Miranda warning in Utah

2021“To guide the decision as to when one is in custody and entitled to a Miranda warning prior to a formal arrest,” the court in Mirquet evaluated the four factors set out in Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983): “(1) the site of interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the length and form of interrogation.” Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147 (cleaned up). ¶49 Our supreme court has since clarified that “[s]trict or sole reliance on the Carner factors is inconsistent with the totality of the circums

1998The court, relying on the four factors discussed in Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983), found that because Brandley was not in custody during the interview for Miranda purposes, Miranda warnings were not required.

2023After isolating Uptain in a booking area of the jail, an officer, without providing Miranda warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), started interviewing Uptain, mainly about drug activity in the community.

2023And there is no dispute that Detective did not provide Miranda warnings until after he turned the questioning to the topic of the 2012 UT App 367 , ¶¶ 16–24, 293 P.3d 1129 (questioning via a long- distance telephone call), cert. denied, 300 P.3d 312 (Utah 2013). 20210766-CA 13 2023 UT App 149 State v. Uptain home invasion and after Uptain said that he regretted his involvement in the event and was wondering when Detective was going to bring it up. ¶28 This sequence of events was in direct violation of Miranda’s explicit directive: “Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he ha

2021As a prophylactic measure, the Court established the Miranda warnings requirement “to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination is protected.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985) (cleaned up). ¶43 But Miranda warnings are required only “in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated,” namely “custodial interrogation.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435, 437 (1984).

2021As a prophylactic measure, the Court established the Miranda warnings requirement “to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination is protected.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985) (cleaned up). ¶43 But Miranda warnings are required only “in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated,” namely “custodial interrogation.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435, 437 (1984).

2019See id. at 203–05. ¶25 Our supreme court reached a similar conclusion in examining a Miranda warning that stated, “If you cannot afford an attorney, you have the right to have an attorney appointed for you by the court at a later date.” State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1989) (quotation simplified).

2003So long as the substance of Werner's Miranda warning, given " 'prior to any ques-tioningl[,]' " indicated to Werner " 'that he hald] the right to remain silent, that anything he salid could] be used against him in a court of law, that he ha[ld] the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he [could not] afford an attorney one [would] be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desire[dl/ " id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)), then the warning was sufficient, regardless of its specific wording.

2023See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 , 291 n.7 (1986) (“Notably, the Court in Doyle did not rely on the contention that Ohio had violated the defendants’ Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination by asking the jury to draw an inference of guilt from the exercise of their constitutional right to remain silent.”); Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178 , 188 n.3 (2013) (“Petitioner is correct that due process prohibits prosecutors from pointing to the fact that a defendant was silent after he heard Miranda warnings, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 617–618, 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (

2023See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 , 291 n.7 (1986) (“Notably, the Court in Doyle did not rely on the contention that Ohio had violated the defendants’ Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination by asking the jury to draw an inference of guilt from the exercise of their constitutional right to remain silent.”); Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178 , 188 n.3 (2013) (“Petitioner is correct that due process prohibits prosecutors from pointing to the fact that a defendant was silent after he heard Miranda warnings, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 617–618, 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (

1980But, it should be pointed out, to eliminate misunderstanding, that in Holman v. Cox, Utah, 598 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1979), cited by the majority opinion, this Court stated: When a driver suspected of driving under the influence is arrested, he is at that point involved in a criminal proceeding and must be given the Miranda warning if his subsequent statements are to be admitted in a criminal proceeding against him.

1980However, the behavior of the driver must clearly indicate, judged objectively, that the driver intended to refuse to take the test. [ 598 P.2d at 1338 .] [Emphasis added.] The Court took pains in Holman to make clear that an arresting officer must explain the duty of an arrestee to take a blood test upon request, notwithstanding a Miranda warning.

2021“To guide the decision as to when one is in custody and entitled to a Miranda warning prior to a formal arrest,” the court in Mirquet evaluated the four factors set out in Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983): “(1) the site of interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the length and form of interrogation.” Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147 (cleaned up). ¶49 Our supreme court has since clarified that “[s]trict or sole reliance on the Carner factors is inconsistent with the totality of the circums

2015State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1996) (footnote, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). 4 151 The fecord evidence in this case indicates that Heywood was not in custody *578 and was therefore not entitled to a Miranda warning.

2018Cir. 2012) (citing Oregon v. Hass , 420 U.S. 714 , 95 S.Ct. 1215 , 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975) ; Harris v. New York , 401 U.S. 222 , 91 S.Ct. 643 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) ); see also Parsad v. Greiner , 337 F.3d 175 , 184-85 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[T]he mere fact that a police officer takes a statement after a suspect invokes his right to remain silent does not, standing alone, render that statement the product of coercion.").

2018Cir. 2012) (citing Oregon v. Hass , 420 U.S. 714 , 95 S.Ct. 1215 , 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975) ; Harris v. New York , 401 U.S. 222 , 91 S.Ct. 643 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) ); see also Parsad v. Greiner , 337 F.3d 175 , 184-85 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[T]he mere fact that a police officer takes a statement after a suspect invokes his right to remain silent does not, standing alone, render that statement the product of coercion.").

2015This court has held that ''the proper inquiry as to whether a defendant is in custody for the purposes of Miranda is whether a reasonable person in defendant's position would believe his 'freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest.'" State v. Mirquet, 844 P.2d 995, 998 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) (quoting State v. East, 743 P.2d 1211, 1212 (Utah 1987)).

2015This court has held that ''the proper inquiry as to whether a defendant is in custody for the purposes of Miranda is whether a reasonable person in defendant's position would believe his 'freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest.'" State v. Mirquet, 844 P.2d 995, 998 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) (quoting State v. East, 743 P.2d 1211, 1212 (Utah 1987)).

2021As a prophylactic measure, the Court established the Miranda warnings requirement “to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination is protected.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985) (cleaned up). ¶43 But Miranda warnings are required only “in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated,” namely “custodial interrogation.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435, 437 (1984).

2021As a prophylactic measure, the Court established the Miranda warnings requirement “to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination is protected.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985) (cleaned up). ¶43 But Miranda warnings are required only “in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated,” namely “custodial interrogation.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435, 437 (1984).

2019See Howes, 565 U.S. at 515 20180441-CA 15 2019 UT App 152 State v. Fredrick (finding that an interview lasting for between “five and seven hours” was not enough alone to show that Miranda’s custody requirement had been met); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam) (stating that the requirement of Miranda warnings is not “to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house”).

2018Ultimately, Mr. Fullerton points to three facts that he alleges show that he was in custody and was entitled to receive a Miranda warning: the officers' focus on him as a suspect, the accusatory nature of the questioning, and Captain Golding's suggestions that Mr. Fullerton would serve his best interests by cooperating with the investigation because it would allow the Captain to tell the prosecutor and the judge that Mr. Fullerton told the truth. 6 ¶29 The requirement of a Miranda warning is not "imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned

2023Jessop was interviewed on other occasions, but these interviews are not at issue in this appeal. 20210544-CA 6 2023 UT App 140 State v. Jessop reads the ‘Miranda rights’ admonition and receives a waiver from the defendant.” Jessop argued that the detectives’ questioning qualified as a custodial interrogation and that he had thus been “entitled to a valid Miranda warning during his interview with detectives on June 3rd, 2019.” Jessop relied on our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50 , 144 P.3d 1096 , arguing that a “custodial interrogation occurs, and Miranda warnings are req

2023Jessop was interviewed on other occasions, but these interviews are not at issue in this appeal. 20210544-CA 6 2023 UT App 140 State v. Jessop reads the ‘Miranda rights’ admonition and receives a waiver from the defendant.” Jessop argued that the detectives’ questioning qualified as a custodial interrogation and that he had thus been “entitled to a valid Miranda warning during his interview with detectives on June 3rd, 2019.” Jessop relied on our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50 , 144 P.3d 1096 , arguing that a “custodial interrogation occurs, and Miranda warnings are req

2021Because we conclude that Goddard was not in custody when the officers asked him whether he had a firearm and whether he had a concealed weapon permit, we do not address whether these questions constitute “interrogation” for purposes of Miranda or whether an exception to the Miranda rule would apply in these circumstances. 20190740-CA 22 2021 UT App 124 State v. Goddard light of the objective circumstances of the interrogation, a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” State v. MacDonald, 2017 UT App 124, ¶ 21 , 402 P.3d 91 (quot

2021Because we conclude that Goddard was not in custody when the officers asked him whether he had a firearm and whether he had a concealed weapon permit, we do not address whether these questions constitute “interrogation” for purposes of Miranda or whether an exception to the Miranda rule would apply in these circumstances. 20190740-CA 22 2021 UT App 124 State v. Goddard light of the objective circumstances of the interrogation, a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” State v. MacDonald, 2017 UT App 124, ¶ 21 , 402 P.3d 91 (quot

2025See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984). ¶26 In Quarles, the United States Supreme Court established “a ‘public safety’ exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect’s answers may be admitted into evidence.” Id.

2025See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984). ¶26 In Quarles, the United States Supreme Court established “a ‘public safety’ exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect’s answers may be admitted into evidence.” Id.

2018See State v. Kelley , 2000 UT 41 , ¶ 26, 1 P.3d 546 ("Failure to raise futile objections does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel."). ¶54 Lastly, Argueta argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial when the prosecutor "continued to make improper comments on [Argueta's] post-arrest silence." We have determined that the prosecutor did not comment on Argueta's silence, but instead drew attention to the statements he made to Officer after he was given a Miranda warning.

2018See State v. Kelley , 2000 UT 41 , ¶ 26, 1 P.3d 546 ("Failure to raise futile objections does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel."). ¶54 Lastly, Argueta argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial when the prosecutor "continued to make improper comments on [Argueta's] post-arrest silence." We have determined that the prosecutor did not comment on Argueta's silence, but instead drew attention to the statements he made to Officer after he was given a Miranda warning.

2015This court has held that ''the proper inquiry as to whether a defendant is in custody for the purposes of Miranda is whether a reasonable person in defendant's position would believe his 'freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest.'" State v. Mirquet, 844 P.2d 995, 998 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) (quoting State v. East, 743 P.2d 1211, 1212 (Utah 1987)).

2015This court has held that ''the proper inquiry as to whether a defendant is in custody for the purposes of Miranda is whether a reasonable person in defendant's position would believe his 'freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest.'" State v. Mirquet, 844 P.2d 995, 998 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) (quoting State v. East, 743 P.2d 1211, 1212 (Utah 1987)).

2017In sum, the Supreme Court has “explicitly recognized that Miranda warnings are not required simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.” Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3517 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 24 But determining whether a reasonable person would have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave is only the first step in the custody analysis.

2017In sum, the Supreme Court has “explicitly recognized that Miranda warnings are not required simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.” Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3517 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 24 But determining whether a reasonable person would have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave is only the first step in the custody analysis.

2017“We protect this right by excluding from a defendant’s criminal trial any incriminating statement that the defendant made to police officers while under custodial interrogation if the officers did not give a Miranda warning.” State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 33 , 144 P.3d 1096 (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297, 300-01 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)).

2017“We protect this right by excluding from a defendant’s criminal trial any incriminating statement that the defendant made to police officers while under custodial interrogation if the officers did not give a Miranda warning.” State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 33 , 144 P.3d 1096 (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297, 300-01 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)).

2021“In determining whether an individual was in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (cleaned up). ¶50 In this case, none of the circumstances surrounding the stop suggest that Goddard was in Miranda custody before the officers administered Miranda warnings and placed Goddard under arrest.

2012Likewise, because whether a defendant was in custody is an objective determination, see Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (per curiam), evidence regarding Defendant's subjective state would have been irrelevant to the court's Miranda analysis.

1995See State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Utah App.1990), ce rt. denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 914 , 112 S.Ct. 1282 -83, 117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992); see also State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 898 (Utah App.1993) (“Our review of the Miranda issue is non-deferential because this court stands in the same position as the trial court in reviewing the transcript of an interrogation.”).

1995This vitiates the related concern in Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1100 , that "[s]omeone ... who simply gets a new set of Miranda warnings with no acknowledgement of his prior reference to counsel may think: T wondered before if I should have a lawyer.

2020See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (holding that “the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored’” (emphasis added)); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010) (“Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.”) And Velarde tells us precisely what to do in that situation: “[I]

1984In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), the Supreme Court held that when a person in custody is given a Miranda warning and he requests that the questioning cease, the police may not then question the prisoner about an unrelated crime unless a significant period of time has passed and another complete Miranda warning is given.

2015Although we recognize the strong presumption that counsel acted competently, "where a defendant can show that there was no conceivable legitimate tactical basis for counsel's deficient actions, the first prong of Strickland is satisfied." State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 359 (Utah Ct.App. 1998). {14 For example, in Snyder, the defendant appealed his conviction of two counts of lewdness involving a child, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel by reason of trial counsel's failure to timely raise a Miranda objection.

1995See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 890 (Utah 1989) (holding confession voluntary, although implying Miranda rights were given only once before defendant was questioned for several hours over next two days); cf. Mabe, 864 P.2d at 893 n. 6 (declaring "we will consider the lack of a Miranda warning under the totality-of-circumstances test as ' "one detail!] of the interrogation”'” (citations omitted)); State v. Martinez, 595 P.2d 897, 899-900 (Utah 1979) (holding defendant advised of Miranda rights need not be re-advised half hour later); State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351 , 358 n. 10 (Utah App.1993)