 693 (emphasis added) (quoting Miranda , 384 U.S. at 445); see also Matheny , 46 P.3d at 462 (" Miranda identified the principal threat to the privilege against self-incrimina

2018See Elstad , 470 U.S. at 317 -18 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 . ¶ 20 The present case involves the scenario in which a suspect in custody is interrogated and confesses before receiving Miranda warnings, is then given the warnings, and then confesses again.

2018See Elstad , 470 U.S. at 317 -18 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 . ¶ 20 The present case involves the scenario in which a suspect in custody is interrogated and confesses before receiving Miranda warnings, is then given the warnings, and then confesses again.

2026Cf. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-401 (1978) (holding that a suspect’s Miranda waiver was involuntary because he was gravely 22 injured, was drifting in and out of consciousness, was unable to think clearly, and repeatedly asked the officers to stop the questioning); Effland, 240 P.3d at 878-79 (concluding that a suspect’s Miranda waiver was involuntary because officers took advantage of his “weakened physical and mental state” and ignored his repeated invocations of his right to remain silent).

2026People v. Smiley, 2023 CO 36 , ¶ 12; Effland v. People, 240 P.3d 868, 878 (Colo. 2010). ¶ 17 A Miranda waiver is valid only if it is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.

2026Id. ¶ 48 Determination of voluntariness requires a nuanced evaluation of the totality of the circumstances that includes the following nonexhaustive factors: • whether the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and was aware of his situation; • whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation and whether the defendant understood and waived his Miranda rights; • whether the defendant had the opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else prior to the interrogation; • whether the challenged statement was made during the course of an interrogation or instead was volunteere

2024People v. Gennings , 808 P.2d 839, 844 (Col o. 1991). ¶ 52 Based on the trial court’s findings on these factors, which are supported by the record, we conclude that the challenged statements were voluntary. ¶ 53 Th e facts that Shukurov was in custody , hadn’t received Miranda warnings, didn’t have the chance to confer with anyone before he made the statements, and had expressed a fear of law enforcement weigh against a finding of voluntariness. ¶ 54 However, the other factors indicate that Shukurov’s post- arrest statements were voluntary.

2021The Public Safety Exception ¶17 The public safety exception applies if "the exigency of the circumstances warrant [s] the momentary omission of Miranda warnings ." People v. Ingram , 984 P.2d 597, 605 ( Colo. 1999 ) ( citing Quarles , 467 U.S. at 658 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 ) .

2021The Public Safety Exception ¶17 The public safety exception applies if "the exigency of the circumstances warrant [s] the momentary omission of Miranda warnings ." People v. Ingram , 984 P.2d 597, 605 ( Colo. 1999 ) ( citing Quarles , 467 U.S. at 658 , 104 S.Ct. 2626 ) .

2022See Davis, ¶ 20. ¶ 58 Second, the test for custody “is not whether a reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave.” Polander, 41 P.3d at 705 ; see also Begay, ¶ 16 (A “trial court errs by applying the ‘free to leave’ standard in evaluating whether a suspect is in custody under the Miranda doctrine.”).

2022See Davis, ¶ 20. ¶ 58 Second, the test for custody “is not whether a reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave.” Polander, 41 P.3d at 705 ; see also Begay, ¶ 16 (A “trial court errs by applying the ‘free to leave’ standard in evaluating whether a suspect is in custody under the Miranda doctrine.”).

2026Applicable Law ¶ 12 “Miranda warnings are not required ‘simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.’” Matheny, 46 P.3d at 463 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).

2025“But when a suspect is not in custody, Miranda warnings are not required.” People v. Bohler, 2024 CO 18 , ¶ 18, 545 P.3d 509 , 514. ¶ 19 “To determine whether an individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda, ‘the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a “formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement” of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’” Willoughby, ¶ 20, 524 P.3d at 1191 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).

2025See Cerda, ¶¶ 42-47; cf. People v. May, 859 P.2d 879, 883 (Colo. 1993) (finding a Miranda waiver invalid when the defendant was intermittently conscious, did not know the date or that he was in the hospital, and could not remember critical details of the accident).

2018Id. ¶ 37 “A Miranda waiver is considered voluntary unless ‘coercive governmental conduct — whether physical or psychological — played a significant role in inducing the defendant to make the confession or statement.’” Platt, 81 P.3d at 1065 (quoting People v. May, 859 P.2d 879, 883 (Colo. 1993)).

2026Before a custodial interrogation, police must inform a suspect “that he has a right to remain silent, 7 that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 . ¶ 19 It is improper for a prosecutor to allude to a defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent “as indicating a consciousness of guilt,” People v. Wright, 511 P.2d 460, 462 (Colo. 1973), “because the Miranda warnings implicitly assure the defendant that his silence will carry no penalty,” People v. Davis

2026Before a custodial interrogation, police must inform a suspect “that he has a right to remain silent, 7 that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 . ¶ 19 It is improper for a prosecutor to allude to a defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent “as indicating a consciousness of guilt,” People v. Wright, 511 P.2d 460, 462 (Colo. 1973), “because the Miranda warnings implicitly assure the defendant that his silence will carry no penalty,” People v. Davis

2019See People v. Figueroa-Ortega, 2012 CO 51, ¶ 8 , 283 P.3d 691, 693 (explaining United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453 , 465–66 (Colo. 2002); and People v. Pancoast, 659 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Colo. 1982)). 2 ¶40 Although we have held that Miranda warnings may sometimes be required under extreme conditions of detention constituting no more than an investigative stop, see, e.g., Breidenbach, 875 P.2d at 885 , the question remains whether Miranda warnings are necessarily required prior to interrogation during a detention that has progressed to a stage at which

2002Israel, Criminal Procedure § 6.6(c), at 526 (2d ed.1999)); People v. Breidenbach, 875 P.2d 879, 885 (Colo.1994) ("Although an investigatory stop is a 'seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, this does not necessarily mean that the suspect is 'in custody' for purposes of Miranda."); see also United States v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126, 131 (4th Cir.1998) ("'The 'custody' that implicates the Miranda rule is conceptually distinct from a seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment."); United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1461 (10th Cir.1993) ("In relying on Fourth Amendment doctrine to dete

2025This “inquiry does not concern the wisdom of a defendant’s decision to waive their Miranda rights, rather it concerns whether the defendant sufficiently comprehended the waiver itself.” People v. Humphrey, 132 P.3d 352, 356 (Colo. 2006); see People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 484 (Colo. 2001) (“[S]imply because the defendant’s decision to talk to the police might be ill-advised does not mean that the defendant’s decision was not knowing and intelligent.”). ¶ 13 In determining whether a Miranda waiver is knowing and intelligent, courts consider the following factors: (1) the length of time between

2022See People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 484 (Colo. 2001) (holding that age is another factor for courts to consider in analyzing whether a Miranda waiver is valid); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726-28 (1979) (noting that even juveniles can validly waive their Miranda rights). ¶ 16 Under the totality of the circumstances, Darbyshire’s behavior did not overbear Sellers’s will and, therefore, we conclude that Sellers’s waiver and his subsequent statements were voluntary.

2006Defendant's Miranda Waiver In reviewing the trial court's determination of the validity of a Miranda waiver, we defer to the trial court's resolution of disputed facts "when the resolution is supported by competent evidence in the record." People v. Al-Yousif, 49 P.3d 1165, 1169 (Colo. 2002).

2006Defendant’s Miranda Waiver In reviewing the trial court’s determination of the validity of a Miranda waiver, we defer to the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts “when the resolution is supported by competent evidence in the record.” People v. Al-Yousif, 49 P.3d 1165, 1169 (Colo.2002).

2013See Matheny, 46 P.3d at 467-68 (“Miranda warnings are not required ‘simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.’ ” (ultimately quoting in part Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 , 97 S.Ct. 711 , 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977))); People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 203-04 (Colo.1984) (interrogation not custodial when the defendant submitted to polygraph examination and was interviewed at the police station following the exam, but was free to leave at any time). ¶ 26 Defendant’s motion to suppress challenged only the fo

2013See Matheny, 46 P.3d at 467-68 (“Miranda warnings are not required ‘simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.’ ” (ultimately quoting in part Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 , 97 S.Ct. 711 , 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977))); People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 203-04 (Colo.1984) (interrogation not custodial when the defendant submitted to polygraph examination and was interviewed at the police station following the exam, but was free to leave at any time). ¶ 26 Defendant’s motion to suppress challenged only the fo

1999To this end, the Court held that the fact that statements were made pursuant to an otherwise valid, voluntary waiver following Miranda warnings does not necessarily purge the taint of an underlying Fourth Amendment violation, such as an illegal arrest. 18 See id. at 603, 605 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 ; see also Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216-17 , 99 S.Ct. 2248 ; People v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18, 33 (Colo.1981); McCall, 623 P.2d at 398 .

1999To this end, the Court held that the fact that statements were made pursuant to an otherwise valid, voluntary waiver following Miranda warnings does not necessarily purge the taint of an underlying Fourth Amendment violation, such as an illegal arrest. 18 See id. at 603, 605 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 ; see also Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216-17 , 99 S.Ct. 2248 ; People v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18, 33 (Colo.1981); McCall, 623 P.2d at 398 .

2025See People v. Lewis, 2017 COA 147 , ¶ 36; see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 , 388-89 (2010) (“[A] suspect who has received and understood the Miranda warnings, and has not 8 invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police.”); cf. People v. Quintana, 665 P.2d 605 , 611 n.7 (Colo. 1983) (“The failure to make any statement should be distinguished from the situation where an accused does make a statement to law enforcement officials but the statement omits significant details which are later included in a subsequent statement.

2025See People v. Lewis, 2017 COA 147 , ¶ 36; see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 , 388-89 (2010) (“[A] suspect who has received and understood the Miranda warnings, and has not 8 invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police.”); cf. People v. Quintana, 665 P.2d 605 , 611 n.7 (Colo. 1983) (“The failure to make any statement should be distinguished from the situation where an accused does make a statement to law enforcement officials but the statement omits significant details which are later included in a subsequent statement.

2010The Voluntary Element "A Miranda waiver is considered voluntary unless 'coereive governmental conduct-whether physical or psychological-played a significant role in inducing the defendant to make the confession or statement'" Platt, 81 P.3d at 1065 (quoting May, 859 P.2d at 883 ); Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170 , 107 S.Ct. 515 ("The voluntariness of a waiver of this [Fifth Amendment] privilege has always depended on the absence of police overreaching, not on 'free choice' in any broader sense of the word.").

2010The Voluntary Element "A Miranda waiver is considered voluntary unless 'coereive governmental conduct-whether physical or psychological-played a significant role in inducing the defendant to make the confession or statement'" Platt, 81 P.3d at 1065 (quoting May, 859 P.2d at 883 ); Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170 , 107 S.Ct. 515 ("The voluntariness of a waiver of this [Fifth Amendment] privilege has always depended on the absence of police overreaching, not on 'free choice' in any broader sense of the word.").

2026Id. ¶ 33 “[A]lthough the Miranda warnings are an absolute prerequisite, they need not be conveyed through any particular ‘talismanic incantation.’” Id. at ¶ 16 (quoting Sanchez v. People, 2014 CO 56, ¶ 12 ).

2026Id. ¶ 33 “[A]lthough the Miranda warnings are an absolute prerequisite, they need not be conveyed through any particular ‘talismanic incantation.’” Id. at ¶ 16 (quoting Sanchez v. People, 2014 CO 56, ¶ 12 ).

2026Marko, ¶ 35; Mumford v. People, 2012 CO 2, ¶ 12 . ¶ 26 A person is in custody for Miranda purposes “whenever his freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.” People v. Mangum, 48 P.3d 568, 571 (Colo. 2002). ¶ 27 “A suspect is interrogated, for purposes of determining whether Miranda warnings are required, whenever the suspect ‘is subjected to either express questioning or its functional 11 equivalent.’” People v. Madrid, 179 P.3d 1010, 1014 (Colo. 2008) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980)).

2025Just detained until they get the search warrant stuff done.” See Mumford, ¶ 16, 270 P.3d at 957 (concluding that the defendant’s “temporary detention during the execution of . . . warrants was consistent with the Fourth Amendment” and under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant’s “temporary detention [did] not escalate[] to the point that an objective, reasonable person in [the defendant]’s position would feel restrained to a degree associated with a formal arrest” and holding that no Miranda warnings were required).

2026Marko, ¶ 35; Mumford v. People, 2012 CO 2, ¶ 12 . ¶ 26 A person is in custody for Miranda purposes “whenever his freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.” People v. Mangum, 48 P.3d 568, 571 (Colo. 2002). ¶ 27 “A suspect is interrogated, for purposes of determining whether Miranda warnings are required, whenever the suspect ‘is subjected to either express questioning or its functional 11 equivalent.’” People v. Madrid, 179 P.3d 1010, 1014 (Colo. 2008) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980)).

2018Whether a statement was volunteered for purposes of a Miranda inquiry is closely related to the question of whether a statement was the product of an interrogation because there were “words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should [have known were] reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01 ; see also Wood, 135 P.3d at 752 (“A defendant’s spontaneous utterances will not be excluded [under Miranda] where there is no interrogation.”).

2019For example, in Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 , 325–27 (1969), the Supreme Court concluded that a suspect interrogated by four officers in his bedroom at 4 a.m. was “in custody” and thus should have been given Miranda warnings.

1999See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 , 89 S.Ct. 1095 , 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1969) (holding that exception to the Miranda rule was not warranted where police officers entered the defendant’s boardinghouse four hours after a murder, awakened him, and interrogated him as to whether he owned a gun).

2018Valdez, 969 P.2d at 211 (quoting Gennings, 808 P.2d at 844 ). 2.

2008See Valdez, 969 P.2d at 211-13 (analyzing whether a defendant's statements were voluntary, regardless of whether a Miranda waiver was first obtained). .

1999But the primary protection afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves. 512 U.S. at 460 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 .

1999But the primary protection afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves. 512 U.S. at 460 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 .

2025We therefore focus our inquiry on whether Berumen was in custody when he made his statements. ¶ 12 A person is in custody for Miranda purposes if, under the totality of the circumstances, “a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would believe himself to be deprived of his freedom of action to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Effland v. People, 240 P.3d 868, 874 (Colo. 2010) (quoting People v. Hankins, 201 P.3d 1215, 1218 (Colo. 2009)); accord Matheny, 46 P.3d at 468 .

2022Id.