Miranda warning in Colorado

2026Before a custodial interrogation, police must inform a suspect “that he has a right to remain silent, 7 that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 . ¶ 19 It is improper for a prosecutor to allude to a defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent “as indicating a consciousness of guilt,” People v. Wright, 511 P.2d 460, 462 (Colo. 1973), “because the Miranda warnings implicitly assure the defendant that his silence will carry no penalty,” People v. Davis

2026Before a custodial interrogation, police must inform a suspect “that he has a right to remain silent, 7 that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 . ¶ 19 It is improper for a prosecutor to allude to a defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent “as indicating a consciousness of guilt,” People v. Wright, 511 P.2d 460, 462 (Colo. 1973), “because the Miranda warnings implicitly assure the defendant that his silence will carry no penalty,” People v. Davis

1999To this end, the Court held that the fact that statements were made pursuant to an otherwise valid, voluntary waiver following Miranda warnings does not necessarily purge the taint of an underlying Fourth Amendment violation, such as an illegal arrest. 18 See id. at 603, 605 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 ; see also Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216-17 , 99 S.Ct. 2248 ; People v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18, 33 (Colo.1981); McCall, 623 P.2d at 398 .

1999The Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603, 605 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), held that the mere giving of "Miranda warnings, alone and per se, cannot always make the act sufficiently a product of free will to break, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the causal connection between the illegality and the confession.

2024See Cline , ¶ 21 , 439 P.3d at 1238 ( listing cases in which police-suspect encounters that occurred outside the suspect's home weighed against a custody determination ) ; Garcia , ¶¶ 21-22 , 409 P.3d at 317 (same) . " Miranda warnings were expressly developed as an added protection against ' incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere.' " People v. Figueroa-Ortega , 2012 CO 51 , ¶ 7 , 283 P.3d 691, 693 ( emphasis added ) ( quoting Miranda , 384 U.S. at 445 ) ; see also Matheny , 46 P.3d at 462 ( " Miranda identified the principal threat to the privilege against

2024See Cline , ¶ 21, 439 P.3d at 1238 (listing cases in which police-suspect encounters that occurred outside the suspect's home weighed against a custody determination); Garcia , ¶¶ 21-22, 409 P.3d at 317 (same). " Miranda warnings were expressly developed as an added protection against ' incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere.'" People v. Figueroa-Ortega , 2012 CO 51, ¶ 7, 283 P.3d 691, 693 (emphasis added) (quoting Miranda , 384 U.S. at 445); see also Matheny , 46 P.3d at 462 (" Miranda identified the principal threat to the privilege against self-incrimina

2018See Elstad , 470 U.S. at 317 -18 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 . ¶ 20 The present case involves the scenario in which a suspect in custody is interrogated and confesses before receiving Miranda warnings, is then given the warnings, and then confesses again.

2018See Elstad , 470 U.S. at 317 -18 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 . ¶ 20 The present case involves the scenario in which a suspect in custody is interrogated and confesses before receiving Miranda warnings, is then given the warnings, and then confesses again.

2026People v. Smiley, 2023 CO 36 , ¶ 12; Effland v. People, 240 P.3d 868, 878 (Colo. 2010). ¶ 17 A Miranda waiver is valid only if it is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.

2026People v. Smiley, 2023 CO 36 , ¶ 12; Effland v. People, 240 P.3d 868, 878 (Colo. 2010). ¶ 47 A Miranda waiver is valid only if it is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

2021The Public Safety Exception ¶17 The public safety exception applies if “the exigency of the circumstances warrant[s] the momentary omission of Miranda warnings.” People v. Ingram, 984 P.2d 597, 605 (Colo. 1999) (citing Quarles, 467 U.S. at 658 ).

2021The officer immediately asked Quarles where the gun was, and Quarles gestured toward some empty cartons and responded, “The gun is over there.” Id. ¶19 The Court held that a public safety exception to the Miranda rule existed because “the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. at 657.

2022See Davis, ¶ 20. ¶ 58 Second, the test for custody “is not whether a reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave.” Polander, 41 P.3d at 705 ; see also Begay, ¶ 16 (A “trial court errs by applying the ‘free to leave’ standard in evaluating whether a suspect is in custody under the Miranda doctrine.”).

2022See Davis, ¶ 20. ¶ 58 Second, the test for custody “is not whether a reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave.” Polander, 41 P.3d at 705 ; see also Begay, ¶ 16 (A “trial court errs by applying the ‘free to leave’ standard in evaluating whether a suspect is in custody under the Miranda doctrine.”).

2024People v. Gennings , 808 P.2d 839, 844 (Col o. 1991). ¶ 52 Based on the trial court’s findings on these factors, which are supported by the record, we conclude that the challenged statements were voluntary. ¶ 53 Th e facts that Shukurov was in custody , hadn’t received Miranda warnings, didn’t have the chance to confer with anyone before he made the statements, and had expressed a fear of law enforcement weigh against a finding of voluntariness. ¶ 54 However, the other factors indicate that Shukurov’s post- arrest statements were voluntary.

2016Relevant circumstances include: (1) “whether the defendant was in custody or was free to leave”; (2) “whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation and whether the defendant understood and waived his Miranda 29 rights”; and (3) “whether any overt or implied threat or promise was directed to the defendant.” Gennings, 808 P.2d at 844 .

2025See Cerda, ¶¶ 42-47; cf. People v. May, 859 P.2d 879, 883 (Colo. 1993) (finding a Miranda waiver invalid when the defendant was intermittently conscious, did not know the date or that he was in the hospital, and could not remember critical details of the accident).

2018Id. ¶ 37 “A Miranda waiver is considered voluntary unless ‘coercive governmental conduct — whether physical or psychological — played a significant role in inducing the defendant to make the confession or statement.’” Platt, 81 P.3d at 1065 (quoting People v. May, 859 P.2d 879, 883 (Colo. 1993)).

2026It is improper for a prosecutor to allude to a defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent “as indicating a consciousness of guilt,” People v. Wright, 511 P.2d 460, 462 (Colo. 1973), “because the Miranda warnings implicitly assure the defendant that his silence will carry no penalty,” People v. Davis, 312 P.3d 193, 198 (Colo. App. 2010) (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976)), aff’d, 2013 CO 57 . 25 ¶ 48 We engage in a two-step analysis when reviewing claims for prosecutorial misconduct.

2026It is improper for a prosecutor to allude to a defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent “as indicating a consciousness of guilt,” People v. Wright, 511 P.2d 460, 462 (Colo. 1973), “because the Miranda warnings implicitly assure the defendant that his silence will carry no penalty,” People v. Davis, 312 P.3d 193, 198 (Colo. App. 2010) (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976)), aff’d, 2013 CO 57 . 25 ¶ 48 We engage in a two-step analysis when reviewing claims for prosecutorial misconduct.

2013See Matheny, 46 P.3d at 467-68 (“Miranda warnings are not required ‘simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.’ ” (ultimately quoting in part Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 , 97 S.Ct. 711 , 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977))); People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 203-04 (Colo.1984) (interrogation not custodial when the defendant submitted to polygraph examination and was interviewed at the police station following the exam, but was free to leave at any time). ¶ 26 Defendant’s motion to suppress challenged only the fo

2013See Matheny, 46 P.3d at 467-68 (“Miranda warnings are not required ‘simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.’ ” (ultimately quoting in part Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 , 97 S.Ct. 711 , 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977))); People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 203-04 (Colo.1984) (interrogation not custodial when the defendant submitted to polygraph examination and was interviewed at the police station following the exam, but was free to leave at any time). ¶ 26 Defendant’s motion to suppress challenged only the fo

2025“But when a suspect is not in custody, Miranda warnings are not required.” People v. Bohler, 2024 CO 18 , ¶ 18, 545 P.3d 509 , 514. ¶ 19 “To determine whether an individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda, ‘the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a “formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement” of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’” Willoughby, ¶ 20, 524 P.3d at 1191 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).

2016See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (holding that there is no requirement to give a Miranda warning to a person not in custody, even when that person is the subject of interrogation). ¶ 37 The record does not support Travis’s claim that she was physically isolated from her husband.

2019See People v. Figueroa-Ortega, 2012 CO 51, ¶ 8 , 283 P.3d 691, 693 (explaining United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453 , 465–66 (Colo. 2002); and People v. Pancoast, 659 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Colo. 1982)). 2 ¶40 Although we have held that Miranda warnings may sometimes be required under extreme conditions of detention constituting no more than an investigative stop, see, e.g., Breidenbach, 875 P.2d at 885 , the question remains whether Miranda warnings are necessarily required prior to interrogation during a detention that has progressed to a stage at which

2002Israel, Criminal Procedure § 6.6(c), at 526 (2d ed.1999)); People v. Breidenbach, 875 P.2d 879, 885 (Colo.1994) ("Although an investigatory stop is a `seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, this does not necessarily mean that the suspect is `in custody' for purposes of Miranda . "); see also United States v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126, 131 (4th Cir.1998) ("The `custody' that implicates the Miranda rule is conceptually distinct from a seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment."); United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1461 (10th Cir.1993) ("In relying on Fourth Amendment doctrine to det

2025This “inquiry does not concern the wisdom of a defendant’s decision to waive their Miranda rights, rather it concerns whether the defendant sufficiently comprehended the waiver itself.” People v. Humphrey, 132 P.3d 352, 356 (Colo. 2006); see People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 484 (Colo. 2001) (“[S]imply because the defendant’s decision to talk to the police might be ill-advised does not mean that the defendant’s decision was not knowing and intelligent.”). ¶ 13 In determining whether a Miranda waiver is knowing and intelligent, courts consider the following factors: (1) the length of time between

2022See People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 484 (Colo. 2001) (holding that age is another factor for courts to consider in analyzing whether a Miranda waiver is valid); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726-28 (1979) (noting that even juveniles can validly waive their Miranda rights). ¶ 16 Under the totality of the circumstances, Darbyshire’s behavior did not overbear Sellers’s will and, therefore, we conclude that Sellers’s waiver and his subsequent statements were voluntary.

1999To this end, the Court held that the fact that statements were made pursuant to an otherwise valid, voluntary waiver following Miranda warnings does not necessarily purge the taint of an underlying Fourth Amendment violation, such as an illegal arrest. 18 See id. at 603, 605 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 ; see also Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216-17 , 99 S.Ct. 2248 ; People v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18, 33 (Colo.1981); McCall, 623 P.2d at 398 .

1999To this end, the Court held that the fact that statements were made pursuant to an otherwise valid, voluntary waiver following Miranda warnings does not necessarily purge the taint of an underlying Fourth Amendment violation, such as an illegal arrest. 18 See id. at 603, 605 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 ; see also Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216-17 , 99 S.Ct. 2248 ; People v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18, 33 (Colo.1981); McCall, 623 P.2d at 398 .

2021Analysis ¶ 73 Under Miranda, the prosecution may not use in its case-in- chief a statement obtained by law enforcement during custodial interrogation unless the suspect was warned about and validly waived certain Fifth Amendment rights. 384 U.S. at 444 ; see People v. Wood, 135 P.3d 744, 749 (Colo. 2006) (same).9 Two prerequisites must therefore exist before a Miranda warning is required: the 9 “[T]he person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either ret

2018Whether a statement was volunteered for purposes of a Miranda inquiry is closely related to the question of whether a statement was the product of an interrogation because there were “words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should [have known were] reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01 ; see also Wood, 135 P.3d at 752 (“A defendant’s spontaneous utterances will not be excluded [under Miranda] where there is no interrogation.”).

2010The Voluntary Element "A Miranda waiver is considered voluntary unless 'coereive governmental conduct-whether physical or psychological-played a significant role in inducing the defendant to make the confession or statement'" Platt, 81 P.3d at 1065 (quoting May, 859 P.2d at 883 ); Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170 , 107 S.Ct. 515 ("The voluntariness of a waiver of this [Fifth Amendment] privilege has always depended on the absence of police overreaching, not on 'free choice' in any broader sense of the word.").

2010The Voluntary Element "A Miranda waiver is considered voluntary unless 'coereive governmental conduct-whether physical or psychological-played a significant role in inducing the defendant to make the confession or statement'" Platt, 81 P.3d at 1065 (quoting May, 859 P.2d at 883 ); Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170 , 107 S.Ct. 515 ("The voluntariness of a waiver of this [Fifth Amendment] privilege has always depended on the absence of police overreaching, not on 'free choice' in any broader sense of the word.").

2026Marko, ¶ 35; Mumford v. People, 2012 CO 2, ¶ 12 . ¶ 26 A person is in custody for Miranda purposes “whenever his freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.” People v. Mangum, 48 P.3d 568, 571 (Colo. 2002). ¶ 27 “A suspect is interrogated, for purposes of determining whether Miranda warnings are required, whenever the suspect ‘is subjected to either express questioning or its functional 11 equivalent.’” People v. Madrid, 179 P.3d 1010, 1014 (Colo. 2008) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980)).

2025Just detained until they get the search warrant stuff done.” See Mumford, ¶ 16, 270 P.3d at 957 (concluding that the defendant’s “temporary detention during the execution of . . . warrants was consistent with the Fourth Amendment” and under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant’s “temporary detention [did] not escalate[] to the point that an objective, reasonable person in [the defendant]’s position would feel restrained to a degree associated with a formal arrest” and holding that no Miranda warnings were required).

2021Id.

2021Id.

2026Marko, ¶ 35; Mumford v. People, 2012 CO 2, ¶ 12 . ¶ 26 A person is in custody for Miranda purposes “whenever his freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.” People v. Mangum, 48 P.3d 568, 571 (Colo. 2002). ¶ 27 “A suspect is interrogated, for purposes of determining whether Miranda warnings are required, whenever the suspect ‘is subjected to either express questioning or its functional 11 equivalent.’” People v. Madrid, 179 P.3d 1010, 1014 (Colo. 2008) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980)).

2018Whether a statement was volunteered for purposes of a Miranda inquiry is closely related to the question of whether a statement was the product of an interrogation because there were “words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should [have known were] reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01 ; see also Wood, 135 P.3d at 752 (“A defendant’s spontaneous utterances will not be excluded [under Miranda] where there is no interrogation.”).

2019For example, in Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 , 325–27 (1969), the Supreme Court concluded that a suspect interrogated by four officers in his bedroom at 4 a.m. was “in custody” and thus should have been given Miranda warnings.

1999See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 , 89 S.Ct. 1095 , 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1969) (holding that exception to the Miranda rule was not warranted where police officers entered the defendant’s boardinghouse four hours after a murder, awakened him, and interrogated him as to whether he owned a gun).

2018Valdez, 969 P.2d at 211 (quoting Gennings, 808 P.2d at 844 ). 2.

2008See Valdez, 969 P.2d at 211-13 (analyzing whether a defendant's statements were voluntary, regardless of whether a Miranda waiver was first obtained). .

2025See People v. Lewis, 2017 COA 147 , ¶ 36; see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 , 388-89 (2010) (“[A] suspect who has received and understood the Miranda warnings, and has not 8 invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police.”); cf. People v. Quintana, 665 P.2d 605 , 611 n.7 (Colo. 1983) (“The failure to make any statement should be distinguished from the situation where an accused does make a statement to law enforcement officials but the statement omits significant details which are later included in a subsequent statement.

2025See People v. Lewis, 2017 COA 147 , ¶ 36; see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 , 388-89 (2010) (“[A] suspect who has received and understood the Miranda warnings, and has not 8 invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police.”); cf. People v. Quintana, 665 P.2d 605 , 611 n.7 (Colo. 1983) (“The failure to make any statement should be distinguished from the situation where an accused does make a statement to law enforcement officials but the statement omits significant details which are later included in a subsequent statement.

1999But the primary protection afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves. 512 U.S. at 460 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 .

1999But the primary protection afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves. 512 U.S. at 460 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 .

2025We therefore focus our inquiry on whether Berumen was in custody when he made his statements. ¶ 12 A person is in custody for Miranda purposes if, under the totality of the circumstances, “a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would believe himself to be deprived of his freedom of action to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Effland v. People, 240 P.3d 868, 874 (Colo. 2010) (quoting People v. Hankins, 201 P.3d 1215, 1218 (Colo. 2009)); accord Matheny, 46 P.3d at 468 .

2022Id.

2025See Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408 (1980) (“[A] defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings . . . has not remained silent . . . .”). “‘[T]he mere fact that [Martinez] . . . answered some questions or volunteered some statements . . . [did] not deprive him of his right to refrain from . . .’ volunteering 26 further . . . exculpatory information.” Ortega, 597 P.3d at 1034 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445 ).

2017See Berghuis v. Thompkins , 560 U.S. 370 , 388-89, 130 S.Ct. 2250 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) ("[A] suspect who has received and understood the Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police."); Anderson v. Charles , 447 U.S. 404 , 408, 100 S.Ct. 2180 , 65 L.Ed.2d 222 (1980) (A prosecutor can elicit the fact the defendant failed to answer some questions after waiving his Miranda rights because "[s]uch questioning makes no unfair use of silence because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Mir