Miranda warning in New Hampshire

2023The State countered that the proposed line of questioning only included admitting the defendant’s uncontroverted statements that he made prior to his arrest and receipt of Miranda warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1996), and assured the court that it would not elicit any testimony about his post-arrest statements “as that would be unconstitutional.” The court overruled the defendant’s objection, finding the evidence to be “clearly probative,” and allowed the State to introduce the statements that the defendant made prior to his arrest and prior to receiving his Miranda wa

2018"While these so-called Miranda warnings are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution, they are procedural safeguards necessary to dissipate the atmosphere of compulsion inherent in a custodial interrogation." Roache , 148 N.H. at 48 , 803 A.2d 572 (quotation and citation omitted); see Miranda , 384 U.S. at 467 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 .

2016The United States Supreme Court has held that “the use for impeachment purposes of [a defendant’s] silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violate[s] the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).

2010In Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617-18 , the United States Supreme Court “held that the requirement of fundamental fairness inherent in the due process guarantee bars the State from impeaching a defendant with evidence that he remained silent after arrest and Miranda warnings.” State v. Coppola, 130 N.H. 148, 150-51 (1987), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969 (1989); see N.H.

2018This court, construing Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution, has specifically interpreted the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to apply in the Miranda context, "holding that certain physical evidentiary fruits derived from a Miranda violation are inadmissible at trial." State v. Barkus , 152 N.H. 701 , 706, 888 A.2d 398 (2005) ; see State v. Gravel , 135 N.H. 172 , 180-84, 601 A.2d 678 (1991).

2018This court, construing Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution, has specifically interpreted the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to apply in the Miranda context, "holding that certain physical evidentiary fruits derived from a Miranda violation are inadmissible at trial." State v. Barkus , 152 N.H. 701 , 706, 888 A.2d 398 (2005) ; see State v. Gravel , 135 N.H. 172 , 180-84, 601 A.2d 678 (1991).

2017See id. 2 The defendant’s brief is unclear as to whether he is arguing that his statement should have been suppressed because it resulted from a custodial interrogation in the absence of Miranda warnings, see State v. Thelusma, 167 N.H. 481, 484 (2015), or because it was the fruit of his allegedly illegal arrest, see State v. Gotsch, 143 N.H. 88, 90 (1998).

2009In determining whether a confession following an illegal arrest is voluntary, and, thus, admissible under our constitution, we balance the following four factors: (1) whether Miranda warnings were given; (2) the temporal proximity of the arrest and confession; (3) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." Gotsch, 143 N.H. at 90 .

2018See McCarty , 468 U.S. at 437 -39 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 (reasoning that traffic stops do not exert sufficient pressure upon *66 a detained person that Miranda warnings are necessary in all cases).

2018See McCarty , 468 U.S. at 437 -39 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 (reasoning that traffic stops do not exert sufficient pressure upon *66 a detained person that Miranda warnings are necessary in all cases).

2015See Ford, 144 N.H. at 63 .

2002Id. at 62.

1999Compare Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365 (1972) (holding that lineup detention was sufficiently distinguishable from alleged illegal arrest to purge the' primary taint) with Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604-05 (1975) (holding that incriminating statements were inadmissible because taint of illegal arrest was not purged by Miranda warnings).

1983Factors to be considered are whether the Miranda warnings were given, the “[t]emporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, [citation omitted] and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 603-04 .

2021See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (stating that government officers are not required to provide Miranda warnings before interrogating a person who is not in custody).

1995The police must give Miranda warnings prior to questioning “only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’” Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam).

2020State v. Carroll, 138 N.H. 687, 696 (1994); see State v. Sachdev, 171 N.H. 539, 548 (2018) (“[T]wo conditions must be met before Miranda warnings are required: (1) the suspect must be ‘in custody’; and (2) he must be subject to ‘interrogation.’”).

2020State v. Carroll, 138 N.H. 687, 696 (1994); see State v. Sachdev, 171 N.H. 539, 548 (2018) (“[T]wo conditions must be met before Miranda warnings are required: (1) the suspect must be ‘in custody’; and (2) he must be subject to ‘interrogation.’”).

2018Compare Pyles , 166 N.H. at 168 , 90 A.3d 1228 (holding that the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant's Miranda waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent), with Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157 , 168, 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (holding that "the State need prove [ Miranda ] waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence").

2018Compare Pyles , 166 N.H. at 168 , 90 A.3d 1228 (holding that the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant's Miranda waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent), with Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157 , 168, 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (holding that "the State need prove [ Miranda ] waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence").

2003Although the United States Supreme Court has declined to extend Miranda warnings to investigatory stops as well as ordinary traffic stops, see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); see also State v. Graca, 142 N.H. 670, 676 (1998), the instant case does not fit neatly within the ambit of either of these temporary seizures.

2003Although the United States Supreme Court has declined to extend Miranda warnings to investigatory stops as well as ordinary traffic stops, see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); see also State v. Graca, 142 N.H. 670, 676 (1998), the instant case does not fit neatly within the ambit of either of these temporary seizures.

2019"In order for Miranda warnings to be required there must be a custodial interrogation by the police." State v. Hammond , 144 N.H. 401 , 403, 742 A.2d 532 (1999).

2019"In order for Miranda warnings to be required there must be a custodial interrogation by the police." State v. Hammond , 144 N.H. 401 , 403, 742 A.2d 532 (1999).

2016See Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 607 (“In the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand.”); see also State v. Hill, 146 N.H. 568, 577 (2001) (explaining that “a defendant who has not received Miranda warnings cannot rely on Doyle in support of a claim that the use of his silence violates his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment”).

2016See Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 607 (“In the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand.”); see also State v. Hill, 146 N.H. 568, 577 (2001) (explaining that “a defendant who has not received Miranda warnings cannot rely on Doyle in support of a claim that the use of his silence violates his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment”).

2007Thus, we think it implausible “that the defendant could have risen from his seat and freely exited the interview room in the middle of an escalating period of interrogation and gone along on his merry way, especially when the detectives had developed a theory which directly implicated him, and it was their intention to question him further at that point about his involvement.” State v. Dedrick, 132 N.H. 218, 223 (1989) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1007 (1990).

2003Finally, if a defendant has been arrested and is unquestionably in custody and entitled to Miranda warnings, State v. Dedrick, 132 N.H. 218, 224 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1007 , 1008 (1990), a police decision to delay giving the required warnings and elicit a statement followed immediately by the warnings and another incriminating statement, see Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318 , strongly suggests that the police are exploiting the inherent pressures of custodial interrogation such that the post-Miranda statement should ordinarily be inadmissible.

2003We first address each of the defendant’s arguments under the State Constitution, State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33 (1983), and cite federal opinions only to aid in our analysis.

2001See State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33 , 471 A.2d 347, 351-52 (1983).

2002While these so-called Miranda warnings are “not themselves rights protected by the Constitution,” Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974), they are procedural safeguards necessary to dissipate the atmosphere of compulsion inherent in a custodial interrogation.

1991See id.; Michigan v. Tucker supra. Instead, where only a Miranda violation was at issue, the Court has focused on whether the value of deterrence would be served in the particular case and on the nature of the “fruits” at issue.

1989Even assuming that the defendant had become the focus of suspicion after he had identified himself to Trooper Hamel as the pilot, it is well established that “Miranda warnings are not required simply ‘because the person being questioned is one whom the police suspect.’” State v. Rodney Portigue, 125 N.H. at 362 , 481 A.2d at 541 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125 (citation omitted)).

1984Miranda warnings are not required simply “‘because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.’” California v. Beheler, supra at 3520 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason supra).

2003Finally, if a defendant has been arrested and is unquestionably in custody and entitled to Miranda warnings, State v. Dedrick, 132 N.H. 218, 224 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1007 , 1008 (1990), a police decision to delay giving the required warnings and elicit a statement followed immediately by the warnings and another incriminating statement, see Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318 , strongly suggests that the police are exploiting the inherent pressures of custodial interrogation such that the post-Miranda statement should ordinarily be inadmissible.

1991Noting that live testimony ‘““is not to be mechanically equated with the proffer of inanimate evidentiary objects illegally seized,”’” 470 U.S. at 308-09 (citations omitted), the Court held “that a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.” Id. at 318.

1995In State v. McGann, 124 N.H. 101,106-07 , 467 A.2d 571, 574 (1983), we held that a warrantless search of the defendant’s vehicle violated his rights under part I, article 19, and stated, “Since the fruits of that search provided the primary basis for the objects that were the subject of the defendant’s motion to suppress, that motion should have been granted.” Similarly, in State v. Tapply, 124 N.H. 318, 325-326 , 470 A.2d 900, 905 (1983), we held that an interview of the defendant while in police custody must be excluded as evidence because of a violation of the defendant’s rights under part

1995In State v. McGann, 124 N.H. 101,106-07 , 467 A.2d 571, 574 (1983), we held that a warrantless search of the defendant’s vehicle violated his rights under part I, article 19, and stated, “Since the fruits of that search provided the primary basis for the objects that were the subject of the defendant’s motion to suppress, that motion should have been granted.” Similarly, in State v. Tapply, 124 N.H. 318, 325-326 , 470 A.2d 900, 905 (1983), we held that an interview of the defendant while in police custody must be excluded as evidence because of a violation of the defendant’s rights under part

2018"While these so-called Miranda warnings are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution, they are procedural safeguards necessary to dissipate the atmosphere of compulsion inherent in a custodial interrogation." Roache , 148 N.H. at 48 , 803 A.2d 572 (quotation and citation omitted); see Miranda , 384 U.S. at 467 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 .

2018"While these so-called Miranda warnings are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution, they are procedural safeguards necessary to dissipate the atmosphere of compulsion inherent in a custodial interrogation." Roache , 148 N.H. at 48 , 803 A.2d 572 (quotation and citation omitted); see Miranda , 384 U.S. at 467 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 .

1989Although this court held in State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915 , 396 A.2d 554, 555 (1978) that Miranda warnings and waiver must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt when necessary to establish the admissibility of a defendant’s statement, cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 523 (1986) (proof by preponderance sufficient under National Constitution), Gulliek does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a statement was spontaneous and therefore outside Miranda’s ambit.

1989Although this court held in State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915 , 396 A.2d 554, 555 (1978) that Miranda warnings and waiver must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt when necessary to establish the admissibility of a defendant’s statement, cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 523 (1986) (proof by preponderance sufficient under National Constitution), Gulliek does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a statement was spontaneous and therefore outside Miranda’s ambit.

1998Although a defendant not previously warned must receive a Miranda warning when he is confronted with a custodial interrogation, see, e.g., State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 633 , 517 A.2d 1163, 1166 (1986), if he is warned prior to this moment, the Constitution does not mandate that he be warned again when the custodial interrogation actually begins.

1998Although a defendant not previously warned must receive a Miranda warning when he is confronted with a custodial interrogation, see, e.g., State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 633 , 517 A.2d 1163, 1166 (1986), if he is warned prior to this moment, the Constitution does not mandate that he be warned again when the custodial interrogation actually begins.

1987The Court held that the right protected by Miranda warnings, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was of constitutional dimension and thus could not be unduly burdened, whereas the right to refuse the blood alcohol test, in contrast, was “simply a matter of grace bestowed by the South Dakota Legislature,” Neville, 459 U.S. at 565 , since compelled blood tests under normal circumstances do not deprive a defendant of his protection against self-incrimination.

1987Furthermore, the Court reasoned that “the Miranda warnings emphasize the dangers of choosing to speak (‘whatever you say can and will be used as evidence against you in court’), but give no warnings of adverse consequences from choosing to remain silent.” Neville, 459 U.S. at 565 .

2023Two conditions must be met before Miranda warnings are required: (1) the suspect must be “in custody”; and (2) he must be subject to “interrogation.” State v. Sachdev, 171 N.H. 539, 548 (2018).

2020State v. Carroll, 138 N.H. 687, 696 (1994); see State v. Sachdev, 171 N.H. 539, 548 (2018) (“[T]wo conditions must be met before Miranda warnings are required: (1) the suspect must be ‘in custody’; and (2) he must be subject to ‘interrogation.’”).

2021See, e.g., State v. Palamia, 124 N.H. 333, 337 (1983).

2005The defendant concedes that he was read his Miranda rights, but, as he correctly points out, “Miranda warnings per se do not remove the taint of the illegal arrest.” State v. Palamia, 124 N.H. 333, 337 (1983).

2019Cf., e.g. , State v. Ducharme , 167 N.H. 606 , 614, 116 A.3d 1281 (2015) (noting that "implied consent law questioning is not 'interrogation' " and therefore need not be preceded by Miranda warnings); State v. Barkus , 152 N.H. 701 , 708, 888 A.2d 398 (2005) (recognizing that "it is settled law that a driver arrested for driving while under the influence has no constitutional right to refuse to provide a sample for a blood alcohol test"). 2 Because we adopt the reasonable officer approach, which is focused on the objective conduct of the officer in administering the testing rather than the sub

2019Cf., e.g. , State v. Ducharme , 167 N.H. 606 , 614, 116 A.3d 1281 (2015) (noting that "implied consent law questioning is not 'interrogation' " and therefore need not be preceded by Miranda warnings); State v. Barkus , 152 N.H. 701 , 708, 888 A.2d 398 (2005) (recognizing that "it is settled law that a driver arrested for driving while under the influence has no constitutional right to refuse to provide a sample for a blood alcohol test"). 2 Because we adopt the reasonable officer approach, which is focused on the objective conduct of the officer in administering the testing rather than the sub

2018We recognized, in State v. Turmel , that although the subject of an investigatory, or Terry , stop is " 'seized' in a Fourth Amendment sense[,] ... [s]uch temporary custody does not ... constitute custody for Miranda purposes and, therefore, Miranda warnings are not triggered." Turmel , 150 N.H. at 383 , 838 A.2d 1279 .

2018We recognized, in State v. Turmel , that although the subject of an investigatory, or Terry , stop is " 'seized' in a Fourth Amendment sense[,] ... [s]uch temporary custody does not ... constitute custody for Miranda purposes and, therefore, Miranda warnings are not triggered." Turmel , 150 N.H. at 383 , 838 A.2d 1279 .

1998Miranda warnings advise a defendant of his constitu tional rights, see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45 ; State v. Nash, 119 N.H. 728, 731 , 407 A.2d 365, 367 (1979), and must be administered when an individual is subject to a custodial interrogation by law enforcement agents.

1998Miranda warnings advise a defendant of his constitu tional rights, see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45 ; State v. Nash, 119 N.H. 728, 731 , 407 A.2d 365, 367 (1979), and must be administered when an individual is subject to a custodial interrogation by law enforcement agents.