standing requirement in Illinois

2026The doctrine of standing “assures that issues are raised only by those parties with a real interest in the outcome of the controversy.” Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 221 (1999).

2026For the following reasons, we find that respondent forfeited review of this contention of error. ¶ 22 The doctrine of standing “ ‘is designed to preclude persons who have no interest in a controversy from bringing suit,’ and ‘assures that issues are raised only by those parties with a real interest in the outcome of the controversy.’ ” Nationwide Advantage Mortgage Co. v. Ortiz, 2012 IL App (1st) 112755, ¶ 24 (quoting Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 221 (1999)).

2013See Peterson, 112 Ill. 2d at 53 -54 (citing Menconi with approval and explaining that standing should not turn on mere physical possession, because “[t]o hold differently would be to encourage abductions of minors in order to satisfy the literal terms of the standing requirement and would, in reality, defeat the statutory intendment”).

2006This court interpreted the similar provision of section 601(b)(2) as a standing requirement for nonparents ( Peterson, 112 Ill.2d at 52 , 96 Ill.Dec. 690 , 491 N.E.2d 1150 ), but later clarified that, when used in this sense, "standing" simply referred to a threshold statutory requirement that had to be met before the court could proceed to a decision on the merits (see A.W.J., 197 Ill.2d at 496-97, 259 Ill.

2015Rather, it merely refers to a threshold issue that must be determined before the court may proceed to a ‘best interests’ determination.” Id. at 435 n.2; see In re A.W.J., 197 Ill. 2d 492 , 496-97 (2001). ¶ 35 The standing requirement of section 601(b)(2) of the Marriage Act safeguards the superior right of parents to the care and custody of their children.

2014“The standing requirement of section 601(b)(2) of the [Dissolution] Act is designed to ‘ensure [ ] that the superior right of natural parents to the care and custody of their children is safeguarded.’ [Citation].” In re A.W.J., 197 Ill. 2d 492 , 497 (2001).

2006The court later determined, however, that it was bound by a line of appellate court cases, beginning with In re Person & Estate of Newsome, 173 Ill.App.3d 376 , 123 Ill.Dec. 61 , 527 N.E.2d 524 (1988), which held that the standing requirement for nonparents who petition for custody under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq.

2006The court later determined, however, that it was bound by a line of appellate court cases, beginning with In re Person & Estate of Newsome, 173 Ill.App.3d 376 , 123 Ill.Dec. 61 , 527 N.E.2d 524 (1988), which held that the standing requirement for nonparents who petition for custody under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq.

2014The doctrine of standing "ensure[s] that courts are deciding actual, specific controversies, and not abstract questions or moot issues." In re Marriage of Rodriguez, 131 Ill. 2d 273, 279-80 (1989).

2014The doctrine of standing “ensure[s] that courts are deciding actual, specific controversies, and not abstract questions or moot issues.” In re Marriage of Rodriguez, 131 Ill. 2d 273, 279-80 (1989).

2025Like the allied doctrines of “mootness, ripeness, and justiciability, the standing doctrine is one of the devices by which courts attempt to cull their dockets so as to preserve for consideration only those disputes which are truly adversarial and capable of resolution by judicial decision.” Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, -5- 122 Ill. 2d 462, 488 (1988).

2025The standing requirement exists “to preclude persons who have no interest in a controversy from bringing suit.” Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 221 (1999). ¶ 18 In Illinois, standing “requires only some injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest. [Citation.] More precisely, the claimed injury, whether ‘actual or threatened’ [citation], must be: (1) ‘distinct and palpable’ [citation]; (2) ‘fairly traceable’ to the defendant’s actions [citation]; and (3) substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of the requested relief [citations].” Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 492

2015Rather, it merely refers to a threshold issue that must be determined before the court may proceed to a ‘best interests’ determination.” Id. at 435 n.2; see In re A.W.J., 197 Ill. 2d 492 , 496-97 (2001). ¶ 35 The standing requirement of section 601(b)(2) of the Marriage Act safeguards the superior right of parents to the care and custody of their children.

2012Mancine, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138, ¶ 17 ; see also R.L.S., 218 Ill. 2d at 436 (holding that section 11-5(b) of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/11-5(b) (West 2004)) imposes a standing requirement that nonparents must meet before proceeding on the merits of a petition for guardianship). ¶ 19 Under section 2-615, a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action because of factual or legal insufficiency.

1994(Peterson, 112 Ill.2d at 52 , 96 Ill.Dec. 690 , 491 N.E.2d 1150 ; see In re Estate of Barnhart (1992), 232 Ill.App.3d 317, 321 , 174 Ill.Dec. 26 , 597 N.E.2d 1238 (standing requirements apply to Illinois Probate Act).) The purpose of the standing requirement is to preserve the presumed superior rights of natural parents to the custody of their children, although that right is not absolute and does not require a rigid and unthinking construction of section 601(b)(2).

1994App. 3d 317, 321 , 597 N.E.2d 1238 (standing requirements apply to Illinois Probate Act).) The purpose of the standing requirement is to preserve the presumed superior rights of natural parents to the custody of their children, although that right is not absolute and does not require a rigid and unthinking construction of section 601(b)(2).

2024Hartigan v. E & E Hauling, Inc., 153 Ill. 2d 473, 482 (1992).

2020Hartigan v. E&E Hauling, Inc., 153 Ill. 2d 473, 482 (1992).

2023Defendants have implicitly recognized that plaintiffs are, in fact, asking the court to decide an “actual controversy,” one of great public import, and are not merely asking the court to answer “abstract questions.” See Lebron, 237 Ill. 2d at 252 (the standing doctrine seeks to ensure that courts decide actual controversies and not abstract questions); Kluk v. Lang, 125 Ill. 2d 306, 315 (1988) (“[Standing] is not meant to preclude a valid controversy from being litigated.”).

2023See Lebron, 237 Ill. 2d at 252-53 (a lack of standing is an affirmative defense, which the defendant forfeits if he does not timely plead it); see also Ill.

2001The standing requirement of section 601(b)(2) of the Act is designed to "ensure[ ] that the superior right of natural parents to the care and custody of their children is safeguarded." In re Petition of Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 491 , 208 Ill.Dec. 268 , 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995).

2001The standing requirement of section 601(b)(2) of the Act is designed to "ensure[ ] that the superior right of natural parents to the care and custody of their children is safeguarded." In re Petition of Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 491 , 208 Ill.Dec. 268 , 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995).

2026For the following reasons, we find that respondent forfeited review of this contention of error. ¶ 22 The doctrine of standing “ ‘is designed to preclude persons who have no interest in a controversy from bringing suit,’ and ‘assures that issues are raised only by those parties with a real interest in the outcome of the controversy.’ ” Nationwide Advantage Mortgage Co. v. Ortiz, 2012 IL App (1st) 112755, ¶ 24 (quoting Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 221 (1999)).

2025The doctrine of standing “ ‘is designed to preclude persons who have no interest in a controversy from bringing suit,’ and ‘assures that issues are raised only by those parties with a real interest in the outcome of the controversy.’ ” Nationwide Advantage Mortgage Co. v. Ortiz, 2012 IL App (1st) 112755, ¶ 24 (quoting Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 221 (1999)).

2022Messenger v. Edgar, 157 Ill. 2d 162, 170 (1993).

1999Messenger v. Edgar, 157 Ill. 2d 162, 170 , 623 N.E.2d 310, 314 (1993).

2021Morr-Fitz, Inc., 231 Ill. 2d at 489 ; Flynn v. Ryan, 199 Ill. 2d 430, 436 (2002).

2007There must be [(!)] an ‘actual controversy’ between adverse parties, and [(2)] the party seeking the declaratory judgment must be ‘interested’ in the controversy.” Flynn v. Ryan, 199 Ill. 2d 430, 436 , 771 N.E.2d 414, 418 (2002).

2026A plaintiff - 18 - bringing a declaratory judgment action must “possess[ ] some personal claim, status, or right, a distinct and palpable injury to which is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct and substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of such relief.” Kluk, 125 Ill. 2d at 314 . “[T]he purpose of the standing requirement is to assure sufficient sharpness in defining the issues so that the court may be aided in deciding the case; it is meant to preclude uninterested persons from suing but is not meant to preclude a valid controversy from being litigated ***.” Id.

2026A plaintiff - 18 - bringing a declaratory judgment action must “possess[ ] some personal claim, status, or right, a distinct and palpable injury to which is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct and substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of such relief.” Kluk, 125 Ill. 2d at 314 . “[T]he purpose of the standing requirement is to assure sufficient sharpness in defining the issues so that the court may be aided in deciding the case; it is meant to preclude uninterested persons from suing but is not meant to preclude a valid controversy from being litigated ***.” Id.

2024The purpose of the standing doctrine “is to ensure that courts are deciding actual, specific controversies and not abstract questions or moot issues” (In re Estate of Wellman, 174 Ill. 2d 335, 344 (1996)) and “to preclude persons who have no interest in a controversy from bringing suit” (Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 221 (1999)).

2012Estate of Wellman, 174 Ill.2d at 344 , 220 Ill.Dec. 360 , 673 N.E.2d 272 .

2019Standing ¶ 35 Defendant claims that, without an injury beyond the statutory violation, plaintiff lacks standing to pursue a claim under the Act. ¶ 36 “The purpose of the standing doctrine is to ensure that courts are deciding actual, specific controversies and not abstract ones.” Maschek v. City of Chicago, 2015 IL App (1st) 150520, ¶ 84 (citing In re M.I., 2013 IL 113776, ¶ 32 ).

2018Standing ¶ 35 Defendant claims that, without an injury beyond the statutory violation, plaintiff lacks standing to pursue a claim under the Act. ¶ 36 "The purpose of the standing doctrine is to ensure that courts are deciding actual, specific controversies and not abstract ones." Maschek v. City of Chicago , 2015 IL App (1st) 150520 , ¶ 84, 399 Ill.Dec. 524 , 46 N.E.3d 843 (citing In re M.I. , 2013 IL 113776 , ¶ 32, 370 Ill.Dec. 785 , 989 N.E.2d 173 ).

2006The court later determined, however, that it was bound by a line of appellate court cases, beginning with In re Person & Estate of Newsome, 173 Ill.App.3d 376 , 123 Ill.Dec. 61 , 527 N.E.2d 524 (1988), which held that the standing requirement for nonparents who petition for custody under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq.

2004Finally, the Newsome court concluded that "[b]ecause of the statutory adoption of the superior right doctrine into the Probate Act * * * the standing requirement of the Marriage Act applies equally to the guardianship proceedings of the Probate Act." Newsome, 173 Ill.App.3d at 379, 123 Ill.Dec. 61 , 527 N.E.2d at 525.

2020Such a rule is in line with the doctrine of standing, which “is designed to insure that the courts are accessible to resolve actual controversies between parties and not address abstract questions, moot issues, or cases brought on behalf of others who may not desire judicial aid.” Village of Lake in the Hills v. Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc., 143 Ill.

1999The doctrine of standing "makes it necessary for a party seeking such relief to allege an injury in fact to some substantive interest he possesses which is recognized by statute or common law." Village of Lake in the Hills v. Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc., 143 Ill.

1994Before nonparents are allowed to petition for custody of a child under the Dissolution Act, they must satisfy a standing requirement — i.e., that the child is not in the physical custody of one of his parents. (750 ILCS 5/601(b) (West 1992); In re Custody of Peterson (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 48, 52-53 , 491 N.E.2d 1150, 1152 ; In re Custody of McCuan (1988), 176 Ill.

1993App. 3d 421, 425 , 531 N.E.2d 102 .) Together with the doctrines of mootness, ripeness, and justiciability, the standing doctrine is one of the devices by which courts cull their dockets to preserve for consideration only those disputes which are truly adversarial and capable of resolution by judicial decision.