standing doctrine in Vermont

2026“Standing doctrine is fundamentally rooted in respect for the separation of powers of the independent branches of government.” Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Co. v. State, 166 Vt. 337, 341 (1997) (noting at 340–41 that “[o]ne of the ‘passive virtues’ of the standing doctrine is to promote judicial restraint by limiting the occasions for judicial intervention into the political process”).

2026“Standing doctrine is fundamentally rooted in respect for the separation of powers of the independent branches of government.” Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Co. v. State, 166 Vt. 337, 341 (1997) (noting at 340–41 that “[o]ne of the ‘passive virtues’ of the standing doctrine is to promote judicial restraint by limiting the occasions for judicial intervention into the political process”).

2026To satisfy this initial burden, a plaintiff must demonstrate that there is “an actual controversy between the parties.” “Otherwise, the judgment would be no more than an advisory opinion, which we lack the constitutional power to render.” The existence of an actual controversy “turns on whether the plaintiff is suffering the threat of actual injury to a protected legal interest, or is merely speculating about the impact of some generalized grievance.” 219 Vt. 80 , 85–86 (2024) (internal citations omitted); see also Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 76-77 (1998) (discussing Vermont’s adopti

2026Parker, 169 Vt. at 77– 78 (explaining that in Hinesburg Sand & Gravel, the Vermont Supreme Court adopted the standing test articulated in Lujan).

2024A series of prior decisions and entry orders in this case had deferred this inquiry to merits, and so, under the rules of the standing doctrine, plaintiff needed to establish this element through “evidence adduced at trial.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quotation omitted).

2019The State argues that all plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the ban on large capacity magazines because each has failed to allege a sufficient “injury in fact.” See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 , 560–61 (1992) (describing the constitutional elements of standing); Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74 , 77–78 (1998) (explaining that in Hinesburg Sand & Gravel, the Vermont Supreme Court adopted the standing test articulated in Lujan); Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Co. v. State, 166 Vt. 337 , 340–41 (1997); see also 5B Wright & Miller et al., Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 3d §

2015See Bischoff v. Bletz, 2008 VT 16, ¶ 21 , 183 Vt. 235 (“Any other conclusion would contravene one of the fundamental principles underlying the standing requirement, which is a ‘general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights.’”) (quoting Hinesburg Sand and Gravel Co. v. State, 166 Vt. 337, 341 (1997)).

2015See Bischoff v. Bletz, 2008 VT 16, ¶ 21 , 183 Vt. 235 (“Any other conclusion would contravene one of the fundamental principles underlying the standing requirement, which is a ‘general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights.’”) (quoting Hinesburg Sand and Gravel Co. v. State, 166 Vt. 337, 341 (1997)).

2023See Wool, 2020 VT 44, ¶ 12 (explaining that denying constitutional standing based on whether plaintiff has right asserted “would be to resolve the matter on the merits and make the standing doctrine redundant”). 4 which we review with no deference to the trial court.” Taylor v. Town of Cabot, 2017 VT 92, ¶ 9 , 205 Vt. 586 , 178 A.3d 313 . ¶ 11.

2020Reg., 2020 VT 44 , q 11 (“The purpose of the standing doctrine is not to weed out unmeritorious claims; it is to determine whether the ‘plaintiff's stake in the outcome of the controversy is sufficient “to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”’”).

2026To satisfy this initial burden, a plaintiff must demonstrate that there is “an actual controversy between the parties.” “Otherwise, the judgment would be no more than an advisory opinion, which we lack the constitutional power to render.” The existence of an actual controversy “turns on whether the plaintiff is suffering the threat of actual injury to a protected legal interest, or is merely speculating about the impact of some generalized grievance.” 219 Vt. 80 , 85–86 (2024) (internal citations omitted); see also Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 76-77 (1998) (discussing Vermont’s adopti

2023Vermont courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction is limited to “actual cases or controversies.” Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 76-77 , 726 A.2d 477, 480 (1998); see also In re Constitutionality of House Bill 88, 115 Vt. 524, 529 , 64 A.2d 169, 172 (1949) (adopting federal case-or-controversy requirement as part of separation-of-powers doctrine in Vermont Constitution and declining to issue advisory opinions).

2021See In re J.L., 2007 VT 32, ¶ 6 , 181 Vt. 615 , 928 A.2d 474 (“[W]e may affirm a decision of a trial court on any legal basis supported by the record, even if it was not the theory relied on by the trial court.”) 4 that applies a similar standing test.

2021See In re J.L., 2007 VT 32, ¶ 6 , 181 Vt. 615 , 928 A.2d 474 (“[W]e may affirm a decision of a trial court on any legal basis supported by the record, even if it was not the theory relied on by the trial court.”) 4 that applies a similar standing test.

2021See In re J.L., 2007 VT 32, ¶ 6 , 181 Vt. 615 , 928 A.2d 474 (“[W]e may affirm a decision of a trial court on any legal basis supported by the record, even if it was not the theory relied on by the trial court.”) 4 that applies a similar standing test.

2021See In re J.L., 2007 VT 32, ¶ 6 , 181 Vt. 615 , 928 A.2d 474 (mem.) (“[W]e may affirm a decision of a trial court on any legal basis supported by the record, even if it was not the theory relied on by the trial court.”) 4 test, we consider our own case law and also look for guidance to decisions from our sister state that applies a similar standing test.

2001Richards v. Town of Norwich, 169 Vt. 44, 49 , 726 A.2d 81, 85 (1999); see generally Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 77 , 726 A.2d 477, 480 (1998).

2001Richards v. Town of Norwich, 169 Vt. 44, 49 , 726 A.2d 81, 85 (1999); see generally Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 77 , 726 A.2d 477, 480 (1998).

2016U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Kimball, 2011 VT 81, ¶ 12 , 190 Vt. 210 . “[Vermont courts] have the same standing requirement as the federal courts in that our jurisdiction is limited to ‘actual cases or controversies.’” Id.

2016See Kimball, 2011 VT 81 , ¶ 12 (“We have the same standing requirement as the federal courts ... a party who is not injured has no standing to bring a suit.”).

2024Vermont courts are not, however, inflexibly bound by federal standing precedents insofar as standing in our courts presents a legal question under the Vermont, rather than United States, constitution.3 See Ferry v. City of Montpelier, 2023 VT 4, ¶ 15 (2023).

2024Ferry v. City of Montpelier, 2023 VT 4 , ¶¶ 10–16, 217 Vt. 450 .

2010“The prudential elements of standing include the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule against adjudication of generalized grievances, and ‘the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.’” Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Co., 166 Vt. at 341 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)); see also Bischoff, 2008 VT 16, ¶ 21 (“[O]ne of the fundamental principles underlying the standing requirement . . . is a ‘general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights.’” (quotin

1997Allen, 468 U.S. at 752 .

2023See Wool, 2020 VT 44, ¶ 12 (explaining that denying constitutional standing based on whether plaintiff has right asserted “would be to resolve the matter on the merits and make the standing doctrine redundant”). 4 which we review with no deference to the trial court.” Taylor v. Town of Cabot, 2017 VT 92, ¶ 9 , 205 Vt. 586 , 178 A.3d 313 . ¶ 11.

2023See Wool, 2020 VT 44, ¶ 12 (explaining that denying constitutional standing based on whether plaintiff has right asserted “would be to resolve the matter on the merits and make the standing doctrine redundant”). 4 which we review with no deference to the trial court.” Taylor v. Town of Cabot, 2017 VT 92, ¶ 9 , 205 Vt. 586 , 178 A.3d 313 . ¶ 11.

2020The purpose of the standing doctrine is not to weed out unmeritorious claims; it is to determine whether the “plaintiff’s stake in the outcome of the controversy is sufficient ‘to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.’ ” Turner v. Shumlin, 2017 VT 2, ¶ 10 , 204 Vt. 78 , 163 A.3d 1173 (per curiam) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).2 ¶ 12.

2015See Dernier v. Mortgage Network Inc., 2013 VT 96, ¶ 49 , 195 Vt. 113 (citing Culhane, 708 F.3d at 91 ).

2015See Dernier v. Mortgage Network Inc., 2013 VT 96, ¶ 49 , 195 Vt. 113 (citing Culhane, 708 F.3d at 91 ).

2015See also Shipley v Unifund CCR Partners, 331 S.W. 3d 27 (Tex. App-Waco, 2010)(Plaintiff did not have a justiciable interest in a Citibank debt where assignments from other Unifund entitites purported to reserve ownership while assigning only the right to collection); Fritz v. Resurgent Capital Services, 955 f.Supp.2d 163 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).

2015See Dernier v. Mortgage Network Inc., 2013 VT 96, ¶ 49 , 195 Vt. 113 (citing Culhane, 708 F.3d at 91 ).

2008See Hams, 20 F.3d at 1121 (stating that the “central purpose of the standing requirement [is] to ensure that the parties before the court have a concrete interest in the outcome of the proceedings such that they can be expected to frame the issues properly”). ¶ 22.

2008Any other conclusion would contravene one of the fundamental principles underlying the standing requirement, which is a “general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights.” Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Co. v. State, 166 Vt. 337, 341 , 693 A.2d 1045, 1048 (1997); see also Palmer, 2006 MT 29, ¶ 14 (explaining that “[ajllowing strangers to a contract to compel strict compliance with contractual provisions despite the parties’ mutual satisfaction with imperfect performance would . . . undermine the transactional efficiency that contracts promote”).

2008See Town of Charlotte, 158 Vt. at 357-58 , 609 A.2d at 640 (subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time).

2008See Town of Charlotte, 158 Vt. at 357-58 , 609 A.2d at 640 (subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time).