Miranda warning in Tennessee

2022Although the State need not “show that a waiver of Miranda rights was express,” the giving of an uncoerced statement following the provision of Miranda warnings, “standing alone, is insufficient to -4- demonstrate ‘a valid waiver.’” Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 564 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 ).

2020See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1964) (providing that a suspect must receive Miranda warnings prior to custodial interrogation).

2013In State v. Walton, our supreme court ruled that the police must give Miranda warnings after a suspect makes a voluntary statement and before asking follow-up questions. 41 S.W.3d 75, 85 (Tenn. 2001).8 The court reasoned that following this procedure ensures that the answers to the follow-up questions “are truly voluntary and free from ‘relevant defendant ignorance.’” Id. (quoting State v. Callahan, 979 S.W.2d 577, 582 (1998)).

2013In State v. Walton, our supreme court ruled that the police must give Miranda warnings after a suspect makes a voluntary statement and before asking follow-up questions. 41 S.W.3d 75, 85 (Tenn. 2001).8 The court reasoned that following this procedure ensures that the answers to the follow-up questions “are truly voluntary and free from ‘relevant defendant ignorance.’” Id. (quoting State v. Callahan, 979 S.W.2d 577, 582 (1998)).

2022The rule is equally applicable to confessions given during custodial interrogations following appropriate provision of Miranda warnings, see State v. Kelly, 603 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tenn.1980), and those provided before the defendant has been placed in custody, see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286-88 (1991).

2020The rule is equally applicable to confessions given during custodial interrogations following appropriate provision of Miranda warnings, see State v. Kelly, 603 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tenn. 1980), and those provided before the defendant has been placed in custody, see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286-88 (1991).

2026At the outset, the majority concluded that Miranda warnings were not necessary in this case because the Defendant “was not under arrest or in custody at the time he spoke with officers and ultimately confessed.” Notwithstanding this determination, the majority considered the factors for juvenile waiver set forth in State v. Callahan, 979 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn. 1998), and determined that they weighed in favor of valid waiver.

2026The so-called “Callahan factors” include: (1) consideration of all circumstances surrounding the interrogation including the juvenile’s age, experience, education, and intelligence; (2) the juvenile’s capacity to understand the Miranda warnings and the consequences of the waiver; (3) the juvenile’s familiarity with Miranda warnings or the ability to read and write in the language used to give the warnings; (4) any intoxication; (5) any mental disease, disorder, or retardation; and (6) the presence of a parent, guardian, or interested adult. - 22 - Id.

2022The rule is equally applicable to confessions given during custodial interrogations following appropriate provision of Miranda warnings, see State v. Kelly, 603 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tenn.1980), and those provided before the defendant has been placed in custody, see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286-88 (1991).

2020The rule is equally applicable to confessions given during custodial interrogations following appropriate provision of Miranda warnings, see State v. Kelly, 603 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tenn. 1980), and those provided before the defendant has been placed in custody, see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286-88 (1991).

2013The test for determining whether a person is in custody to a degree that he would be entitled to Miranda warnings is “whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would consider himself or herself deprived of freedom of movement to a degree associated with a formal arrest.” Anderson, 937 S.W.2d at 855 .

2013The test for determining whether a person is in custody to a degree that he would be entitled to Miranda warnings is “whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would consider himself or herself deprived of freedom of movement to a degree associated with a formal arrest.” State v. Anderson, 937 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tenn. 1996).

2022To determine voluntariness, the reviewing court must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession to determine “whether the behavior of the State’s law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the defendant’s] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined—a question to be answered with complete disregard of whether or not [the defendant] in fact spoke the truth.” Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961).

2020To determine voluntariness, the reviewing court must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession to determine “whether the behavior of the State’s law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the defendant’s] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined—a question to be answered with complete disregard of whether or not [the defendant] in fact spoke the truth.” Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961).

2022He argues that pursuant to State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Tenn. 1992), an initial confession given without Miranda warnings gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that a second confession, given after Miranda warnings, is tainted.

2017In Crump, the supreme court applied the factors for determining voluntariness of a statement originally articulated in State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915, 919-20 (Tenn. 1992), in the context of a second confession after an initial unwarned confession and subsequent Miranda warnings.

2010The party prevailing at the suppression hearing is further “entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from such evidence.” Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23 . “[P]olice officers are only obligated to administer Miranda warnings prior to ‘custodial interrogation’ which has been defined as a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’” State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 499 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323

2003As our supreme court has observed, “police officers are only obligated to administer Miranda warnings prior to ‘custodial interrogation’ which has been defined as a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’” State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 499 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 , 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529 , 128 L.

2025In considering whether an officer’s words and/or actions constitute an interrogation for purposes of the Miranda doctrine, the paradigmatic example of interrogation is the questioning of a suspect by law enforcement.1 The United States Supreme Court has clearly indicated that Miranda safeguards apply, however, not only to “express questioning” but also to its “functional equivalent.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).

2025In considering whether an officer’s words and/or actions constitute an interrogation for purposes of the Miranda doctrine, the paradigmatic example of interrogation is the questioning of a suspect by law enforcement.1 The United States Supreme Court has clearly indicated that Miranda safeguards apply, however, not only to “express questioning” but also to its “functional equivalent.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).

2019In Seibert, the United States Supreme Court held that “when Miranda warnings are inserted in the midst of coordinated and continuing interrogation, they are likely to mislead and ‘depriv[e] a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.’” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613-14 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986)); see State v. - 22 - Dailey, 273 S.W.3d 94, 108-09 (Tenn. 2009) (concluding that the Defendant’s second confession was inadmissible because the late Miranda warnings, which were given after the Def

2019Because “[b]y its own terms, Miranda applies to the questioning of an individual who has been ‘taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way,’” Dailey, 273 S.W.3d at 102 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478), and because the defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation, the officers were not required to provide him with Miranda warnings.

2026A Miranda violation “does not categorically prohibit the government from using nontestimonial evidence derived from such statements.” State v. Washington, No. W2022-01201-SC-R11- CD, 2025 WL 2847585 , at *6 (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2025) (citing Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 567 ), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jan. 5, 2026) (No. 25-6564).

2026A Miranda violation “does not categorically prohibit the government from using nontestimonial evidence derived from such statements.” State v. Washington, No. W2022-01201-SC-R11- CD, 2025 WL 2847585 , at *6 (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2025) (citing Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 567 ), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jan. 5, 2026) (No. 25-6564).

2015In Brown v. Illinois, 522 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 (1975), the Supreme Court outlined the factors to be considered when determining whether a statement obtained following an illegal arrest should be suppressed: The Miranda warnings are an important factor, to be sure, in determining whether the confession is obtained in exploitation of an illegal arrest.

2015In Brown v. Illinois, 522 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 (1975), the Supreme Court outlined the factors to be considered when determining whether a statement obtained following an illegal arrest should be suppressed: The Miranda warnings are an important factor, to be sure, in determining whether the confession is obtained in exploitation of an illegal arrest.

2026The Smith Court relied on the “spirit and principles” of Article I, Section 9, to part ways with one aspect of the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1992): the effect of an initial confession obtained without Miranda warnings on the voluntariness of subsequent statements.

2013See, e.g., State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Tenn. 1992) (disagreeing with Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), and holding that under *562 article I, section 9, an initial unwarned confession raises a rebuttable presumption that a subsequent confession "even if preceded by proper Miranda warnings, is tainted by the initial illegality”). 14 .

2025The Court further emphasized that “while it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings.” Id. at 618 (emphasis added).

2025The Court further emphasized that “while it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings.” Id. at 618 (emphasis added).

2011McField contends that despite the waiver, his second statement was not knowingly and voluntarily given because it was tainted by his first statement to Detective Meyer. -16- The Tennessee Supreme Court has stated, “When Miranda warnings are given and a waiver obtained, the prosecution has ‘a virtual ticket of admissibility’ for any resulting custodial statement of the defendant.” Northern, 262 S.W.3d at 749 (quoting Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09 (2004)).

2010He instead relies on our supreme court’s guidance that “extraction of an illegal, unwarned confession from a defendant raises a rebuttable presumption that a subsequent confession, even if preceded by proper Miranda warnings, is tainted by the initial illegality.” State v. Northern, 262 S.W.3d 741, 763 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Tenn. 1992)).

2010The party prevailing at the suppression hearing is further “entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from such evidence.” Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23 . “[P]olice officers are only obligated to administer Miranda warnings prior to ‘custodial interrogation’ which has been defined as a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’” State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 499 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323

2009In his reply brief, the defendant further contends that there was no actual proof presented that he was provided with Miranda warnings during his juvenile arrests, but instead only the unsworn statements of the prosecutor, who characterized the defendant’s eleven arrests as “approximately thirteen prior contacts with the criminal justice system and in eleven of those taken into custody by the Memphis Police Department where he was read his Miranda rights.” When this court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, “[q]uestions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight a

2015The requirement of the - 17 - Miranda warnings “must be strictly enforced, but only in those situations in which the concerns that motivated the decision are implicated.” State v. Goss, 995 S.W.2d 617, 629 (Tenn. 1998) (citing Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 294 , 296 (1990)).

2008In Tennessee, the standard to determine whether Miranda warnings must precede questioning in a prison setting were set out in State v. Goss. 995 S.W.2d at 629 .

2026A Miranda waiver “must be ‘voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.’” State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 564 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)).

2019In Seibert, the United States Supreme Court held that “when Miranda warnings are inserted in the midst of coordinated and continuing interrogation, they are likely to mislead and ‘depriv[e] a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.’” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613-14 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986)); see State v. - 22 - Dailey, 273 S.W.3d 94, 108-09 (Tenn. 2009) (concluding that the Defendant’s second confession was inadmissible because the late Miranda warnings, which were given after the Def

2015The court would have had to consider four factors: A(1) the presence or absence of Miranda warnings; (2) the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession; (3) the presence of intervening 17 circumstances; and finally, of particular significance, (4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.@ See id.

2014The court would have had to consider four factors: “(1) the presence or absence of Miranda warnings; (2) the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession; (3) the presence of intervening circumstances; and finally, of particular significance, (4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” See id.

2022See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 293 (1988) (explaining that Miranda warnings effectively convey to a defendant his right to have counsel present during questioning and also adequately inform a defendant of “the ultimate adverse consequence” of making uncounseled admissions).

2022Accordingly, “[s]o long as the accused is made aware of the ‘dangers and disadvantages of self-representation’ during post-indictment questioning, by use of the Miranda warnings, his waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at such questioning is ‘knowing and intelligent.’” Id. at 300 . 15 Relevant to this issue, the trial court found that, since there had been no initiation of judicial proceedings at the time of the December 11 interview, there was no right to counsel.

2018The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that “Miranda warnings are not required ‘simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.’” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).

2016California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (noting that the fact that questioning occurs at the police station does not, in itself, mandate Miranda warnings); David Louis Raybin, 10 Tenn. Prac.

2017In Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 609 (2004), “a plurality of the Supreme Court held inadmissible a defendant’s post-Miranda confession because the police had first obtained a pre-Miranda confession, rendering the subsequent Miranda warnings ineffective.” Charles Nash v. State, No. E2012-02511-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 5314599 , at *7 (Tenn. Crim.

2017In Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 609 (2004), “a plurality of the Supreme Court held inadmissible a defendant’s post-Miranda confession because the police had first obtained a pre-Miranda confession, rendering the subsequent Miranda warnings ineffective.” Charles Nash v. State, No. E2012-02511-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 5314599 , at *7 (Tenn. Crim.

2013See Reaves v. State, 523 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tenn. Crim.

2002App. 1981) (defendant’s statement given three hours after Miranda warnings held to be admissible); Reaves v. State, 523 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tenn. Crim.

2012See also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441-42 (1984).

2009See also Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442 (holding that “[a] policeman’s unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was ‘in custody’ at 15 the Defendant with Miranda warnings, but protested that the circumstances did not require them.

2017The giving of Miranda warnings is designed “to combat the inherently compelling pressures of in-custody interrogation and - 16 - to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination.” Crump, 834 S.W.2d at 268 .

2017In Crump, our supreme court held that a defendant‘s rights were not scrupulously honored when ―[t]hirty minutes after responding to Miranda warnings with ‗I don‘t have anything to say,‘ [the defendant] was taken on a 30 to 45-minute drive and questioned -31- while retracing the route of his escape.‖ Crump, 834 S.W.2d at 269 .

2026See U.S. v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 644 (2002) (“[A]lthough it is true that the Court requires the exclusion of the physical fruit of actually coerced statements, it must be remembered that statements taken without sufficient Miranda warnings are presumed to have been coerced only for certain purposes and then only when necessary to protect the privilege against self-incrimination. . . . [W]e decline to extend that presumption further.”).

2017See State v. Climber, 400 S.W.3d 537, 567 (Tenn. 2013) (noting that “exclusion of the statements elicited during custodial interrogation ‘is a complete and sufficient remedy for any perceived Miranda violation.’”) (quoting United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641-42 (2004) (plurality opinion)).

2018The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that “Miranda warnings are not required ‘simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.’” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).

2012The Supreme Court has cautioned that while “[a]ny interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime,” officers “are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question.” -29- Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (U.S. 1977).

1998Today, the test for determining whether the Miranda warnings should have been given by a law enforcement officer in this state is whether there has been a “custodial interrogation.” 912 S.W.2d at 766 .

1998Today, the test for determining whether the Miranda warnings should have been given by a law enforcement officer in this state is whether there has been a “custodial interrogation.” 912 S.W.2d at 766 .