Miranda warning in Hawaii

2025As this court has explained, Under the Hawaiʻi Constitution, “[a]bsent Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of them, statements obtained from a person subjected to uncounseled custodial interrogation are inadmissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding brought against that person.” State v. Ah Loo, 94 Hawaiʻi 207, 210, 10 P.3d 728, 731 (2000).

2025As this court has explained, Under the Hawaiʻi Constitution, “[a]bsent Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of them, statements obtained from a person subjected to uncounseled custodial interrogation are inadmissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding brought against that person.” State v. Ah Loo, 94 Hawaiʻi 207, 210, 10 P.3d 728, 731 (2000).

2024The ICA held that pursuant to the bright-line rule of State v. Ketchum, 97 Hawai‘i 107, 34 P.3d 1006 (2001), Miranda warnings were required before James was “interrogated” because 1 The Honorable Randal G.B.

2022So it's – all of the statements are out." (Formatting altered.) 8 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER "A critical safeguard is the Miranda warning: an accused must be warned that he or she had a right to remain silent, that anything said could be used against him or her, that he or she had a right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he or she could not afford an attorney one would be appointed for him or her." Kazanas, 138 Hawai#i at 34, 375 P.3d at 1272 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Ketchum, 97 Hawai#i 107, 116, 34 P.3d 1006, 1015

2022So it's – all of the statements are out." (Formatting altered.) 8 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER "A critical safeguard is the Miranda warning: an accused must be warned that he or she had a right to remain silent, that anything said could be used against him or her, that he or she had a right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he or she could not afford an attorney one would be appointed for him or her." Kazanas, 138 Hawai#i at 34, 375 P.3d at 1272 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Ketchum, 97 Hawai#i 107, 116, 34 P.3d 1006, 1015

2022So it's – all of the statements are out." (Formatting altered.) 8 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER "A critical safeguard is the Miranda warning: an accused must be warned that he or she had a right to remain silent, that anything said could be used against him or her, that he or she had a right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he or she could not afford an attorney one would be appointed for him or her." Kazanas, 138 Hawai#i at 34, 375 P.3d at 1272 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Ketchum, 97 Hawai#i 107, 116, 34 P.3d 1006, 1015

2022See Melemai, 64 Haw. at 481 , 643 P.2d at 544 (probable cause to arrest may play a significant role in the application of the Miranda rule, but it is "not determinative"). 6/ The State clarifies in its reply brief: [Officer] Breyer's Body Worn Camera footage clearly indicates that [Balai], while standing about 10-15 feet from [Officer] Breyer, was actively working on the fencing material when [Officer] Breyer asked him, " So, we just got called here.

2022See Melemai, 64 Haw. at 481 , 643 P.2d at 544 (probable cause to arrest may play a significant role in the application of the Miranda rule, but it is "not determinative"). 6/ The State clarifies in its reply brief: [Officer] Breyer's Body Worn Camera footage clearly indicates that [Balai], while standing about 10-15 feet from [Officer] Breyer, was actively working on the fencing material when [Officer] Breyer asked him, " So, we just got called here.

2022Application of the “routine booking question exception” is instructive: Muniz recognized that “questions to secure the biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services” that are “requested for record-keeping purposes only” and “reasonably related to the police’s administrative concerns” do not require Miranda warnings despite being direct questioning of an in-custody suspect. 496 U.S. at 601-02 (quotation marks omitted).

2022Accordingly, if performance on the SFST is testimonial, it, like the answers to the medical rule-out questions, would constitute statements adduced in violation of Miranda. 10 But as we settled in Wyatt and recently reaffirmed in Uchima, performance on the SFST is not testimonial. “[I]n order to be testimonial, an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a 10 In this way, the theory that the SFST is testimonial would independently require suppression of that evidence as a new Miranda violation, separate and apart from the (ultimately unsuccessful) argument that the

2024See Kazanas, 138 Hawai#i at 40, 375 P.3d at 1278 (noting that although police officer intended to calm Kazanas down by making "small talk," "it was 'reasonably likely' that Kazanas would answer the question about how his Halloween went with an incriminating statement about the events leading to Kazanas's arrest.") We conclude that Officer Takayama's dialog with Rudersdorf was "interrogation." Although State's Exhibit 1 had been redacted, it contained incriminating statements made by Rudersdorf after he was subject to custodial interrogation before being given a complete Miranda warning.

2023"Whether an accused's right against self-incrimination under the Hawai‘i constitution was protected through the use of a Miranda warning is a question of constitutional law, which this court reviews de novo under the right/wrong standard." State v. Kazanas, 138 Hawai‘i 23, 33, 375 P.3d 1261, 1271 (2016) (citing State v. Jenkins, 93 Hawai‘i 87, 100, 997 P.2d 13, 26 (2000)).

2022That formulation is consistent with the purposes of Miranda since it focuses the inquiry on whether police have created a “coercive atmosphere.” 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** See, e.g., State v. Melemai, 64 Haw. 479, 482 , 643 P.2d 541, 544 (1982) (Miranda warnings are required when “the totality of circumstances created the kind of coercive atmosphere that Miranda warnings were designed to prevent”); State v. Wyatt, 67 Haw. 293, 299 , 687 P.2d 544, 549 (1984) (“the ultimate test is whether the questioning wa

2022That formulation is consistent with the purposes of Miranda since it focuses the inquiry on whether police have created a “coercive atmosphere.” 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** See, e.g., State v. Melemai, 64 Haw. 479, 482 , 643 P.2d 541, 544 (1982) (Miranda warnings are required when “the totality of circumstances created the kind of coercive atmosphere that Miranda warnings were designed to prevent”); State v. Wyatt, 67 Haw. 293, 299 , 687 P.2d 544, 549 (1984) (“the ultimate test is whether the questioning wa

2022Miranda warnings are also mandated under the Hawai‘i Constitution, State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254 , 265–66, 492 P.2d 657, 664 (1971) (“We hold today that the protections which the United States Supreme Court enumerated in Miranda have an independent source in the Hawai[ʿ]i Constitution’s privilege against self-incrimination.”), and we have provided broader protections under our constitution than exist under the United States Constitution, id. at 263, 266 , 492 P.2d at 662, 664 (rejecting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), and holding that defendant who testifies cannot be impeached with

2022Miranda warnings are also mandated under the Hawai‘i Constitution, State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254 , 265–66, 492 P.2d 657, 664 (1971) (“We hold today that the protections which the United States Supreme Court enumerated in Miranda have an independent source in the Hawai[ʿ]i Constitution’s privilege against self-incrimination.”), and we have provided broader protections under our constitution than exist under the United States Constitution, id. at 263, 266 , 492 P.2d at 662, 664 (rejecting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), and holding that defendant who testifies cannot be impeached with

2004In other words, the defendant, objecting to the admissibility of his or her statement and, thus, seeking to suppress it, must establish that his or her statement was the result of (1) "interrogation" that occurred while he or she was (2) "in custody." See, e.g., [State v.] Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i [207,] 210, 10 P.3d [728,] 731 [(2000)] ("the requirement of Miranda warnings is triggered by `two criteria': '(1) the defendant must be under interrogation; and (2) the defendant must be in custody'" (quoting State v. Kauhi, 86 Hawai'i 195, 204 , 948 P.2d 1036, 1045 (1997) (quoting State v. Blanding, 69 H

2004In other words, the defendant, objecting to the admissibility of his or her statement and, thus, seeking to suppress it, must establish that his or her statement was the result of (1) "interrogation" that occurred while he or she was (2) "in custody." See, e.g., [State v.] Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i [207,] 210, 10 P.3d [728,] 731 [(2000)] ("the requirement of Miranda warnings is triggered by `two criteria': '(1) the defendant must be under interrogation; and (2) the defendant must be in custody'" (quoting State v. Kauhi, 86 Hawai'i 195, 204 , 948 P.2d 1036, 1045 (1997) (quoting State v. Blanding, 69 H

2004In other words, the defendant, objecting to the admissibility of his or her statement and, thus, seeking to suppress it, must establish that his or her statement was the result of (1) "interrogation" that occurred while he or she was (2) "in custody." See, e.g., [State v.] Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i [207,] 210, 10 P.3d [728,] 731 [(2000)] ("the requirement of Miranda warnings is triggered by `two criteria': '(1) the defendant must be under interrogation; and (2) the defendant must be in custody'" (quoting State v. Kauhi, 86 Hawai'i 195, 204 , 948 P.2d 1036, 1045 (1997) (quoting State v. Blanding, 69 H

2004In other words, the defendant, objecting to the admissibility of his or her statement and, thus, seeking to suppress it, must establish that his or her statement was the result of (1) "interrogation" that occurred while he or she was (2) "in custody." See, e.g., [State v.] Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i [207,] 210, 10 P.3d [728,] 731 [(2000)] ("the requirement of Miranda warnings is triggered by `two criteria': '(1) the defendant must be under interrogation; and (2) the defendant must be in custody'" (quoting State v. Kauhi, 86 Hawai'i 195, 204 , 948 P.2d 1036, 1045 (1997) (quoting State v. Blanding, 69 H

2023The supreme court recently reiterated in State v. Hewitt, 153 Hawai#i 33, 526 P.3d 558 (2023): The Miranda rule is, at core, a constitutionally prescribed rule of evidence that requires the prosecution to lay a sufficient foundation—i.e., that the requisite warnings were administered and validly waived before the accused gave the statement sought to be adduced at trial—before it may adduce evidence of a defendant's custodial statements that stem from interrogation during their criminal trial. 7/ Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 7 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACI

2023The supreme court recently reiterated in State v. Hewitt, 153 Hawai#i 33, 526 P.3d 558 (2023): The Miranda rule is, at core, a constitutionally prescribed rule of evidence that requires the prosecution to lay a sufficient foundation—i.e., that the requisite warnings were administered and validly waived before the accused gave the statement sought to be adduced at trial—before it may adduce evidence of a defendant's custodial statements that stem from interrogation during their criminal trial. 7/ Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 7 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACI

2022However, respectfully, he fails to consider the context surrounding the passage he quotes, which suggests to the contrary that all of the circumstances must be considered: No precise line can be drawn because each case must necessarily turn upon its own facts and circumstances, but we think that the California court in People v. Manis, 268 Cal.App.2d 653, 669 , 74 Cal.Rptr. 423, 433 (1969) came as close as any to delineating, generally, the outer parameters beyond which on-the-scene interviews may not proceed without the Miranda warnings: “(P)ersons temporarily detained for brief questioning b

2022However, respectfully, he fails to consider the context surrounding the passage he quotes, which suggests to the contrary that all of the circumstances must be considered: No precise line can be drawn because each case must necessarily turn upon its own facts and circumstances, but we think that the California court in People v. Manis, 268 Cal.App.2d 653, 669 , 74 Cal.Rptr. 423, 433 (1969) came as close as any to delineating, generally, the outer parameters beyond which on-the-scene interviews may not proceed without the Miranda warnings: “(P)ersons temporarily detained for brief questioning b

2025(The detective then recorded the reading of the Miranda warnings and his post- Miranda statement.) Id. at 515, 273 P.3d at 1201.

2025(The detective then recorded the reading of the Miranda warnings and his post- Miranda statement.) Id. at 515, 273 P.3d at 1201 .

2022Manion’s performance on the SFST was accordingly admissible despite the absence of Miranda warnings preceding the test. 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2 We decline to revisit our holding in State v. Uchima, 147 Hawai‘i 64, 85, 464 P.3d 852, 873 (2020), that a person’s performance on the SFST is not testimonial. 2 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** II.

2022The ICA affirmed this conclusion, which is not at issue here. 6 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Manion if he would participate in the SFST.” 6 The ICA next determined that “the defendant’s performance on the [S]FST did not constitute an interrogation requiring Miranda warnings” pursuant to our decision in Uchima, 147 Hawai‘i at 84-85, 464 P.3d at 872-73 , in which we held that the SFST was nontestimonial.

2023The supreme court recently reiterated in State v. Hewitt, 153 Hawai#i 33, 526 P.3d 558 (2023): The Miranda rule is, at core, a constitutionally prescribed rule of evidence that requires the prosecution to lay a sufficient foundation—i.e., that the requisite warnings were administered and validly waived before the accused gave the statement sought to be adduced at trial—before it may adduce evidence of a defendant's custodial statements that stem from interrogation during their criminal trial. 7/ Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 7 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACI

2023The supreme court recently reiterated in State v. Hewitt, 153 Hawai#i 33, 526 P.3d 558 (2023): The Miranda rule is, at core, a constitutionally prescribed rule of evidence that requires the prosecution to lay a sufficient foundation—i.e., that the requisite warnings were administered and validly waived before the accused gave the statement sought to be adduced at trial—before it may adduce evidence of a defendant's custodial statements that stem from interrogation during their criminal trial. 7/ Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 7 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACI

2023The supreme court recently reiterated in State v. Hewitt, 153 Hawai#i 33, 526 P.3d 558 (2023): The Miranda rule is, at core, a constitutionally prescribed rule of evidence that requires the prosecution to lay a sufficient foundation—i.e., that the requisite warnings were administered and validly waived before the accused gave the statement sought to be adduced at trial—before it may adduce evidence of a defendant's custodial statements that stem from interrogation during their criminal trial. 7/ Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 7 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACI

2023The supreme court recently reiterated in State v. Hewitt, 153 Hawai#i 33, 526 P.3d 558 (2023): The Miranda rule is, at core, a constitutionally prescribed rule of evidence that requires the prosecution to lay a sufficient foundation—i.e., that the requisite warnings were administered and validly waived before the accused gave the statement sought to be adduced at trial—before it may adduce evidence of a defendant's custodial statements that stem from interrogation during their criminal trial. 7/ Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 7 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACI

2012See Henderson, 80 Hawai'i at 441-42 , 911 P.2d at 76-77 (1996) (concluding that the defendant’s Miranda waiver was valid when he initiated dialogue after initially refusing to sign a waiver of his rights); see also State v. Hoey, 77 Hawai'i 17, 36 , 881 P.2d 504, 523 (1994) (concluding that if upon a non-substantive clarification of an equivocal request for counsel, the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waives the presence of counsel, then substantive questioning may continue).

2012See Henderson, 80 Hawai'i at 441-42 , 911 P.2d at 76-77 (1996) (concluding that the defendant’s Miranda waiver was valid when he initiated dialogue after initially refusing to sign a waiver of his rights); see also State v. Hoey, 77 Hawai'i 17, 36 , 881 P.2d 504, 523 (1994) (concluding that if upon a non-substantive clarification of an equivocal request for counsel, the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waives the presence of counsel, then substantive questioning may continue).

2026Surina continued a "sustained and coercive interrogation" without advising him of his Miranda rights "in order to extract further incriminating evidence and manipulate the existing petty misdemeanor charge into a felony." "Under the Hawai#i Constitution, absent Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of them, statements obtained from a person subjected to uncounseled custodial interrogation are inadmissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding brought against that person." State v. Spies, 157 Hawai#i 75, 98, 575 P.3d 708, 731 (2025) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.

2026Surina continued a "sustained and coercive interrogation" without advising him of his Miranda rights "in order to extract further incriminating evidence and manipulate the existing petty misdemeanor charge into a felony." "Under the Hawai#i Constitution, absent Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of them, statements obtained from a person subjected to uncounseled custodial interrogation are inadmissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding brought against that person." State v. Spies, 157 Hawai#i 75, 98, 575 P.3d 708 , 731 (2025) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.

2022Id. at 482 , 643 P.2d at 544 ; see also State v. Hoffman, 73 Haw. 41, 54 , 828 P.2d 805, 813 (1992) (applying Melemai to hold that custody attached when the police obtained probable cause because defendant admitted to possessing a bottle of beer in a public park); State v. Russo, 67 Haw. 126 , 135-36 & n.6, 681 P.2d 553 , 560-61 & n.6 (1984) (officers went to defendant’s apartment at 4 a.m. to question him about a murder; Miranda warnings required after defendant told them that he had recently purchased a handgun and that it was in his car, which “matched” the description of a car used during

2022Id. at 482 , 643 P.2d at 544 ; see also State v. Hoffman, 73 Haw. 41, 54 , 828 P.2d 805, 813 (1992) (applying Melemai to hold that custody attached when the police obtained probable cause because defendant admitted to possessing a bottle of beer in a public park); State v. Russo, 67 Haw. 126 , 135-36 & n.6, 681 P.2d 553 , 560-61 & n.6 (1984) (officers went to defendant’s apartment at 4 a.m. to question him about a murder; Miranda warnings required after defendant told them that he had recently purchased a handgun and that it was in his car, which “matched” the description of a car used during

2022We held that Miranda warnings were not required at that point since the circumstances were not intimidating or coercive, but rather constituted “on-the-scene questioning of brief duration conducted prior to arrest in public view.” Wyatt, 67 Haw. at 300 , 687 P.2d at 550 ; see also State v. Kuba, 68 Haw. 184, 188 , 706 P.2d 1305, 1309 (1985) (holding, under facts “almost indistinguishable” from Wyatt, that Miranda warnings were not required before the police began asking questions).

2022We held that Miranda warnings were not required at that point since the circumstances were not intimidating or coercive, but rather constituted “on-the-scene questioning of brief duration conducted prior to arrest in public view.” Wyatt, 67 Haw. at 300 , 687 P.2d at 550 ; see also State v. Kuba, 68 Haw. 184, 188 , 706 P.2d 1305, 1309 (1985) (holding, under facts “almost indistinguishable” from Wyatt, that Miranda warnings were not required before the police began asking questions).

2025As noted below, Spies’s argument before this court is limited to whether that determination was based on an improper “categorical exception to the Miranda requirement.” 15 14 Within the meaning of Miranda, an “incriminating response” is “any response—whether inculpatory or exculpatory—that the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 n.5 (1980). 15 Within the context of our system of state constitutional protections, the Miranda rule is a rule of evidence, prescribed by article I, section 10 of our Constitution, that requires a sufficient foundation

2025As noted below, Spies’s argument before this court is limited to whether that determination was based on an improper “categorical exception to the Miranda requirement.” 15 14 Within the meaning of Miranda, an “incriminating response” is “any response—whether inculpatory or exculpatory—that the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 n.5 (1980). 15 Within the context of our system of state constitutional protections, the Miranda rule is a rule of evidence, prescribed by article I, section 10 of our Constitution, that requires a sufficient foundation

2022So it's – all of the statements are out." (Formatting altered.) 8 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER "A critical safeguard is the Miranda warning: an accused must be warned that he or she had a right to remain silent, that anything said could be used against him or her, that he or she had a right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he or she could not afford an attorney one would be appointed for him or her." Kazanas, 138 Hawai#i at 34, 375 P.3d at 1272 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Ketchum, 97 Hawai#i 107, 116, 34 P.3d 1006, 1015

2022So it's – all of the statements are out." (Formatting altered.) 8 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER "A critical safeguard is the Miranda warning: an accused must be warned that he or she had a right to remain silent, that anything said could be used against him or her, that he or she had a right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he or she could not afford an attorney one would be appointed for him or her." Kazanas, 138 Hawai#i at 34, 375 P.3d at 1272 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Ketchum, 97 Hawai#i 107, 116, 34 P.3d 1006, 1015

2022Without quoting the either/or test from Ketchum, Kaleohano emphasized the importance of probable cause for determining custody: “Ah Loo recognized that, ‘if neither probable cause to arrest nor sustained and coercive interrogation are present, then questions posed by the police do not rise to the level of “custodial interrogation” requiring Miranda warnings.’ We, therefore, examine whether [the police officer] had probable cause to arrest [the defendant].” Id. at 377, 56 P.3d at 145 (citation omitted) (quoting Ah Loo, 94 Hawai‘i at 210, 10 P.3d at 731 ). 23 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘

2021See also State v. Kaleohano, 99 Hawai#i 370, 377, 56 P.3d 138, 145 (2002) ("[I]f neither probable cause to arrest nor sustained and coercive interrogation are present, then questions posed by the police do not rise to the level of 'custodial interrogation' requiring Miranda warnings.") (quoting State v. Ah Loo, 94 Hawai#i 207, 210, 10 P.3d 728, 731 (2000)).

2024More to the point, this court held, There is no per se exception under the Hawaiʻi Constitution for questions “necessarily ‘attendant to’ [a] legitimate police procedure.” To avoid suppression for want of Miranda warnings, such questions must pass muster under our well-established interrogation test: “whether the officer should have known that his words and actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant.” 151 Hawaiʻi at 173, 510 P.3d at 602 (citing Paahana, 66 Haw. at 503 , 666 P.2d at 595-96 ).

2024More to the point, this court held, There is no per se exception under the Hawaiʻi Constitution for questions “necessarily ‘attendant to’ [a] legitimate police procedure.” To avoid suppression for want of Miranda warnings, such questions must pass muster under our well-established interrogation test: “whether the officer should have known that his words and actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant.” 151 Hawaiʻi at 173, 510 P.3d at 602 (citing Paahana, 66 Haw. at 503 , 666 P.2d at 595-96 ).

2024More to the point, this court held, There is no per se exception under the Hawaiʻi Constitution for questions “necessarily ‘attendant to’ [a] legitimate police procedure.” To avoid suppression for want of Miranda warnings, such questions must pass muster under our well-established interrogation test: “whether the officer should have known that his words and actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant.” 151 Hawaiʻi at 173, 510 P.3d at 602 (citing Paahana, 66 Haw. at 503 , 666 P.2d at 595-96 ).

2023In State v. Skapinok, 151 Hawai#i 170, 510 P.3d 599 (2022), the supreme court 8/ The MRO questions directed at Vasconcellos included "if he was under the care of a doctor, an eye doctor, if he was epileptic or diabetic, whether or not he had contacts, a glass eye[,]" and other questions Officer Amasiu read from the SFST form. 9 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER held that all seven MRO questions that the defendant was asked while in custody were likely to elicit an incriminating response, and therefore Miranda warnings were required.

2020As we determined in Sagapolutele-Silva, "the failure to provide a Miranda warning when required for one crime will taint a subsequent interrogation even if the interrogation relates to a different crime for which Miranda warnings were not yet required, if a defendant is still in custody." Id. at *7 (citing People v. Bejasa, 205 Cal. App. 4th 26 , 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 80, 91 (2012)).

2020As we determined in Sagapolutele-Silva, "the failure to provide a Miranda warning when required for one crime will taint a subsequent interrogation even if the interrogation relates to a different crime for which Miranda warnings were not yet required, if a defendant is still in custody." Id. at *7 (citing People v. Bejasa, 205 Cal. App. 4th 26 , 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 80, 91 (2012)).

2020“A critical safeguard is the Miranda warning[.]” Id.

2014In determining whether a suspect in custody has been subjected to “interrogation” for purposes of Miranda , and thus entitled to Miranda warnings, “the ultimate question becomes, ‘whether the police officer should have known that his or her words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response[.]’ ” State v. Ketchum, 97 Hawai'i 107, 119 , 34 P.3d 1006, 1018 (2001) (quoting State v. Ikaika, 67 Haw. 563, 567 , 698 P.2d 281, 284 (1985)).