Miranda warning in Virginia

2025Miranda warnings “are required only when a suspect is both in custody and subjected to interrogation.” Watts v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 206, 214 (2002); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam) (“only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody’” (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam))).

2025As in other contexts, courts must consider “all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.” Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322 . “[N]o single factor alone may necessarily establish custody for Miranda purposes, and not all factors may be relevant in a given case.” Wass v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 27, 33 (1987). 6 See, e.g., Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 (“[P]olice officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question.

2026In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits “the use for impeachment purposes of [defendant’s] silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings.” Id. at 619 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966)); accord Caprino v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 181, 185 (2008).

2025At the police station, the officers read Brunk his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Brunk then signed a Miranda warning form.4 Brunk told the officers that he had gone to his brother’s workplace “to have a conversation with him about that warrant”—which had been issued against him in 2020 by their father for “assault and battery” but had only “recently been served on” him.

2024However, “‘police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question,’ and Miranda warnings are not required when the interviewee’s freedom has not been so restricted as to render him or her ‘in custody.’” Harris, 27 Va. App. at 564 (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 ).

2023“Appellate courts ‘review such questions de novo but defer to the fact-finder’s findings of historical fact unless they are plainly wrong or without evidence to support them.’” Id. (quoting Spinner, 297 Va. at 392). “‘[P]olice officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question,’ and Miranda warnings are not required when the interviewee’s freedom has not been so restricted as to render him or her ‘in custody.’” Harris v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 554, 564 (1998) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).

2023Nonetheless, “[n]o single factor is dispositive of the issue.” Id. (quoting Aldridge, 44 Va. App. at 642 ). “[I]t is the custodial nature rather than the location of the interrogation that triggers the necessity for giving Miranda warnings.” Aldridge, 44 Va. App. at 643 (quoting Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 47 (1983)).

2020“It is the custodial nature rather than the location of the interrogation that triggers the necessity for giving Miranda warnings.” Id. at 643 (emphasis added) (quoting Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 47 (1983)).

2025“In determining whether an individual was in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but ‘the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a “formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement” of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’” Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322 (alteration in original) (quoting - 11 - California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam)). “[T]he initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or

2004See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (addressing the meaning of “in custody” for purposes of requiring Miranda warnings).

2019Miranda warnings are not required unless an individual is “both in ‘custody’ and subjected to ‘interrogation.’” Blain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 10, 13 (1998).

2007“Miranda warnings are implicated . . . during a custodial interrogation.” Bailey v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 745 , 529 S.E.2d 570, 583 (2000) (citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)); see Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 (“[T]he special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation.”). “‘Failure to give Miranda warnings prior to custodial interrogation requires suppression of any illegally obtained statements.’” Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 187, 194 , 503

2024See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310-11 (“[A] careful and thorough administration of Miranda warnings serves to cure the condition that rendered the unwarned statement inadmissible.”).

2024See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310-11 (“[A] careful and thorough administration of Miranda warnings serves to cure the condition that rendered the unwarned statement inadmissible.”).

2024The majority wrongly suggests that such mandatory disclosures in a custodial setting—on top of standard Miranda warnings—are required by the Supreme Court’s decision in Seibert, 542 U.S. at 600 .

2024“The object of question-first is to render Miranda warnings ineffective by waiting for a particularly opportune time to give them, after the suspect has already confessed.” Id. at 611 .

2019“If the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to convict [Carlson], he is entitled to an acquittal; if he is so entitled, a remand for retrial would violate the Constitution’s prohibition against double jeopardy.” Parsons v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 576, 581 (2000); see also Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 187 (1998) (addressing sufficiency after reversing on a Miranda violation).

2019“If the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to convict [Carlson], he is entitled to an acquittal; if he is so entitled, a remand for retrial would violate the Constitution’s prohibition against double jeopardy.” Parsons v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 576, 581 (2000); see also Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 187 (1998) (addressing sufficiency after reversing on a Miranda violation).

2026We evaluate “how a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would have understood his circumstances.” Alvarez Saucedo v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 31 , 41 (2019) (quoting Dixon v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 34, 40 (2005)). “[P]ersons temporarily detained pursuant to [traffic] stops generally are not ‘in custody’ for purposes of the Miranda rule.” Dixon, 270 Va. at 40 .

2026We evaluate “how a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would have understood his circumstances.” Alvarez Saucedo v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 31 , 41 (2019) (quoting Dixon v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 34, 40 (2005)). “[P]ersons temporarily detained pursuant to [traffic] stops generally are not ‘in custody’ for purposes of the Miranda rule.” Dixon, 270 Va. at 40 .

2023Nonetheless, “[n]o single factor is dispositive of the issue.” Id. (quoting Aldridge, 44 Va. App. at 642 ). “[I]t is the custodial nature rather than the location of the interrogation that triggers the necessity for giving Miranda warnings.” Aldridge, 44 Va. App. at 643 (quoting Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 47 (1983)).

2023Nonetheless, “[n]o single factor is dispositive of the issue.” Id. (quoting Aldridge, 44 Va. App. at 642 ). “[I]t is the custodial nature rather than the location of the interrogation that triggers the necessity for giving Miranda warnings.” Aldridge, 44 Va. App. at 643 (quoting Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 47 (1983)).

2009Cherry v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 135, 140 (1992); see also Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (“police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question.”).

2008Even though “Miranda warnings are required whenever a suspect is subject to ‘custodial interrogation,’” not every detention “constitutes a custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda.” Cherry v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 135, 140 , 415 S.E.2d 242, 244 (1992) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)); see also Harris v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 554, 564 , 500 S.E.2d 257, 261-62 (1998) (“‘[P]olice officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question,’ and Miranda warnings are not -4- required when the interviewee’s freedom has not been so rest

2018Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’” Bailey v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 745 , 529 S.E.2d 570, 583 (2000) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).

2018Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’” Bailey v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 745 , 529 S.E.2d 570, 583 (2000) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).

2024If a suspect waives his right to an attorney after he has received Miranda warnings, the police “are free to interrogate him, but if the suspect requests counsel at any time during the interrogation, the interrogation must cease until an attorney has been made available to the suspect or the suspect reinitiates the interrogation.” Id. at 540 (quoting Commonwealth v. Redmond, 264 Va. 321, 328 (2002)); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).

2022If a suspect waives his right to an attorney after he has received Miranda warnings, the police “are free to interrogate him, but if the suspect requests counsel at any time during the interrogation, the interrogation must cease until an attorney has been made available to the suspect or the suspect reinitiates the interrogation.” Id. at 540 (quoting Commonwealth v. Redmond, 264 Va. 321, 328 (2002)); see also Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 .

2009We now turn to appellant’s argument that his statement to Deputy Ruff should have been suppressed because it was not preceded by Miranda warnings “reasonably contemporaneous with the questioning.” Assuming, without deciding, that Deputy Ruff’s conversation with appellant constituted an “interrogation” for purposes of Miranda, we conclude that no further Miranda warnings were required at that time. “[W]here a person, after receiving Miranda warnings, has once given [] a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights, such waiver will be presumed to continue in effect throughout sub

2009Appellant received the Miranda warnings from Detective Wallace and executed his waiver; and he presented no evidence that he “ever manifested any desire to revoke the waivers he had given, and, therefore, -9- no further warnings or waivers were required.” Washington, 228 Va. at 549 , 323 S.E.2d at 586 .

2025See Watts v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 206, 214 (2002) (“‘Miranda warnings[]’ are required only when a suspect is both in custody and subjected to interrogation . . . .” (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980))).

2024If a suspect waives his right to an attorney after he has received Miranda warnings, the police “are free to interrogate him, but if the suspect requests counsel at any time during the interrogation, the interrogation must cease until an attorney has been made available to the suspect or the suspect reinitiates the interrogation.” Id. at 540 (quoting Commonwealth v. Redmond, 264 Va. 321, 328 (2002)). “[T]he term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and - 23

2020While “a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after the warnings are given,” Miranda does not require “a waiver to be in writing or verbally expressed, nor does it preclude the conclusion that a waiver occurred based on the suspect’s course of conduct.” Id. at 259; see Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 35 (1990) (“Cheng’s decision to talk with Officer Carter, after having been advised of the Miranda rights, constitutes an implied waiver of those rights.”); see also Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 251 (1990) (inferring a waiver of defendant’s right to co

2013While “a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after the warnings are given,” Miranda does not require “a waiver to be in writing or verbally expressed, nor does it preclude the conclusion that a waiver occurred based on the suspect’s course of conduct.” Angel, 281 Va. at 259 , 704 S.E.2d at 392 ; see Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 35 , 393 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1990) (“Cheng’s decision to talk with Officer Carter, after having been advised of the Miranda rights, constitutes an implied waiver of those rights.”); see also Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 251

2025Miranda warnings “are required only when a suspect is both in custody and subjected to interrogation.” Watts v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 206, 214 (2002); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam) (“only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody’” (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam))).

2025See Watts v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 206, 214 (2002) (“‘Miranda warnings[]’ are required only when a suspect is both in custody and subjected to interrogation . . . .” (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980))).

2023The Fifth Amendment public safety exception is a narrow exception to the Miranda rule that applies when the “need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.” Anderson v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 85 , 91 (2010) (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984)).

2023The Fifth Amendment public safety exception is a narrow exception to the Miranda rule that applies when the “need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.” Anderson v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 85 , 91 (2010) (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984)).

2026Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 4 Even if the physical evidence were the fruits of the suppressed statement, a violation of the prophylactic Miranda rule does not by itself warrant the suppression “of the physical fruit[s] of a voluntary statement.” United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636 (2004).

2008As a result, the “mere failure to give Miranda warnings does not, by itself, violate a suspect’s constitutional rights or even the Miranda rule.” Id.

2023See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 428-33, 440 (1984); see also Thomas v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 560 , 574-81 (2020) (discussing the purpose and evolution of Miranda warnings). -2- aloud from a Henrico County Police Division form, written in English, that set out those rights.4 When the appellant indicated he did not “know” the right to remain silent, Walker gave him a Spanish version of the Division’s advisement-of-rights form.

2008In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), the Court held that Miranda warnings are not required when an accused is detained pursuant to a lawful Terry stop.

2002As the Court stated in Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988): Thus, the prophylactic protections that the Miranda warnings provide to counteract the “inherently compelling pressures” of custodial interrogation and to “permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination,” are implemented by the application of the Edwards corollary that if a suspect believes that he is not capable of undergoing such questioning without advice of counsel, then it is presumed that any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities’ behest, and not at the suspect’s own instiga

2002As the Court stated in Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988): Thus, the prophylactic protections that the Miranda warnings provide to counteract the “inherently compelling pressures” of custodial interrogation and to “permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination,” are implemented by the application of the Edwards corollary that if a suspect believes that he is not capable of undergoing such questioning without advice of counsel, then it is presumed that any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities’ behest, and not at the suspect’s own instiga

2024But Murphy’s principles apply equally in a custodial setting as long as Miranda warnings have been properly administered and the government does not expressly or implicitly threaten to revoke probation to deter the defendant from asserting his privilege against self-incrimination. “[T]he primary protection afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves. ‘[F]ull comprehension of the rights to remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process.’” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452,

2024But Murphy’s principles apply equally in a custodial setting as long as Miranda warnings have been properly administered and the government does not expressly or implicitly threaten to revoke probation to deter the defendant from asserting his privilege against self-incrimination. “[T]he primary protection afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves. ‘[F]ull comprehension of the rights to remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process.’” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452,

2026In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits “the use for impeachment purposes of [defendant’s] silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings.” Id. at 619 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966)); accord Caprino v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 181, 185 (2008).

2026In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits “the use for impeachment purposes of [defendant’s] silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings.” Id. at 619 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966)); accord Caprino v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 181, 185 (2008).

2025As in other contexts, courts must consider “all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.” Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322 . “[N]o single factor alone may necessarily establish custody for Miranda purposes, and not all factors may be relevant in a given case.” Wass v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 27, 33 (1987). 6 See, e.g., Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 (“[P]olice officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question.

2007Nevertheless, “[q]uestioning in a ‘coercive environment’ alone is insufficient to trigger the need for Miranda warnings.” Wass, 5 Va. App. at 32 , 359 S.E.2d at 840 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).