72 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1974–2024 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sosa v. SAFEWAY PREMIUM FINANCE CO.green2 sentences2024“A trial court’s decision as to whether a party has satisfied the standing requirement is reviewed de novo.” Id. 2024“To satisfy the standing requirement for a class action claim, the class representative must illustrate that a case or controversy exists between him or her and the defendant, and that this case or controversy will continue throughout the 5 existence of the litigation.” Id. | 12 | 15 |
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Morcomgreen2 sentences2018See, e.g., Morcom, 125 So. 3d at 322 (noting: “Appellees cite Florida Supreme Court precedent dating back to the late 1800s to suggest Appellant must both hold and own the note and mortgage to satisfy the standing requirement for a foreclosure action. 2018See, e.g., Morcom, 125 So. 3d at 322 (noting: “Appellees cite Florida Supreme Court precedent dating back to the late 1800s to suggest Appellant must both hold and own the note and mortgage to satisfy the standing requirement for a foreclosure action. | 4 | 4 |
Gorel v. Bank of New York Mellongreen2 sentences2018Mellon, 165 So. 3d 44, 46 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (quoting Sosa v. Safeway Premium Fin. 2015“A trial court’s decision as to whether a party has satisfied the standing requirement is reviewed de novo.” Gorel v. Bank of New York Mellon, 165 So.3d 44, 46 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (quoting Sosa v. Safeway Premium Fin. | 2 | 2 |
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robinsgreen2 sentences2023LEGAL ANALYSIS We affirm in all respects based on the standing analysis in Southam v. Red Wing Shoe Co., Inc., 343 So. 3d 106 , 113 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022), review denied, SC22-1052, 2022 WL 16848677 (Fla. Nov. 10, 2022) (finding the appellant lacked standing to pursue his federal FACTA claim as he did not demonstrate an injury in fact “since appellant kept the credit card receipt and there is no danger that the credit card number could result in any concrete injury to appellant”); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016) (holding that “a bare procedural violation, divorced from a 2023Because this amounts to nothing more than a ‘bare procedural violation, divorced from 4 any concrete harm,’ [Appellant] has failed to allege that he has standing to bring this lawsuit.” (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341 )). | 1 | 2 |
Agrico Chem. Co. v. DEPARTMENT, ETC.green2 sentences1986This court, adopting the principles expressed in the Second District's opinion in Agrico Chemical Co. v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 406 So.2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), has said that a petitioner enjoys standing to seek a section 120.57 hearing (1) if confronted with injury in fact of sufficient immediacy and (2) the injury is of the type or nature that the particular proceeding is designed to protect. 1984See, for example, Agrico Chemical Company v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 406 So.2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); City of Panama City v. Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund, 418 So.2d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). | 1 | 2 |
State v. JPgreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1113 (“Because the Second District never determined whether these juveniles have standing to assert the constitutional rights of their parents, we decline to rule on these claims.” (footnote omitted)).21 Our inconsistent approach is especially evident in the context of third-party standing. | 1 | 1 |
Progressive Exp. v. McGRATH CHIROPRACTICgreen1 sentence2024See Progressive, 913 So. 2d at 1285 (“[T]he plaintiff’s lack of standing at the inception of the case is not a defect that may be cured by the acquisition of standing after the case is filed.”); Haratz v. Dental Team of Atlantis, LLC, 372 So. 3d 282 , 286 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) (distinguishing standing from failure to comply with a condition precedent to suit and noting that “a party’s lack of standing to bring an action is a defect that cannot be cured mid-suit”). | 1 | 1 |
Summers v. Earth Island Institutegreen1 sentence2023Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009); see ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (stating that “the constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts” even when addressing a federal statute). | 1 | 1 |
Asarco Inc. v. Kadishgreen1 sentence2023Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009); see ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (stating that “the constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts” even when addressing a federal statute). | 1 | 1 |
Department of Revenue v. Kuhnleingreen1 sentence2023Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d 885, 895 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Dep’t of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d 717, 720 (Fla.1994)), he need not allege or demonstrate an actual injury in order to have standing in a Florida state court. | 1 | 1 |
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanosgreen1 sentence2023Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d 885, 895 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Dep’t of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d 717, 720 (Fla.1994)), he need not allege or demonstrate an actual injury in order to have standing in a Florida state court. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Dept. of General Serv. v. Willisgreen1 sentence2023Had the Legislature wanted the Commission to address specific statutory factors in writing or face remand, it could have said so as it has in several other contexts. 18 Willis, 344 So. 2d 580, 590 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)). | 1 | 1 |
VIRGINIA GIUFFRE v. BRADLEY J. EDWARDSgreen1 sentence2022See Giuffre v. Edwards, 226 So. 3d 1034, 1039 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (quoting the “three minimal requirements for standing” and finding that the plaintiff did not meet the third requirement); DeSantis v. Fla. Educ. | 1 | 1 |
Renard v. Dade Countygreen1 sentence2022See Renard, 261 So. 2d at 834 . 14 I suggest the three-part standing test of J.P. applies: injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability. | 1 | 1 |
Fischer v. HSBC Bank United States, Nat'l Ass'ngreen1 sentence2019Loan Tr., Series 2006-AR1, 257 So. 3d 512, 515 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fosmiregreen1 sentence2019Second, the State argues the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to the State’s warrantless use of CSLI and the cell-site simulator. 2 i. Standing The State challenges the defendant’s standing for the first time on appeal. “[A]n argument regarding standing to contest the search and seizure of evidence has been subsumed into Fourth Amendment issues and may be raised for the first time on appeal.” State v. Fosmire, 135 So. 3d 1153, 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). | 1 | 1 |
Diana Jelic v. Bac Home Loans Servicing, LPgreen1 sentence2017See Jelic v. BAC Home Loans Servicing; LP, 178 So.3d 523, 525 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (citing Lamb v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 174 So.3d 1039, 1041 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)). 4 . | 1 | 1 |
| Craig D. Lamb v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Elsman v. HSBC BANK USAgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Paul v. Blakegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Greenberg v. MAHONEY ADAMS & CRISER, PAgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Winston v. Brogangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Foundation for the Developmentally Disabled, Inc. v. Step by Step Early Childhood Education & Therapy Center, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Fox v. Professional Wrecker Operators of Florida, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Olen Properties Corp. v. Mossgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gregory v. Indian River Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| St. Joe Paper Co. v. COMMUNITY AFFAIRSgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ybor III, Ltd. v. FLA. HOUSING FIN. CORP.green | 1 | 1 |
| City of Sunrise v. Broward Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. One-Sixth Share of Bulger in All Present & Future Proceeds of Mass Millions Lottery Ticket No. M246233green | 1 | 1 |
| Adoption of Dianegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sucogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Heggs v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Televisual Comm. v. St. Dept. of Laborgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cole Vision v. Dept. of Bus. and Prof.green | 1 | 1 |
| SOUTH END IMP. GROUP, INC. EX REL. BANK OF NY v. Mullikengreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Forfeiture of One 40' Fiberglass Boat, White in Color with Black Bottom, Florida Registration FLO346EM, Hull No. Per 40014M1Cgreen | 1 | 1 |
| All Risk Corp. of Florida v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Castaneda v. Partidagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
green
2 sentences2024For example, as noted above we adopted the three-part standing test established by the United States Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 , in J.P. 2022The United States Supreme Court in TransUnion recently reiterated its adherence to the three-part standing test, as cited in State v. J.P.: “[T]o establish standing, a plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2203 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 ). | 2 | 2022–2024 |
Miguel Tilus, Alta Tilus, Rose A. Joaseus and Kesner Joaseus v. AS Michai LLC
green
2 sentences2018The cases Appellees cite are not persuasive because the supreme court decided the cases prior to the adoption of the now-instructive and binding Florida UCC”); Tilus, 161 So. 3d at 1286 . 2018The cases Appellees cite are not persuasive because the supreme court decided the cases prior to the adoption of the now-instructive and binding Florida UCC”); Tilus, 161 So. 3d at 1286 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Munoz v. City of Coral Gables
green
2 sentences2004Id. at 1286-87 . 1998Id. at 1286-87 . | 2 | 1998–2004 |
Rakas v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1988NOTES [1] Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1122 , 99 S.Ct. 1035 , 59 L.Ed.2d 83 (1979), in which the United States Supreme Court subsumed the standing requirement under substantive fourth amendment doctrine in determining whether a defendant is entitled to claim the protections of the exclusionary rule. [2] In Jones, the Court held that defendants who are charged with crimes of possession were not required to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched or the property seized because they were entitled to a 1988NOTES [1] Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 , 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1122 , 99 S.Ct. 1035 , 59 L.Ed.2d 83 (1979), in which the United States Supreme Court subsumed the standing requirement under substantive fourth amendment doctrine in determining whether a defendant is entitled to claim the protections of the exclusionary rule. [2] In Jones, the Court held that defendants who are charged with crimes of possession were not required to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched or the property seized because they were entitled to a | 2 | 1988–2003 |
Hayes v. Guardianship of Thompson
green
1 sentence2024But a few years later in Johnson, we stated broadly that “standing ‘requires a would-be litigant to demonstrate that he or she reasonably expects to be affected by the outcome of the proceedings, either directly or indirectly.’ ” 78 So. 3d at 1314 (quoting Hayes, 952 So. 2d at 505 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Johnson v. State
green
1 sentence2024But a few years later in Johnson, we stated broadly that “standing ‘requires a would-be litigant to demonstrate that he or she reasonably expects to be affected by the outcome of the proceedings, either directly or indirectly.’ ” 78 So. 3d at 1314 (quoting Hayes, 952 So. 2d at 505 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez
green
1 sentence2022The United States Supreme Court in TransUnion recently reiterated its adherence to the three-part standing test, as cited in State v. J.P.: “[T]o establish standing, a plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2203 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Boucher v. Novotny
green
1 sentence2020In Boucher, the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed that “where municipal officials threaten or commit a violation of municipal ordinances which produces an injury to a particular citizen which is different in kind from the injury suffered by the people of the community as a whole[,] then such injured individual is entitled to injunctive relief in the absence of an adequate legal remedy.” 102 So. 2d at 134 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Allen v. State
green
1 sentence2020Detournay, 127 So. 3d at 877 . 3 These cases set forth the standing requirement for equitable zoning enforcement actions. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Collier v. State
green
1 sentence2020Our decision is controlled in part by PennyMac Corp. v. Frost, 214 So. 3d 686 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), which recognizes the existence of the standing defense which the purchaser sought to litigate. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A. v. Dennis M. Conley
green
1 sentence2019Id. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Chuck v. City of Homestead Police Dept. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Velez v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY POLICE DEPT.
green
1 sentence2017Velez v. Miami-Dade Police Dep’t., 934 So.2d 1162 (Fla. 2006); Chuck v. City of Homestead Police Dep’t, 888 So.2d 736 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Sapp v. State
green
1 sentence2017A foreclosure plaintiff satisfies the standing requirement when, at trial, it presents “competent, substantial evidence that it has standing to foreclose.” Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Taylor v. Cedar Key Special Water & Sewerage District neutral | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| City of Tampa v. Addison green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| School Bd. of Volusia County v. Clayton green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Kumar Corp. v. Nopal Lines, Ltd. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Dade County v. Baker green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Peace River/Manasota Regional Water Supply Authority v. IMC Phosphates Co. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Reily Enterprises, LLC v. Dept. of Environmental Protection green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Gray green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Broadrick v. Oklahoma green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Matter of Surface Water Mgmt. Permit green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Cochran v. Jones green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| NAACP, INC. v. Florida Bd. of Regents green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| NORTH FLA. REGIONAL HOSP., INC. v. Douglas green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Eisenstadt v. Baird green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Heggs v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Thomas v. State neutral | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Ward v. Board of Trustees green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Fla. Medical Ass'n v. Dept. of Prof. Regulation green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. KAW green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Florida Home Builders Ass'n v. Dept. of Labor green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Jacobs v. Alabama green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Florida Patient's Comp. Fund v. Von Stetina green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Lenier v. Schulstead green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| State, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Professional Firefighters of Florida, Inc. green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Jones v. United States red | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Aiello v. City of Wilmington, Del. green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.